December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Welcome to IIA (fwd)
by szabo＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's the IIA info message that has caused all the furor: Forwarded message: >From info(a)iia.org Mon Jan 10 14:31:54 1994 The text in this document is how we envision our host machine to look in the very near future. Please be patient if some things are not currently available. We are working on this system daily to improve it. Welcome to the International Internet Association - the largest non-profit provider of free Internet access in the world. We are a Washington based association dedicated to the free flow of information without regard to position or affiliation. We look forward to serving you. In response to your request we need a little more information to set up an account and get you on-line. Please complete the attached form and return to our offices in Washington. You will advance in line quicker if you simply fax back the attached registration form at the end of this document. When received we will provision accounts in the order received. We have responded to over fifteen thousand requests in the last several weeks, and we greatly appreciate your continued patience. WHO AM I ON THE INTERNET? We will assign a USERID (User Identification) which combines your first and last name in accordance with international standards governing E-mail. All accounts will be eight characters or less beginning with the last name and ending with the first initial. For example John Smith will become SMITHJ. If your last name is over seven characters only the first seven characters will be used. If you would like a specific ID, this can be arranged as well as other custom services upon your first login. You need only follow the menu items to custom services and make the electronic request. Since you will gain access to the Internet through the IIA your address to the rest of the internet community will be USERID(a)IIA.ORG where USERID is the name we generated using your last name first initial. WHAT DO I GET? You get an Internet account providing 14,400 BPS capability and lower (9600,2400,1200). 256K of storage allowing you to download files and messages (more can be made available). Kermit, X-MODEM, Y-Modem, and Z-MODEM download protocols to transfer information to your home computer. Menu driven options will allow easy access to GOPHER, World- Wide-Web, Archie, Prospect, Telnet, FTP and a host of others (no pun intended) In short you can do what anyone else anywhere can do on the net and more (we have built in capabilities beyond the general capabilities of the Internet). ACCESS The International Internet Association is able to make this service available through generous private donations, and extraordinary dedication of its membership. We will invite users to join, but will in no way restrict access based on membership. WHAT TO EXPECT You will receive two numbers with your welcome aboard package. One is a direct dial number to either our master node in Washington D.C., or our research facility in New Jersey. If you choose to direct dial it is your responsibility to pay your long distance carrier for the time spent on-line. Your bill will be identical to the cost of calling and speaking to someone. The cost of a phone call. The second option is to receive an 800 number provided by the IIA. The IIA has made arrangements for this service to be provided universally across the U.S. 24 hours a day at the rate of 20 cents per minute. (The 20 cents is billed exactly at cost through the generous contribution of our supporting provider). You need to look at your long distance rate from your current provider and decide the most economical way to reach our nodes. The IIA plans to install local calling points across the U.S. to support our users, as soon as we obtain the funds. WHAT WE NEED FROM YOU: Please complete the enclosed form in its entirety. Pay careful attention to the accuracy of your name and address. We need a Master Card, Visa, Or American Express. When we provision your account you will have access to both the direct dial, and the U.S. 800 number. If you do not use the 800 number you will never receive a charge. If you find the 800 number more economical than direct dial than you will be billed in 10 dollar increments. A charge will be rolled over until all time has been exhausted. Without receiving a Credit Card Number, the IIA cannot provision an account. (We apologize for this inconvenience to our users planning on direct dial. Shortly we plan to rectify this through programming, but until that time we must adhere to the policy of our long-distance provider.) WELCOME ABOARD PACKAGE Your welcome aboard package will contain additional information about the IIA including your USERID and Password (required for login) and instructions on how to login. We will also provide information on the Internet services available. However the majority of the useful information can be found on-line by following the menus to the help section. OUR THANKS The IIA would like to thank-you for your interest in becoming part of the electronic community, and we look forward to serving in the capacity of your host. We trust it will change you life. INTERNATIONAL INTERNET ASSOCIATION APPLICATION FOR FREE INTERNET ACCESS Name ________________________________________ Address ________________________________________ ________________________________________ Fax Line(___)______________ Voice Line (___)____________ Modem Speed (1200) (2400) (9600) (14.4) (Whats a modem?) Credit Account: Required (See attached statement) Visa _______________________Exp-date_____ MC _______________________Exp-date_____ AMEX _______________________Exp-date_____ Signature ____________________ Date _____________________ 1. I understand that the use of this account will be for lawful purpose and accept responsibility for my actions while on-line. I will not hold the IIA responsible for any activities occuring, or initiated by any user who makes knowing use of the ID IIA assigns on my behalf. 2. I agree that any use of the 800 number made available to me by the IIA will be billed to my credit card. I authorize use of this account with regard to voluntary on-line services to which I approve. When completed please fax this document to the following. (202) 387 - 5446 PLEASE NOTE - FAX THIS DOCUMENT DIRECTLY - WE CAN NOT ENSURE PRIVACY IF YOU SEND IT THROUGH THE NETWORK! This form may be copied for the purposes of adding additional Internet users. If you are having difficulties making a clean connection try changing your modem parameters to 7 bits, even parity and 1 stop bit.

