December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Give me your password- OR ELSE!
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Watch the nightly news or if you want to be really anal about it look up >statistics about the increase in violent carjacking. Actually, I did that. Turns out the supposed increase that got all the media attention was solely due to the SFPD establishing a new statistical category. The actual number of incidents has not changed significantly. --- Jef

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Tax Havens on the Net
by Jim Hart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------- Tax Havens on the Net --------------------- compiled by James R. Hart sources: Internet Connectivity List -- Larry Landweber, U.Wisc. ftp.cs.wisc.edu ../connectivity_table Version 9, August 1993 Hoyt L. Barber, _Tax Havens_, McGraw-Hill 1993 Codes used to indicate sites in each country with access to the Global Multiprotocol Open Internet: BITNET b: minimal, one to five domestic BITNET sites B: widespread, more than five domestic BITNET sites IP INTERNET I: = operational, accesible from entire IP Internet i: = operational, not accesible via the NSFNET backbone UUCP u: minimal, one to five domestic UUCP sites U: widespread, more than five domestic UUCP sites FIDONET f: minimal, one to five domestic FIDONET sites F: widespread, more than five domestic FIDONET sites OSI o: minimal, one to five domestic X.400 sites O: widespread, more than five domestic X.400 sites ------------------------ and without further ado: ------------------------ Aruba net access: ---f- languages: Papiamento, English, Dutch, Spanish currency controls: none? bank secrecy: moderate (numbered accounts not permitted) preferred legal entities: Aruba Exempt Company, NV (Dutch legal tradition, bearer shares allowed) taxes: no income tax on AEC or shareholders, no witholding of any kind tax treaties: none? Austria net access: BIOUFO language: German currency controls: ?? bank secrecy: good; numbered accounts available preferred legal entities: limited liability company, stock orporation taxes: corporate tax. no bank interest tax. 20% divident ax. tax treaties: many, OECD model, primarily personal and orporate income contact: Price Waterhouse, Austria Barbados net access: --u-- language: English currency controls: some (none for offshore banks & nsurance) preferred legal entities: company, public company, offshore bank, exempt insurance company, foreign sales corporation , international business company taxes: income tax offshore banks and international business companies 2.5%, exempt insurance companies and foreign sales corporations none tax treaties: double-tax treaties with 5 major countries (incl. U.K. & U.S.) Bermuda net access: --uf-- language: English currency controls: none for nonresidents bank secrecy: moderate preferred legal entities: local (conduct business in Bermuda, must be 60% Bermuda owned), exempt (only conducts business outside Bermuda) -- min. capitalization US$12,000 -- extensive background check on the principles taxes: no income, profit, sales, value added, witholding, or capital gains taxes tax treaties: no double-tax treaties. U.S. can be provided with tax information concerning civil & criminal tax cases Costa Rica net access: bIuf- language: Spanish currency controls: only on local currency, applies only to citizens or legal entities bank secrecy: good legal entities: individual enterprise/limited liability collective company limited partnership limited-liability company stock corporation (aka chartered company): most common taxes: 15% on dividents for some nonresident shareholders, moderate corporate income, payroll, imort, real estate taxes. Exporters exempt from most taxes. tax treaties: no double-tax treaties. Caribbean Basin Initiative exchange-of-information agreeement signed but not yet ratified (as of 1/93). Hong Kong net access: BI-F- languages: Cantonese, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate? preferred legal entity: limited-liability corporation (English common law Companies Ordinance) taxes: 16.5% domestic source corporate income, 15% domestic employment wages, 15% on domestic property rental income tax treaties: no double-tax agreements n.b.: treaty to return Hong Kong to Communist China in 1997 Ireland net access: BIUFO language: English currency controls: none? bank secrecy: moderate? preferred legal entity: noresident company (private corporation w/limited liability, must conduct operations outside Ireland) taxes: only on Irish operations tax treaties: many double-tax treaties n.b.: those with Irish grandparents can obtain second citizenship Leichtenstein net access: ---f- languages: German, Alemanni currency controls: none bank secrecy: excellent preferred legal entities: allows any type found anywhere in the world (!) establishment (limited liability, unlimited duration) company limited by shares foundations and trusts taxes: none for income outside Leichtenstein. Net worth tax of 0.01% on capital and reserves (min. 1,000 Swiss francs), local resident taxes tax treaties: not party directly or indirectly to any exchange-of-information agreements double-tax treaty exists only with Austria n.b.: bankers won't assist law enforcement officials with drug, fraud, theft, or tax investigations. They might assist in money laundering and insider trading investigations, informing the customer first. Luxembourg net access: bIUFO languages: Letzeburgesh, French, German, English bank secrecy: moderate preferred legal entity: holding company taxes: holding companies pays only 10% registration fee on issued shares and 0.20% annual capital tax on issued capital bonds. tax treaties: many double-tax treaties n.b.: EC member Malta net access: --u-- languages: Maltese, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: good preferred legal entities: offshore notrading, trading, banking (overseas, subsidiary, local), insurance, trusts taxes: nontrading exempt, trading very low tax treties: many double-tax treaties n.b.: EC member Netherlands net access: BIUFO language: Dutch currency controls: ?? bank secrecy: poor preferred legal entities: private or public NV (can have bearer shares) taxes: complex, high (many loopholes for large offshore companies) tax treaties: many Panama net access: b-uFO languages: Spanish, English curency controls: none bank secrecy: good; numbered accounts permissable preferred legal entity: corporation taxes: none on income generated outside Panama tax treaties: only on shipping income Singapore net access: bIuF- languages: Malay, Mandarin, Tamil, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate; numbered accounts available preferred legal entities: private limited company taxes: none on dividends, foreign deposit interest, or income derived from outside Singapore. tax treaties: many Switzerland net access: BIUFO languages: French, German, Italian, Romansch currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate to good; numbered accounts available preferred legal entity: AG (stock company under Laws of Obligation) taxes: 3.6-9.8% worldwide