December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

'Nother possible Stego place...
by Alan (Miburi-san) Wexelblat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It's a bit of a hack, but don't most char implementations in C just ignore the high-order bit? --Alan Wexelblat, Reality Hacker, Author, and Cyberspace Bard Media Lab - Advanced Human Interface Group wex(a)media.mit.edu Voice: 617-258-9168 Page: 617-945-1842 na53607(a)anon.penet.fi We are Chaos Boys. We are coming to a paradigm near you.

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Re: encrypting the list (Was Re: Insecurity of public key)
by Eric Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: Eric Johnson says: : > I don't think "adjust[ing] on a case by case basis" is necessary. : > I was suggesting just the opposite. It obviously isn't a security : > issue. I believe it is more of a first principles issue; "Thou : > shall encrypt thy communications, lest thou draw attention to thy : > self, and the right be removed by thine opponents." : : You miss the point, Eric. We are advocating that IN THE FUTURE all : communications should be encrypted. However, FOR THE MOMENT this is : often impractical. Cypherpunks write code in an effort to try to bring : this future closer. However, making our lives impossible right now : will delay that future. This is hyperbole. It would not make our lives impossible. And far from delaying the future, as it relates to communications on the list, I would argue that it would reduce the signal-to-noise ratio immensely, thereby hastening the deployment of tools. So I don't think I'm missing the point simply by disagreeing with you. : I encrypt things whenever possible. Some people I communicate with : can't encrypt, so I adjust, on a case by case basis. Someday, : hopefully within the next year or two, things will be different. : : Encrypting this list ever would be useless -- but fine if it would : be easy to do. Since it isn't easy or useful, it is a bad idea. It's usefulness depends both upon whether you think increasing the ratio of cryptext vs. cleartext to your system is useful, and whether easy is defined by the least capable systems on the list. Don't worry. I'll drop it here. : : Perry BTW, you don't have to shout. I can read upper-lower case text without difficulty. --Eric

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Defenders of Clipper
by area51＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi everyone, I've been watching this list for a few weeks now, and I really don't see any real basis for defending Clipper. It seems the essential arugment of Denning and others is, "Well, we can't tell you what we're afraid of, but trust us, we should be afraid". Can they not tell us because they don't know? Or is it some sort of "secret" they fear? Obviously, widespread secure communications would make life much easier for criminals. Yes, terrorists will be able to make their secret plans using cryptography. But, I would hasten to point out that the Trade Center bombers managed to pull their attack off with NO encrypted conversations that I've heard about. And yes, next time it might be a nuclear bomb. There, is that the unnamed terror? Or is it that the intelligence community is learning all the neat-o toys they bought for SIGINT are rapidly becoming worthless, and in reality there's absolutely nothing they can do about it. They'll have to strengthen their long neglected human intel-gathering side, much as some members of their own community have been arguing for years. The real reason Denning, the NSA, et al are arguing for Clipper is that they realize their professions are becoming obsolete. Welcome to the ranks of the techo-unemployed. Just as nuclear proliferation marches on slowly but surely, so will high-tech crypto. Information wants to be free, as they say, and the implication here is you just can't stop it. Does the government really think they can stop everyone in the world who wishes this nation harm from using crypto? I think not....So they better get on the ball really defending us... Sorry for rambling on.... Rod Ramsey Area51(a)aol.com

