December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ADV:Valentine's for the Very Special!
by sender04＠mail.usa.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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adv....ATTENTION : INVESTORS...HOT press release on developing mining company!
by goldpromo＠investormail.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NOTE: Your name was added to our list because you have shown an interest in smart investing. If your name was added erroneously or you no longer wish to be on our mailing list, simply send "remove" to the "from address". For further information regarding this investment opportunity: Phone: (604) 681-6186 The Board of Directors of El Misti Gold Limited is pleased to summarize current diamond drill results for its wholly owned Sinchao Project in northern Peru located some 450 km north of Lima and 30 km from the Yanacocha Mine, South America's largest gold producer. These results confirm the presence of a large copper-gold-zinc-silver system with potentially economic grades amenable to open pit mining. The deposit remains open laterally in all directions and there is potential for several hundred million tonnes of mineralization. The analytical results were provided by Intertek Testing Services (Bondar Clegg). The quality assurance for all aspects of the diamond drill program has been provided by Howe Chile Ltda., a subsidiary of ACA Howe Ltd. Drill holes SDH-10, SDH-5, SDH-6 and SDH-7 have delineated mineralization over a length of 640 metres and a width of 300 metres with an average thickness of 478 metres. Preliminary test work indicates a specific gravity of 2.6. These measurements indicate a potential for a mineralized zone of approximately 239 million tonnes at a grade of 1.45g/t gold equivalent (Cu equiv. 0.84%). This includes 163 million tonnes at a grade of 1.70 g/t gold equivalent (Cu equiv. 0.99%) which includes 111 million tonnes at a grade of 2.18 g/t gold equivalent (Cu equiv. 1.27 %). The mineralization is polymetallic whose value is derived approximately 38% from copper, 24% from gold, 23% from zinc and 15% silver. The accompanying map (not available in e-mail format, please check the Company's web site) shows the area of mineralization defined by the current diamond drill results. Additional results for drill hole SDH-10 and previously released results are set out in Table 1 and are summarized below. Gold and copper equivalent grades have been calculated for each of the significant mineralized intercepts on the basis of in-ground values using the following metal prices: US $287/oz gold, US $5.55/oz silver, US $0.72/lb copper, and US $0.52/lb zinc. Hole SDH 10: 490 (1,181 feet) metres of mineralized intercept at a gold equivalent grade of 1.61 g/t (Cu equiv. 0.94 %). Hole SDH-5: 495 (1,636 feet) metres of mineralized intercept at a gold equivalent grade of 1.59 g/t (Cu equiv. 0.92 %). Hole SDH-6: 602 (1,850 feet) metres of mineralized intercept at a gold equivalent grade of 1.22 g/t (Cu equiv. 0.71 %). Hole SDH-7: 592 (1,810 feet) metres of mineralized intercept at a gold equivalent grade of 1.36 g/t (Cu equiv. 0.79 %). At Sinchao, to date, the Company has undertaken geological mapping, geochemical sampling and ground geophysics followed by drilling. During 1997, twelve RC holes (1,768 metres) were drilled and during 1998, seven RC holes (1,174.5 metres) and ten diamond drill holes (5,176.25 metres) were drilled. The Board is highly encouraged with the mineralization and potential of the Sinchao project and has retained well known and highly respected independent geologist Lindsay R. Bottomer, P. Geo to review all Sinchao project data and help the Board formulate the appropriate next steps for 1999. NOTE: We strive to comply with all laws and to send information to interested parties only. This message is not intended for, nor was it intentionaly sent to Washington state residents. Mistigold has paid a fee of $500.00 for advertising on 2-14-1999 For further information regarding this investment opportunity: Phone: (604) 681-6186

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Re: Query on "secure databases"
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Peter - here's my previous posting, with an addendum, Cc: cypherpunks At 04:43 PM 2/11/97 -0500, Peter Swire <swire.1(a)osu.edu> wrote: > Can you point me to anything I can read on "secure databases"? I >hadn't hit that term before. I am curious to what extent they are secure >due to cryptographic approaches, or to what extent you rely on other >mechanisms for keeping out unauthorized users. It's been a long time since I've looked much into it, since I was getting out of phone-company-defense-contractor mode at the time the field was developing. I think the NCSC Rainbow Book that deals with secure databases is the Purple Book, though it might be the Gray. Oracle and/or Sybase have done some work trying to do databases at the B1 or B2 level, but I don't know details. I'll talk about secure databases a bit, but for the real world there's more useful stuff that isn't related to them. =================== Begin "Secure Database" Section ============== At the time, the Orange Book (security for standalone computers) was well-understood, though there weren't really any systems above B2 level, and the Red Book was written, but nobody really had a clue how to implement multi-level machines on a multi-level LAN, though you could use encrypting Ethernet cards to get single-level machines of different levels on the same LAN, if they were all administered by the same group of people (so user-IDs and security levels worked across the entire system.) At the lower security levels, Orange Book techniques mainly involve removing bugs and adding accounting features. At the higher levels, the key is to come up with a good mathematical/logical model of interactions in your computer system, and then design a computer system that only does the things permitted by the model and prove it does that. Some of these systems use cryptographic techniques, including some of the capability-based systems - see Bill Frantz's KeyKOS work, which he's referred to on Cypherpunks occasionally. The objective is to have databases that can be accessed by multiple users with different sets of security permissions. In the military vernacular, this mainly means having UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and maybe TOP SECRET data in the database, where not all users are cleared to the highest security level, and maybe projects X, Y, and Z, where users of project X may not have a need to know for project Y, etc. The easy problems are probably solved by now - either you do a good job of verifying the design and bug-free-ness of your database software so you can be sure that each request includes, and obeys, security levels, or you use crypto to encrypt the data items for each security level (e.g. everybody with a SECRET or PROJECT Z clearance shares a key for that data, which isn't really ideal for non-small groups of people, the database just tries to do a good job, and you only do operations in the database that make sense when the data is encrypted, though that's annoyingly restrictive for many applications.) The