December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ANNOUNCE: bruteRC4, 40 bits all swept
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well we have demonstrated that 40 bit RC4 can be brute forced in around a weeks compute time. (We've also learned a list of thinks to fix for the next attempt as no key was forthcoming :-|, details on why not and what is being fixed to ensure this doesn't happen with a future RC4-40 or with the coming 40+88 SSL brute forceing are given below) The problems are logistic, human error, etc, from a compute time point of view it *really* was a full sweep of a 40 bit keyspace. And on average you would expect to sweep in half this time. The bulk of the work was done in under one weeks compute time, but problems with people forgetting to acknowledge what they swept, meant that 3 or 4 people swept the remaining key space over, which slowed down this announce. Here's the hall of fame, for bits/percentage swept per identifiable contributer (this is tallied by acknowledgement, if you swept but did not acknoweldge quickly enough or at all, that work won't show as the last keyspace was re-swept to hurry things up. The first acknowledgement to be recieved counts, the rest get ignored). bits/40 percent contributer ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 37.2 bits (14.063%) Jon Shekter <jshekter(a)alias.com> 36.4 bits (8.081%) Alvin Brattli <alvin(a)phys.uit.no> 36.1 bits (6.909%) anonymous 36.1 bits (6.836%) Dan Bailey <merzbow(a)ibm.net> 36.1 bits (6.812%) Piete Brooks <Piete.Brooks(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> 35.6 bits (4.688%) Loren Rittle <rittle(a)comm.mot.com> 35.6 bits (4.663%) Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> 35.4 bits (4.102%) Eric Young <eay(a)mincom.oz.au> 35.4 bits (4.004%) Fred <admin(a)dcwill.com> 35.3 bits (3.809%) Martin Hamilton <martin(a)mrrl.lut.ac.uk> 35.2 bits (3.711%) Kevin Wang <kwang(a)blackbox.punk.net> 35.0 bits (3.125%) Richard Martin <rmartin(a)alias.com> 34.7 bits (2.490%) Dan Oelke <droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com> 34.3 bits (1.978%) Branko Lankester 34.0 bits (1.611%) Simon McAuliffe <sai(a)comp.vuw.ac.nz> 34.0 bits (1.562%) Mike Gebis <m-gebis(a)uiuc.edu> 33.8 bits (1.392%) Pat Finerty <zinc(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> 33.8 bits (1.367%) <hodgeman(a)csd.uwm.edu> 33.5 bits (1.123%) Panu Rissanen <Panu.Rissanen(a)lut.fi> 33.4 bits (1.001%) Paul Bell <pjb(a)23kgroup.com> 33.3 bits (0.977%) Matt Thomlinson <phantom(a)u.washington.edu> 33.3 bits (0.952%) Will Kinney <kinney(a)colorado.edu> 33.2 bits (0.903%) T J Hardin <hardin(a)cyberspace.com> 33.2 bits (0.879%) Patrick May <pjm(a)ionia.engr.sgi.com> 32.8 bits (0.684%) Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer(a)cnam.fr> 32.7 bits (0.635%) anonner 32.5 bits (0.537%) Matt Pauker <mpauker(a)peganet.com> 32.5 bits (0.537%) Ed Kern <ejk(a)digex.net> 32.5 bits (0.537%) Andrew Kuchling <andrewk(a)cst.ca> 32.5 bits (0.537%) <rmtodd(a)mailhost.ecn.uoknor.edu> 32.4 bits (0.513%) <somogyi(a)digmedia.com> 32.3 bits (0.488%) Jon Baber <jbaber(a)mi.leeds.ac.uk> 32.2 bits (0.439%) Bryce Boland <bryce(a)cybernet.co.nz> 32.0 bits (0.391%) Thad Beier <thad(a)thresher.uucp.netcom.com> 32.0 bits (0.391%) Per Stoltze <stoltze(a)fysik.dtu.dk> 32.0 bits (0.391%) Glenn Powers <gpowers(a)bradley.edu> 32.0 bits (0.391%) <janzen(a)idacom.hp.com> 31.8 bits (0.342%) Mike Bailey <bailey(a)computek.net> 31.7 bits (0.317%) Robert Hayden <hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu> 31.7 bits (0.317%) John Limpert <johnl(a)radix.net> 31.6 bits (0.293%) Opus 31.6 bits (0.293%) Mark Rogaski <rogaski(a)phobos.lib.iup.edu> 31.6 bits (0.293%) <josh(a)silicon.net> 31.5 bits (0.269%) Michael Bacon <mbacon(a)dfw.net> 31.3 bits (0.244%) Jim Gillogly <jim(a)acm.org> 31.3 bits (0.244%) David Zuhn <zoo(a)armadillo.com> 31.2 bits (0.220%) Russell Ross <rross(a)sci.dixie.edu> 31.2 bits (0.220%) Don Kitchen <don(a)cs.byu.edu> 31.0 bits (0.195%) Scott Renfro <csylvix!srenfro(a)cuok.cameron.edu> 31.0 bits (0.195%) Planar <Damien.Doligez(a)inria.fr> 30.8 bits (0.171%) Matt <panzer(a)dhp.com> 30.8 bits (0.171%) Joe Thomas <jthomas(a)access.digex.net> 30.8 bits (0.171%) Adrian Thomson <a.thomson(a)nexor.co.uk> 30.6 bits (0.146%) Michael Axelrod <mja(a)cacs.usl.edu> 