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PEM, was Re: low-overhead encrypted telnet
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message Wed, 2 Mar 1994 11:55:32 -0600 (CST), Jim McCoy <mccoy(a)ccwf.cc.utexas.edu> writes: > I sincerely doubt that such a system would be designed or implemented > before the turn of the century. All one needs to do is take a look at the > PEM key certification authority clusterfuck to see just how difficult it > can be to implment something like this. I have to admit that PEM's RSN availability against PGP 2.X's 20+ months of worldwide availability has made me not keep up with PEM and the latest hierarchical, government controlled certification process... But is there an intrinsic problem with a PGP-style web of trust for remote telnet/rlogin applications. I really don't expect to login to arbitrary nodes on the net, but is that required? or simply a robust way (SecureID in software?) Maybe PCMCIA cards with PGP once desktop systems have them. If i'm cluelessly missing something essential, please email me the news. Thanks Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via firger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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RE: Laziness?
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message Wed, 2 Mar 1994 10:38:55 -0800 (PST), tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: > I connect to the Net from my home Mac IIci or PowerBook 170 over a > 14.4 modem line to Netcom, an Internet service provider many of you > are familiar with. Once on Netcome, I have access to a wide range of > standard UNIX tools. However, I do NOT run PGP on these machines! > > Rather, I run MacPGP (or PGP on my DOS machines, in emergencies, or > even "MailSafe" in rare circumstances) on my *home* machine, after first > downloading the mail with "Eudora 2.0," a nice off-line mail reader. > It still takes several steps, as most of you can imagine. I use a similar system to Tim's, except that I use NUpop on a "PC" to download 150+ messages a day from cypherpunks and a bunch of other lists. We have to move the tools to the user's controlled, secure environment. For some that may be Unix, but for close to 98% of the 'net community, a controlled computer is a Mac or PC. At GMU, a few supported grad students have personal Suns or other workstations, maybe 50 students out of 22,000. But nearly all of the students in the techy schools have at least a PC or mac that is under their personal control. Multi-user Unix solutions don't cut it. More importantly, if all 700+ of us on this list used encrpytion for _every message every day_ it would be only an insignificant portion of the net volume. We have to get encryption out to the masses. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Windows Programming help wanted.
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a repeat of a request that I made last fall. I got no real response then. Perhaps as the list has grown, someone will respond.... I am looking for help on a Microsoft Windows development project. I have most of a Windows Client SMTP mail client program written, but I can't devine how to make the Windows Communications API work with any marginal success. I need help from someone who has written Windows communications software. The program is functionally equivalent to NUpop or Eudora. It is designed to work over dialup asynchronous lines without TCP/IP. Not that I dislike all the nice functionality tht TCP/IP provides, but because some netowrk providers (such as George Mason University) refuse to support SLIP/PPP for political reasons, and because other providers (Netcom for one) charge orders of magnitude more for SLIP/PPP than for async support. The resulting product will be user firendly, a native Windows program with the usual buttons, icons, context sensitive help, etc. It will have PGP, and maybe RIPEM, support built in. Automagically. I plan to release the code to the net, and will give full credit in the About Box, documentation, etc. for any help. Please respond via email. Cypherpunks write code. Thanks Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: Insecurity of public key crypto #1 (reply to Mandl)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A while back, when people were starting to talk about encrypting the list, someone like Eric Hughes pointed out that, if you *want* to run an encrypted, or batch-digested, or whatever, version of cypherpunks, you were free to do so - just set up your system and have it forward cypherpunks to your subscribers. Somebody could still do it now (not me! :-), preferably outside the US where the problems of RSA/PKP patents don't apply. The flip side of the problem is building an automagic decryptor for mail sent *to* cypherpunks, though you could accomplish part of that by using the extropia anonymous remailer which accepts encrypted mail. On the other hand, doing either of these functions on toad.com today risks subjecting John and friends to harassment from RSA (unless toad.com happens to be a Sun 486i or really hot box with SoftPC that can emulate Intel code fast enough to run ViaCrypt.) Bill