sticky problems are aggregation-related. It may be ok if an uncleared person knows that military base A has missile types 1, 3, and 5, and if the uncleared person knows where all your military bases are. But is it ok if the uncleared person knows about _all_ the missiles at _all_ the bases, and can tell that nobody's using Type 2 missiles any more, and that all the Type 4 missiles got moved to New Jersey last week? =============== End "Secure Database" section ================= =============== Begin "Real-World and Crypto" section ========= For the average person, though, the simple military models aren't really useful. You really care more about groups of people, though the multi-level stuff is sometimes a good way to keep machines from being hacked. But the real problem is that computers are very good at correlating information - if two different companies know your Social Security Number, and they share their data with each other (maybe for a price), then they can all tie together everything they each know about you. And there's no way to stop it, except by limiting the information you give people (which limits the transactions they'll do with you), or contractually limiting what they can do with it (good luck), or using multiple identities - and even then, computers are often good at guessing that the John Doe at 1234 Main Street is the related to Jane Smith at 1234 Main Street, and maybe the foreign car parts Jane bought on her American Express are for the Porsche registered to John, so there's a junk-mail opportunity. There's really only one technology that lets you avoid this, which is crypto and its relatives - though you still have to get people you use business with to use it, which is an uphill game. Some of the fundamental work on this is David Chaum's papers on Credentials without Identity (or something about like that, from ~1985.) For instance, you can have a voter registration number that's cryptographically signed by the voting bureau, but uses blinded signatures so they can't correlate the known good unique number with the Peter Swire who walked in and showed a picture ID one day. A driver's license smartcard could keep a pointer to your driving records, but wouldn't give your True Name, and would only show a cop that the person whose picture is on the front is a Licensed Driver, and maybe could demonstrate that the bearer knows the card's PIN. One big issue is that the government is pushing banks to demand SSNs, and requiring employers to demand SSNs (makes them easy Employee IDs), and pushing medical insurers and providers to use SSNs (makes it easy to collect Medicare data.) You can gain a lot of privacy just by having employers use their own employee-ID numbering system, so the travel agent subcontracting to Corporate Travel doesn't need your SSN on every form they fill out. But suppose the Social Security Administration and IRS issued you a bunch of separate numbers, that were either related using a cryptographic key, or just randomly picked and kept in a big database (maybe pointing to your old SSN), so you could give everybody who needs a Tax ID a different number, and only you and the IRS could correlate them. (To some extent, you can do this yourself by creating lots of companies, but it's a real pain and costs a certain amount of money.) =============== addendum ===================== Of course, for many transactions, the way to reduce the privacy problems is to use bearer certificates rather than book-entry approaches - pay cash, or digicash, rather than credit cards, use on-line anonymous delivery of bits, or picking up stuff in person, rather than mailing stuff to a snail address, etc. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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AlterNIC takes over InterNIC traffic
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C12382%2C00.html?nd AlterNIC takes over InterNIC traffic By Courtney Macavinta July 14, 1997, 12:15 p.m. PT A rival domain name registry to the official Internet registrar, InterNIC, redirected users from "www.internic.net" to its own site last weekend in what is being called a "protest." Netizens told CNET's NEWS.COM that they ended up at AlterNIC, or "www.alternic.net," after typing in InterNIC's URL. AlterNIC was set up by the enhanced Domain Name Services to offer alternate top-level domains, such as ".ltd," ".sex," and ".med." "By redirecting the domain name 'www.internic.net,' we are protesting the recent InterNIC claim to ownership of '.com,' '.org,' and '.net,' which they were supposed to be running in the public trust," AlterNIC CFO Eugene Kashpureff stated on his site. "Our apologies for any trouble this DNS [domain name system] protest has caused you...We think we exercised restraint in the use of our latest DNS technology for this protest," the letter states. "We terminated the protest configuration at 8 a.m. Monday, July 14." The AlterNIC site also contained a link that allowed visitors to access the actual InterNIC in the protest message. InterNIC is the registrar of the most valuable domain names, such as ".com." It is administered in part by Network Solutions under agreement with the National Science Foundation, which ends in March of next year. During its tenure, Network Solutions has collected approximately $78 million in registration fees. The protest is the latest move in the heated debate over who will control the Internet naming system, which has turned into a lucrative business as commercial entities fight to establish brand awareness by using the most coveted names. For example, the name "business.com" was bought recently from its registered owner for $150,000. Last month, the Commerce Department asked for public comment on the future of the domain name system. An ad hoc committee formed in part by the Internet Society also proposed a plan last year for replacing Network Solutions and reconfiguring how the names are handed out. Kashpureff said he is protesting Network Solutions' claim in its recent Securities and Exchange filing that it owned the property rights to ".com" and the other popular domains. "If they think they own the entire domain name space, I've got news for them. Over the weekend, I possessed their name," he told CNET's NEWS.COM. No one at Network Solutions could be immediately reached to comment on whether the company will look into legal ramifications for the rerouting of its traffic by AlterNIC. Kashpureff wouldn't say how he managed to abduct InterNIC's domain name but did say he did it to demonstrate the system's vulnerability. "I'm not releasing how I did it because it would take out the name service on the Net. The hack was a result of a years' worth of work under a project called 'DNS Storm.'" Moreover, there is no telling how many registrations InterNIC could have lost due to the antic. But some Netizens who were involuntarily transported to the alternate site didn't seem to mind. "They do have a good point in the fact that those domain names are supposed to be in the public trust. I don't agree with the InterNIC monopoly either," said Jason Brunette, a Webmaster for TCB Internet in Wisconsin, who was rerouted to AlterNIC this weekend when he tried to register a domain.

