December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

4th ammendment and Cryptography
by kevin＠axon.cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phil Karn writes: > Worst of all are the complete loonies (some apparently on this list) > who assert that guns are an essential protection against a tyrannical > US Federal Government. Those "complete loonies" include Thomas Jefferson and many other of the founding fathers. > Those who believe this have apparently never heard of the US Civil War, ...a conflict in which the opposing sides were geographically separate, making it easy to know where to aim an attack. The situation is much more difficult when the enemy is hidden among you. Apparently, you've never heard of the Revolutionary War, the Vietnam War or the Afghanistan War. > I'd rather not be associated with gun fetishists [...] My, my, more name-throwing. You know, it never ceases to amaze me how selective some people can be in the rights they support (and for whom). It always comes back to bite them eventually, though. The South might have successfully seceded if it hadn't been for their nasty habit of keeping slaves. Conservatives who supported property rights but not certain personal rights now find that no-one's property is safe under the civil forfeiture laws, which were passed to fight the War on (Some) Drugs. And those who support the right to use cryptography, but not the right to bear arms, will find that the same argument used against gun owners -- "X is a favored tool of criminals, thus we must ban X" -- will be turned against users of cryptography. You'd better learn to get along with gun owners, Phil. You just might end up sharing a prison cell with one. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Kevin S. Van Horn | It is the means that determine the ends. kevin(a)bert.cs.byu.edu |

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re: 4th ammendment and Cryptography
by dave_taffs＠rainbow.mentorg.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sender: Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com>: > Worst of all are the complete loonies (some apparently on this list) > who assert that guns are an essential protection against a tyrannical > US Federal Government. Those who believe this have apparently never > heard of the US Civil War, because the South tried exactly this over > 130 years ago. (They failed, BTW.) It succeeded only in destroying > most of an entire generation of Americans, along with much of the > country. And that was before some rather significant advances in US > military weaponry, vis a vis privately owned weapons. > ... > Phil This guy scares me more than any number of "gun nuts"... -- O_O 01234567 dave_taffs(a)mentorg.com | . . ^ "Kolmogorov-Chaitin measures of complexity are | (_:_) MGC != me very exciting." -- Tim May on 12/02/93 |

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re: 4th ammendment and Cryptography
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>sender: Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com>: > >> Worst of all are the complete loonies (some apparently on this list) >> who assert that guns are an essential protection against a tyrannical >> US Federal Government. Those who believe this have apparently never >> heard of the US Civil War, because the South tried exactly this over >> 130 years ago. (They failed, BTW.) It succeeded only in destroying >> most of an entire generation of Americans, along with much of the >> country. And that was before some rather significant advances in US >> military weaponry, vis a vis privately owned weapons. >> ... >> Phil > >This guy scares me more than any number of "gun nuts"... Perhaps I'm foolish for asking, but what, precisely, has any of this to do with _cryptography_? Could you all go out back and shoot it out, perhaps? -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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re: 4th ammendment and Cryptography
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>sender: Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com>: >> ... >> Phil >This guy scares me more than any number of "gun nuts"... > O_O 01234567 dave_taffs(a)mentorg.com Personally I have a lot of respect for Phil with regards to areas we can at least agree on. Hopefully, we can at least agree on the exercise of free speech. We can see at the very least that the adage "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" doesn't hold true for political polarities. All of us see some threat to rights by government, varying by degree and intent. Instead of bickering (and name calling) perhaps we should seek common ground in this forum: Cryptography. There are those of us who focus on breaking the government monopoly on power by removing money from its exclusive control, promoting digital money with the ability for anonymity. It would be very hard for a government to be oppressive when it doesn't control society through its purse strings. (It makes it hard to unilaterally raise or even have taxes, too.)

