December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

public key algorithms and Netscape
by eric＠remailer.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The claim was made here by someone at Netscape that no suitable public key algorithms existed other than RSADSI technology. I don't remember how explicit this claim was; it may have been an implication of some more general statement. I note that the folks at Netscape must never have heard of elliptic curve algorithms for public key technology. I would hazard that representatives at RSADSI stated or implied that such technology was covered by their patents. I would then ask if they said so in writing. Making claims about a patent that are knowingly false is grounds for vacating the patent. The IEEE P1363 working group on cryptography standards is moving forward with elliptic curve cryptosystems but not with RSA because of patent issues. Coincidence? Eric

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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Tim May wrote: ... I don't want to see my local cops have all of their actions videotaped and reviewed for quite another reason--I don't want a "mechanization" of the enforcement process! Won't happen. First, cops are already required to enforce some stupid laws; the mechanism used is "quotas." Second, the vast number of laws makes total enforcement impossible. Third, the cops aren't pulling a fast one when they use their discretion to cut someone loose. I've even seem them do it on the TV show "COPS." That discretion is clearly within their powers. It's the "let's-whack-the-hippie" sort of discretion that is denied them. ... I have some good opinions of the California Highway Patrol ... even a cop-disliking skeptic like me can be convinced that some good is done is by them, and that not all cops are bad.... I agree; and Mussolini did make the trains run on time . . . My proposal is not anti-cop; it's anti- *bad* cop. Good cops *benefit* from protective surveillance; and *all* cops benefit from having their exact location known when the feces impacts the turbine. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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OFF LINE
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, I am moving back to California. I fly out tomorrow evening. I will be off-line for a day or two at least. Go ahead and send me stuff; I'll get to it as soon as I can. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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uSuRa anonymous remailer [update]
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have registerd the domain-name replay.COM at InterNic. XS4all has installed some sort of MX-handling for my account, usura(a)xs4all.nl, so my new address wil be usura(a)replay.com. The remailer that is operated from that account is now also reachable at the replay.com address. The usura(a)xs4all.nl remains valid. Raph Levien has updated the address in his automated pinger; here is the updated PGPkey for the usura(a)replay.COM remailer: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Replay and Company Limited. mQCNAi4wTh8AAAEEAMb9gl6NlZHy4FdjADel4d+C+Th7+inTOV4mEsKk+N/QfJAj BN6YPnJ9bm+Ch19FrR1KeTwrpluP6J+GdJrMkVSosvIqBPpSRgOs7nvMhnn3Tnrn uUFZVDYslQ1wRZvFbTpCEW8TzgVhGy6HMznxEC4ttnOq8pFRFUpL3asf+toVAAUR tCt1U3VSYSBhbm9ueW1vdXMgcmVtYWlsZXIgPHVzdXJhQHJlcGxheS5DT00+iQCV AgUQLu0YykpL3asf+toVAQGqhAQAuAnqzqRc5MzYGHmzBVjvUxnEuHiwju4EZmIO OZ5wbxd62gNDV7Nj+M3yj5pnSuwLBL/AOjxLEGRQ49HwvCOLy0wtJWulsg71Pi+y sPkUrP9uq7Aa381Rkwcrcje73WGvFcv89LGtcZlvuiqeNatubbvEgeC9VWb5ovEq jZFLvEI= =snZE -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- EnJoY. -- Exit! Stage Left. <URL:mailto:usura@replay.com> Alex de Joode <URL:http://www.xs4all.nl/~usura>

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Re: THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
by snyderra＠dunx1.ocs.drexel.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 9:13 PM 12/12/94, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >My proposal is not anti-cop; it's anti- *bad* cop. Good cops >*benefit* from protective surveillance; and *all* cops benefit >from having their exact location known when the feces impacts the >turbine. sed -e "s/cop/citizen/g" sed -e "s/cop/employee/g" sed... Bob [For the sed-impared: s - search and replace string 1 with string 2. g - do it multiple times per line.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLu0bQeS0CjsjWS0VAQEmzAP+OV59f7hR8CKi6UC13k2x/Fj1QylXPSaj /nR614LzoCeHf7+OAVLN6COx5vGC6yL3EoDL1Ocjm52bWh1nxoIfsGImRBuqRo9R Mcwa6Av+/kn9271O6I6VKLnFU6SYA35vuOAACOAVB647aQ6dAOfheU2fLAd0xEEZ l9mpaNalm7E= =HXZ/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Bob Snyder N2KGO MIME, PGP, RIPEM mail accepted snyderra(a)post.drexel.edu PGP & RIPEM keys on key servers When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl.

