December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Fiat Shamir Zero Knowledge Test
by trollins＠hns.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, Can someon point me to a net description of the "Fiat Shamir Zero Knowledge Test" used in the RCA DirecTV smart cards. Thanks in advance...

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Re: Poisson numbers for random keyspace assignment
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:49 AM 8/31/95, MONTY HARDER wrote: > [Great statistical summary deleted] Thanks. Two other people sent me e-mail saying the odds of a keyspace chunk being left uncovered are 1/e, so this part is pretty well known. (With an expectation of "1" of course, as I noted. Interestingly, this was the same formula we used at Intel to figure out chip yields: "What's the probability that a chip will have zero defects given that m defects are the "expected" number?") I wanted to explain the derivation in more detail than just saying 1/e, especially for the more interesting cases where the keyspace gets more coverage. (Where the m = expected value is more than 1.) >TC> * For opportunistic attacks on keys in challenges, the odds are 95% that a >TC> key will be found with only twice the total effort (or time) using a >TC> totally random method of picking up keyspace to search. > > The odds can be improved somewhat by scaling the granularity of the >sweep to the size of the sweep. (Align larger chunks on large-chunk >boundaries, eliminating the chance of overlap with other large chunks.) Indeed, this is an effect to consider. That is, each searcher is (presumably) not overlapping, so the results I reported are sort of a bound on the actual numbers. At one end, with lots of searchers doing very small fractions of the total, the results are pure Poisson. At the other end, with a searcher covering most or all of the keyspace, then of course the results are those of nonrandom search. Practically speaking, with dozens or hundreds of searchers, the Poisson results produce accurate enough estimates. > The best advantage of the random method is that it allows people to >participate completely anonymously, as there is nothing to report save >the Eureka!, and that can be done through a remailer anyway. When the >challenge is solved, everyone can stop cracking. A very good point! Anonymous cracking has many advantages. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Crypto '95
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anything really fun revealed at Crypto? Anything fun at the rump session? .pm

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PKIX Part 3 REQUIRES SUPPORT OF KEY RECOVERY?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: blacklodge.c2.net: majordom set sender to owner-cryptography(a)c2.org using -f X-PGP-Key: <http://www1.shore.net/~sable/info/rltkey.htm> X-Sender: rodney(a)pop3.pn.com Date: Fri, 15 Aug 1997 07:39:04 -0400 To: cryptography(a)c2.net From: Rodney Thayer <rodney(a)sabletech.com> Subject: PKIX Part 3 REQUIRES SUPPORT OF KEY RECOVERY? Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-cryptography(a)c2.net (This is a note I posted on the PKIX (Public Key Infrastructure) mailing list. I would be interested in comments on this document -- the draft is <ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-ipki3cmp-02.txt> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >It seems to me that PKIX Part 3, section 2.2.2.1 "Centralised scheme" >requires that a conformant implementation support the capability of >generating the private key at the CA. This means that a conformant >implementation essentially is required to implement key recovery. > >I do not think that this conforms to IETF practice and I certainly do >not want to require CA implementations to support this capability. >If for some reason someone wants to implement this I can see it being >an optional feature but I do not think it is an acceptable mandatory >requirement. > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 >Charset: noconv > >iQCVAwUBM/Ph38KmlvJNktGxAQGM4AP6AxwWoXMuNo13f2tHxAb85eo4eCHSfE0D >OVvEqv3LrYyctkKULPkDb3IQKwEVkrba5EEVvFytyblgROh12eftgIfndqQWQyca >LLiUXZemSS59lD+gI0TFaqayOvAGJenN3SdxJDaQ6eiY04vjoxrLZ9/aX3/lnzYC >efAB14L23Eg= >=3M+q >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Re: Mixmaster Security Issues
by hodges＠CNMAT.CNMAT.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lance Cottrell writes: >Because of the message size limitations there are some advantages to >sending the mixmaster chain through some type 1 remailers first, rather >than sending a type 1 message in a Mixmaster packet. Are there any gateways that will take a (pgp-encrypted) type 1 message, with presumably some kind of headers giving onward routing information and put it into the type 2 network? Should there be such a service? I think this was discussed earlier, but Lance's statement above seems to reopen the discussion. >It is very difficult to know what fraction of the traffic I see is cover. I >generate some cover traffic my self, and I know some others do as well. >Right now a reordering pool of 5 messages results in a latency of about 30 >min. Mixmaster is no longer a small fraction of the remailer market. A >majority of all public remailers support Mixmaster. What is the total daily volume of mixmaster traffic for all the advertised mixmasters? Has anyone measure this statistic? Regards, Richard Hodges

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No charges for Ruby Ridge murderers
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WASHINGTON (AP) - The Justice Department today closed its investigation into whether the FBI's former deputy director tried to obstruct an inquiry into the deadly 1992 seige at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, saying it lacked evidence to bring criminal charges, governent officials said. The Justice Department decided not to bring charges against former FBI Deputy Director Larry Potts or Danny Coulson, Potts' deputy during the 1992 seige at the remote cabin of white supremacist Randy Weaver, said government officials who spoke on condition of anonymity. The Justice Department informed lawmakers and lawyers for the FBI agents that its review did not warrant any further criminal charges, but it left open the possibility of disciplinary action. The department said in a statement obtained by The Associated Press, "The available evidence does not support further criminal prosecution of FBI officials ... from the August 1992 incident at Ruby Ridge."

