December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Macintosh PGP CDEV Idea
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have a proposal for a piece of code I'd like to try and put togethor over Xmas break, and I want to bounce it off of the group to make sure that I'm not duplicating anyone else's work. I work mostly on the Macintosh, and this program would be for the mac. It would be a CDEV (good 'ol desk accessory) which would contain a smaller version of PGP. By smaller, I don't mean less secure, I mean a little less functionality. All it would do would sign, encrypt, or decrypt text files. By being a desk accessory, it would allow a message that's been downloaded by whatever means (MS Mail, FTP, Kermit, etc.) to be quickly decrypted, or to encrypt files for uploading. The idea is to have a simple, easy graphical interface on a small floating pallete type window. Since it would be a CDEV, it could be used simultaneously with a communications program even if the machine was running 6.0 w/ the unary finder. Keys would still be generated in the full fledged version, but these keys would be accessible by the CDEV. A possible later version could also take advantage of Apple Events, thus becoming a module which other programs could send files to to become decrypted, or encrypted without worrying about the process themselves. I've begun poreing through the source code to see how easy or difficult this is going to be, but first I'd like to make sure that their aren't already projects like this in development, or if there is any body who would like to help with the development process. It must be made clear that I am a beginning C programmer and a beginning developer of hard-coded Macintosh applications. I've started to consider tackling this project as something that will force me to learn both. Anybody have any ideas, comments, proposals? E-mail me directly, unless you think its a discussion that should be posted to the group as a whole. later, - -john. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBVAgUBLNJm3qNqtARNqVmxAQGL2wH/dYM7nkpeNbrFniRseZUHEl0X1p4Cn5md iqPkZWhznhwa+QhcEm6s8RGSq/Kf/uEPsy1C58wVfFbwhMF23WfPhQ== =car+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Has anyone seen "Applied Cryptography" yet ?
by trestrab＠GVSU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone has seen Bruce Schneir's new book, "Applied Cryptography", please post a short review to the list so that others can know whether to special order it. Thanks. Jeff

1 0

Pseudospoofing, LD, life, the universe, and everything
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Cypherpunks, I thought that the infamous L. Detweiler had stopped his posting, but it appears that he is back, and more neurotic than ever. I thought that it was the time for me to make another post relating to him, the list in general, and LD's obsession with pseudospoofing. OK, first, LD is pissing me off, as, I am sure, he is doing to many others out there in net.land. His raves are nothing if not persistant and ever increasingly long. I, being the founding member of the Colorado Cypherpunks, am not particularly prowd of him being affiliated with the group. I don't hate him, as some of teh others on this list apparently do, I just think he is a very persistant pest, a fly in the ointment. I think it is important to remember that in every movement there are fanatics, and in the best of intentions are those who would do harm while trying to crusade the good. I believe that Detweiler is one such person. He is experiencing some very serious problems with what he believes to be a concerted effort by some devilish cabal to warp and mung his brain through the rampant use of pseudospoofing. OK, fine if he believes that, I cannot keep him from thinking that some of us are emmisaries of Satan. I can, however, wish that he would leave me the hell alone and stop posting these long, drawn-out core dumps of his mangled psyche. I can ask him to stop his madness, though I know that it will only get me on his bad side, and possibly put me in physical danger (since I live in his vicinity, lucky me). I think that's enough on Detweiler himself, and I hope I don't have to talk about him anymore. On to pseudospoofing. I think that it exists, and that it's denial is just plain naive. The world is a non-friendly place, and there are dangers out there, and people who will exploit every aspect of the system to trick, decieve, and mangle others. This should not come as a shock to anyone on the list, since we are generally on (or close to) the cutting edge of new technologies and methods to use those technologies. I, myself have never participated in any kind of conspiracy with intent to confuse, nor have i ever posted under a name other than my own, and my anon.penet.fi identity. I have not posted as anyone that I am not, and have no intention to do so. I do not, however, object to the use of these technologies, or to the act of pseudospoofing. It cannot hope to be prevented, since there are always people out there who will figure out how to exploit the system to do their bidding. Yes, it's true, I am coming out in favor of pseudospoofing. I do not object to it's use, on the premise that it cannot be stopped, and it rarely does hard, aside from those (LD) whose minds are bent by the mere thought that it is happening. Enough of that. Now onto the list. I put some serious thought into dropping from the list for the past week or so, and I have decided _not_ to leave bacause sometime there are bits of information that I get from the list that are simply not available anywhere else. Some of the members of the list are, however, pissing me off. The list has degraded from a band of freedom fighters with things they cared about in jeopardy to a bunch of fucking children bickering over the most pathetic of things. I hope that the recent barrage of postings is not indicative of what is to come. If it is, then I may just reconsider and leave. I think that's all I have to say for now... I just wanted to let people know what I was thinking, and set the record straight if there are any members who think I am still on LD's side (which I was for quite some time). Thanks, - -nate +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Nate Sammons nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu (303) 491-1578 | | Colorado State University -- Computer Visualization Laboratory | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