30.6 bits (0.146%) Mark Eichin <mark(a)kitten.gen.ma.us> 30.6 bits (0.146%) Jason Burrell <jburrell(a)crl.com> 30.3 bits (0.122%) Will Ware <wware(a)world.std.com> 30.3 bits (0.122%) Kevin Maher <kmaher(a)ucsd.edu> 30.3 bits (0.122%) Josh Sled <jsled(a)cello.gina.calstate.edu> 30.3 bits (0.122%) Checkered Daemon <cdaemon(a)goblin.punk.net> 30.3 bits (0.122%) Andrew Roos <andrewr(a)realtime.co.za> 30.0 bits (0.098%) Jason Weisberger <jweis(a)primenet.com> 30.0 bits (0.098%) <pdlamb(a)iquest.com> 30.0 bits (0.098%) <matt(a)comp.vuw.ac.nz> 29.6 bits (0.073%) Mark Grant <mark(a)unicorn.com> 29.6 bits (0.073%) Lou Poppler <lwp(a)mail.msen.com> 29.6 bits (0.073%) Edwin de Graaf <graaf(a)iaehv.nl> 29.6 bits (0.073%) David Conrad <conrad(a)detroit.freenet.org> 29.6 bits (0.073%) Dan Tauber <dat(a)netcom.com> 29.6 bits (0.073%) Alexandra Griffin <acg(a)kzin.cen.ufl.edu> 29.6 bits (0.073%) <pkronenw(a)erc.cat.syr.edu> 29.6 bits (0.073%) <ghazelwo(a)cs.oberlin.edu> 29.0 bits (0.049%) Stuart <stu(a)nemesis.wimsey.com> 29.0 bits (0.049%) Pekka Riiali <Pekka.Riiali(a)lut.fi> 29.0 bits (0.049%) Jeffrey Ollie <jeffo(a)noc.netins.net> 29.0 bits (0.049%) James Hightower <jamesh(a)netcom.com> 29.0 bits (0.049%) Hadmut Danisch <danisch(a)ira.uka.de> 29.0 bits (0.049%) Bob Snyder <rsnyder(a)janet.advsys.com> 29.0 bits (0.049%) <stevet(a)smeg.net4.io.org> 28.0 bits (0.024%) Sang Hahn <sghahn(a)math1.kaist.ac.kr> 28.0 bits (0.024%) Roy Silvernail <roy(a)cybrspc.mn.org> 28.0 bits (0.024%) Ollivier Robert <roberto(a)keltia.freenix.fr> 28.0 bits (0.024%) Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> 28.0 bits (0.024%) L Futplex McCarthy <futplex(a)pseudonym.com> 28.0 bits (0.024%) Jeff Licquia <jalicqui(a)prairienet.org> 28.0 bits (0.024%) J Francois <frenchie(a)magus.dgsys.com> 28.0 bits (0.024%) Brian LaMacchia <bal(a)mit.edu> 28.0 bits (0.024%) Andy Brown <a.brown(a)nexor.co.uk> 28.0 bits (0.024%) Adam Morrison <adam(a)math.tau.ac.il> 28.0 bits (0.024%) <mikew(a)nersc.gov> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 40.0 bits (100.000%) 89 cpunks + x * anonners in 1 weeks compute Report is on the brute-rc4.html page also: http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/brute-rc4.html Problems. --------- But, briefly these are the things which may be responsible for the failure to find a key: a) We weren't sure if we had a known plaintext / ciphertext pair This due to lack of Microsoft Access specs, this was known from the begining, but we thought we'd try it and see. b) Eeek! There was a bug in bruterc4.c for some time which affected Alphas, and possibly other BSD machines. This meant keyspace wasn't being searched when the -v option was used. c) Some people reported that their browser / uuencode software combination meant that cutting and pasting of the uuencode plain text and cipher text files was silently failing due to extra spaces inserted by a flawed pasting operation. d) Human error - it is possible that some keys were unswept - by accident. e) Malicious humans - we don't know, but think this was not a problem. Solutions. ---------- Proposed solutions for future brute forcing efforts (such as the upcoming SSL effort), for respective points above: a) Need better spec of MA, or more experimentation / reverse engineering. For SSL this is not a problem as the SSL specs are openly available and very detailed. b) Write bug free software :-) Test more rigourously on multiple unixs and architectures with a brief test run. c) Use hex numbers in a config file. Ie don't use uuencode on web page. d) We're going to have the programs (bruteRC4.c and bruteSSL.c) produce a checksum on completion. Acknowledgements of swept keyspace must be with checksum. Crude check to reduce chances of mistyped big hex nums. Represent the key space as a 4 digit hex number like this: 1a23, in terms of 24 bit keyspaces, and represent keyspace to sweep in terms of numbers of those, lots of people had difficulty reasoning in log base2 for bits. e) Do nothing yet. If we get lots of compute and it proves to be a problem perhaps implement some redundancy into the system. Coming soon brute force attempt on Hal Finney's brute of 40+88bit SSL. Watch this space, several cypherpunks are hard at work optimising their bruteSSL.c code, and also writing farming software via a system of servers connected via sockets. The WWW page doler will still be available for those with out direct IP. Hal Finney's SSL challenge is here: http://www.portal.com/~hfinney/sslchal.html More on SSL later, but we hoped to give the SSL one a wider announce in sci.crypt, and see how *fast* we can brute 40 bit keyspace. Hope to see your compute in the brute SSL effort when it is announced, Adam -- HAVE *YOU* EXPORTED A CRYPTO SYSTEM TODAY? --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ --rsa--------------------------------8<------------------------------------- #!