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$140/day, Full 90 Day Guarantee!!!
by entreprenuers＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Group 6549 Mission Gorge Road Suite 279 San Diego, California 92120 Dear Dianne, I want to receive $140, $200, even $250 and more every time I mail out 10 of the exact same sales letter that you will supply. Please rush me your "Every-Day Cash Plan" By first class mail and if I don't make at least $140 a day mailing your special sales letter, I can return your materials within 90 days for a complete refund. On that basis, I have enclosed $19.95 U.S. plus $3.50 U.S. first class mail. ( total $23.45 U.S.) Visa, Mastercard, Discover, American Express, check or money orders only. Please Do Not Send Cash! Credit Card orders processed 24 hours per day, seven days per week! Simply e-mail back the completed order form below. ***Send all e-mail orders to: orders(a)gox.com.*** Thank you! (If paying by credit card, please make sure that your Name and Address information is the same as on your credit card and statement. We cross validate for your protection. Thank You.) Note: Credit Card Fraud Is A Felony And We Will Prosecute All Offenders! Name: _______________________________________________________ Address: _____________________________________________________ City: _________________________________________________________ State/Province: __________________ Zip/Postal code: _______________ Country if other than U.S.: _______________________________________ E-mail address:________________________________________________ If applicable: Credit card type: (Visa, Mastercard, Discover, American Express). _____________________________________________________________ Credit card number: ___________________________________Expiration date:_____________ Name as it appears on credit card: _____________________________________________________________ 1997 Stefanie Aquino, The G.O.X. Group. ALL ORDERS ARE SHIPPED BY FIRST CLASS MAIL AND ARE GUARANTEED FOR 90 DAYS. PLEASE DO NOT SEND CASH!

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No Subject
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi everyone, Well, I guess it's official now. I'm going to speak at MacWorld on Thursday the 7th. If your planning to go to MacWorld, feel free to stop by and talk about e$ and financial cryptography on the Macintosh. > ---------------------------------- > * DIGITAL COMMERCE FOR THE REST OF US [Session 92, Thursday 8/7, 4:00-5:15 > pm, World Trade Center] -- What are the fundamental forces in the technology > of digital commerce? What effect will digital commerce have on society? What > are Mac's strengths are in this environment? What are some very specific > things that Apple and the Macintosh community can do, right now, to > participate as a full partner in the development of digital commerce on > public networks? What are the technologies that Mac people should concentrate > on to be first movers in the new geodesic economy? Solo Speaker: BOB > HETTINGA, Freelance Digital Commerce Analyst, e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, > MA 02131; http://www.shipwright.com/ > ---------------------------------- Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Center for Security Policy calls for domestic key escrow (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 16:00:27 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Center for Security Policy calls for domestic key escrow In the boxing ring of Washington, the Center for Security Policy packs a hefty punch. Its faxed alerts appear once or twice a week on the desks of thousands of key decisionmakers. They're predictably hawkish, with titles like "The Nation Needs MORE B-2s." A recent one focused on encryption. The message: The Clinton administration isn't doing *enough* to control crypto, especially domestically: But a national information infrastructure also needs selective transparency on call to support users' needs to get at their encrypted data... U.S. law enforcement agencies in carrying out criminal investigations also need to be able to access voice communications, data records and data transmissions consistent with constitutional protections. The loss of this investigative technique, which is subject to strict judicial scrutiny -- would be disastrous for law enforcement. Regrettably, the Clinton Administration has been unwilling to stand up and say, here is what needs to be done -- perhaps out of a fear of alienating a key constituency, the computer industry. Read on for the full text of the alert and a well-reasoned response by ATR's Jim Lucier. -Declan Additional articles on crypto: http://pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,931,00.html http://pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1022,00.html ************** No. 97-D 88 DECISION BRIEF 25 June 1997 For Immediate Release (202) 466-0515 Breaking the Code on the Encryption Debate: National Security Interests Are Being Jeopardized (Washington, D.C.): With relatively little fanfare, a truly momentous public policy debate is taking place in Washington. Unfortunately, all other things being equal, it seems likely that the outcome of this debate concerning the domestic use, foreign export and international regulation of encryption techniques will do grievous harm to the national security interests of the United States. 'You Can't Tell the Players...' Such an extraordinary, and ominous, result is in prospect due to several factors: By its very nature, encryption -- a generic name for numerous means of encoding computer, voice or other transmissions of data so as to conceal the contents from unauthorized access -- is one of the most complex and obscure of sciences. Given its direct relevance for the protection of classified U.S. government information and for the penetration of foreign governments and other entities' secure communications, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) has jealously tried to shield from public view as much as possible about the technology and techniques involved in encryption and code-breaking. The necessary secretiveness associated with what NSA does and how the spread of encryption systems might affect the American ability to perform signals intelligence (SIGINT) by intercepting and monitoring foreign communications enormously complicates this debate. Robust encryption at home contributes to national security as well as protecting American industry, critical information networks and citizens' privacy. But a national information infrastructure also needs selective transparency on call to support users' needs to get at their encrypted data. U.S. law enforcement agencies in carrying out criminal investigations also need to be able to access voice communications, data records and data transmissions consistent with constitutional protections. The loss of this investigative technique, which is subject to strict judicial scrutiny -- would be disastrous for law enforcement. Widespread use of unbreakable encryption is exactly what terrorists, drug lords, pedophiles and their ilk want to see. But law enforcement needs a controlled window into this encryption as part of its responsibility to detect, prevent or prosecute criminal behavior. Experience with court-ordered wiretaps suggests that, by requiring judicial approval of such electronic monitoring, this function critical to the rule of law and a civil society can be performed without risk of serious