income tax for operating companies, 35% witholding tax on interest and dividends tax treaties: many double-tax treaties Vanuata net access: --u-- languages: Melanesian, French, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate? preferred legal entities: holding, trading, agency, mgmt. service, contracting taxes: no income or capital gains taxes tax treaties: none Western Samoa net access: --u-- languages: Samoan, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: good preferred legal entities: international company, offshore bank, insurance company taxes: none for companies under offshore acts tax treaties: none If you like having this information, let me know. Also let me know what other kinds of information you need on tax havens and net access; I'd love to be of service. If you have corrections to or additional information for the Tax Havens on the Net list, I'd be happy to add it with full attribution (or full privacy, as you prefer). To preserve your privacy, feel free to use anonymous remailers and encryption. My PGP key enclosed below. James R. Hart hart(a)chaos.bsu.edu -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2 mQCNAiz0Br4AAAEEAJohFjXdkx6i2Mq6nJXdJN+VGupeKwuu1SAiRvsBK7TQ1ajY d3wEFohbwaHGn3iq7A1//koipvzE5S/C6pPxIAHFeoYOUzeI/cWmh6vsuaF3/lVm K9lx/L7PyaF8rvd4FOmLqkvs1xk/24S9ZQaBb3cjhLV571NaiPCIc3SPJUKXAAUT tCJKYW1lcyBSLiBIYXJ0IDxoYXJ0QGNoYW9zLmJzdS5lZHU+ =z2UE -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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The History of Cypherpunks
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mr. N.Sammons, esteemed Founder of Colorado Cypherpunk Chapter, kindly sent me a message he apparently posted to cypherpunks commenting on the `neurotic L.Detweiler' and my `obsession with pseudospoofing' who is `pissing me off' and is not `particularly prowd' [sic] of me `being affiliated with the group.' All of this is a rather clever distortion of reality apparently designed to ingratiate Mr. N.Sammons with the CA Conspiracy Clique. Mr. Sammons, I have no idea why you want to throw in your lot with the psychopunks (esp. given they all appear to be centered in CA), but far be it for me to stand in your way. The most serious distortions, considering my own mental state, however, I must address. I have been subject to dozens of accusations of mental instability over the past few weeks from fanatic CA cypherpunks bent on silencing me in very reprehensible ways, such as exerting pressure through my postmaster, mailbombs, employer, and higher administrators in the University. I must credit the eminent Cypherpunks E.Hughes,T.C.May,P.Metzger, and D.Barnes for their glorious atrocities. Also, just recently Mr. Gilmore suggests that these efforts amount to `doing me a favor' by `asking people at my university to come talk to me' by `people who think you are becoming unstable.' The truth is that I have made their own corruptions and lies increasingly unstable. The Psychopunk revisionist history appears to have reached a climax in Mr. Sammons' latest note: >He is experiencing some very serious problems with what he believes to be >a concerted effort by some devilish cabal to warp and mung his brain >through the rampant use of pseudospoofing. OK, fine if he believes that, >I cannot keep him from thinking that some of us are emmisaries of Satan. >I can, however, wish that he would leave me the hell alone and stop posting >these long, drawn-out core dumps of his mangled psyche. This is all nothing but BLACK DISINFORMATION typical of the brainwashing of CA cypherpunks. (Reminds me of D.Barnes, the `stellar hypocrite', telling another cypherpunk that his majestic L.D. blackmail fishing expedition were not an invasion of privacy but a simple psychopunk demonstration of how much sensitive personal information about people is vulnerable to exposure. bastard.) Mr. Sammons, the only thing that has propelled me over several weeks of postings to Cypherpunks and elsewhere (e.g. RISKS) is the hope that some Cypherpunk leader would crack and admit to their systematic efforts in systematic, conspirational cyberspatial deception in pseudospoofing. There has never been any other issue, and to call me insane for accusing the leadership of pseudospoofing is like telling Galileo he is a heretic for saying the earth revolves around the Sun. The top leadership has cloaked their effort to develop the cult religion of pseudospoofing in the guise of `privacy for the masses' and the `cryptographic revolution'. `pseudospoofing' and `pseudopools' are the core aspects of their perverted religion. They *have* a secret mailing list hidden from the public used to promote subversions and the CA Conspiracy. They have written customized software for pseudospoofing and style analysis for cyberspatial warfare across many lists. They have built up an extensive international infrastructure of sites and public access internet accounts for manipulation of the public through the mailing list and elsewhere. They have corrupted DNS and SMTP software. They have infiltrated many sensitive lists, such as `internet mercantile protocols' and CERT lists, and derailed discussions with public and private sabotage, and stolen sensitive confidential information. They have molested me and many others (e.g. G.Spafford and other well-meaning cypherpunk list subscribers) with their numerous tentacles in my private mailbox, even after I publicly requested they stop. Virtually all of these various harassments were over project proposals on the list by `outsiders' (such as the Whistleblowing newsgroup, the disk stacker encryption program) that rubbed them the wrong way for some capricious whim. They love to post effusive messages from tentacles congratulating themselves on their vacuous achievments, and attacks on others who have accomplished anything substantial. They love to post subtle disinformation that cloaks their future aims and past depravities. They have deceived the respectable media like NYT and Wired in dark, atrocious ways, and revel in it. And they would rather censor me by inflaming those above me at my site into revoking my Internet account, with completely deceptive complaints about my `deranged' postings, than confess their depravities in front of their loyal, marching, brainwashed, braindead sycophants, who still think that J.Dinkelacker and N.Szabo are real people. And they blame the ashes of their arson on the lone firefighter. I assure you, psychopunks, this is *not* a comprehensive list! These are only some of the *cyberspatial* crimes! Your eminent leaders would rather brand or drive a man into an insane pariah than admit the truth, an investigation they cower cowardly in fear and attack as Terrorizing McCarthyist WitchHunt Inquisition, which for them it is. This is all that drives me in posting here, is the hope that everyone sane and honest still listening will have the sense to get the hell out of here. Cypherpunks, your `leaders' are nothing but cyberspatial psychopaths. None will escape culpability for complicity. It's only a matter of timing at this point! tick, tick, tick ...