/usr/local/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-in-3-lines-PERL ($k,$n)=(a)ARGV;$m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2% Sa2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*' ,$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length($n||die"$0 [-d] k n\n")&~1)/2) -------------------------------------8<------------------------------------- TRY: echo squeamish ossifrage | rsa -e 3 7537d365 | rsa -d 4e243e33 7537d365

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Re: Government Mandated Keys
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:02 AM 7/19/95 PDT, rick hoselton wrote: >I want to register the 1-bit key of "1". I expect to >send about half my message bits encrypted, the rest will be clear-text. Oh, go ahead, register 0 also. You'll probably want to switch keys occasionally during sessions. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com

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Re: cypherpunk "Zen" victories
by Doug Hughes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vladimir Z. Nuri scribbled: > >I was recently marvelling at how much the "cypherpunk agenda" >is being advanced even in light of what would seem to be setbacks. >Particularly in the area of anonymous remailers. We now have a very >major article on remailers and Julf's setup in the NYT that portrays >them in an unbiased, unhysteria-stricken mode. Also in the article, >it quotes the police as regretting their falling victim to >Scientology manipulation and investigating the remailer "without >cause". A major officer is quoted as saying, roughly, "we are >going to need a crime before we investigate in the future". > Could you provide a page, date, and title for this article? I would like to read it but don't get a daily subscription. Muchas gracias Doug Hughes Engineering Network Services doug(a)eng.auburn.edu Auburn University

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Re: "Hey Phil! Stop telling people *not* to use PGP!" (plus: "help me with my PGP problems!") (fwd)
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Wed, 19 Jul 1995, Bryce Wilcox wrote: [lots of really really good stuff deleted, because I really don't have anything good to add to it] > I am fond of saying that we PGP enthusiasts have two choices ahead of us > within a couple of years: either 5,000 enthusiasts using PGP with > MAXIMAL SECURITY at all times, or 5,000 enthusiasts with MAXIMAL > SECURITY and 10,000,000 computer-illiterate e-mail users using PGP with > push-button interfaces and multi-user remote systems. I said it last week, and I'll say it again. From a sociological standpoint, it's those 10,000,000 computer-illiterate e-mail users that we need to focus all of our efforts towards. Those 5,000 literate people we really don't have to care about. I will say, and this makes for interesting commentary, over the last week or so, I've released those simple scripts for Pine (and today for Tin) that integrate digital signing fairly seamlessly with those programs. I've received about 200 requests since Monday from people asking where to find PGP, asking about similiar scripts for Windoze or Dos or Mac, or thanking me for providing an easier way to do digital signatures. And that was a simple sh script! Imagine if some people with REAL writing ability worked on some programs... Pushing for wide use of digital signatures is one way to get PGP to be a "household" name for people writing on the net. I now sign everything I post and mail. It gets people's attention and interest. Interest leads to use. > The important thing, of course, is the easy-to-use, e-mail-integrated > software (version 3.0, I hope?), but it would also help if Zimmermann's > PGP Doc didn't tell those computer-illiterates