abuse. Due to advances in information techniques, the know-how and means for providing sophisticated encryption capabilities has proliferated dramatically in recent years. With the burgeoning use of the Internet and other electronic devices for conducting business, the demand for means to keep voice communications, data records and data transfers private has also grown tremendously. U.S. manufacturers of computer software and hardware -- many of whom have been key supporters of and enjoy great influence with President Clinton and his Administration -- are demanding an opportunity to meet this demand with encryption products that will be exceedingly robust, if not impenetrable. They typically point not only to the trade benefits such sales would represent but to the prospect that foreign manufacturers of encryption technologies will gladly supply products not available from American sources. Similar arguments have proven effective in obtaining Administration support for the wholesale elimination of export controls on powerful computers -- even supercomputers. President Clinton has already issued an Executive Order substantially liberalizing the export of powerful encryption capabilities. Under its terms, encryption programs involving up to 40-bit keys (in layman's terms, the number of variables used in combination to conceal a given piece of encrypted message traffic, one of several factors determining the robustness of an encryption program) can be exported without a license. The Executive Order also permits programs of any strength to be exported provided they have a "key recovery" capability (i.e., a code-breaking spare key has been created) -- even if that key resides with the purchaser of such encryption. Civil libertarians -- including some conservatives with well-deserved reputations for concern about U.S. national security -- have taken the position that techniques which impede or preclude government monitoring of electronic transmissions are highly desirable. Their enthusiasm for the most widespread proliferation of encryption techniques, both domestically and internationally, provides tremendous political cover for others with more suspect motivations. Counter-culture opponents of U.S. government power, including some holding high office in the Clinton Administration, appear untroubled by the diminution of American capabilities to perform signals intelligence -- historically an area of decisive and strategically vital advantage for the United States.(1) Evidently, they are no more concerned by the other side of this coin: Thanks to the Clinton-approved transfer of American supercomputers and other powerful data processing systems, foreign governments are likely to have much enhanced capabilities to perform their own code-breaking operations, further reducing U.S. dominance in the field. The Legislative Context Against this backdrop, several bills have been introduced reflecting two basic approaches. The first sponsored by Senators Conrad Burns (R-MT) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) in the Senate and by Rep. Robert Goodlatte (R-VA) in the House would essentially eliminate controls on the export of encryption. This legislation is favored by the computer software and hardware industries and a number of civil libertarians. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott has thrown his support behind the Burns-Leahy bill. A bill recently introduced by Senator John McCain, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, presents an alternative approach. It attempts to "split the difference," addressing domestic law enforcement concerns by way of creating incentives for U.S. manufacturers to participate in a key management infrastructure (i.e., establishing means whereby federal agencies, with appropriate court orders, can obtain the ability to read encrypted communications). While the incentives to do so are significant, the companies would be under no requirement to take part in this arrangement. As a sop to the encryption industry, however, the McCain legislation would make several concessions that could be injurious to the national security. First, it would raise the threshold for unlicenced exports from 40 bits to 56 bits. This represents a dramatic increase in the power of encryption programs that will find their way into the hands of hostile powers, international terrorists and other foreign criminal elements -- and will add dramatically to the time and computing power required by U.S. intelligence to monitor their activities. Second, the McCain legislation calls for the creation of an industry-government advisory board tasked to consider and jointly develop recommendations concerning future standards for encryption exports. Such an arrangement would put those responsive to multinational stockholders on an essentially equal footing with government agencies responsible for the national security. In addition, the bill would mandate foreign-availability assessments -- a pretext frequently used by industry to argue for even the most irresponsible transfers of U.S. technology.(2) Parsing Out the Issues There are, in fact, three separate issues involved in the present encryption debate -- issues that have, to some extent, been commingled by the Clinton Administration, it appears in an effort to obscure what is at stake for a vital national security capability. 1. Domestic Policy Encryption products are the future for the privacy and security of communications and information. Americans have a right to be secure in the knowledge that their private communications and information remain private, and that they can conduct electronic commercial transactions reasonably safe from fraud or compromise. Security embedded in consumer goods (as well as in information systems) needs to become a common part of how business works in this country. There is today no restriction on the use of encryption within the United States. Americans may import any encryption devices and software into the U.S. There are, however, restrictions on the export of U.S. encryption items. Unfortunately, encryption in the hands of domestic criminals can be a menace to American business and society, enabling them to hide illicit records and transactions. For law enforcement today, encrypted communications mean no electronic surveillance. Court-ordered wiretaps may be unenforceable. Because of the importance of court-ordered electronic surveillance to law enforcement, law enforcement agencies across the country believe the impact of widely proliferating encryption will be disastrous for them, unless they have a means of lawfully and promptly decrypting communications and information of criminal suspects. Accordingly, the United States requires common standards for accessing encrypted data and communications (known as "key recovery"). Importantly, such standards are required not only by law enforcement but in order to support commercial needs (for example, companies need to be able to get at their electronic records if the person who encrypted them dies or turns into a vindictive disgruntled employee). Consumers also have a vested interest in ensuring that standards exist whereby they can be assured that encryption will be reliable and easily interoperable (e.g., to manage interfaces between various network systems). A domestic public key recovery infrastructure is the answer to these requirements, A public key recovery infrastructure is, however, particularly essential for law