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Photuris
by amanda＠intercon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Ah, the hazards of not going to IETF... Good thing the proceedings get publicized in electronic format, eh? :) --Amanda

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RE: Crypto Declaration of Independence
by nobody＠jpunix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- James A. Donald <jamesd(a)netcom.com> wrote: >Anonymous writes >> I have a proposal for you all. >> >> I have started work on a Crypto Declaration of Independence, based on the >> famous American work which represents Independence. > >This is unwise and unnecessary. > >It is unwise because we do not wish to alert the government >to the fact that the net is largely ungoverned and ungovernable. I do not think it is unwise because we do want to state a position for ourselves. We need to let everyone, including the government, know that we will not stand for crypto-policy which is not in our best interest. No matter what comes, we will continue to use PGP, SHTTP, link-encryption and every method which we have determined to be in our best interest, not what we must have faith in what we are told is in our best interest. >It is unnecessary because crypto is already covered by various >existing declarations on rights. > > > >THE BILL OF RIGHTS This is bullshit, and you know it as well as I do. A steady stream of misinformation has mislead government officials into 'ignoring' these rights when dealing with electronic documents, and encryption specifically. When the administration has something which might be unfavorable in the public eye (ie, Clipper), they quickly try to pass it through, ignoring public cries in the process. How many letters did it take before there were any open hearings about the EES, and then the words of respected professionals were seemingly ignored as the policy was pushed ahead. This was not thought to be an extremist attempt at breaking off from our current government. It's also not supposed to be a confrontational attack. It was intended to be a strong statement, letting all know what we believe in and why we do. We need to declare our independence from being governed by policy which encroaches on our rights, rights which this country was founded in, and rights which are being ignored. Asynchronous -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLuwXDFG1rORFKstdAQEc2wP/Ytq8crc/8YiHlYeO9eoF/Mrx4Q39be9t Y1vD/Hn2qcvXUlWqtqfSPZXzpBV10rNH2qZ0L1A7j/ErUxqXm4Xqz36fWDgxht2m t/KWBXydSBzGDt3HEgmXQ29XE0Ka8w9iaXXq0bKfx87l5XPuknOnAyu8ZBEPj4wM dN5Gc4uMdtM= =vrB+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Broadcasts - addressing
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I have been contemplating how to mark broadcast messages as being > 'for' someone. To foil traffic analysis, you don't want to include > their nym or key-id, for the sake of the your poor CPU, you want to > avoid the need to attempt decryption on everything that passes through. The main problem is how to avoid decrypting _most_ of the traffic, without giving away significant information about the recipient. One approach is to do something some political users have been asking for - implement support for very short keyids (e.g. 4 bits instead of 24-32), so that the keyid isn't a good identifier for the user. Another approach is to include a tag in the Subject: with either a hash of the key (substantially reducing the number of bits), or simply the last hex or two of the keyid - that lets you ignore 15/16th or 255/256th of the traffic, without giving away much.

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Re: Real-time surveillance of the police
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim wrote: >(The longer-than-I'd-planned section above is meant to show that even >a cop-disliking skeptic like me can be convinced that some good is >done is by them, and that not all cops are bad. Perhaps my on-day >exposure co-opted me the way certain folks in D.C. got co-opted?) Yup! -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Standard Packet size.
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am about to release Mixmaster as a beta test. Before I do, I would like some input on what size message packet to standardize on. Each message includes twenty 1k headers, and a block with the message text. Right now I have the text block size set to 4k. That seems small, but I am worried about mail systems choking on big messages. Messages over the minimum size are sent separately (through the same chain), and only recombined by the last remailer in the chain. Previous remailers do not know that the message parts are associated. This is quite secure, but not as good as a single packet, so the fewer messages that get split up, the better. Mixmaster compresses the contents of the text block. So, any thoughts on what size the text block should be? BTW Mixmaster still only runs on Sun. Several people are working on porting it to linux. Help with porting to PC and Mac would be appreciated. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLu1Ml1Vkk3dax7hlAQHWfAP+Kj2LyWBySVHfI0QTBBhEvF3b+ru/hywm kALdnXWUkbcSgRHQAMdSpwYza44M7Tc6sX++kDASSjwWyV80cTPHqFEPFmoEcbRV 1BPJB7SAkhwHGpRB5e0daLe0LAuS9KRHbTQcN//n0pUrbqMS2sVJCrDQ7kwrFC8L 3QEzCjWHsAQ= =Dc4G -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Encrypted mail welcome. Home page http://nately.ucsd.edu/~loki/ Home of "chain" the remailer chaining script. For anon remailer info, mail remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu Subject: remailer-help "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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