December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

One man's view on Clipper...
by Michael Wilson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks... just thought I would contribute my two cents on the recent developments, by showing you a response I wrote to a friend on the issue recently. I've been building anti-Clipper sentiment in some 'old school' businessmen friends of mine, since my belief is in free markets and money trails... === >Many thanks for the messages -- Clipper is still bothering a bunch of >people including me, and I hope the cyberworld will do something organized >about it. If I were more competant in computers than I am I would be >willing to lead the charge. The politics of Clipper are insidious. If it actually gets passed off as the standard, it will show up in pretty much any standard product that will hook into the grid. Most people, since there is already encryption built into the products they use, won't advocate the use of anything else, and more importantly, won't PAY for anything additional. I can tell you from experience, people won't buy security products, there is no security market; security is something that people expect to get built in to a system. The only reason that there is any market to speak of at all is a symptom of just how bad the current security situation is--essentially, most systems, including critical ones, are wide open, and you can certainly say that secure communications make up less than 1% of the total amount of traffic on the grid. So what happens when Clipper gets in? People once again abdicate responsibility for handling their own security and secure communications. Why pay more (money, time, effort) when it is already taken care of? The market for competing products dries up; interest dies. If there is no money, how can you expect to pursue a product or create a market? There is no perceived need to address. And so Big Brother wins; they once again become the only experts in the field, since they are the only ones with the money to continue playing the game. Direct outlawing of the technology would only make martyrs of the people trying to present it. Instead, the government is striking in a much more intelligent and, from my viewpoint, dangerous strategy. Their [govt] encryption scheme is good enough... Yes, there are holes, but only to 'hackers'... People who want to have secrets must have something to hide... Only criminals will need to protect themselves, and have additional security and cryptography.... The folks at NSA have struck a blow from a very advanced PsyOps perspective, rather than a cryptographic one. They destroy the marketplace, and also attack any popular support that could be put to good use by the opposition [cypherpunks]. Does this outlaw other cryptographic methods? Not at all; there is the fiction of choice still available (the old game of "let them hold free elections as long as we get to choose the candidates"). Cypherpunks and others who are concerned will be the 'lunatic fringe.' And their more secure traffic will stand out like a sore thumb; somebody somewhere will be making lists. So at this stage, I am increasingly convinced that the solution, actually the groundrules of the game, are not technical at all, but belong solidly in the realm of political warfare. It just so happens that I know more than a little about that game. === The rest of the communication is confidential, but I thought you folks would appreciate some additional thoughts. Michael Wilson Managing Director, The Nemesis Group An old hand at political warfare...

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One man's view on Clipper...
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Michael Wilson <0005514706(a)mcimail.com> writes: > Cypherpunks... just thought I would contribute my two cents on the recent > developments, by showing you a response I wrote to a friend on the issue > recently. I've been building anti-Clipper sentiment in some 'old school' > businessmen friends of mine, since my belief is in free markets and money > trails... My congratulations on a well-written document. I agree 100% with what you said on a cursory view. I haven't looked into this very deeply yet. But, the points you bring up are valid, and need to EXPLOITED before Clipper becomes a standard. Even then, I'll still use PGP, or whatever the newest secure gizmo is at the time. Let them put me on a list for protecting my privacy. It'd be an honor to be recognized for it. --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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Linux under SecureDrive partition?
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1. Where can I get the latest/greatest copy of SecureDrive? (I'm a U.S. resident). 2. Can I install Linux underneath a SecureDrive partition -- say, DOS on C:, Linux under SecureDrive under D: and the Linux swap also under SecureDrive. So that the C: DOS partition is in the clear, and all the good stuff running under Linux is hidden on D:. Much thanks.

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Re: Linux under SecureDrive partition?
by jpp＠jpplap.markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I don't know how to make a dos device driver run under linux. I would be interested since due to lack of space, most of my dos partition is doublespaced. I supose you could port SecureDrive to linux, after all, you have (or theoreticaly can get) the source. j' -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQBXAgUBLg3DedC3U5sdKpFdAQHHWAIKAsUp+azpPNe2QnPBVBfds9bUcnufauqs BjK07S1/S+i6naeLXj4Ge7JB2qKlmqYQs5DylPAHeUa5QxVOnoQtOYh5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Linux under SecureDrive partition?
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Re: Linux under SecureDrive partition? > 1. Where can I get the latest/greatest copy of SecureDrive? > (I'm a U.S. resident). > > 2. Can I install Linux underneath a SecureDrive partition -- > say, DOS on C:, Linux under SecureDrive under D: and the > Linux swap also under SecureDrive. So that the C: DOS > partition is in the clear, and all the good stuff running > under Linux is hidden on D:. There's something called CFS written by mab(a)research.att.com which is an encrypting file system for many flavours of Unix (essentially does NFS over the loopback) including Linux. It isn't the fastest thing in the world, but it does work. I've heard mutterings about a port of SFS to Linux, but I don't have any concrete information about this. You can get the latest SecureDrive from ftp.wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXXX/SECDRV/secdrv13e.zip to find the value of XXXXXXXX cd /pub/crypto/software and read the README file. Mark -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQBVAgUBLg3fnmrJdmD9QWqxAQEyywIAn/Q15RpxdXMS0OACYQTCyYkbgIGNhACc eWpL1FyZM84r1aUeQDVimlOAz9qHIr6Yy4cT0408ZtcKJituXgHrGQ== =Z6UI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca - RIPEM MD5: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP key fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 low security key fingerprint: EC E7 C3 A9 2C 30 25 C6 F9 E1 25 F3 F5 AF 92 E3 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp to ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto

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GILMORE IN THE SUNDAY PAPER
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks, John Gilmore has a hot op-ed piece in the business section of the San Francisco Examiner entitled, "Strong Cryptography a Must." Lots of good stuff. My favorite was, "...we want the public to see a serious debate about why the Constitution should be burned in order to save the country." Gee, I'm glad John is on *our* side. S a n d y

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Re: anon service at vox.hacktic.nl
by usura＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- There are basicly two remailers at vox.hacktic.nl : - -> a cypherpunx-style remailer with three adresses -) nobody -) remail -) remailer - -> a anon mail back ID remailer -) anon Sometimes you may find it conveniant to have te ability to receive mail, but to remain anonymous for the sender. anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl gives you that ability. Here is some info: {step 1} send some mail to ping(a)vox.hacktic.nl to receive a pong and an account ie. an0(a)vox.hacktic.nl {step 2} send your first message to anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl, the commands for remailingare similair to the cypherpunx-remailers, the only differance will be the sender. If you send mail to remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl, the name that will appear in the FROM: line is nobody(a)vox.hacktic.nl. If you send mail to anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl the corresponding entry for the adress that is sending the mail will be in the FROM: line, ie an0(a)vox.hacktic.nl so someone can contact you by sending mail to an0(a)vox.hacktic.nl. This mail will not be anonymised, you -will- know the sender. If you - -as a sender- want to remain anonymous send the mail trough a remailer or aquire a anon account at vox.hacktic.nl and send the mail using the anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl remailer. {step 3} make -absolutily positively- sure the header pasting tokens [::] are the first thing you type, if you start with a blanc line, your remail request -will- fail. Hope this helps. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 for VoX Labz. iQCVAgUBLg4Ki1nfdBSNVpE9AQG+jgP+PUmaqszGp+aMelflYXOOin47Zu+dVIqX 25Ry356L3/dGD2rMKYZMTK3P1+ly4F4ildgh/Gf5zQiqTh4Ry4L0zG8z3/xYEzwJ vNun9e6zREXGhnaFx9W/7Da67AHfhe38hvcO15riG9Jl4sEQWAXCkqQmyj+05KFx oxxt2XbkQ+U= =Rg9Y -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regz, -- ____ Alex de Joode <usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl> \ /__ =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- \/ / "It's dangerous to be right when the government is wrong." \/ --Voltaire --finger usura(a)hacktic.nl for PGPKEY -kinky-

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H.E.A.T. UPDATE
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C'punks, "Acapulco H.E.A.T." was hip deep in crypto again this week. This time the Team was trying to bust *drug trafficers* (bad, bad drug lords). For some reason, my favorite character, "Cat" (Alison Armitage) got herself into a school for women drug operative recruited by the trafficers. We got to see lots of scenes of Cat and other nubiles jogging, doing jumping jacks, push ups and, best of all, shooting strange large caliber automatic weapons. The crypto part? Oh, yeah, right. Anyway, the trafficers (ex-KGB types) were transmitting date, time and location information to associates in Miami. Communications was via a series of numbers read in the clear over shortwave radio. For some reason, the H.E.A.T. guys new that the "key" was a ten-digit number that was the *same* every time! Since the KGB guy had once been busted by the CIA, H.E.A.T. finally guessed that the key was the CIA's phone number. No kidding. There was some other minor computer stuff, but the important values were preserved: Alison and other babes did callisthenics, there was lots of gun play and Fabio did *not* "act" in this episode. Tune in next--same H.E.A.T.-time, same H.E.A.T.-channel--for the further crypto adventures of "Acapulco H.E.A.T." S a n d y

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Warning about PGP
by trollins＠debbie.telos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING Quoting "Applied Cryptography by Bruce Schneier, Page 287-288." > Low Exponent Attack Agenst RSA > Another suggestion to "improve" RSA is to use low > values for e, the public key. This makes encryption > fast and easy to perform. Unfortunately, it is also > insecure. Hastad demonstrated a successful attack > against RSA with a low encryption key [417]. Another > attack by Michael Wiener will recover e, when e is > up to one quarter the size of n [878]. A low decryption > key d, is just as serious a problem. Moral: Choose > large values for e and d. > 417. J. Hastad, "On Using RSA with Low Exponent in a Public- > Key Network," Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '85 > Proceedings, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp403-408 > 878. M. J. Weiner, "Cryptanalysis of Short RSA Secret Exponents." > IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, v.36, n. 3, > May 1990, pp. 553-558. The public domain PGP programs curriently produce short public key exponents, (17 is a common value). It would seem that the Governments of the world have had easy access to PGP traffic. Tom Rollins <trollins(a)debbie.telos.com> WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING - WARNING -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCzAgUBLg3CpGWJTLDtTMmNAQHhfQTwkalahr6xBNpeO8Yg2Ln1TkTbJ/VDccSS 4hZmqos1WEhmNuHEYTbKBZoS5wA9PHJkd26byy8JCAxoM5siiL6tNUaA4hRa+0IV RJtIYnS5yIvGfocrBcmN+e2fJGZXyyc+h1cUzNMq/aml4CEmnaHl7PKhL69pk4jI TfKUnah0ihgCb72Dkzqtsw6iTsJpg1rEd+TDpDPpTp3KIB0xbtk= =e5eN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: H.E.A.T. UPDATE
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, shoot, what's the use of watching this show if Fabio (+5) isn't in it? Why, it's because when he *is* on, it will make you ponder the need for & importance of privacy. I get it, now. Blanc Le Bon Femme

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