1 0

Re: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > From: karn(a)qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) > >Car alarms and security systems didn't convince the criminals who make their > >living ripping off cars that the *Good ole days were over* and it was time > >to get a job at Burger Sri, it spurred them to find new methods to ply > >their trade. > How do you know this? Clearly some crooks may have just moved to more > violent methods, but it's quite probable that others moved off to > other fields where it's easier to make a buck, either legal or > illegal. Watch the nightly news or if you want to be really anal about it look up statistics about the increase in violent carjacking. Walk down the street in any San Francisco neighborhood, and count the piles of tempered glass that used to be car windows. So OK, you don't have a criminal mind, and it makes sense to you that it might be a good time to go legit, but let me offer you my sincere advice not to move into a bad neighborhood, you are at a natural disadvantage. > Although widely deployed strong cryptography may well cause an > increase in violent, rubber-hose cryptanalysis, this technique is > likely to be useful only for stored encrypted records and for > encrypted communications whose protocols are not secure against this > type of attack, e.g., PGP encrypted email. tightly focused linear thinkers are perfect targets for criminally minded predators, they are assured that you will leave them a wide arena from which to operate undetected. > > But much better protocols exist where online two-way communication is > possible, e.g., signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange, with periodic > automatic rekeying. Once you rekey in such a system, no amount of > rubber hosing will obtain prior session keys; they're gone even to the > participants. Recently a Cash machine was installed in a building which I frequent. It was placed 10 feet inside a plate glass window, and has easy access for a small truck to drive up and haul it away. It even has wheels. I noted that this presented a danger to those of us who were in the building late at night, since it was apparently so vulnerable. I was concerned that the unarmed security guard was a sitting duck, and perhaps target practice, for theives intent on driving through the window and quickly hauling the whole shebang away. The cash machine installer informed me that the unit had a cel phone and GPS that would call and give its location if tampered with, but he didn't have an answer when I remarked that this would be littel comfort to anyone shot or injured by thieves unaware of this factor. and please don't tell me that posting signs telling would-be criminals about these security precautions will do any good. They won't. > And even if you rubber-hose one of the participants into revealing the > RSA key he uses to sign his DH exchanges, this will only let you > masquerade as him in future conversations. In order to tap his future > conversations surreptitiously, you'd have to rubberhose him without > his knowledge, or hypnotize him into forgetting the incident. I'd say > this is difficult. More so than secretly hacking the machine he uses > to capture his secrets. Once again, it comes down to some level of > physical security, at least while the machine is in actual use. You are making an error if you think that any locks keep out anything but honest people. Necesity is the mother of invention. The point is that these issues are not linear, when implemented in real world situations you must consider the real world implications and provide real world solutions. LUX ./. owen

1 0

Re: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Watch the nightly news or if you want to be really anal about it look up >statistics about the increase in violent carjacking. Actually, I did that. Turns out the supposed increase that got all the media attention was solely due to the SFPD establishing a new statistical category. The actual number of incidents has not changed significantly. --- Jef

