December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Randomness of a bit string
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Thompson writes: > its a joke, you didn't get it, or Ray's bought into > the biggest joke of 2 years hence. No, it was a joke, and I'm just ignorant. Duhh. Thanks to everybody who sent mail and didn't call me an idiot. -- | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> | | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO. ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX: | | (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |

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Re: Randomness of a bit string
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I remember one of those MENSA-type tests where your were supposed to >find the pattern in a set of numbers. One of the strings were the >stops of a NY City subway line! ...thereby demonstrating that Stephen Hawking, for instance, is probably not qualified to join the ranks of Mensa. I wish people would learn to distinguish "intelligence" from "high tolerance for retaining massive amounts of pointless trivia". Sorry, just a peeve of mine. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Remailer Noise Traffic
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Is there some reason why lots of 'punks _aren't_ running a simple script that will, say, fire a message to one's self through a chain of remailers every time you log on or at random intervals or something? This may be an imerfect solution to the problem of traffic analysis, but it's so uncomplicated that there seems no reason not to do it. And if there were fifty or a hundred people or so making a practice of this, it seems to be agreed that the remailers would be a great deal more secure than they are now. This is a nice little opportunity for everybody to help out the remailer operators. God knows, this list seems to be capable of generating sufficient noise -- all we have to do is harness it :-). The question is, how much traffic is _too_ much? Recommendations from remailer people? -- Will -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLUZCnffv4TpIg2PxAQFYLgP8DihQb+OXI8kqYcjmt/KI/1XZ39CzSa/r 8Af74o33GUPjGLjtayWTqWFRZbjHMMhr9xH6bgtjUz2AxhrANoeZRHm9J7pkJchN oKwDryooOexlyO88quriQsMv8trlh7UEtWf1Ig4shSgVpJUMPDkad6LHVYk3fnFn 7Un2p6cYUKU= =e6+8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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SunFed protests NSA procurement in High Performance Workstations 2
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Florida SunFlash SunNews: SunFed Protest, Sun Foundation Grants SunFLASH Vol 61 #17 January 1994 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 61.17.A Subject: SunFed Files Protest with GAO If you have questions regarding this announcement, please contact John Leahy at (703) 204-4818. SUN FEDERAL FILES AGENCY PROTEST WITH THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE Company Challenges "Round Two" of the NSA-HPW2 Workstation Procurement VIENNA, Virg. -- January 12, 1994 -- On Jan. 7, Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc., the original awardee of the National Security Agency (NSA) HPW2 (High Performance Workstation) contract, filed a formal protest with the Government Accounting Office (GAO) challenging the rebid of the procurement. It is Sun Federal's contention that the Maryland Procurement Office (MPO) has violated Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) by substantially changing the requirements of the original solicitation. The company is asking the GAO to direct the MPO to cancel this solicitation and issue a new specification based on current requirements. Sun Microsystems Federal, Inc., is the leading vendor of open client-server computing solutions to the government. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sun Microsystems, Inc., with headquarters in Milpitas, Calif.

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Re: The Packwood Memorial Diary Server
by drzaphod＠brewmeister.xstablu.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Need it be any more secure than the crypto system you would use on your > own harddisk (which could get confiscated)? > > Jim_Miller(a)suite.com Both crypto systems should be as secure as possible; however, if your documents are spinning somewhere in v-space then you've lost one piece of security: The Physical Lock. If any organization DOES find a way to break the code, then they can easily go thru the public archive and read EVERYTHING. -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- - DrZaphod #Don't Come Any Closer Or I'll Encrypt! - - [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP] #Xcitement thru Technology and Creativity - - [drzaphod(a)brewmeister.xstablu.com] [MindPolice Censored This Bit] - - 50 19 1C F3 5F 34 53 B7 B9 BB 7A 40 37 67 09 5B - -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

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Re: 4th ammendment and Cryptography
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com> >Two recommendations: >"In Our Defense - The Bill of Rights in Action", Ellen Alderman and >Caroline Kennedy [yes, *that* Caroline Kennedy], Morrow, ISBN 0-688-07801-X. With all due respect, I find it difficult to reconcile Ms. Kennedys assertion that "the people" refers collectively to state organized militia in the second amendment, without carrying this inference elsewhere. Her book is extremely fast reading, and well, light.