enforcement. Increasingly, criminals are utilizing techniques to encode their phone calls, concealing their computer transmissions and keeping their records locked up in encrypted computer disks or drives, rather than in file cabinets. Subject to the limits of U.S. constitutional guarantees, law enforcement needs to be able to continue to do its job in the information age. Law enforcement does not need more intrusive authorities or abilities than it has now; it needs merely to be able to continue to be able to make use of the same investigative techniques presently available with respect to wiretaps. Alternatively, if the government does nothing but passively watch as encryption proliferates with no standards to guide it, law enforcement will lose critical investigative capabilities. In all likelihood, it will be forced to turn to more intrusive techniques (microphones in the room or car rather than taps on telephones), measures that are more invasive of privacy and which put more police officers' lives at risk. Criminals (drug dealers, kidnappers, thieves) will enjoy safe havens they do not presently have, and more good citizens will find themselves victims of unsolved crimes. Regrettably, the Clinton Administration has been unwilling to stand up and say, here is what needs to be done -- perhaps out of a fear of alienating a key constituency, the computer industry. The Administration clearly appreciates the need to support law enforcement (law and order is, after all, good politics). But when asked, its spokesmen say they are afraid their endorsement of a domestic policy would prejudice its chances of enactment, citing their experience with the public relations disaster of an earlier encryption management initiative known as the "Clipper Chip." The truth is that there is no one better positioned than President Clinton to provide leadership, given his well known ties to the hardware and software industries. 2. Export Controls In some respects, the Clinton Administration's policy has been worse than doing nothing: It has tied the domestic encryption issue to liberalizing export controls on encryption techniques, ostensibly in the hopes of buying the support of the producers of encryption products for greater cooperation with regard to domestic key management arrangements. This is most regrettable since export controls are the single most important tool the United States has for protecting sensitive national security interests in this arena. The unavoidable reality is that U.S. national security is heavily dependent on being able to collect intelligence by listening in on what its adversaries -- actual and potential -- are up to. This intelligence saves lives, wins wars, and preserves the peace. And in an era of information warfare, having superior information systems may be determinative of military power. This reality was reflected until last year by treating encryption technologies as part of the State Department's Munitions Control List. President Clinton's Executive Order, however, moved export controls on such technology over to the much less rigorous Commerce Department. It also further adulterated the export controls regime by directing that: 40-bit encryption programs may be exported without a license; 56-bit encryption programs may be exported without a license provided the exporter is working on a public key recovery technology base; and any product that is part of a public key recovery system may be exported without a license. American products should enjoy the lion's share of the market (U.S. software has 75% of the global market today), but U.S. exporters of highly capable "crypto" -- 40-bit and above -- should be required to get a license to minimize the likelihood that their products will fall into the wrong hands. Any further weakening of export controls would have a deeply debilitating impact on national security. With all of the focus on domestic encryption regime, and with no advocacy from the Executive Branch, national security interests are not being represented -- and are losing out. 3. International Dimension To make matters worse, the Clinton Administration -- under the "leadership" of a controversial former Carter Administration official, David Aaron, who has been designated as its "Ambassador for Encryption" -- has come up with a curious and dangerous gimmick: It proposes to "multilateralize" yet another area of sovereign U.S. policy concern(3) by getting OECD nations to take the lead in an area it is reluctant to champion domestically, namely in implementing national key recovery regimes. As in other issues -- ranging from environmental regulation to family planning -- the Administration appears to hope that the creation of common international practice and standards will provide a basis for imposing arrangements domestically that would otherwise be highly controversial, and perhaps politically costly. Not surprisingly, the Administration has come under some criticism from allies for the hypocrisy of trying to make them go first with respect to developing key recovery infrastructures even as it declines to step up to the issue at home. But this is worse than simple hypocrisy. It is flatly inconsistent with American values for U.S. officials to argue that foreign governments -- many of which do not recognize the basic individual rights of their citizens -- should have unfettered access to their private communications. Few of these governments actually observe the strict limitations on electronic surveillance which pertain in the United States. It is one thing for the U.S. to have a domestic key recovery regime which is subject to the rigorous and proper constraints of its Constitution and system of justice. It is quite another to say that, as a foreign policy objective of this country, Washington wants to guarantee the ability of foreign governments to spy on their own citizens, or (worse) on Americans who may communicate with those foreign citizens or travel within those countries. The Bottom Line The Clinton Administration appears once again to have gotten the answers exactly wrong. Their efforts have confused the debate and helped to divide the ranks of those who generally are concerned with national security -- even as they are jeopardizing vital national security interests, evidently out of a desire to avoid antagonizing major political donors. Domestic policy, export controls, and international accords concerning encryption are different concerns, each in need of understanding and debate on the merits. And the vital American national security requirement for electronic intelligence abroad must be supported. On an even more fundamental level, those who traditionally are sensitive to national security concerns must not allow differing perceptions of domestic law enforcement to translate into legislation that may not only endanger the defense of the United States but undermine its rule of law domestically. A lawless society is no defender of American liberties. The undeniable fact is that U.S. national security is dependent upon our ability to collect intelligence in peacetime on foreign threats, from terrorist groups to the proliferation of "weapons of mass destruction" to the status of thousands of nuclear-tipped missiles in potentially unfriendly hands. Likewise, success in foreign matters (from trade to diplomacy to support for friends and allies) requires intelligence to identify opportunities for the U.S. officials to act in defense of our values and interests around the world. The U.S. ability to gather SIGINT therefore is not something about which responsible Americans can afford to be ambivalent. This is a vital national security priority. And it is, to be sure, one that must take precedence over the commercial advantages of selling U.S. software abroad. 