1 0

Tax Havens on the Net
by Jim Hart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------- Tax Havens on the Net --------------------- compiled by James R. Hart sources: Internet Connectivity List -- Larry Landweber, U.Wisc. ftp.cs.wisc.edu ../connectivity_table Version 9, August 1993 Hoyt L. Barber, _Tax Havens_, McGraw-Hill 1993 Codes used to indicate sites in each country with access to the Global Multiprotocol Open Internet: BITNET b: minimal, one to five domestic BITNET sites B: widespread, more than five domestic BITNET sites IP INTERNET I: = operational, accesible from entire IP Internet i: = operational, not accesible via the NSFNET backbone UUCP u: minimal, one to five domestic UUCP sites U: widespread, more than five domestic UUCP sites FIDONET f: minimal, one to five domestic FIDONET sites F: widespread, more than five domestic FIDONET sites OSI o: minimal, one to five domestic X.400 sites O: widespread, more than five domestic X.400 sites ------------------------ and without further ado: ------------------------ Aruba net access: ---f- languages: Papiamento, English, Dutch, Spanish currency controls: none? bank secrecy: moderate (numbered accounts not permitted) preferred legal entities: Aruba Exempt Company, NV (Dutch legal tradition, bearer shares allowed) taxes: no income tax on AEC or shareholders, no witholding of any kind tax treaties: none? Austria net access: BIOUFO language: German currency controls: ?? bank secrecy: good; numbered accounts available preferred legal entities: limited liability company, stock orporation taxes: corporate tax. no bank interest tax. 20% divident ax. tax treaties: many, OECD model, primarily personal and orporate income contact: Price Waterhouse, Austria Barbados net access: --u-- language: English currency controls: some (none for offshore banks & nsurance) preferred legal entities: company, public company, offshore bank, exempt insurance company, foreign sales corporation , international business company taxes: income tax offshore banks and international business companies 2.5%, exempt insurance companies and foreign sales corporations none tax treaties: double-tax treaties with 5 major countries (incl. U.K. & U.S.) Bermuda net access: --uf-- language: English currency controls: none for nonresidents bank secrecy: moderate preferred legal entities: local (conduct business in Bermuda, must be 60% Bermuda owned), exempt (only conducts business outside Bermuda) -- min. capitalization US$12,000 -- extensive background check on the principles taxes: no income, profit, sales, value added, witholding, or capital gains taxes tax treaties: no double-tax treaties. U.S. can be provided with tax information concerning civil & criminal tax cases Costa Rica net access: bIuf- language: Spanish currency controls: only on local currency, applies only to citizens or legal entities bank secrecy: good legal entities: individual enterprise/limited liability collective company limited partnership limited-liability company stock corporation (aka chartered company): most common taxes: 15% on dividents for some nonresident shareholders, moderate corporate income, payroll, imort, real estate taxes. Exporters exempt from most taxes. tax treaties: no double-tax treaties. Caribbean Basin Initiative exchange-of-information agreeement signed but not yet ratified (as of 1/93). Hong Kong net access: BI-F- languages: Cantonese, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate? preferred legal entity: limited-liability corporation (English common law Companies Ordinance) taxes: 16.5% domestic source corporate income, 15% domestic employment wages, 15% on domestic property rental income tax treaties: no double-tax agreements n.b.: treaty to return Hong Kong to Communist China in 1997 Ireland net access: BIUFO language: English currency controls: none? bank secrecy: moderate? preferred legal entity: noresident company (private corporation w/limited liability, must conduct operations outside Ireland) taxes: only on Irish operations