December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Blacknet worries
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

D.>With all due respect....the U.S Government has PLENTY D.>of tools to go after those deemed to be violators of D.>various rules and regs...with or without Blacknet, D.>with or without encryption. D.>What other tools can be used, well... D.> D.>1. Imputed income. Try to do this some time. It is very expensive to 'net worth' someone. The CIA didn't manage in their recent case. There are 114 million 'taxpayers' in the Naked City.. D.>2. Criminal conspiracy. Elements are D.> a. two or more people D.> b. a preparatory act If they can decrypt your conspiratorial communication. Conspiracy charges are rare in the absence of an overt act. D.>3. CCE (Continuing Criminal Enterprise). If they can find out something is happening and connect disparate encrypted activities to you. D.>4. IRS-1040, Schedule B, Part III, Foreign Accounts and Trusts. D.> Except for one relatively minor loophole, if you fail to D.> report a foreign bank account, it is considered prima D.> facie evidence of tax fraud. Sound like a really bad D.> day in the making? Prosecutions are rare and are dependent on linking you to the accounts, proving the balance of the accounts, and in any case only apply to US citizens/residents. D.>5. If you have more than $10,000 in US Dollar value in D.> an offshore account, you are required to fill out a D.> special form for the IRS giving your account numbers; D.> unless you want to declare that you have more than D.> 20 such accounts, aggregating to more than $10,000. Likewise. D.>6. RICO. They got Mike Miliken using this...indeed, Barron's D.> magazine did an interesting report on RICO, with the D.> conclusion that a determined Federal Prosecutor could D.> use the law to convict a ham sandwich. Mike was not convicted under RICO. He plead to two counts of stock parking and something else. D.>7. Did you know that Federal prosecutors have a better than D.> 90% conviction rate? In the several thousand annual prosecutions out of a US population of 256 million. D.>8. HOW does one spend "magic money"? If you have bunches of D.> cash offshore, and bring it in, records are created. If D.> you buy something, potential witnesses are created. Can D.> you really expect that the clerk in wire transfer at XYZ D.> bank (who makes $6.50/hr) won't tip off someone when you D.> wire in the $20,000 to buy ...whatever? Since much of future commerce will be online anyway, why not just spend it for telecoms time, software, living expenses in a VR environment, other non-physical services. Use it overseas. Expat yourself (see the current issue of Forbes for an article on expatriation as the ultimate tax shelter. Or just get cash from your local ATM. D.>9.. Spies, criminals, and others often get in trouble due to their D.> own and others' lack of discretion. Can we really expect D.> users of a hypothetical blacknet would never drink too much, D.> never wish to impress someone, never trust someone unwisely? Lost in the noise with millions of 'violators' extant. D.>I'm all for more of it; but, I really don't think it will D.>be anything more than a minor inconvenience for law enforcement D.>and prosecutors if people engage in wholesale criminal acts. Studies show that where the perceived risk is low, people are fairly willing to violate mere regulations. Most people can tell the difference between murder and tax evasion. The Common Law recognized this difference calling one malum in se (wrong in itself) and the other malum prohibitum (wrong because it has been prohibited). In any case, since US tax laws don't apply to non resident non citizens of the US but these sorts of people will be able to fully participate in the US economy over the nets, either US citizens and residents will have to fiddle their regulatory compliance or they will lose out in competition with foreigners who can undercut them or do things Americans are prohibited from doing. Sell strong crypto par example. DCF 1993 - Perhaps the first year in American history in which the Justice Department killed more people than the Defense/War Department. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: Blacknet worries
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