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Am. Bar Ass'n Information Security Committee Meeting (fwd)
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a crypto-EDI/legal mini-conference announcement from the Electronic Data Interchange Issues <EDI-L(a)UCCVMA.UCOP.EDU> list. This is a great list for issues of networked-based commerce and security practicum. Forwarded message: Date: Fri, 7 Jan 1994 09:45:57 -0500 Sender: Electronic Data Interchange Issues <EDI-L(a)UCCVMA.UCOP.EDU> From: Michael Baum <BAUM%HULAW1.bitnet(a)UCCVMA.UCOP.EDU> Subject: Am. Bar Ass'n Information Security Committee Meeting Announcement To: Multiple recipients of list EDI-L <EDI-L(a)UCCVMA.UCOP.EDU> **Posted For Information Purposes Only** Please correspond to: Michael S. Baum, Esq. 33 Tremont Street Cambridge, MA 02139-1227 Tel: 617/661-1234 Fax: 617/661-0716 Email: baum(a)hulaw1.harvard.edu Subject: ** Notice and Invitation ** Certification Authority Work Group Notarization and nonrepudiation Work Group Information Security Committee, EDI/IT Division Section of Science and Technology You are cordially invited to participate in a meeting of the above- referenced work groups of the Information Security Committee on Wednesday-Thursday, January 19-20, 1994. These interdisciplinary work groups will continue to address conventional and electronic notarization and certification authority issues. The meetings are focused around the work product of its respective participants and will be highly results driven. At the last meeting, further progress was made on the development of "Model Certification Authority Guidelines/Rules of Practice ("Guideline") to provide a legal framework for the use of certificate- based public key cryptography. Also, proposals were further debated and developed including for: (i) the creation of a new ABA accreditation/- specialization "attorney-notary;" (ii) a "Clipper Resolution;" and (iii) alternative dispute resolution for CAs. Professor Carl Felsenfeld has secured the use of the Faculty Reading Room of Fordham Law School in New York City. The meeting agenda and logistics are attached. I look forward to seeing you in New York. Sincerely, Michael S. Baum Chair, Information Security Committee and EDI/IT Division cc: Joe Potenza, Section Chair Council, Division and Committee Chairs attachment Information Security Committee EDI and Information Technology Division Section of Science and Technology American Bar Association Certification Authority Work Group Notarization and Nonrepudiation Work Group January 19-20, 1994 TENTATIVE AGENDA Wed. Jan. 19, 1994 8:30- 9:00 Continental breakfast and registration. 9:00- 9:30 Participant introductions, meeting logistics and questions. 9:30-10:30 Presentation of revised notary and accreditation proposals. 10:30-10:45 Break. 10:45-12:30 Review of revised draft Guideline outline; presentation on identity credentials; break-out session on contributions. 12:30-13:30 Lunch & informal presentation - TBD. 13:30-15:00 Report from break-out session; drafting sessions. 15:00-15:15 Break. 15:15-16:45 Update on computer-based powers of attorney; continuation of Guideline contribution presentations and discussion. 16:45-17:00 Wrap-up. Thurs. Jan. 20, 1994 8:30- 9:00 Continental breakfast and registration. 9:00-10:30 Break-out sessions on Guideline. 10:30-10:45 Break. 10:45-12:30 Additional presentation by contributors to the Guideline; Review of outline and contributions. 12:30-13:30 Lunch & informal presentation - TBD. 13:30-15:00 Review of Meeting Work Product and "mid-course corrections." 15:00-15:45 Break. 15:15-16:15 Presentation and Update of Clipper-Capstone Resolution; presentation of revised proposal/resolutions (Notarial, etc.). Report on Dec. '93 WG meeting on Digital Signature Legislation. 16:45-17:00 New Work Group assignments; wrap-up. Certification Authority Work Group Notarization and Nonrepudiation Work Group Information Security Committee January 19-20, 1994 Meeting Details Papers: All prior participants who plan to attend must submit their agreed upon contributions ASAP to: baum(a)hulaw1.harvard.edu and please bring a copy of the contribution to the meeting on disk. First-time participants (who plan to attend the January 19-20 meeting) must submit a brief paper (~3 pages in length) relevant to the subject matter or discuss their planned contribution to the committee (please contact Michael Baum for details). A binder of prior papers will be presen to new participants during registration. Prior participants are requested to bring their Work Group binders. Meeting Location: Faculty Reading Room - 4th Floor Fordham Law School 140 West 62nd Street New York, NY (enter btwn. Amsterdam and Columbus Aves.) (this is adjacent to Lincoln Center) Phone: 212-636-6856 (Prof. Carl Felsenfeld) Fax: 212-636-6899 (Law School Faculty Office) Meals: Continental breakfast and refreshments during the breaks will be served as well as a light lunch (at cost). Hotels: The closest hotel to the meeting is