1. During both World War II and the half century of the Cold War, SIGINT was far and away the most important type of intelligence the U.S. gathered. Without the ability to collect and read enemy codes and ciphers, the U.S. might well have lost the Second World War. Without SIGINT, the Cold War might have ended far differently and might well have turned into a hot war at critical junctures; certainly, the U.S. would have been almost blind to many of the Soviet Union's malevolent activities. 2. It is unclear on what basis other industries selling sensitive products -- for example, the supercomputer, chemical and biotechnology, machine tool, chip manufacturers, etc. -- would be denied similar vehicles for demanding the elimination of any remaining export controls on the transfer of their respective products. What is more, it not self-evident that the national security will be well served by advertising which foreign encryption products are of concern to the U.S. government, let alone encouraging American manufacturers to supply superior -- i.e., less breakable encoding techniques -- in place of such products. 3. See in this connection, the Center's Decision Brief entitled Truth or Consequences #9: C.W.C. Proponents Dissemble About Treaty Arrangements Likely to Disserve U.S. Interests (No. 97-D 46, 27 March 1997). *************** Americans for Tax Reform Memo To: Frank From: Jim Lucier CC: Friends Date: June 26, 1997 Re: Encryption and National Security Dear Frank: I think we both agree that total U.S. dominance of all technologies across the board is a vital guarantor of national security. We disagree on factual premises. The powerful encryption methods under discussion are universally published mathematical techniques taught in universities everywhere to people like my brother who studied them at the undergraduate level. I particularly recommend the fine textbook by Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography. It is a mistake to assume this information, once disseminated, can be controlled. It is also incorrect to assume there is only one type of encryption which the U.S. could somehow keep secret. In fact, there are an infinite variety of techniques, some more elegant than others and all with their quirks, but many offering effective security. Indeed, almost any routine that manipulates data --including file compression algorithms -- can be considered a type of encryption. The case of encryption is dramatically unlike that of supercomputers, where one or two manufacturers in the U.S. may be uniquely capable of producing cutting edge equipment. Bad actors will not voluntarily participate in a key management system they can easily opt out of. The impact on crime will be zero. Only law-abiding people will be trapped in a system that opens them to maximal violations of privacy by governments and technically sophisticated rogue agents. This is not a case of greedy software companies that want to "sell encryption" overseas. In fact, encryption software is a low-margin commodity product that only a few specialists sell profitably. U.S. companies want to sell high-margin products like Lotus Notes, cc:Mail, Domino, secure servers, and Oracle databases, and sophisticated financial management tools that operate in a networked environment. U.S. companies dominate the market for these enterprise-wide, mission-critical applications. For now. The problem is that without encryption modules, the American products are useless for conducting secure business, and the power of networking, which gives them their unique value-added quality, is eliminated. U.S. regulations even prohibit American companies from selling software with "hooks," where foreign-made encryption products can be plugged in. The result is increasing inroads by foreign competitors. The German, Japanese, and Chinese governments are pointedly encouraging their programmers to make hay while they can. Dozens of companies around the world explicitly advertise that they sell products not subject to U.S. export restrictions. There is also the chance that the United States will lose the opportunity to set and dominate standards in vital areas such as digital currency, which involve encryption now subject to control. Currently, Europeans lead in this field. The use of telephone wiretaps has exploded under the Clinton Administration, and under legislation passed last year the number of people impacted by telephone wiretaps is slated to grow still further. For many, this gives ample ground to doubt that wiretaps are used sparingly, or that cases of abuse are minimal. The real restraint on the use of telephone wiretaps is that they are very expensive, and they require human intervention. Technology does not yet allow machines to monitor calls. On the Internet, by contrast, "packet sniffing" is virtually cost-free, and the packets of data are machine readable. Thus there is nothing to prevent widespread abuse of privacy. The single-sentence Frist Amendment to McCain-Kerrey which purports to solve this problem is totally meaningless. The claims of law enforcement are wildly exaggerated and not offered in the context of any statistical evidence to make serious risk assessment possible. Strong encryption is dangerous? Compared to what? No encryption? A government-sponsored system only incompetent criminals will use? For decades people have been predicting the death of SIGINT. It never happens. The reason is that as the volume of communications goes up, the opportunities for SIGINT also increase. In a networked environment, virtually any interaction with legitimate businesses, and even public infrastructure, can create a database of transaction streams greatly useful to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, who can examine this data with powerful heuristic searching tools. The information age will give, and is giving, law enforcement officers and intelligence agencies astonishing new powers. Law enforcement officials who claim they will be powerless in the future are being somewhat disingenuous. What really worries them is missing the opportunity to gain powers they dont have now, plus the stress of learning to operate in a different environment. The key management infrastructure (KMI) called for in McCain-Kerrey is a fiction. Detailed technical standards for such an infrastructure do not exist and may take several years to develop. A recent technical paper by leading private-sector cryptographers claims that the requirements of building a KMI are beyond the current expertise of the field. A central problem is that the Justice Department's insistence on real-time access to data in transit is not consistent with existing models of key recovery for stored data. If KMI works, it offers no advantage and many grave dangers. If it doesn't work, it is a costly drain on the economic sectors currently driving U.S. economic growth. A global KMI in which the U.S. arbitrarily limits its own information security and somehow expects other countries to participate is an atrocious idea. Reasonable people can debate the issue of export controls. The weight of evidence suggests that controls should be loosened, but there can be legitimate