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sase script
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone posted something about SASE's and remailers. Most of the hardcore remailer fans will undoubtably be bored by this, but for the rest of us, this post contains a script that will cause a text file called foo.txt to be sent back to me through a remailer chain. Just write your reply and save it in a text file called foo.txt, save this post to a text file in the same directory, and run unshar on the post. (If you called the post sase.post, for example, just say unshar -n sase.post.) All of this assumes you use unix, of course. If you're going to send me something, a remailer list with PGP keys would be nice. I posted a request for such a list a day or so ago, and didn't get any response at all. And if you can't figure out how to make your own sase script, drop me a line and I'll help you out. Just make sure you give me a way to get in touch with you. Here's my public key if you want to encrypt your message to me. I've used uuencode because the ascii-armour format native to PGP chokes unshar. begin 644 blank.pgp MF0"-`BU(/U0```$$`+T3IG-PKA_8+6Q@/BIU(G5<E1@)]R4RZ0J"X<_O:!;" M$A/:QUS>NI"6I':G*X<[BT)BPGM2XFY:T<70YJH7Y:FY^'P^R)52I=;NDT/" M?0F-('XJ"0L[)7$+JNV8P%1!Q_0KVWH*LM2Q0G1E]@ZF)"FE>$<N`T<:;]MP D-?J$+"8I``41M!EB;&%N:R`\8FQA;FM`;F]W:&5R92YC;VT^ ` end #!/bin/sh # # This script will mail a file called foo.txt to me. # sed -e '/^BEGINSASE/d' -e '/^ENDSASE/d' << \End_of_File > sase.tmp BEGINSASE :: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.3a hEwCpNUZLrF9FUsBAf9Dtq1jBDAT42Jj+XPVDwiDf88FG1hZBILWNtDQ4b13Qt7j 1Hd1FcXX8NiPFFKFgt6Y7bi+xGGg7yMowlNfMw1vpgAAAW13PygtTOl3VgX2442B hFyVNnzYpOBJ+E1z56RUsVujOIjyXIIZVWmfnrO5PaOIsSKWRSaHfWEIM9nVJaNm xgsahPw5PlJaV1+em7VEjLSeyb5NNUyOm6Rq4Fptye0o3kBVpsDRPX5LBkE4XJlU Q1fZZaGg+VLZ+e9jwiwu86j+S15imv8YHZeFxoMKD1pmfZAKqzUPdpiH4sq2UmAz OOAI4e+Vh41GmLV9qr5hdMk9A8vi6vrqOUr3ouDLdQ8+RQsvbUUHT2RtGrWyql6d mdR9QpuhgSdas3Hxre15RSVreCWozlh9Q1HGCAExu6H+DcVTLHfmNqyFZjkUmHIM /mpd1Sf331MytdIYjvIv8OaKrwiQaAKFpOyo8iigTpI1bIAUDaW+BC2JpXJv5vIq MaAPV8zsqNywNtexLGvg32v2JELGoHNegycUwDYnKCwmWEtr9acEJ3HOQ4OWnb2W dUr/Dd5akY6L+07AWFKa6w== =Geng -----END PGP MESSAGE----- ENDSASE End_of_File cat sase.tmp foo.txt | mail -s "" ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu rm sase.tmp

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Remailer delays
by Matthew J Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I tried out a whole batch of cypherpunk remailers. I sent ping messages to: remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu, nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu, hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu, hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu, hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu, 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu, hal(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu, cs60a-qu(a)cory.eecs.berkeley.edu, ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu, catalyst(a)netcom.com, remailer(a)rebma.mn.org, elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu, hfinney(a)shell.portal.com, sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu, remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu, remailer(a)merde.dis.org, remailer(a)entropy.linet.org, elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu The ping messages were sent out at 20:27:44 EST. Here's the ones I got back, and the respective times: nobody(a)shell.portal.com 20:30:46 (+0:03:02) catalyst-remailer(a)netcom.com 20:30:55 (+0:03:11) nobody(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 20:31:05 (+0:03:21) nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 20:31:16 (+0:03:32) remailer-admin(a)chaos.bsu.edu 20:31:27 (+0:03:43) nobody(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 20:31:50 (+0:04:06) nobody(a)shell.portal.com 20:32:33 (+0:04:49) nobody(a)soda.berkeley.edu 20:34:01 (+0:06:17) nobody(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 20:34:14 (+0:06:30) nobody@eli-remailer 20:37:08 (+0:09:24) nobody(a)soda.berkeley.edu 20:37:26 (+0:09:42) remailer(a)dis.org 20:45:48 (+0:18:04) nobody(a)Menudo.UH.EDU 01:00:19 (+4:32:35) I got mail bounces ("Unknown User") from: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu cs60a-qu(a)cory.eecs.berkeley.edu After 24 hours, I have gotten no response from: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu hal(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu remailer(a)rebma.mn.org remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu remailer(a)entropy.linet.org I think sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu just forwards to hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu. I got two messages back from hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu. elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu batches out messages at midnight (which is 1:00 here). My apologies to the remail operators who received the corrupted messages from my failed first two attempts in their mailboxes.