the Radisson Empire Hotel at 44 West 63rd Street, New York, NY 10023 Ph: +1 212-265-7400 Fax: +1 212-314-0349). However, you may want to take advantage of the conference discount provided for the Worldwide Electronic Commerce conference being held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, Ph: 212-355-3000 (hotel reservations). I am informed that the Waldorf's conference discount will continue for the duration of the Information Security Committee Meeting. R.S.V.P. Please notify the ABA to RSVP. Also, please send a biography (new participants) and confirmation of your intention to participate to Ann Kowalski, Section Manager, Section of Science and Technology (ABA Chicago 312-988-6281 or kowalskya(a)attmail.com) as soon as possible. *** END *** ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about this anonymous remail service, send mail to remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu with the word "remail help" as the only words in the subject field.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Noone persists in the belief that absolutely no "psuedospoofing" is occurring on Cypherpunks. What is patently obvious, however, is that Detweiler makes wild and unsubstantiated charges against others. Please send me a small selection of his 1000 messsages that he feels prove the charges he has been making. Otherwise, let him keep his delusions to himself. His behaviour concerning these absurd claims that Tim May and Eric Hughes (neither of whom I have met) are criminals is completely unacceptable to reasonable people. I urge Detweiler to bring forth proof or shut up. Has he ever considered how sociopathic it is for him to whine about how painful a particular letter or article is to him and yet he never seems to care about the hurt he's causing with his apparently groundless charges concerning TC May, Eric Hughes, and Cypherpunks list members in general ???? Jeremy Anderson Freelance programmer and Chinese translator jeremy(a)cyberspace.com PGP public key available on request Good cheer and smiles dispensed freely

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Re: Public key encryption, income tax and government
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- Proc-Type: 2001,MIC-CLEAR Originator-Name: cme(a)sw.stratus.com Originator-Key-Asymmetric: MIGbMAoGBFUIAQECAgP+A4GMADCBiAKBgCl79/jl0DEVl1GQzOHlzjDmChDDxnWO Acd7jShj2x1vclFh6vbHx9IJqkQdwNhNAWf8XnTrqBDN+VSBc1qdT6nSEAbNPxHD XcvY2DudhuRaRBVLgUQ4scTK657m90Q+bTL5yIh2MaFipUw9BgbIXPTDlksSskWP 9oHjo+pCJC+lAgMBAAE= MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA, C3gMSFO0aMHOYmm5S1biubEdUqIq8HEhOvSHO8n/+DqknxLju55dTCcI43u6rhH9 Nh6A0d8+9rZFi1P+sNAJ/kk0ory5q144Chg1z1Aukf/uLrhDLYkZZhplL0tFSi5y YWmf6jzlH5I6tcTzMbpf5/5iHFsgLiFJ0LVFn1rYwTY= In article <jdurr-100194200236(a)nubs92.ccs.itd.umich.edu> jdurr(a)eland.com (J. Durr) writes: > >from Strategic Investment, p 11, November 11 1993 > >Escape to Cypherspace: >The Information Revolution and the demise of the income tax > >by James Bennett > >The ultimate revenge of the Nerds > > Readers of Strategic Investment are already aware of the crucial >role of the microchip in eroding the power of governments over their >citizens. Recent developments herald an expansion of this role that >promises to dwarf the effects seen to date. >[...] in >the coming decade, it may create consequences which change the life of >everyone on the planet more than the atomic bomb. Mr. Bennett is clearly a victim of the popular impression that privacy is somehow new. Anything which can be done with public key encryption can be done already with private communications (whispers, notes which are mailed and destroyed, secret mail drops, couriers, secret-key encryption, ...). All the hype over cryptoanarchy is overblown. We are capable of anarchy, income tax evasion and secret bank accounts today. Look around you. How much of that do you see in your own life? What makes you think that you'll see any more of it in 10 years? - Carl P.S. His claim that RSA markets RIPEM was humorous -- but sad. Maybe it's always like this when the general public gets interested in something technical. -----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----

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retraction re: triple-DES
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some of you may remember that I was promoting triple-DES-CBC using three feedback loops rather than one, claiming that is was clearly at least as secure as triple-DES with one feedback loop, while being faster for pipelined operation. It is clearly faster in a pipeline but Eli Biham has shown me his attack on inner-loop triple-DES and it's quite good and I was quite wrong...at least for chosen-ciphertext attacks. The inner loops weaken the resulting cipher drastically, under those attacks. I might still use the inner loops to get longer brute force attacks (as noted by Burt Kaliski in a posting here a while ago), if I knew that chosen-ciphertext attacks couldn't happen, but my original claim is clearly wrong and I thank Eli for pointing that out. Meanwhile, there are probably better ways to get the longer key for avoiding brute force (eg., XOR with a single secret value or with a simple (fast) PRNG). I'm told that Eli has a paper in preparation explaining his attack in full and I'm looking forward to that paper. I am sure that its location will be announced to this list when it becomes available. - Carl