argument of how far and how quickly we should go. The McCain-Kerrey bill is by no means a "compromise" on export controls. It is legislation totally different from the Burns, Goodlatte, and Leahy proposals Congress has long been considering. For the first time, McCain-Kerrey would seek to impose controls on U.S. domestic use of cryptography through a combination of regulation, criminal penalties, civil liability exposure, and taxpayer-financed industrial policy. It is highly significant that the Administration forced this legislation through the Commerce Committee without a single day's hearings. Senators were given only three days to study the legislation and supplied with misleading and incorrect information about who supported it. McCain-Kerrey probably could not have withstood public scrutiny in the Commerce Committee. As it is, the bill will very likely never move to the Senate Floor, but the Administration now has substantial leverage to pursue its regulatory agenda. The relaxation of exportable key lengths from 40- to 56-bits is not a sop to industry but a pathetic offering that raises the time-to-break for a foreign intelligence agency stealing U.S. trade secrets from ..0002 seconds to 12 seconds. McCain-Kerrey actually represents a step backward from previous Administration positions on the issue of export controls and exemplifies the bad faith and intransigence this Administration has consistently shown. Last year, for instance, the Administration announced it was relaxing export controls from 40 to 56 bits and then reversed itself, saying the relaxation, if offered, would only be temporary and contingent on businesses developing plans to comply with Administration key-recovery standards. In short, the Administration has been using export controls solely as a club to get unprecedented domestic regulation. In economic terms, McCain-Kerrey represents a stunning arrogation of power by Congress to itself for the purposes of regulating digital commerce which, as the digital age begins, is probably at least as significant as the Communications Act of 1934. This makes the "three days-no hearings" approval process in committee all the more astonishing. A vigorous national security debate is welcome on this issue. The issue of encryption involves profoundly difficult choices and any decisions we make must be taken with grave deliberation and great care. We can postpone these choices but we cannot put them off forever. Ultimately, these decisions turn on findings of fact as to whether control of encryption is still possible. The Administration has made no effort to show its entire proposal is not based on wishful thinking and a regulatory mindset. The United States does have enormous investment in its SIGINT capabilities, which are many and varied. These will also not disappear overnight. But tomorrow will not be like today. Peter Drucker has written movingly of the stress undergone by companies who feel they owe their existence to a particular product but who discover that markets have changed and they must do something different. Companies that succeed are the ones that can innovate. A similar mindset is in order for national security policy. The United States has always competed by out-innovating our adversaries, and on this basis we have always won. The risk to be avoided all costs is a Maginot Line mentality. French planners obsessed with fighting the first World War lavished untold fortunes and considerable engineering brilliance on a structure that was not only useless in the following conflict but locked France into a defensive posture that guaranteed France would be defeated in days by the Germanys mechanized army. The fundamental national security interest of the United States is best served by total dominance of world markets in information technology as well as information technology products and services, financial services, telecommunications and a host of other fields. Our goal should be raw commercial power in all these areas -- especially information products and information flows -- backed by impressive military and intelligence capabilities. However, we do not reach this goal by saddling U.S. business with irrational regulation and ill-conceived industrial policy. When U.S. companies dominate the world markets for advanced management software which foreign businesses must use to remain competitive and telecommunications services which have no equal on the planet, there is tremendous scope for the NSA to work productively with U.S. business. Indeed, the national security community has long enjoyed such a relationship, and law enforcement agencies are well-advised to develop one. The essence of such a relationship, however, is that it must be maintained quietly. We do not need to advertise worldwide exactly how the United States plans to conduct its foreign intelligence or how law enforcement agencies, in truly exceptional and Constitutionally permissible cases, plan to conduct domestic surveillance. Meanwhile, we must remember that the United States has the most to protect in terms of intellectual property, proprietary knowledge, global business dealings, and critical information infrastructures that keep all aspects of our societyincluding the military and strategic onesrunning smoothly. We should be the worlds masters of encryption, the tools to break it, and the ways of getting around it. We should protect our information security by having a diversified environment that relies on no one government-mandated information standard. It should be a stated goal of U.S. policy in the Information Age and the global economy to force totalitarian societies and welfare states to play by our rules or collapse. Our friends in Europe need a wakeup call. Our trusted allies in Asia need reassurance the United States can still exert powerful influence in their region. Developing nations need the model of U.S. economic growth. Russia must see unthreatening but overwhelming U.S. power. The Chinese regime should experience outright destabilization when its totalitarian system breaks down under a coordinated U.S. information technology assault through peaceful means such as Radio Free Asia and Internet communication. These are worthy goals, and they are eminently attainable, as long as technology boondoggles dont sidetrack us along the way. In short, I salute you for making the best possible case for caution at a time when caution is due. However, it is also a time to examine a changing world carefully and prepare for the future as best we can. Let's set our sights on a new American Century. ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/

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ESPN hacked -- got info? (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 17:56:29 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: ESPN hacked -- got info? [From a friend. Any responses? --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Declan -- Do you have any information about the ESPN/SportZone web site store being hacked? Or a contact? The pro-crypto folks on the Hill are quite interested to know if 1) this site was using encryption before being hacked and 2) what type of encryption they are using now (one of the press stories noted that crypto was one of the security measures implemented after the hacking). I realize this was probably an inside job, but it's good fodder for the Hill. Any insight you might have -- or other examples -- would be great. Thanks in advance.