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Re: Mixmaster Security Issues
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:38 PM 8/31/95, Richard Hodges wrote: >Lance Cottrell writes: > >>Because of the message size limitations there are some advantages to >>sending the mixmaster chain through some type 1 remailers first, rather >>than sending a type 1 message in a Mixmaster packet. > >Are there any gateways that will take a (pgp-encrypted) type 1 message, >with presumably some kind of headers giving onward routing information and >put it into the type 2 network? > >Should there be such a service? I think this was discussed earlier, but >Lance's statement above seems to reopen the discussion. > > >>It is very difficult to know what fraction of the traffic I see is cover. I >>generate some cover traffic my self, and I know some others do as well. >>Right now a reordering pool of 5 messages results in a latency of about 30 >>min. Mixmaster is no longer a small fraction of the remailer market. A >>majority of all public remailers support Mixmaster. > >What is the total daily volume of mixmaster traffic for all the advertised >mixmasters? Has anyone measure this statistic? > >Regards, >Richard Hodges You don't need anything this fancy. Just have Mixmaster dump the message to a file rather than sending it (-o option). Then make that the message you send through the type 1 chain, and make the first Mixmaster remailer the final destination of the type 1 chain. -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Reducing Crypto-Anonymous Crime by 50%
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike wrote: > Alice wants to receive e$1 from Bob. She creates a random number, blinds > it, and gives the blinded number to Bob. He shows the number to the > Mint, asking for a withdrawal of e$1 with a signature on this coin > number. Bob gives the signed and still blinded coin to Alice. She > unblinds it and spends it, end of story. It seems to me that many of the government's fascist goals for stopping strong crypto and anonymous financial transactions could be realized merely by whacking out Alice and Bob. An analysis of the cypherpunks list archives shows that most of the undesirable activities being perpetrated in the crypto-anonymity arena are the result of a conspiracy between Alice, Bob, and their shady friends. Anybody know their last names? A Concerned Cititzen

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Graphics
by mastergraphics714＠usa.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<HTML><PRE><BODY BGCOLOR="#000000"><FONT COLOR="#00FFFF" SIZE=3> Hello, I design unique web graphics and web pages here in cyberspace. http://www.laughingbird.com I'd like to help you redesign your webpages by adding professional images. My prices are all flat rates. I don't believe in "hourly" charges. I also have some free software on my site for you to download. Made both for the Macintosh and Windows machines. There's a cartoon blackjack game... and a recipe program with 215 recipes called "The Laughingbird Restaurant" with colorful cartoon graphics. Both free, no strings attached. It's just my way of saying "thanks for checking me out". If you're interested in having some nice, totally customized, graphics... animations... logos or Icons, please keep me in mind. Thanks for listening. Marc Sylvester http://www.laughingbird.com </FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=3>

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Fascism at Work
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:30 PM 8/15/97 +0200, you wrote: > WASHINGTON (AP) - The Justice Department today closed its >investigation into whether the FBI's former deputy director tried to >obstruct an inquiry into the deadly 1992 seige at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, >saying it lacked evidence to bring criminal charges, governent officials >said. The bodies of Weaver's son and wife should be evidence enough! This is the same verdict as the Texas Border murders, some dick federal agent blows away some innocent civilian, and gets off the hook. > The Justice Department decided not to bring charges against former >FBI Deputy Director Larry Potts or Danny Coulson, Potts' deputy during the >1992 seige at the remote cabin of white supremacist Randy Weaver, said >government officials who spoke on condition of anonymity. To those who say government workers aren't above the law: You're wrong. Damn wrong. Almost any of these pricks can kill your children and/or wife, and get away with it. If anyone bumps these assholes off, I'm gonna applaud. >The Justice Department informed lawmakers and lawyers for the FBI agents >that its review did not warrant any further criminal charges, but it left >open the possibility of disciplinary action. The only appropriate action is death to the murdering bastards who shot his wife and kid. Kill the murdering sons of bitches! > The department said in a statement obtained by The Associated >Press, "The available evidence does not support further criminal >prosecution of FBI officials ... from the August 1992 incident at Ruby >Ridge." Dead bodies don't just *happen*, someone makes them dead, in this case, the FBI schills who blew away innocents. That makes them guilty as sin, and for that, they should die slowly, and painfully. Someone, please, put some bullet holes in FBI Agents if they ever come to your house. Someone needs to teach these bastards a lesson. It seems that everything like this happens because some agency fucks something up. Waco happened because the BATF ran in like dumbasses and fucked everything up. At Ruby Ridge, some FBI dick screws up, killing Mr. Weaver's child and wife. At the Texas B! order, they blew away a kid with a .22 rifle, while on "Drug Patrol". What's should be done about these incidents? Kil those who participated, and make sure to shoot to kill if some agents from a TLA come to YOUR house. And they wonder why McVeigh said "Enough!" EnoughMonger "There's somthing wrong when innocent people die because of fascist use of military forces."

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