to either "become enthusiasts > or don't use it." I think the politics of PGP is stagnated at about two years ago or so. The demographics are no longer accepting to long technical rants. Today's generation of net.user doesn't need 100% security 100% of the time, what they need is "good" security when they want it, but in a way that they don't have to think much about. Sorry if I'm ranting again abotu everything I said last week. I'm in the process of doing research on social evolution using the net as an example of accelerated cultural change. I'm kinda in a specific mindset right now :-). -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.1 iQCVAwUBMA1WVjokqlyVGmCFAQEtJgP+JPbrM4KSQGiIznlnghYs1FEizGGhHLJZ +cSz36jatErJ/kFOEsNSwLz0crjdyHtv2v3ojsExTQVgQxzS/U60zwNR+gPxwdr7 bpIoEaZwGtANmsrkUtTqIwEncs7WPAF08ZbbaZpeB58qcvnpAergshrJya7gtOSM Wp8BqFcU+84= =TOLZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> Cthulhu Matata \ /__ -=-=-=-=- <=> -=-=-=-=- \/ / Finger for Geek Code Info <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \/ Finger for PGP Public Key <=> http://att2.cs.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden

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Adding
by netchaos＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to be added to your list.

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Re: "Hey Phil! Stop telling people *not* to use PGP!" (plus: "help mewith my PGP problems!") (fwd)
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Robert A. Hayden writes: > I said it last week, and I'll say it again. From a sociological > standpoint, it's those 10,000,000 computer-illiterate e-mail users > that we need to focus all of our efforts towards. Those 5,000 > literate people we really don't have to care about. [...snip...] > Imagine if some people with REAL writing ability worked on some > programs... [...snip...] > I think the politics of PGP is stagnated at about two years ago or > so. The demographics are no longer accepting to long technical > rants. Today's generation of net.user doesn't need 100% security > 100% of the time, what they need is "good" security when they want > it, but in a way that they don't have to think much about. This has been hashed over on the list many, many times in the past. I suspect there are competent programmers out there who want to write easy-to-use interfaces for PGP (I know at least one), but there are problems. To write a good GUI interface (with proper key-management features) on Windows or Mac, for instance, you need to have access to PGP's internal crypto routines as well as the routines for reading and writing PGP messages and key certificates. The problem is that the PGP 2 code does not have the internal 'core' routines separated from it's command-line interface. The answers are to either shell out to PGP (which, AFAIK, is what every interface except MacPGP does), hack the PGP 2 code, or use PGPTools. Shelling out to PGP isn't going to cut it for a slick GUI package, especially if you want to have a decent key-management interface. You could do it, but it will be slow and kludgy and you will have to change it all when PGP 3 comes out. Hacking PGP would be a major effort. Additionally, there is risk of introducing a subtle flaw in the crypto routines. However, the main killer is that PGP 3 is going to have a brand new key-ring format along with many other enhancements, fixes, and other changes to the crypto code. All of the work will have to be done again to bring the interface up to date when PGP 3 is released, which could be within 6 months (who knows?). PGPTools is buggy and not supported. Any effort to bring PGPTools up to a stable level would likely be thrown away when PGP 3 is released. The real solution is that PGP 3 will have all of it's core routines in a separate library with a stable API specifically for the purpose of writing slick interfaces. So basically all of the would-be PGP interface developers are waiting for beta releases of the library. Unfortunately, this has been the situation for almost two years now. By now the PGP 2 code could have been completely turned into a library with a clean API and no command-line interface remnants, but developers have been discouraged by the promise of PGP 3 coming out 'RSN'... andrew ...still waiting for pgp 3 news...

