December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

remailer multiple paths?
by Mark W. Eichin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there any value to the idea of breaking up a message and sending the parts of it by different "remailer paths" to the ultimate recipient? Shouldn't this reduce the risk of remailer compromise as much or more than simply nesting remailers? You'd need a good way of breaking up the message; if you were encrypting already, it'd probably do well enough to put byte x into message (x mod n) where you're sending n messages. (You could even slice it at the bit level, but that's a little harder to do in a trivial script...) Or would you? is breaking up the message at all good enough, or is it necessary that "nothing of value" can be produced from the pieces? Haven't thought this through, but perhaps others here have. (The concept could even be used with an anonymous pool, sort of a "collect the whole set!" type of reading mechanism...) It could be argued that the various binary.pictures groups are already run this way :-) _Mark_ <eichin(a)paycheck.cygnus.com> ... just me at home ...

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GUI for a remailer!
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Check out: http://monet.vis.colostate.edu/testing/mailer.html It's a test of a remailer based in a WWW HyperText Server, coded by yours truly. You need a WWW client that supports "forms" to see it, so try NCSA's Mosaic 2.1 for X. (available from ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu in /Mosaic -- they have binaries for most machines.) Tell me if you would like to set one up for yourself, and I would be glad to help. Please realize that this is just a test. Don't use it for remailing, just for seeing if you like it. Thanks, and have fun, -nate -- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Nate Sammons <nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu> <nate(a)yuma.ANCS.ColoState.Edu> | | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | | Data Visualization/Interrogation, Modeling, Animation, Rendering | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re:quote of the day
by an56238＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric Hughes writes: >Because of economics and political stability. > >You can build computers and monitoring devices in secret, deploy them >in secret, and listen to _everything_. To listen to everything with >bludgeons and pharmaceuticals would not only cost more in labor and >equipment, but also engender a radicalizing backlash to an actual >police state. So, it looks like cryptography boils down to making a lot of noise on the _everything_ channel, to prevent the state from listening to it, but that the case of an individual under suspicion is hopeless. How terrible! That almost scares you into being honest and paying your taxes and everything again. All of you cypherpunks who were hoping to hide your little secrets with pgp, just forget about it: what cryptography is all about is to make statistics look bland. >Of course, if one is paranoid, these considerations of the whole do >not hold, since for only one person the cost balance is reversed. But I *am* paranoid, and proudly so, since the age of two. And you would be too if you were into the business of getting cryptography down into the real world instead of toying with theoretical ideas in front of a computer screen. - -zap -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCUAgUBLUdx0Ck+9PttYUp1AQHm+AP0CFtl01rygFYz16WYFsd5r7+gpe9iajUr xeVmB/YTccc/GJO8jbzeA+cpTtedQ8t5iiFlMdtX6NcskeN3fwi52RAL/7sgNhIL LMV13dhl7IJ5pEHb2zdhbCIMClXSVVihHfs2eJRRWHSVwSYV+0Xpy8ISNW/OM7A3 WsqlsMip/A== =ZHFB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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remailer?
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nice as remailers are, I wonder if it might be better to simply create a "message drop". Various anon ID's would be created, with suitable passwords. If Sam wishes to mail to Joe, he sends to the account. It sits for up to a week before auto-deletion; prior to that time Joe can check his account for messages, retrieve as appropriate, leave other messages, and leave. The primary 'phone number would be in one location, with the remailer at a different physical location connected via non-toll call forwarding. Hence, no LD toll records of the calls to the device. Individuals would place calls, so their records might "give them away"; but there would be no return calls from the device. Finally, if someone wanted to use methods other than PGP this would seem to support such methods. Any thoughts, or am I hopelessly clueless? Regards, Dave

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Re: clipper pin-compatibl
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

T >Yeah, a lot of folks suggested the same thing (I didn't, so I'm T >neutral on the credit issue). It was debated in scy.crypt, as well as T >here on Cypherpunks. Modesty, modesty. It seems to me than *some* T. C. May discussed the reverse engineering of the Clipper Chip in April 1993 as part of the Clipper/Capstone announcement firestorm. DCF An elephant never forgets. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: subpoenas of personal
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com C >I stated that those cases didn't hold against reporters because of C >constitutional backing (i.e. Freedom of the Press). C > C >A protection which we do not have, unless you happen to publish. C > C >-ck An appeals court has just held that Press Shield laws apply to those writing books. Since anything can be research for a book, those of us who have written books may have protection for all our "notes." Likewise those who have written freelance magazine articles. Better to use encryption for your notes though. DCF Who wonders if those who post to Usenet News are "reporters"? --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Re: subpoenas of personal
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An appeals court has just held that Press Shield laws apply to those writing books. Since anything can be research for a book, those of us who have written books may have protection for all our "notes." Likewise those who have written freelance magazine articles. Better to use encryption for your notes though. One caveat -- I believe that the shield laws are state laws; the U.S. Supreme Court has *not* upheld the principle. Check with your local lawyers first.

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Re: clipper pin-compat - Not really
by baum＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think we're missing the point here. I think you want a chip that has the same pinouts and possibly communication protocols as Clipper - I don't think you want or need to know exactly how it encrypts or decrypts. You'd want to use your own algorithm, not NSAs! Then, you can buy phones, replace the chip with your own, and talk to anyone else with the same chip securely. Further, it gives incentive for ATT/whoever to start producing phones with your chip, since they have very little additional engineering to do. So, the reverse engineering bit might not be so bad, since the parts that are almost certain to get munged by peeling isn't what you care about. Most likely, all you want to do is read a bunch of ARM code ROM (if that is the controller inside it, which should be easy to determine unpon inspection) to see how it talks to the outside world, and talks to the encrypt/decrypt module. This sounds a bit more tractable ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, 20525 Mariani Ave, MS 305-3B * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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HTML/remailer testing
by nobody＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This message is from an experimental anonymous remailer. For information, send mail to nate(a)vis.colostate.edu ----------------------------------------- Test Message for Nates Remailer Home Page -----------------------------------------

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re: The Packwood Memorial Diary Server
by dave_taffs＠rainbow.mentorg.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Miller writes: >If true, I guess the next question becomes: How can you offer a service >to the Internet, but make it impossible for a Bad Guy to physically locate >you? >Perhaps the server shouldn't stay in any one location for very long. >Bring it up and post an Internet address. Operate for a few days, then >shut it down and move to some new location, with a new Internet address. You can use the Internet itself as a storage device. I've seen articles about how you can use the ether between here and the moon as a storage device, sending (e.g. optical or radio) information up to the moon, bouncing it off, receiving the echo, and then resending it. It takes a few seconds I think, which allows a fair amount of storage, depending on the bandwidth. So, for example, you have a bunch of net.sites that receive stuff and send it back. Of course, you have to wait for it to come around again to your neck of the Net-u-verse to read it again, but then you don't have to pay for as much disk storage, as all your friends on the 'net will let you use what they have in their store-and-forward mechanisms. The disadvantage is that it relies on a form of security by obscurity; once people figger out what you are doing, they may get pissed off. If you use it wisely however, and just gradually increase the bandwidth over time, eventually you may be able to get everybody else to pay for the disk space to keep _your_ data, without anybody being the wiser. The Internet as a (w)hole must have enormous capacity at this very minute. -- O_O 01234567 dave_taffs(a)mentorg.com | . . ^ "Kolmogorov-Chaitin measures of complexity are | (_:_) MGC != me very exciting." -- Tim May on 12/02/93 |

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