tax treaties: many double-tax treaties n.b.: those with Irish grandparents can obtain second citizenship Leichtenstein net access: ---f- languages: German, Alemanni currency controls: none bank secrecy: excellent preferred legal entities: allows any type found anywhere in the world (!) establishment (limited liability, unlimited duration) company limited by shares foundations and trusts taxes: none for income outside Leichtenstein. Net worth tax of 0.01% on capital and reserves (min. 1,000 Swiss francs), local resident taxes tax treaties: not party directly or indirectly to any exchange-of-information agreements double-tax treaty exists only with Austria n.b.: bankers won't assist law enforcement officials with drug, fraud, theft, or tax investigations. They might assist in money laundering and insider trading investigations, informing the customer first. Luxembourg net access: bIUFO languages: Letzeburgesh, French, German, English bank secrecy: moderate preferred legal entity: holding company taxes: holding companies pays only 10% registration fee on issued shares and 0.20% annual capital tax on issued capital bonds. tax treaties: many double-tax treaties n.b.: EC member Malta net access: --u-- languages: Maltese, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: good preferred legal entities: offshore notrading, trading, banking (overseas, subsidiary, local), insurance, trusts taxes: nontrading exempt, trading very low tax treties: many double-tax treaties n.b.: EC member Netherlands net access: BIUFO language: Dutch currency controls: ?? bank secrecy: poor preferred legal entities: private or public NV (can have bearer shares) taxes: complex, high (many loopholes for large offshore companies) tax treaties: many Panama net access: b-uFO languages: Spanish, English curency controls: none bank secrecy: good; numbered accounts permissable preferred legal entity: corporation taxes: none on income generated outside Panama tax treaties: only on shipping income Singapore net access: bIuF- languages: Malay, Mandarin, Tamil, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate; numbered accounts available preferred legal entities: private limited company taxes: none on dividends, foreign deposit interest, or income derived from outside Singapore. tax treaties: many Switzerland net access: BIUFO languages: French, German, Italian, Romansch currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate to good; numbered accounts available preferred legal entity: AG (stock company under Laws of Obligation) taxes: 3.6-9.8% worldwide income tax for operating companies, 35% witholding tax on interest and dividends tax treaties: many double-tax treaties Vanuata net access: --u-- languages: Melanesian, French, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate? preferred legal entities: holding, trading, agency, mgmt. service, contracting taxes: no income or capital gains taxes tax treaties: none Western Samoa net access: --u-- languages: Samoan, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: good preferred legal entities: international company, offshore bank, insurance company taxes: none for companies under offshore acts tax treaties: none If you like having this information, let me know. Also let me know what other kinds of information you need on tax havens and net access; I'd love to be of service. If you have corrections to or additional information for the Tax Havens on the Net list, I'd be happy to add it with full attribution (or full privacy, as you prefer). To preserve your privacy, feel free to use anonymous remailers and encryption. My PGP key enclosed below. James R. Hart hart(a)chaos.bsu.edu -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2 mQCNAiz0Br4AAAEEAJohFjXdkx6i2Mq6nJXdJN+VGupeKwuu1SAiRvsBK7TQ1ajY d3wEFohbwaHGn3iq7A1//koipvzE5S/C6pPxIAHFeoYOUzeI/cWmh6vsuaF3/lVm K9lx/L7PyaF8rvd4FOmLqkvs1xk/24S9ZQaBb3cjhLV571NaiPCIc3SPJUKXAAUT tCJKYW1lcyBSLiBIYXJ0IDxoYXJ0QGNoYW9zLmJzdS5lZHU+ =z2UE -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