D.>With all due respect....the U.S Government has PLENTY D.>of tools to go after those deemed to be violators of D.>various rules and regs...with or without Blacknet, D.>with or without encryption. D.>What other tools can be used, well... D.> D.>1. Imputed income. Try to do this some time. It is very expensive to 'net worth' someone. The CIA didn't manage in their recent case. There are 114 million 'taxpayers' in the Naked City.. D.>2. Criminal conspiracy. Elements are D.> a. two or more people D.> b. a preparatory act If they can decrypt your conspiratorial communication. Conspiracy charges are rare in the absence of an overt act. D.>3. CCE (Continuing Criminal Enterprise). If they can find out something is happening and connect disparate encrypted activities to you. D.>4. IRS-1040, Schedule B, Part III, Foreign Accounts and Trusts. D.> Except for one relatively minor loophole, if you fail to D.> report a foreign bank account, it is considered prima D.> facie evidence of tax fraud. Sound like a really bad D.> day in the making? Prosecutions are rare and are dependent on linking you to the accounts, proving the balance of the accounts, and in any case only apply to US citizens/residents. D.>5. If you have more than $10,000 in US Dollar value in D.> an offshore account, you are required to fill out a D.> special form for the IRS giving your account numbers; D.> unless you want to declare that you have more than D.> 20 such accounts, aggregating to more than $10,000. Likewise. D.>6. RICO. They got Mike Miliken using this...indeed, Barron's D.> magazine did an interesting report on RICO, with the D.> conclusion that a determined Federal Prosecutor could D.> use the law to convict a ham sandwich. Mike was not convicted under RICO. He plead to two counts of stock parking and something else. D.>7. Did you know that Federal prosecutors have a better than D.> 90% conviction rate? In the several thousand annual prosecutions out of a US population of 256 million. D.>8. HOW does one spend "magic money"? If you have bunches of D.> cash offshore, and bring it in, records are created. If D.> you buy something, potential witnesses are created. Can D.> you really expect that the clerk in wire transfer at XYZ D.> bank (who makes $6.50/hr) won't tip off someone when you D.> wire in the $20,000 to buy ...whatever? Since much of future commerce will be online anyway, why not just spend it for telecoms time, software, living expenses in a VR environment, other non-physical services. Use it overseas. Expat yourself (see the current issue of Forbes for an article on expatriation as the ultimate tax shelter. Or just get cash from your local ATM. D.>9.. Spies, criminals, and others often get in trouble due to their D.> own and others' lack of discretion. Can we really expect D.> users of a hypothetical blacknet would never drink too much, D.> never wish to impress someone, never trust someone unwisely? Lost in the noise with millions of 'violators' extant. D.>I'm all for more of it; but, I really don't think it will D.>be anything more than a minor inconvenience for law enforcement D.>and prosecutors if people engage in wholesale criminal acts. Studies show that where the perceived risk is low, people are fairly willing to violate mere regulations. Most people can tell the difference between murder and tax evasion. The Common Law recognized this difference calling one malum in se (wrong in itself) and the other malum prohibitum (wrong because it has been prohibited). In any case, since US tax laws don't apply to non resident non citizens of the US but these sorts of people will be able to fully participate in the US economy over the nets, either US citizens and residents will have to fiddle their regulatory compliance or they will lose out in competition with foreigners who can undercut them or do things Americans are prohibited from doing. Sell strong crypto par example. DCF 1993 - Perhaps the first year in American history in which the Justice Department killed more people than the Defense/War Department. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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I have FOIA'd the Clipper Key Escrow databases
by hughes＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Should John's FOIA request for the clipper key database work, it creates a wonderful hole in the entire key custody system. It would require a legislative act to plug the hole. This is extremely significant, since the whole clipper strategy is based on unchecked and unbalanced actions by the executive branch. No laws were passed to create clipper and no judicial review has taken place. John's request will be denied, no doubt, and will go to court. Should he prevail in court, the executive branch is bound by that decision. A key custody database which was public would make the system insecure and unusable. The executive branch could not change this. Only the legislature could. Now, how many legislators do you know that are going to make a public record by voting in favor of Big Brother? We are witnessing the genius of framers of the USA Constitution here, folks. Eric

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SQUISH
by stutzmjj＠bigvax.alfred.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just received a notice concerning your game. Please send me some more information on how to join/play as well as any rules. Thanks, Jeff Stutzman STUTZMJJ(a)BIGVAX.ALFRED.EDU

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Re: Dorothy Denning
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Number 2. People on this list have said that she's an expert in cryptography. When I read that damned Newsday article posted on cypherpunks, I thought that she was just a whiny college bitch. The argument was just very, well, flimsy is the word I guess. I believe that Clipper is wrong, but someone could at least write a paper that would influence more by pointing out its merits, rather than just saying that the government should start spying on all of us to stop drug deals.... Anyone know: A) Is she an expert in cryptography? B) Is she a college graduate? Dr. Denning is the head of the computer science department at Georgetown. She's the author of ``Cryptography and Data Security'', a classic (though now somewhat-dated) work in the field. In sort -- though she may be politically naive, and she obviously puts a different weight on personal liberty than do most of the people on this list -- she can't be accused of technical incompetence. There is no doubt that she knows more -- and perhaps far more -- about cryptography per se than do most of the people on this list. And of course, you don't want to put cryptographic details in an Op-Ed column in a tabloid newspaper; most of the audience won't understand them.

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A Push for Surveillance Software
by mikemck＠mrc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here are some choice excerpts from the headline article of the NY Times Business section, 2/28. A Push for Surveillance Software by John Markoff In the age of computer communications and digital telephone calls, the American people must be willing to give up a degree of personal privacy in exchange for safety and security, the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation said. In an interview on Friday, Louis J. Freeh (note: is it really pronounced Free?), the FBI director, defended proposed legislation that critics say would turn the nation's telephone network into a vast surveillance system. He said taxpayers would be asked to pay up to half a billion dollars to develop and deploy the necessary network software. The administration wants to impose new technology that would enable law-enforcement agents to gather a wealth of personal information by monitoring citizens' calling patterns and credit card transactions over the telephone network - and over the two-way cable television networks being planned by cable and phone companies. The system would go well beyond current wire- tapping technology, because much of the information could be gleaned without the police or FBI actually having to eavesdrop on specific voice or electronic-mail conversations. "The costs are high, but you have to do a cost-benefit analysis," said Mr. Freeh, who insisted that fighting terrorists and criminals was the governments intention - not playing Big Brother to the citizenry. ... The administration is trying to line up congressional support for the legislation, called Digital Telephony and Communications Privacy Improvement Act of 1994, before having it formally introduced. ... ____________________________________________________________ There's much more but I don't have a scanner handy. I can't believe how quickly this appalling threat has developed. The government always veils its expansion of powers as a need for increased security: the War on Drugs, criminals, terrorists. What I'm really surprised by is that they foresee the endpoint of freely available information technology, a diminishing need for centralized government. If the net contributes to the end of centralized control, it's easy to extrapolate who the target terrorists are going to be. mikemck(a)mrc.com