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cfs on linux - rpcgen broken in slackware distribution!
by zinc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cpunks, yesterday i requested some help compiling cfs on my linux system. well, after some serious help i got it to work. the problem was that my copy of rpcgen was broken. this was the copy installed with the slackware distribution. damn, this is some sort of never ending contest between my sanity and the slackware distribution! -pat patrick finerty = zinc(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu = pfinerty(a)nyx.cs.du.edu U of Utah biochem grad student in the Bass lab - zinc fingers + dsRNA! ** FINGER ME for my pgp public key ** crypto for the masses! zifi runs LINUX 1.2.11 -=-=-=WEB=-=-=-> http://zifi.genetics.utah.edu

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Re: "Hey Phil! Stop telling people *not* to use PGP!" (plu
by jfmesq＠ibm.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I've received about 200 requests since Monday from people asking where to >find PGP, asking about similiar scripts for Windoze or Dos or Mac.... If anyone asks about OS/2, a good script is available at ftp.gibbon.com. FWIW. --JFM

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Why no action alert, coalition opposing S. 974?
by Paul Elliott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have read the EFF analysis of Senate bill 974, which is designed to inhibit encryption on Networks. I think that it is a thoughtful document but I am concerned that there has been no action alert produced to tell people the most effective way to oppose this horrible Bill. People who are concerned about the bill need to know what Senators could most profitably be contacted. Also why has no coalition been formed to oppose this bill? I am aware that many people are busy opposing S314, but S974 is equally terrible as it attempts to suppress free expression. I could try to produce an action alert myself, but I would probably make errors as I am not up on the legal subtleties and the intricacies of Congress. Could some of the savvy people please write an action alert? Otherwise I will be forced to take a stab at it. - -- Paul Elliott Telephone: 1-713-781-4543 Paul.Elliott(a)hrnowl.lonestar.org Address: 3987 South Gessner #224 Houston Texas 77063 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBMA10YfBUQYbUhJh5AQFMBAQAgUJAj1nNdG54IxIFAboCw+Q/E8WWOvEO 9Aazj9hjHK7VeHi+vpTY7eJRbQq7LyQq/ex41PE+QXu+mjWe3c1si8HmhherA22i CUGv3UI8L/Z43zLtN2TI9reJsizeYnmHlO3uUffP3vnhwBJm1G7EAlXvKFqikC90 q1DUqqgq7k4= =4yQ7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Investigate Your Federal Building :)
by The Gate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Had problems with the original transmission... 21:22 EST July 17th, 1995 New Haven, CT Day One, Investigation Begins. Of course, I've been researching THE FACTS all my life, but never before have I gone to the FBI to ask for information. Also of course, they gave me none, or practically none, just this: (202) 324-3000. Can anyone guess? FBIHQ it says on the yellow post-it note. That's all she could give me. I have been incredibly scared these last couple of days, wondering exactly what I was doing, but I feel better this evening. Just going down to the Federal Building and poking around asking questions has not gotten me killed, and I don't think it will. Check. In a recent post to this list I said I was going to go to the Federal Building here in New Haven to begin a local investigation of Federal Events. So I put on my coat and tie, washed up a little (long-hair and beard couldn't be controlled, will not cut) and started walking, stopping off at Kinko's Copies to make a free local phone call to one of my partners and grab some note paper for the session. Then on across the green towards the courthouse, town hall and on Orange Street, the Robert N. Giaimo (sp) Federal Building. Of course, I'd been there before, to the post office, and it was always a rather non-descript affair. But now I was looking for something, and though I didn't find what I was looking for, I did find out a lot. Alot of it was disturbing, alot of it was funny, and alot of it was encouraging, especially the print of the original Declaration and Constitution/Bill of Rights, as well as the posted Code of Ethics for Government