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900 MHz Cordless question
by analyst＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Catching up on my reading the other day, I noticed an article in the Economist about Cincinnati Microwave's 900 Mhz cordless phone. It seems that Cylink makes the actual chip that is used in the phone to do the spread-spectrum communications. My questions to the readers of this list are: 1: Given that Cylink was one of the two original companies to manufacture Clipper hardware, what does this say about the protocols that are used in this spread-spectrum chip? Was it designed to be easy for law enforcement to crack? 2: Of the digital 900 Mhz telephones available, are any of the phones better from a security standpoint than any of the others? Are they all using different protocols or the same? Enquiring minds want to know! Thanks. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Benjamin McLemore analyst(a)netcom.com 214/522.7640 fax

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Secure Wipe
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hola all, I've just started working on a good Mac implementation of IDEA, but I need a little more info on something. I've got more info on IDEA than I know what to do with, but I've yet to find any good references on doing a secure wipe to remove the plaintext file from the hard disk. Can anyone point me to some good refs on the topic? Many thanks... Ken

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Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>BTW, schneier is literally a FAQ for cypherpunks. >Fantastic book. Cough up the money for it... I'll second that motion! Waldenbooks just got my copy of _Applied Cryptography_ in yesterday, and I've pretty much had that book in my hands every minute I've been awake since. Definitely required reading. Ken ============================================================================= Ken Kirksey kkirksey(a)world.std.com Mac Guru & Developer ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest. - Mahatma Ghandi

