December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Multiple Posting
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry about the multiple appearance of "Digital Barter Economy". I did not send it twice; Delphi does that sometimes. It seems to think the message bounced the first time, so it sends it again.

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Re: Remailer Noise Traffic
by Philippe Nave 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric Hollander writes : > > Hey, no problem, I'll have my remailer barf up a bunch of noise messages if > you'll run a slocal to filter them out. > I don't know what 'slocal' is, but I've got a kill file; if these messages contain some identifying pattern, I should be able to filter them out. Throw me a few of them and I'll tinker with my setup; also, give me some warning about what they'll look like so I can pick them out of the 'normal' mix of inspired brilliance and warped lunacy that passes for Cypherpunks message traffic...... :) [Zing! Off on a tangent.....] Stop me if you've heard this... This looks like a neat opportunity to play with digital money. Note that I said _play_. Apologies to all, but my eyes glaze over when I read too deeply into postings about authenticated foo bar prime number anonymously deniable recursively repudiable ching fong quux blat zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz...... However, if you wanted to send me (n) digital coins, electric cents, donkey farts, or whatever for every (k) noise messages I send/receive, I can see where it would be fun to try to spend them. Everybody else could try to steal them from me, I could try to spend them over and over and try to counterfeit them (perhaps asking for skilled help), and we could fiddle around with Monopoly money to our hearts' content. I'd buy things, somebody would produce goods for sale, we'd screw up the whole 'economy' repeatedly, and you digital-cash types could write enormously complex and elegant papers about the whole thing. - -- ........................................................................ Philippe D. Nave, Jr. | The person who does not use message encryption pdn(a)dwroll.dw.att.com | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO... Denver, Colorado USA | PGP public key: by arrangement. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLUgq+AvlW1K2YdE1AQFoIwQAiCL067b+4zHbPQJYTJiDz0vrwu9dCwr9 9f83J4rAMFWENB/+8MRDskKgG0oY9l1qz/trdwqvkWr5SpYuGGnecULl/8jpAp6f NfNOA3bCopVpnTH4EpHG569kAjcpQk9vWi8zmEj7Y7s/hW4sVZmqmTVvMWbh6EEp yRRlkVmrjVM= =cJX9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Talk at MIT Feb 2 (mini-abstract)
by Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This was posted to an MIT internal newsgroup; people in the local area are welcome to attend. I do not have any further information. --AW] MIT TOC SEMINAR Wednesday, February 2, 1994 Refreshments at 4:00pm, Talk at 4:15pm in NE43-518 Title: Tracing Traitors by Amos Fiat, Tel Aviv University Abstract: We give cryptographic schemes that help identify the source of a leak. Such schemes are relevant in the context of pay television, and easily combine and complement the broadcast encryption schemes of Fiat and Naor. Joint work with Benny chor and Moni Naor Host: Baruch Awerbuch

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remailer multiple paths?
by Mark W. Eichin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there any value to the idea of breaking up a message and sending the parts of it by different "remailer paths" to the ultimate recipient? Shouldn't this reduce the risk of remailer compromise as much or more than simply nesting remailers? You'd need a good way of breaking up the message; if you were encrypting already, it'd probably do well enough to put byte x into message (x mod n) where you're sending n messages. (You could even slice it at the bit level, but that's a little harder to do in a trivial script...) Or would you? is breaking up the message at all good enough, or is it necessary that "nothing of value" can be produced from the pieces? Haven't thought this through, but perhaps others here have. (The concept could even be used with an anonymous pool, sort of a "collect the whole set!" type of reading mechanism...) It could be argued that the various binary.pictures groups are already run this way :-) _Mark_ <eichin(a)paycheck.cygnus.com> ... just me at home ...