1 0

The History of Cypherpunks
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr. N.Sammons, esteemed Founder of Colorado Cypherpunk Chapter, kindly sent me a message he apparently posted to cypherpunks commenting on the `neurotic L.Detweiler' and my `obsession with pseudospoofing' who is `pissing me off' and is not `particularly prowd' [sic] of me `being affiliated with the group.' All of this is a rather clever distortion of reality apparently designed to ingratiate Mr. N.Sammons with the CA Conspiracy Clique. Mr. Sammons, I have no idea why you want to throw in your lot with the psychopunks (esp. given they all appear to be centered in CA), but far be it for me to stand in your way. The most serious distortions, considering my own mental state, however, I must address. I have been subject to dozens of accusations of mental instability over the past few weeks from fanatic CA cypherpunks bent on silencing me in very reprehensible ways, such as exerting pressure through my postmaster, mailbombs, employer, and higher administrators in the University. I must credit the eminent Cypherpunks E.Hughes,T.C.May,P.Metzger, and D.Barnes for their glorious atrocities. Also, just recently Mr. Gilmore suggests that these efforts amount to `doing me a favor' by `asking people at my university to come talk to me' by `people who think you are becoming unstable.' The truth is that I have made their own corruptions and lies increasingly unstable. The Psychopunk revisionist history appears to have reached a climax in Mr. Sammons' latest note: >He is experiencing some very serious problems with what he believes to be >a concerted effort by some devilish cabal to warp and mung his brain >through the rampant use of pseudospoofing. OK, fine if he believes that, >I cannot keep him from thinking that some of us are emmisaries of Satan. >I can, however, wish that he would leave me the hell alone and stop posting >these long, drawn-out core dumps of his mangled psyche. This is all nothing but BLACK DISINFORMATION typical of the brainwashing of CA cypherpunks. (Reminds me of D.Barnes, the `stellar hypocrite', telling another cypherpunk that his majestic L.D. blackmail fishing expedition were not an invasion of privacy but a simple psychopunk demonstration of how much sensitive personal information about people is vulnerable to exposure. bastard.) Mr. Sammons, the only thing that has propelled me over several weeks of postings to Cypherpunks and elsewhere (e.g. RISKS) is the hope that some Cypherpunk leader would crack and admit to their systematic efforts in systematic, conspirational cyberspatial deception in pseudospoofing. There has never been any other issue, and to call me insane for accusing the leadership of pseudospoofing is like telling Galileo he is a heretic for saying the earth revolves around the Sun. The top leadership has cloaked their effort to develop the cult religion of pseudospoofing in the guise of `privacy for the masses' and the `cryptographic revolution'. `pseudospoofing' and `pseudopools' are the core aspects of their perverted religion. They *have* a secret mailing list hidden from the public used to promote subversions and the CA Conspiracy. They have written customized software for pseudospoofing and style analysis for cyberspatial warfare across many lists. They have built up an extensive international infrastructure of sites and public access internet accounts for manipulation of the public through the mailing list and elsewhere. They have corrupted DNS and SMTP software. They have infiltrated many sensitive lists, such as `internet mercantile protocols' and CERT lists, and derailed discussions with public and private sabotage, and stolen sensitive confidential information. They have molested me and many others (e.g. G.Spafford and other well-meaning cypherpunk list subscribers) with their numerous tentacles in my private mailbox, even after I publicly requested they stop. Virtually all of these various harassments were over project proposals on the list by `outsiders' (such as the Whistleblowing newsgroup, the disk stacker encryption program) that rubbed them the wrong way for some capricious whim. They love to post effusive messages from tentacles congratulating themselves on their vacuous achievments, and attacks on others who have accomplished anything substantial. They love to post subtle disinformation that cloaks their future aims and past depravities. They have deceived the respectable media like NYT and Wired in dark, atrocious ways, and revel in it. And they would rather censor me by inflaming those above me at my site into revoking my Internet account, with completely deceptive complaints about my `deranged' postings, than confess their depravities in front of their loyal, marching, brainwashed, braindead sycophants, who still think that J.Dinkelacker and N.Szabo are real people. And they blame the ashes of their arson on the lone firefighter. I assure you, psychopunks, this is *not* a comprehensive list! These are only some of the *cyberspatial* crimes! Your eminent leaders would rather brand or drive a man into an insane pariah than admit the truth, an investigation they cower cowardly in fear and attack as Terrorizing McCarthyist WitchHunt Inquisition, which for them it is. This is all that drives me in posting here, is the hope that everyone sane and honest still listening will have the sense to get the hell out of here. Cypherpunks, your `leaders' are nothing but cyberspatial psychopaths. None will escape culpability for complicity. It's only a matter of timing at this point! tick, tick, tick ...

3 2

900 MHz Cordless question
by analyst＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Catching up on my reading the other day, I noticed an article in the Economist about Cincinnati Microwave's 900 Mhz cordless phone. It seems that Cylink makes the actual chip that is used in the phone to do the spread-spectrum communications. My questions to the readers of this list are: 1: Given that Cylink was one of the two original companies to manufacture Clipper hardware, what does this say about the protocols that are used in this spread-spectrum chip? Was it designed to be easy for law enforcement to crack? 2: Of the digital 900 Mhz telephones available, are any of the phones better from a security standpoint than any of the others? Are they all using different protocols or the same? Enquiring minds want to know! Thanks. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Benjamin McLemore analyst(a)netcom.com 214/522.7640 fax

3 2

Secure Wipe
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hola all, I've just started working on a good Mac implementation of IDEA, but I need a little more info on something. I've got more info on IDEA than I know what to do with, but I've yet to find any good references on doing a secure wipe to remove the plaintext file from the hard disk. Can anyone point me to some good refs on the topic? Many thanks... Ken

2 1

Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>BTW, schneier is literally a FAQ for cypherpunks. >Fantastic book. Cough up the money for it... I'll second that motion! Waldenbooks just got my copy of _Applied Cryptography_ in yesterday, and I've pretty much had that book in my hands every minute I've been awake since. Definitely required reading. Ken ============================================================================= Ken Kirksey kkirksey(a)world.std.com Mac Guru & Developer ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest. - Mahatma Ghandi

1 0