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Index for ftp site csn.org:/mpj/
by exabyte!smtplink!mikej＠uunet.UU.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A partial listing of the contents of the ftp source at csn.org:/mpj/ follows. This site is dedicated to the First Amendment of the Constitution of the USA. If you are interested in distributing data here, please send mail to mpj(a)csn.org. Bible/ Contains the entire King James Version of the Holy Bible in both gzipped tar and pkzipped format. One ASCII text file per book. Bill_of_Rights.txt U. S. Constitution's Bill of Rights (ASCII). I_will_not_export/ Contains export controlled encryption software. README.MPJ Read this for access to encryption software. Note that you MUST read and agree to the terms set forth in this document to access the crypto software. If abuses are brought to my attention, access to this site may be restricted with little or no notice. cryptusa.ps.gz Commentary on U. S. Encryption Export laws (gzipped PostScript). cryptusa.txt.gz Commentary on U. S. Encryption Export laws (ASCII text). cryptusa.zip Commentary on U. S. Encryption Export laws (pkzipped Word for Windows 2.0 format). help Help on accessing crypto area (ASCII). help.txt Help on accessing crypto area (ASCII). itar-july-1993.txt.gz U. S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (gzipped ASCII). itar9307.zip U. S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (PKZIPPED ASCII and WordPerfect versions). mpj4.asc Viacrypt PGP public key for Michael Paul Johnson <mpj(a)csn.org>, who is providing this site. I_will_not_export/crypto_???????: For the actual characters to replace the question marks, you MUST read README.MPJ. The crypto_??????? directory will not show up in a directory listing. cryptanalysis/ Cryptanalysis programs and documents. curve_encrypt/ IDEA based encryption for the Mac. Not to be confused with elliptic curves. des/ A PC equivalent of the Unix DES command and some DES C source code. hpack/ Compression/archiving program with encryption. misc/ Stuffit expander for the Mac, etc. mpj/ Crypto programs and documents written by Mike Johnson. papers/ How to crack DES, etc. pgp/ The latest Pretty Good Privacy freeware version. pgp_tools/ PGP compatible function library. pgpshell/ DOS & Windows shells for PGP. ripem/ A subset implementation of the proposed Privacy Enhanced Mail standard. Not as secure as PGP or Viacrypt PGP, but it is both free and free of patent infringements in the USA. rsa/ Contains RSAREF, the most legal way to create FREE software using the RSA algorithm in the USA. secdrv/ Secure Drive - device driver based IDEA encryption on the fly for MS-DOS. I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/mpj: crypte11.zip Fast, somewhat user-friendly proprietary encryption for the PC. cryptmpj.zip Master's thesis on encryption, including original design of the MPJ encryption algorithm. Includes working example program with source code in Pascal. The example program is NOT user-friendly, but it works. mpj.ps.gz Description of MPJ2 encryption algorithm, gzipped PostScript format. mpj2d100.zip MPJ2 encryption algorithm demo with C source code. mpj2ieee.txt.gz More on MPJ2. Note: the key expansion algorithm has mpj2ieee.zip been improved after this publication. Send mail to mpj2source.gz mpj(a)csn.org for details. mpj_ps.zip onepad11.zip Simple implementation of the classic one time pad in C++. PKZIPPED. I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/papers: des_key_search.ps.gz I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp: amiga/ atari/ macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx.gz gzipped, binhexxed executable for PGP for the MAC. old/ pgp-ng.zip Norton guides for PGP. pgp23A.tar.Z Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) (TM) Version 2.3A for Unix and other platforms. pgp23A.tar.Z.sig Detached signature for above. pgp23A.zip Pretty Good Privacy 2.3A for DOS. pgp23A.zip.sig Detached signature for above. pgp23docA.zip Documentation only for PGP 2.3A (not export controlled). pgp23sigA.asc pgp23sra.sig Source code detached signature. pgp23sra.zip Source code for PGP 2.3A. pgpfaq-1.asc Frequently Asked Questions for PGP (ASCII). pgpfaq-2.asc pgpfaq-3.asc pgpfaq-4.asc pgpfaq.doc Frequently Asked Questions for PGP (MS Word for Windows format). pgpfaq.sig pgplegal.zip Some legal issues with PGP. I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/amiga: PGPAmi23a2_src.lha PGPAmi23a2_src.readme PGPAmi23a_2.lha PGPAmi23a_2.readme PGPAmi23aplus.lha PGPAmi23aplus.readme PGPAmiga.tar PGPAmiga2_3a.lha PGPAmiga2_3a.readme I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/atari: pgp23ab.lzh pgp23abm.lzh pgp23ast.lzh I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp_tools: PGPTOOLS.ZIP A function library for developing PGP compatible programs or programs using RSA or IDEA. Also contains useful functions for radix-64 ASCII armor, etc. Note that RSA and IDEA are patented, so you may have to license these algorithms for your particular application. I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgpshell: PWF20.ZIP A PGP shell for Windows. PWFNOTE.TXT pgpshe30.zip A PGP shell for DOS. ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-938-9654 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org ftp csn.org \mpj\README.MPJ for access info.| | |||/ /_\ | aka mpjohnso(a)nyx.cs.du.edu mikej(a)exabyte.com | | |||\ ( | m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org CIS 71331,2332 VPGP key by finger | | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLUmmUT9nBjyFM+vFAQFTpwP/Z8sGDy14Tj1kHU/q9g3/3pR4Tfvs/WIs GXt0Xf897JSpBC1ozgjhOo31kp2OyjtX1a5lT5LEgF2LY3/D4vCfdHeTL41mOEgz 2bMzxiyZzXJ18QaigF1M/f0IZl7qamZB7FhBbveJClMXH85ndudoySUVCUEuXngY s121tfIsc/I= =Bv/r -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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re: 4th ammendment and Cryptography
by dave_taffs＠rainbow.mentorg.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > This guy scares me more than any number of "gun nuts"... > Perhaps I'm foolish for asking, but what, precisely, has any of this to do > with _cryptography_? > Could you all go out back and shoot it out, perhaps? You are right, of course -- I apologize for responding hastily... ObCrypto: Maybe there was another message hidden in the dots...