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amusing quote
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found this quote amusing: >obviously, I don't give a damn, do I? somehow my life has become far more >exciting now that I have so many enemies and have discovered all their >blackest secrets. I've been keeping out of the Detweiler fray, and wouldn't ordinarily quote him, but this is unusual...I'm taking him at face value here; that probably *is* the source of his motivation for all his frothing at the mouth. Paranoia is entertaining to him. The quote comes from talk.politics.crypto, where I was grazing the other day. Doug -- Doug Merritt doug(a)netcom.com Professional Wild-eyed Visionary Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs

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Weak Random Number Generators
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jerry(a)terminus.dell.com a while ago said he'd made a hardware random number generator, and offered to send out data generated by it, inviting people to look for weaknesses. I followed up on that and found problems with one of the two sets of data he sent (files a.bin and b.bin, one produced with his hardware and one with a software RNG, but which is which was not identified). He apparently is too busy to acknowledge my response, so I thought I'd post the results I emailed him here, for those of you interested in weaknesses of RNG's. The weakness is shown via ascii graphics of the results of the analysis, which makes it accessible and intuitive. -------------- included message ------------------ As I suspected, it only took a few minutes of programming to find periodicity in the phase space. The set you called "a.bin" is the one that shows a great deal of obvious structure. The intrinsic resonance is related to powers of two (I haven't figured it out more closely than that), which is what one might expect from software methods, but less likely from hardware methods (unless there's a power-of-two bias introduced by an ADC). On the other hand, I may be seeing structure in your psuedo-random number generator...they're notoriously bad unless you went out of your way to find a really really good one. The b.bin file appeared ergodic, almost completely filling the 2d phase space I picked as an easy-to-implement test. I may try another few tests shortly. For your amusement, I produced two psuedo-RNG files, one using the ancient and decrepit rand() function, well known to be a very poor source of randomness (c.bin), and one using the more carefully constructed BSD Unix random() function (d.bin). The latter also has its flaws, but they are far better hidden than those of rand(). Note that c.bin is even more grossly flawed (structured) than your a.bin. Meanwhile, if a.bin happens to be from your software RNG rather than from your hardware RNG, then you need a new one! I have one of the better ones lying around somewhere, let me know if you need it. Below is what I saw from my crude-ascii graphics output from the four test sets. If you think this would be of interest to cypherpunks, feel free to post this there...or tell me to. Doug (Note that I'm using a 35 by 80 window to view these) 2811> ran < a.bin . . .... . . .... . . ..... . ... . . . . ... .... . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .... . . . .... . ....... . .... ... ... .... .. ..... . ..... .... . ..... . ..... . ..... . .... . .... . . .... .... . ... . . ... . .. . . . .. . . . . .. .. ... . . ..... . . ..... . ..... . .... . . ....... ...... ..... ... . . ..... . ..... . ..... .... 2812> ran < b.bin ........................................................... .... . .............................................................. ..................................... .......................... ................................................................ ...................................... ......................... ..................... .......................................... ................................................................ ........................................ ....................... ................................................................ ................................................................ .................... ................. ......................... ................................................................ .......................................... ..................... ................................................................ .................................... ........................ .. ............................. .................................. ............................................. .................. ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................ ............................... ................................................................ ......... ..................................................... ............................ ................................... .......................... ..................................... ................................................................ ................................................................ ........... .................................................... ................... ............................................ .......................... ..................................... ................................................................ ................................................................ .............................................................. . 2813> ran < c.bin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2814> ran < d.bin ................................................................ ................................................................ ... ............................................... ....... .... ........................................................... .... ................................................................ ........................................................ ....... ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................. .............. ...................................... ......................... ................................................................ ............ ................................................... ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ............... ................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ .......................... ................ .................... ................................................... ............ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ -------------- end included message -------------

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Bay area BBS bust--fyi
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric, please put me back on the list. Keith ------ About two years ago I helped a guy from Milpitias (just north of San Jose) deal with a BBS bust at what he described as a "light" porn BBS. The San Jose cops realized shortly that they had really goofed by not considering the ECPA and related laws in their search&seizure. The result was that they gave his system back after five weeks, and stated in a written release that this guy's activities were within the scope of the law. The BBS is called Amateur Action, and the sysop's name is Richard Thomas (408-263-1079). A few minutes ago Richard (who I have yet to meet in person) called. A search warrant was being served at that very moment by the US Postal Inspectors, who (with the help of San Jose cops) were packing up his equipment and carting it out--again. Richard managed to get one of these inspectors on the phone with me. This inspector seemed to be rather knowledgeable of such things as the ECPA, 2000aa, and the Steve Jackson case. He was completely unconcerned! He piously stated that it was their intent to bring the system back to Richard within a "few days" and, as a result of the short interruption of user access, and their good intent "not to look at private email," they were completely safe from the provisions of the ECPA. This postal inspector gave his name as David Dirmeyes, from Tennesse (does this sound like Bible Belt prosecution for pron?) and gave me the name of the US Attorney he was working under, one Dan Newson with a phone of 901-544-4231 in TN (though he stated that the phone # would be of no use because Dan was at a conference for a week). For what it is worth, the postal people were using the San Jose cops on the bust because they did not have the expertise themselves to move the system and make copies. According to the investigator, they did not know that they could get a court order to have a backup of the system made on the spot. It may be that Richard is the target, he said there was a mystery package which came today in the mail today (which his son brought in and his wife opened, but he had not gotten around to seeing what it was) which seemed to the center of the postal inspector's concerns. (In spite of not meeting him, I suspect Richard may be the kind of smart alec who attracts the attention of cops.) I don't know if this is something of marginal concern to those of us concerned with government abuse of people's computers and communications or a major concern. I intend to find out more tomorrow, but if the ECPA is applicable, this guy had about 3500 users, over 2k pieces of protected email on his system, plus (I think) agreements with his uses for him to represent them in an ECPA related legal action--two million dollars if I am multiplying right tonight. (My "Warning to Law Enforcement Agents" was part of his signup screens.) Keith Henson 408-972-1132 hkhenson(a)cup.portal.com