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Re: clipper pin-compatible chip
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: m5(a)vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) >I don't think the idea proposed is to reverse-engineer the Clipper. >Rather, the idea is that once you know the pin-out you can make an >electrically-compatible (and, in important ways, software-compatible) >replacement. While the clipper chip and its CCEP brethern have chip specifications that imply that key is supplied as long as a read flag is in a certain state. The key for the clipper chip is 10 bytes of actual key plus 3 bytes of cryptographic check word (CCW), for a total of 13 bytes. Operating in a system expecting a clipper chip potentially restricts the keyspace. Non-centrally selected keys use the clipper chip to 'fish' for the CCW, where it is re-fed. The host system (to the clipper chip) is going to try and feed 10 bytes plush 3 bytes of a constant. Utilizing IDEA, the key is supposed to be 16 Bytes. The point being that dropping an IDEA chip in is not 'plug and play'.

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unsubscribe
by Godzilla's Home Boy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

UNSUBSCRIBE

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Quantum cryptography
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

J >Does anyone know how quantum cryptography works? J > J > - Joi Almost certainly. DCF "We'll free you sons of bitches whether you want to be freed or not." --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: Crypto and 4th A.
by Lee Tien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Roy: I'm a lawyer, and I've not run across any law review articles that discuss cryptography in relation to privacy or Fourth Amendment rights. The classic treatise on Fourth Amendment search and seizure is by LaFave. I haven't looked at it recently, but it might discuss crypto. One "brute-force" approach to the legal literature is to go to the law library and scan the Index to Legal Periodicals, which is organized by subject as well as author. I don't think you'll find anything under crypto, but you'll find LOTS of stuff about the Fourth Amendment. It'll take time, but by scanning the titles of the articles you'll be able to tell if there's anything about crypto. Some law libraries also have an index of recent articles on CD- ROM, which is easier to search but is typically less comprehensive. Also check under the name Tribe, L. Tribe is the nation's leading constitutional scholar IMHO and at the first Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy he gave a talk on "technology and the Constitution." I don't recall his talking about crypto at all, but he did use as an example the cases involving privacy and wiretapping, i.e., Olmstead v. U.S., Katz v. U.S. Katz is the case which set forth the notion of "reasonable expectation of privacy." (REP) Tribe was a Supreme Court clerk who worked on this opinion, I believe. Tribe's one-volume treatise, "American Constitutional Law," briefly discusses constitutional dimensions of privacy law in one section. It is good, but only current up to 1988, as I recall. Having said that, it becomes obvious that you may want to focus on the law of REP and how it intersects with technological change. For instance, advocates of Digital Telephony, Clipper et al often make the argument that "we're only trying to maintain the status quo -- we just want to keep the existing practical balance that comes from most communications being plaintext." Yet in the same discussion -- almost in the same breath -- the same advocates of "maintaining the status quo" will remind you that you have NO REP in such things as your hair fibers, DNA obtained from saliva under a postage stamp, etc., and therefore "we don't need a search warrant." Clearly, forensic technologies have improved greatly over the years, but the law has not consistently followed a "status quo" approach. Law enforcement is better described as having a "ratchet" approach; they want to keep all the gains from improvements in forensic and surveillance technology, but not the losses. (I am indebted to Mike Godwin of EFF for this point, which he made publicly in a panel with an Assistant U.S. Attorney back in January.) BTW, keep in mind that there's an (arguably) crucial difference between the privacy implications of something like hair fiber or DNA forensic analysis and encryption/decryption relative to communications. Analyzing my hair fibers reveals no information about anyone else. With most communications there is a threat to the privacy of more than one person. I'm curious -- what's the thesis or general thrust of your article? I could say more, but that's probably enough for now. We can take this discussion to e-mail rather than the list if Cypherpunks find it too tangential. Lee Tien tien(a)well.sf.ca.us

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