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Need info on E-mail security
by KEPERRIER＠setpoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I need a some help from all of you crypto-literate people out in Net.Land. The company currently employing me has recently opened several overseas offices. We have connected ourselves to the Internet to send e-mail between the Houston office (corperate HQ) the new overseas offices. As to be expected, the powers-that-be here gave no thought to security for e-mail. I have brought this to their attention about 6 weeks ago and nothing has been done yet. I know 6 weeks is a short period of time but this is still a relatively small company (400 people) so something should have happened by now if anything was going to happen. That's the history of the current situation. I believe I need to provide some proof as to how easy it is to read unencrypted Internet E-mail. Not being an experienced programmer and not knowing how a lot of things work on the Internet, I do not know how easy it is to scan in-transit e-mail for keywords. Could some kind person please inform me as to how easy it is to do this, and, if possible, please direct me to a place that papers and/or programs have been written on the subject. I belive I need to "shock" the higher-ups that this could be a very big problem if we don't do something now while use of the Internet is light. Thanks, Kent Perrier keperrier(a)setpoint.com (work) kperrier(a)neosoft.com (play) Corporations don't have opinions, people do. These are mine.

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Re: Dorothy Denning
by nobody＠jarthur 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Anyone know: >A) Is she an expert in cryptography? >B) Is she a college graduate? Now you may not agree with Dorothy's stance on Clipper, but you can't mar her academic record. Yes, she is a college graduate and an expert in cryptography. She was a professor for a while at Purdue, and is now chair of the computer science department at George Washington University. She has written quite a bit, including _Cryptography and Data Security_ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLXJj5IOA7OpLWtYzAQGn8wP/S1AFr0SfdcZcJ/XNbCU2VbP9NkbTfNAz Zf3ZiokCyvt9MwZxt6oFKRS9FgePPNysWxNegJyLWmT7KGUKE3fqK+5NEX6k8ZCz /f5/W3s4RmemQWBT3+FYkybtfqWI7GfkH3xzr4D0L5fWcyaH2S+jSXDAbHdQOlC2 02hR4C5orj0= =YVfF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Dorothy Denning
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

New York Newsday, Tuesday, March 1, 1994 Letter to the Editor THESE YANKEE CLIPPERS ... Dorothy E. Denning asserts that the federal government needs to force telecommunications consumers to buy into a so-called "weak encryption" scheme using the National Security Agency's "Clipper" computer chip because the government needs to be able to decrypt communications traffic that criminals might generate in the future ["The Clipper Chip Will Block Crime," Viewpoints, Feb. 22]. Denning fails to offer any evidence that any criminal or terrorist group has ever used encryption in the past, and also fails to explain why they would be stupid enough to use a compromisable encryption scheme in the future. Denning glosses over past governmental abuses of intercept technology with assurance that Clipper intercept procedures are resistant to abuse. Denning fails to mention that federal documents confirm that government intercept procedures involving Clipper technology offer users no more protection from wrongful government surveillance than plain text. Intercepted data protected by so-called "strong" encryption cannot be told from data protected by weak encryption until somebody actually tries to break the code --- which would make random checking of the data stream necessary to expose users of strong encryption schemes. But the government disclaims the use of codebreaking except under court order. Universal adoption of Clipper technology is unlikely because now, just months after the government unveiled Clipper, designers are offering, through electronic bulletin boards and user groups, freeware [available for free tryouts before buying] programs using strong encryption. It is only a matter of months before true "military-strength" encryption software reaches the market --- making Clipper the Edsel of cryptography. If the government forces Americans to use nothing but Clipper encryption, we can kiss the First and Fourth Amendment rights good-bye. Hold out for military-strength encryption to keep your data safe! Ludwig R. Vogel Manhattan Editor's note: The writer is chair of the Libertarian Party of New York State. The views expressed are his own. ---- Keyboarding by Lois Roth --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Mar 17 IEEE mtg:Cryptanalysis of DES
by baum＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Santa Clara Valley Information theory Group will meet to talk about Cryptanalysis of DES. Topics will include differential cryptanalysis (Biham & Shamir) and Matsuis linear cryptanalysis. Spekaers will be Susan Langford, grad student in Stanford's EE Dept., & Dr. Martin Hellman, professor in Stanford's EE Dept. Dinner, 5:30 at Good Earth, University Ave., Palo Alto, CA Presentation, 7:00, Rm 450, Durand Bldg, Stanford. Reservations (dinner? pay for yourself?) Art Astrin 408-970-6826 ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, 20525 Mariani Ave, MS 305-3B * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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