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No Subject
by ltech1!ltech1!mercury＠heifetz.msen.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubscribe

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Updated/corrected posting
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

About two years ago I helped a guy from Milpitias (just north of San Jose) deal with a BBS bust at what he described as a "light" porn BBS. The San Jose cops realized shortly that they had really goofed by not considering the ECPA and related laws in their search & seizure. The result was that they gave his system back after five weeks, and stated in a written release that this guy's activities were within the scope of the law. The BBS is called Amateur Action, and the sysop's name is Robert Thomas (408-263-1079). Robert's lawyer, Richard Williams's phone number is 408-295-6336. Last night about 8 pm, Robert (who I have yet to meet in person) called. A search warrant was being served at that very moment by the US Postal Inspectors, who (with the help of San Jose cops) were packing up his equipment and carting it out--again. Robert managed to get one of these inspectors on the phone with me. This inspector seemed to be rather knowledgeable of such things as the ECPA, 2000aa, and the Steve Jackson case. He stated he was completely unconcerned about their lack of warrants for email! He piously stated that, because it was their intent to bring the system back within a "few days" and, as a result of the short interruption of user access, and their good intent "not to look at private email," they were completely safe from the provisions of the ECPA. This postal inspector gave his name as David Dirmeyer, from Tennessee (does this sound like Bible Belt prosecution for pron?) and gave me the name of the US Attorney he was working under, one Dan Newson with a phone of 901-544-4231 in TN (though he stated that the phone # would be of no use because Dan was at a conference for a week). For what it is worth, the postal inspector said they were using the San Jose cops on the bust because they did not have the expertise themselves to move the system and make copies. According to the investigator, they did not know that they could get a court order to have a backup of the system made on the spot. It may be that Robert is the target. (In spite of not meeting him, I suspect Richard may be the kind of smart alec who attracts the attention of cops.) Robert said there was a mystery package which came today in the mail today (which his son and wife picked up and she opened). The package turned out to be real honest-to-gosh kiddy porn. Robert claims not to have ordered it, and considering that his wife picked the (unexpected) package up and opened it, I think this is the actual case. Robert was busy with system problems that afternoon and had not gotten around to doing anything about the stuff. The guy who sent it is known as "Lance White," who Robert thinks is one of his BBS members. (As is postal inspector Dirmeyer.) They had Robert pull all postal correspondence with this guy (video porn orders) from his files and took it with them. Robert thinks the postal folks may be after this guy, and his BBS just got caught in the middle. An interesting side point is that while they asked for the package which came that day when they came in, they did not have a warrant for it, and said they would have drive over to SF to get one unless he volunteered to give it up. Robert signed off that they could take it, and they did. He noted this morning that the original warrant he has was neither signed nor dated, though a judge's name was typed in. I don't know if this is something of marginal concern to those of us concerned with government abuse of people's computers and communications or a major concern. I intend to find out more, but if the ECPA is applicable, this guy had about 3500 users, over 2k pieces of protected email on his system, plus (I think) agreements with his uses for him to represent them in an ECPA related legal action--two million dollars if I am multiplying right. (My "Warning to Law Enforcement Agents" was part of his signup screens.) Question for Mike Godwin. One aspect of this case gives me the shakes. *Anyone* with a grudge (and access to this kind of stuff) can send you a package in the mail and tip off the postal inspectors. Short of the obvious (don't make enemies!) how can you protect yourself from this kind of attack? My non-lawyer thoughts: Burn it at once! Call my lawyer. Call the cops. For a while this will be a very serious problem, because *any* of us with readily available morfing tools can make (what looks like) kiddy porn out of legal porn. Keith Henson 408-972-1132 hkhenson(a)cup.portal.com

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