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re: Denning
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I agree with those who oppose unwarranted attacks on Dr Dennings character. She is by all accounts an intelligent, well-mannered person and deserves to be treated as such. I completely disagree with her about clipper however. I have watched with growing horror as our government over the last 15 years has slowly turned into a near fascist state. Black clad commandos storming a religious group's compound deliberately inciting an armed confrontation, then harrassing for more then a month, then initiating an attack that left most members including the children dead. People who had not been convicted of anything. We are told if we only knew, we would support clipper, I think not. Hide behind your secret information if you chose, we have a general idea of what you fear anyway. We are less worried about nuclear/chemical/biological/informational terrorists then we are of what our government could become with such fascist tools. After all, there are terrorist acts now, when you can listen. Its about privacy...... Its about adults making their own decisions, not some paternalistic government, no matter how well meaning, doing it for us. We will build the tools we need, we will bypass attempts to stop us, we will advance till our communication ressembles noise. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLXUQbdCcBnAsu2t1AQG9OgQApYhHWjg47wShhzMfQL2LedmAv5j52Ijb H7V+0EO3V4VFsJ2qgtEvOZNHDs2XBCcIthxbpfALOn+V+PY/0eayff5gHBfirKpX AyXRSdGabqA7uVu0PgSSH31fG4OLL4j91crI/9HrVccztfOMGv2dcZGdpyNLBGRi OEW8ZBGieCg= =I02i -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Dorothy Denning
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Chill... I thought that our prime objective was to defeat Clipper... >even if you don't like Ross, he does have some pull with the people of >this country, and that's what we need... we need the *PEOPLE* to fight >Clipper. Mark Twain once said that the only people entitled to use the word "we" when referring to themselves were kings, editors and people with tapeworms. I assume that you're speaking on behalf of your intestinal parasites. Ross Perot is a reactionary head-case. He is the _last_ person I would think to bring into the Clipper debate, right after Bob Packwood and Jesse Helms. >We need the fight not to just be "a group of civil libertarians", but >the general populous. Maybe Ross isn't the answer, but at least I've >taken a real step to try to oppose Clipper. What the hell have you >done, Black Unicorn? Well, for starts, he's posted things that demonstrate possession of a nervous system a few levels above a notochord. What on earth would lead you to believe that you have any claim whatsoever to doing something significant to oppose Clipper in relation to others on this list? You sent a bloody piece of email, and to very much the wrong person: BFD. Don't hold your breath waiting for either a medal or a parade. Your ravings regarding Dorothy Denning pretty much set the tone for all of your contributions since then: juvenile, poorly thought out, and ineptly executed. Goodbye, Mr. Ortenzi. Down the oubliette with you. *plonk* -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Re: Clipper (Re: Dorothy Denning)
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I write: > I think this is very perceptive. Clipper is perhaps the best > they could _think_ of given an outmoded set of axioms. Bill Stewart writes: >I disagree. My opinion is that the axioms involved are >1) We're in power, and want to stay there. >2) Some kinds of technology greatly enhance our power if we control them. >3) Crypto Technology is a major threat to our power unless we control it. Looks to me like we substantially agree with one another, actually. I might, however, throw out an additional concept, which, to me at least, is a very significant consideration. The basic reasoning of our government with regard to individual rights has always been that rights are agreed on by society as a whole, and one of the social roles of government is to act both as protector and _arbiter_ of those rights. I think this shows through every time somebody talks about "trade-offs" -- this is government acting as arbiter, trying to enforce an assumed role as the body charged with deciding what rights _mean_ in a practical social context. Under many circumstances, this is an appropriate role: the government acts to protect free speech more often than it acts to suppress it, for instance. But the spooky illogic of Clipper comes, I think, from this model of rights as things the government can, but doesn't take away from its citizens. Cryptography breaks this paradigm, because privacy becomes something posessed by the citizen independent of the government's good will. Clipper is an effort to restore the traditional paradigm, to return the government quite literally to its traditional role of "keeper of the keys". It is a failure to recognize that the rules of the world are changing, and a failure to adapt. This is more frightening in a lot of ways than any "Nixon-esque" intrigue could ever be. -- Will -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLXSzcffv4TpIg2PxAQGhMwP9EXJdIgj3vJVLYdavBon4GAPQF3lWDh/b E8nRToSPKR5iac7X3tmoEyl2AHiArneKgeqcdFh+1AZapfGyRl0iWQDZgQxlDMrt Vix9GxQ/wDVJTjopWyTIMFtgPz86B47ObRXi2doCG7od1+Rlw5rvwTARW0H4jUep ZvVsgmaOx+c= =R7+u -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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