Service, Public Law 96-303, passed unanimously in Congress on June 27, 1980, signed by the President (Carter?) on July 3, 1980: Article One of Ten: "Put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party or Government department." No problem, I thought, I'll keep that in mind. Article 9: "Expose corruption wherever discovered." Whoa, that's a tough one, where are you going to find corruption in the United States of America? Article 11:"Uphold the Constitution, laws and regulations of the United States and all governments therein and never be a party to their evasion." Well, the Constitution I can uphold, as it upholds me, but I don't know about all the other laws and regulations...I'm not sure everything signed since 1776 passes my muster. You? But though I had been to the Federal Building several times previously, I wasn't ready for what I encountered this time, as it had never before been present: heavy security presence. No secret service types, just rent-a-cops with a metal detector and baggage x-ray device. But they were bustling, somewhat loud, and definitely a presence. A humorous note: Usually the electro-magnetic energy that I generate because of meditation and honest emotional presence is enough to kick the metal detectors, but I thought if I took my belt off, I could get through. No such luck, and when I took my belt off, my pants, which were bought for my bigger brother, started to fall off. I don't wear underwear either, so I ended up walking through security holding my breeches up by hand. I thought, mmm the joy of security...of course, it was *my* costume (cover) that was falling apart, but I got back together without real embarassment. That's when I started to look around the building lobby. First I checked the directory. Yup, there it was, FBI, fifth floor, right underneath the penthouse cafe. BATF on the second floor, IRS third. Department of Protective Service (SS) first floor, though I saw no evidence of their lair or personnel. Bill Clinton and Al Gore on the wall, of course...Recycling bins for paper, cans, bottles and something else, perhaps newpapers. Nice touch I thought, it would be nice to see more of those. I wandered over to the bulletin board: Arson informants offered rewards $100,000 to $250,000 rewards offered to informers leading to convictors of international terrorists - mostly airplane and boat hijackers. The Code of Ethics for Government Service as mentioned above. Help for choking victims... (At this time, I was rushed by the closing of the computer center. The facts are flear though...) Anyway, on to greater heights... Elevator, fifth floor, get in, man there, looks like FBI, look at numbers in elevator, 5 already lit. A real live FBI agent and I in the elevator together, wow. Day already made, still only ten o'clock or so. Get off 5th floor. Man goes one way, I go another, meet another real live FBI guy, "Where's the receptionist?" "Through that door" came the warm reply from a brown-suited man with a pock-marked face. Hmm, definitely FBI. Into FBI visitor center, one small room, bulletproof glass, Time magazines, American Flag with gold tassels in corner, photos of Agents, woman behind the counter: "Uh, I'm something of a freelance reporter for Citizen's Television and Internet newsgroups, and I'd like to know if you can confirm whether or not someone worked for the FBI..." Polite no from FBI woman. "Is there a public information office?" No, then checks mind, goes to back to talk with all male contingent, at least seven agents in back room, including the one I saw on the elevator, all are rustled into alert by the inquiry from CTV producer and Searchnet Reporter. I can just hear them saying, by gosh they were right, the Internet really is spawning investigators... Then all I get back is the phone number, but it was a lot of fun. Down to the BATF? nah, enough for the day. Thoughts on the way to the library... Next time, maybe I'll deliver a message. Gotta run, Lee. ____________________________|||||||||||||||||||||______________________________ R. Leland Lehrman@The Gate, New Haven, CT. http://id.wing.net/~gate/gate.html God, Art, Technology and Ecology Research and Development >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>Do you love the Mother?>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

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