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Re: 4th ammendment and Cryptography
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Phil Karn <karn(a)qualcomm.com> >Two recommendations: >"In Our Defense - The Bill of Rights in Action", Ellen Alderman and >Caroline Kennedy [yes, *that* Caroline Kennedy], Morrow, ISBN 0-688-07801-X. With all due respect, I find it difficult to reconcile Ms. Kennedys assertion that "the people" refers collectively to state organized militia in the second amendment, without carrying this inference elsewhere. Her book is extremely fast reading, and well, light.

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Re: 2-way anonymous via SASE
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim's idea looks good for anonymous communication. It is basically the same as the one Chaum describes in his 1981 Communications of the ACM paper. CACM is one of the most widely available computer science journals so I would encourage people interested in this topic to go to the local university or junior college library and xerox it (CACM, vol 24, p. 84, February, 1981). The one difference is that Jim's B, C, and D are conventional rather than public keys in Chaum's system. This could be slightly more efficient. We have had a primitive SASE capability available and documented on the cypherpunks remailers for over a year. Karl Barrus and I have written scripts and programs to facilitate creating SASE's - you just type in your address and a list of remailers to use and out comes the SASE block which goes at the top of the reply message. The weakness of the present system is that it lacks the B's etc. for extra encryption at each stage. That means that someone who can observe net traffic can match up incoming and outgoing messages because the body does not change, only the address portion changes. (Of course, such matching is already possible for the non-batching remailers based on simple timing, which includes almost all of them.) One other caution Chaum raises re the SASE's is that they should not be used more than once. If they could be it would be possible to send in multiple messages using the same SASE and notice which output address was similarly duplicated. This non-reuse actually has to be enforced by the remailer, else the Opponent can eavesdrop on an SASE-based message and replay the address portion. Hal

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