December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PGP Public Key Server Commands HTML Document
by Jon 'Iain' Boone 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Although I can access this document and read its contents, I am unable to select the options for submitting or extracting a key. I am using XMosaic to access it -- is this a problem? Jon Boone | PSC Networking | boone(a)psc.edu | (412) 268-6959 finger boone(a)psc.edu for PGP public key block

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >I have a question for all the 'punks who are running remailers. >I've noticed that most of you run the remailers from your accounts at >various colleges & universities. I want to know what kinds of reactions >you got from the system administrators. Did they ask lots of questions, Well, I run three remailers, and as far as I know, the system administrators don't know about them. Actually, for the two on rosebud.ee.uh.edu, I don't think the admin would care since it doesn't take up much cpu time. The remailers run on previous accounts I had when I was a student at UH. As far as Rice, the usage policy states: :Sending electronic mail directly to an unofficial automatic mail :handling program is not allowed. Unofficial means something that is :not a standard part of the system and has not been installed by the :Owlnet system management. Using an automated method to direct any :incoming mail to an unofficial program is not allowed. so the chances of me running one here are zero, since I can't really risk the hassle with my only account. >Also, if I was to try running a remailer, would I need my own >machine, or is there some way I could get the school's computers to >run the remailer for me? Well, running it from a school account is probably the least expensive option :-) If you have your own machine then that's the way to go! Karl Barrus klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLU01KYOA7OpLWtYzAQEoSwP/byCQamg1NgbK/cv8gqJZLliqMF8lhBZm /i6+Q9KryvdLsMcc/Kg1XAIYPMGO+PDttCqpzqJoFC2kL2FkzkkXI4vB/RtdQScT flA7CRcpIWfYfOoCkuou4GMAAbZnkKCrOpDu3Ea8j6geQN6HZn5sGP0stF/9w/Y+ VxwkbePp4C8= =yrzM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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An easy-to-create pay-for-use remailer service
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I might set one of these up sometime this fall when I get a better net connection for my computer.. meanwhile, here's the idea: A payforuse anonymous id system. Someone would snail mail to me a money order, an login/aliasname, and a pgp SASE, encrypted with the public key of the remailer of their choice. (And the address of the remailer of course.) I would set up a mail alias which would take incoming mail, and send it off to the anonymous remailer defined by the user, with the SASE block thrown in the beginning of the message, and the To: From:, etc. lines added to the message using the "##" header pasting mechanism. Accounts would be debited according to the amount of traffic going through. Once all credit is used up, it would take another money order with the login/aliasname attached to refill the account with credit. In this way an anonymous persona can have a much more normal-looking email address, and the operator of the remailer is still ignorant of the anon-id<=>real-address mapping, to protect against subpeonas. This is just as weak as the remailer-chain used in the SASE block. The privacy of that will improve as the remailers improve.

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Re: Remailer Tearline Conventions
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unfortunately, no, there isn't an accepted convention for tear-lines that cut off the bottom of a message. The top is handled adequately. Julf's anon.penet.fi remailer cuts off anything resembling a signature, using the convention that a -- line (or maybe an all-dash line?) is a signature, since some of the common mail and news programs use that, but the regular cypherpunks remailers didn't the last time I checked. It would be nice if there were an official syntax, either something formal and mimeish, or a simpler '--truncate here--' sort of line that gets retained across remailing so additional junk doesn't accrete. Bill # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Systems, aka NCR Corp # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465

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Properties of hash functions
by Aviel David Rubin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know the following, or can someone point me to the proper references? What properties are preserved by hash functions? For example, take x = MD5(Y). Now, say that Y is a quadradic residue mod N, is it the case that x is also a quadradic residue mod N? Are there any interesting properties that are preserved by frequently used hash functions? Thanks a lot for any help, Avi Rubin

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Re: Index for ftp site csn.org:/mpj/
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just recently got MacRipem and find it much easier to use th an PGP, and was wondering why I should use PGP over Ripem. The above seems to indicate that Ripem isn't as secure. Why is this? I don't doubt that its much easier to use -- it was written by Ray Lau, who is an excellent Mac/UI programmer. The most reasonable reasons why it might be called "less secure" is that RIPEM does not have a signature web like PGP does. It is possible in PEM to only have one signature on your certificate, which can be your own signature, or that of a CA. Therefore, you either have the status of "I say I am who I say I am", or a "Certification Authority says I am who I say I am". I can't speak for RIPEM, but that's not accurate for PEM. You can have as long a chain of signatures as you want up to the certifying authority. That may not be as general as you'd like, but it's better than just a single authority. A bigger problem is that PEM uses DES rather than IDEA. I just learned of a new attack by Mitsuru Matsui of Mitsubishi that requires 2^43 *known* plaintexts, not chosen ones. The note I received says that it ``breaks the scheme in 50 days on 12 HP9735 workstations''. This was presented last week at the Japanese Conference on Cryptography and Information Security.