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Re: strong crypto => increase in rubber-hose attacks?
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Assume you use strong crypto to protect your secrets. > >Assume a lot of people start using crypto to protect their secrets. > >Assume there are people who want to discover these secrets. > > >Might we some day see an increase in the number physical attacks as bad guys >resort to rubber-hose methods to get at the keys that protect the secrets? Now Jim, you wouldn't be implying that our big warm fuzzy government would EVER resort to using methods like that on it's own citizens, would you? :-) Not possible, unless you count Waco, Ruby Ridge, Ken Ballew, John Lawmaster, no-knock search warrants, ad infinitum... Seriously, I think you may be right, although physical security has always seemed to me to be the weakest link in any crypto chain. All I can say is that scenarios such as you envision simply point out the wisdom of always going armed. Or did I read to much Heinlein when I was a kid? :-) Ken ============================================================================= Ken Kirksey kkirksey(a)world.std.com Mac Guru & Developer ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest. - Mahatma Ghandi

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PC Based One-Time Pad
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While I was reading though _Applied Cryptography_ last night, a thought struck me (no damage): Why hasn't anyone come up with a good Mac or PC based One-Time Pad system. I'd envision it working something like this: * A 1.4 Meg floppy with a single file, or multiple files, of random bits. 2 copies, one for sender and one for reciever. * The first few bytes of the cyphertext file will contain the name of the pad file used, possibly the volume name where the pad file is stored, and the starting offset within the pad file. It seems like this would be a fairly easy system to implement, but since no one (to my knowledge) has yet done so, there must be something I'm missing. :-) Secure distribution and storage of the pad disk could be difficult, but not insurmountable. The only hurdle that comes to mind is that filling a 1.4 meg floppy, or even a 700k floppy, with a sequence of TRULY random bits might be difficult and/or very time consuming. Any thoughts? Ken ============================================================================= Ken Kirksey kkirksey(a)world.std.com Mac Guru & Developer ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Among the many misdeeds of the British rule in India, history will look upon the act of depriving a whole nation of arms, as the blackest. - Mahatma Ghandi

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Forwarded Article
by russell＠eternity.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'll write more on the (I think successful) ECFP '93 later; for now... -- Russell This article was forwarded to you by russell(a)eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker): --------------------------------- cut here ----------------------------- Xref: demon alt.wired:1244 demon.local:6413 sci.crypt:10110 uk.politics:7717 alt.security.pgp:5994 Newsgroups: alt.wired,demon.local,sci.crypt,uk.politics,alt.security.pgp From: russell(a)eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker) Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!eternity.demon.co.uk!russell Subject: MEDIA: PGP covered in London *Guardian* 25 Nov 93 Organization: Extropy Institute Reply-To: Russell(a)eternity.demon.co.uk X-Newsreader: Simple NEWS 2.0 (ka9q DIS 1.24) Lines: 24 Date: Thu, 25 Nov 1993 17:34:57 +0000 Message-ID: <754248897snz(a)eternity.demon.co.uk> Sender: usenet(a)demon.co.uk Thursday, 25 November 1993: All Londoners interested in the issue of communications privacy should pick up today's *Guardian*: in the Computers section is an article by Wendy Grossman, "Enter the crypto factor", subtitled "How computers could give us back the privacy that computerisation has taken away". The article discusses the "export problems" at the centre of Phil Zimmermann's recent troubles. Good job, Wendy! [She can be reached, by the way, at 70007.5537(a)compuserve.com.] -- Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker(a)eternity.demon.co.uk Communications Editor AMiX: RWhitaker EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI) Co-organizer, 2nd European Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy, London, October 1994 --------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

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PC Based One-Time Pad
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199311251654.AA02190(a)world.std.com> kkirksey(a)world.std.com "Ken B Kirksey" writes: > While I was reading though _Applied Cryptography_ last night, a thought > struck me (no damage): Why hasn't anyone come up with a good Mac or PC based > One-Time Pad system. Because they're trivial to write. I could do one in less that 15 minutes. > It seems like this would be a fairly easy system to implement, but since > no one (to my knowledge) has yet done so, there must be something I'm > missing. :-) Because very few people can be bothered driving half way across the country to deliver the OTPs. It's *way* too much hassle for day to day use of the kind we use pgp for. And if someone *is* doing it for real security (like say AT&T shipping around their secure phone circuit diagrams because they don't trust clipper :-) ) then they're *not* going to be mentioning it in passing on usenet news groups... G PS No, you *don't* send them in the mail. But you knew that, right? -- Personal mail to gtoal(a)gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings) Business mail to gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!) Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678 Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212

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