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GUI for a remailer!
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check out: http://monet.vis.colostate.edu/testing/mailer.html It's a test of a remailer based in a WWW HyperText Server, coded by yours truly. You need a WWW client that supports "forms" to see it, so try NCSA's Mosaic 2.1 for X. (available from ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu in /Mosaic -- they have binaries for most machines.) Tell me if you would like to set one up for yourself, and I would be glad to help. Please realize that this is just a test. Don't use it for remailing, just for seeing if you like it. Thanks, and have fun, -nate -- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Nate Sammons <nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu> <nate(a)yuma.ANCS.ColoState.Edu> | | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | | Data Visualization/Interrogation, Modeling, Animation, Rendering | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re:quote of the day
by an56238＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric Hughes writes: >Because of economics and political stability. > >You can build computers and monitoring devices in secret, deploy them >in secret, and listen to _everything_. To listen to everything with >bludgeons and pharmaceuticals would not only cost more in labor and >equipment, but also engender a radicalizing backlash to an actual >police state. So, it looks like cryptography boils down to making a lot of noise on the _everything_ channel, to prevent the state from listening to it, but that the case of an individual under suspicion is hopeless. How terrible! That almost scares you into being honest and paying your taxes and everything again. All of you cypherpunks who were hoping to hide your little secrets with pgp, just forget about it: what cryptography is all about is to make statistics look bland. >Of course, if one is paranoid, these considerations of the whole do >not hold, since for only one person the cost balance is reversed. But I *am* paranoid, and proudly so, since the age of two. And you would be too if you were into the business of getting cryptography down into the real world instead of toying with theoretical ideas in front of a computer screen. - -zap -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCUAgUBLUdx0Ck+9PttYUp1AQHm+AP0CFtl01rygFYz16WYFsd5r7+gpe9iajUr xeVmB/YTccc/GJO8jbzeA+cpTtedQ8t5iiFlMdtX6NcskeN3fwi52RAL/7sgNhIL LMV13dhl7IJ5pEHb2zdhbCIMClXSVVihHfs2eJRRWHSVwSYV+0Xpy8ISNW/OM7A3 WsqlsMip/A== =ZHFB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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remailer?
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nice as remailers are, I wonder if it might be better to simply create a "message drop". Various anon ID's would be created, with suitable passwords. If Sam wishes to mail to Joe, he sends to the account. It sits for up to a week before auto-deletion; prior to that time Joe can check his account for messages, retrieve as appropriate, leave other messages, and leave. The primary 'phone number would be in one location, with the remailer at a different physical location connected via non-toll call forwarding. Hence, no LD toll records of the calls to the device. Individuals would place calls, so their records might "give them away"; but there would be no return calls from the device. Finally, if someone wanted to use methods other than PGP this would seem to support such methods. Any thoughts, or am I hopelessly clueless? Regards, Dave

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Re: clipper pin-compatibl
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

T >Yeah, a lot of folks suggested the same thing (I didn't, so I'm T >neutral on the credit issue). It was debated in scy.crypt, as well as T >here on Cypherpunks. Modesty, modesty. It seems to me than *some* T. C. May discussed the reverse engineering of the Clipper Chip in April 1993 as part of the Clipper/Capstone announcement firestorm. DCF An elephant never forgets. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: subpoenas of personal
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com C >I stated that those cases didn't hold against reporters because of C >constitutional backing (i.e. Freedom of the Press). C > C >A protection which we do not have, unless you happen to publish. C > C >-ck An appeals court has just held that Press Shield laws apply to those writing books. Since anything can be research for a book, those of us who have written books may have protection for all our "notes." Likewise those who have written freelance magazine articles. Better to use encryption for your notes though. DCF Who wonders if those who post to Usenet News are "reporters"? --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: subpoenas of personal
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An appeals court has just held that Press Shield laws apply to those writing books. Since anything can be research for a book, those of us who have written books may have protection for all our "notes." Likewise those who have written freelance magazine articles. Better to use encryption for your notes though. One caveat -- I believe that the shield laws are state laws; the U.S. Supreme Court has *not* upheld the principle. Check with your local lawyers first.

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