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Re: Index for ftp site csn.org:/mpj/
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> A bigger problem is that PEM uses DES rather than IDEA. I just learned > of a new attack by Mitsuru Matsui of Mitsubishi that requires 2^43 > *known* plaintexts, not chosen ones. The note I received says that it > ``breaks the scheme in 50 days on 12 HP9735 workstations''. This was > presented last week at the Japanese Conference on Cryptography and > Information Security. RIPEM supports two key triple DES. Mark

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Re: MacPGP BAD on soda.be
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com W >> Re: encrypted valium W >Just wait until Chemical CAD/CAM becomes available - shipping valium W >will be protected by the First Amendment, the data police will be W >competing with the drug police to confiscate your computers, W >and LD wibe ranting that drug dealers are using crypto remailers W >for both payments and product delivery :-) Likewise, the BATF. "Who's that knocking on my door?" "The Dowager Dutchess of Dykedom's Daring Destructors?" "But my stout door will only last a few minutes and I have no weaponry." "Oh, woe is me." "But wait, I just got my new 3D molecular deposition printer and the varlets have yet to block my wireless net link. What is the address of that hot new weapons haven. Quick, download the DDF's for that new full auto flechette cloud Block Leveler (plus DDF's for the ammo belt)." Copy the gun DDF out the printer port, wait that looong 30 seconds, grab the freshly printed device, copy the ammo belt ddf out the printer port (after clicking the icon for continuous printing), grab the end of the belt as it starts to come out of the printer. Get the kids, dogs, goats, and chickens into the circle around the printer, when the door gives way, start a circle sweep taking out the house, the garden, and all vertebrate life out to the visible horizon." ******* Just kidding. No problem running off a couple dozen Ruger Mini 14s though. Though cypherpunks is not the place to argue RTKBA issues, it *is* the place to discuss issues like the effect of crypto, and reduced costs of information, on society. Since some of the things that people will choose to trade over the nets will be porno, drug files, and weapons files (they are already doing so), and since desktop molecular synthesis units and molecular deposition "printers" are inside our event horizon, they can be discussed here. DCF Who (despite evidence to the contrary) doesn't have a psychological need for automatic weapons merely a tactical one (just like Salman Rushdie). --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: Index for ftp site csn.org:/mpj/
by Derek Atkins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I can't speak for RIPEM, but that's not accurate for PEM. You can have > as long a chain of signatures as you want up to the certifying authority. > That may not be as general as you'd like, but it's better than just a > single authority. I think we have a lack of communication here. What I said is completely true about PEM, as well as RIPEM. You cannot have more than one signature on your certificate. I did not mention signature chains in my message at all, only signatures. For example, in PEM, you have the root key sign some certificate, and that certificate signs another, and so on down the chain to a user certificate. However, in PEM I cannot sign your certificate! *THAT* is what I'm talking about. PEM certificates can have one, and *ONLY* one, signature on them. I'm not saying that I think the PEM CA model is bad -- there are good points to it. I just feel it is too restrictive. I like being able to have anyone sign anybody's key in PGP, and building certification in that manner. The fact that in PEM you have a lot of hoops to jump through in order to become a CA will, IMHO, be its downfall. Right now anyone can become a PGP Certification Authority. -derek

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Clipper Petition
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Clipper Petition Electronic Petition to Oppose Clipper Please Distribute Widely On January 24, many of the nation's leading experts in cryptography and computer security wrote President Clinton and asked him to withdraw the Clipper proposal. The public response to the letter has been extremely favorable, including coverage in the New York Times and numerous computer and security trade magazines. Many people have expressed interest in adding their names to the letter. In response to these requests, CPSR is organizing an Internet petition drive to oppose the Clipper proposal. We will deliver the signed petition to the White House, complete with the names of all the people who oppose Clipper. To sign on to the letter, send a message to: Clipper.petition(a)cpsr.org with the message "I oppose Clipper" (no quotes) You will receive a return message confirming your vote. Please distribute this announcement so that others may also express their opposition to the Clipper proposal. CPSR is a membership-based public interest organization. For membership information, please email cpsr(a)cpsr.org. For more information about Clipper, please consult the CPSR Internet Library - FTP/WAIS/Gopher CPSR.ORG /cpsr/privacy/crypto/clipper ===================================================================== The President The White House Washington, DC 20500 Dear Mr. President: We are writing to you regarding the "Clipper" escrowed encryption proposal now under consideration by the White House. We wish to express our concern about this plan and similar technical standards that may be proposed for the nation's communications infrastructure. The current proposal was developed in secret by federal agencies primarily concerned about electronic surveillance, not privacy protection. Critical aspects of the plan remain classified and thus beyond public review. The private sector and the public have expressed nearly unanimous opposition to Clipper. In the formal request for comments conducted by the Department of Commerce last year, less than a handful of respondents supported the plan. Several hundred opposed it. If the plan goes forward, commercial firms that hope to develop new products will face extensive government obstacles. Cryptographers who wish to develop new privacy enhancing technologies will be discouraged. Citizens who anticipate that the progress of technology will enhance personal privacy will find their expectations unfulfilled. Some have proposed that Clipper be adopted on a voluntary basis and suggest that other technical approaches will remain viable. The government, however, exerts enormous influence in the marketplace, and the likelihood that competing standards would survive is small. Few in the user community believe that the proposal would be truly voluntary. The Clipper proposal should not be adopted. We believe that if this proposal and the associated standards go forward, even on a voluntary basis, privacy protection will be diminished, innovation will be slowed, government accountability will be lessened, and the openness necessary to ensure the successful development of the nation's communications infrastructure will be threatened. We respectfully ask the White House to withdraw the Clipper proposal.

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