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index.html
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN logo Navigation Infoseek/Big Yellow Pathfinder/Warner Bros Tech banner Click here to play IBM's virtual tennis @ www.wimbledon.org rule DATABASE PROBLEM SLOWS SOME INTERNET TRAFFIC July 17, 1997 Web posted at: 9:53 p.m. EDT (0153 GMT) (AP) -- A problem with the database that keeps track of all Internet addresses slowed network traffic for several hours Thursday morning, effectively blinking some Web sites out of existence. The problem appeared to be resolved by midafternoon. During the trouble, computers couldn't always find someaddresses ending in .net and .com, sometimes e-mail didn't go through and attempts to look up some Web sites came up empty. A user seeking an address ending in .com, for example, wouldhave received an error message that read "Could not resolve DNS," said Aggie Nteta, a spokeswoman for Network Solutions Inc., which runs the main registry of Internet addresses, called InterNIC, under an arrangement with the U.S. government. Every morning at 2:45 a.m. EDT, the files listing all Internet addresses for North America are updated and sent out through the network. On Wednesday morning, two of those files somehow became corrupted, setting off error alarms. However, the system administrator on duty chose to release the files anyway, creating a situation in which many Web sites effectively blinked out of existence, at least in the eyes of browsers. "The big effect was that our site became invisible," saidChris Caldwell, chief engineer at NDA, a Web site design company in Woburn, Massachusetts. Problems with addresses The files were corrected and re-released about four hours later, although it may have taken several more hours for the corrected information to spread throughout the network, Nteta said. The problem is the latest in a series of addressing glitchesover the past few days. Last weekend AlterNIC, an InterNIC rival, briefly took over InterNiC's address on the Web. AlterNIC described this on its Web site as a form of protest over InterNIC's current monopoly on distribution of Internet addresses. InterNIC has also encountered numerous problems with badinformation on its database. Some businesses have been double billed, while others have had their Web sites dropped from the address lists by mistake. Dave Crocker, a computer consultant and founder of theInternet Mail Consortium, said it was a problem of qualityassurance. "The fact that they are growing quickly is not an excuse forthis. The rate of errors they are having would not be tolerable for any other professional organization doing a technical task," he said. Copyright 1997 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. rule Related site: Note: Page will open in a new browser window * Welcome to the InterNIC External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive. Search for related CNN stories: ________________________________________ ______ [Help] Tip: You can restrict your search to the title of a document. Infoseek grfk Example: title:New Year's Resolutions rule Watch these shows on CNN for more sci-tech stories: CNN Computer Connection | Future Watch | Science & Technology Week rule Message Boards Sound off on our message boards Tell us what you think! You said it... [INLINE] Click here to play IBM's virtual tennis @ www.wimbledon.org rule To the top © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms under which this service is provided to you.

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court order required for keys?
by rschlafly＠attmail.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Posted online news accounts of the McCain-Kerrey bill have implied that the a court order is required under the bill to get keys. Eg, from recent postings, [AP, 07/09/1997] As with wiretaps, authorities would have to obtain court orders to make the keys available for law enforcement. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ... Sponsored by Kerrey and Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., that bill would set up a key recovery system to give computer companies strong incentives to make keys available to investigators who obtain a court's permission. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ [Wired, 11.Jul.97] Law enforcement could then access that copy of your key through a court order. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I find this distressing, because I have read the bill, and a court order is most emphatically NOT required. Only a form specified by J. Reno. This is a tricky point in the bill, but notice that: (1) Court orders are not required for wiretaps in the US. While it may be true that court orders are used most of the time when wiretap evidence is used in a criminal trial, there are a number of exceptions. (2) There is no restriction in the bill to getting keys to decipher communications covered by the wiretap laws. It lets cops get keys to many other communications. Part of the point to using encryption is to use public networks where access to the encrypted data need not be hidden or withheld from the public. Under S.909, if the cops can get access to the data, then they can get the keys without any court order. (3) Even if there is a court-ordered wiretap, there is no obligation to notify the judge that keys will also be seized. While it may seem obvious that if a judge is willing to order a wiretap, he is willing to order key seizure, I don't think this is necessarily the case. When a judge orders a wiretap, he is supposed to be balancing the possibility of getting incriminating evidence against the invasion of privacy of innocent parties. If the keys of innocent parties are being seized as well, it may affect the judge's balancing. (4) In S.909, all of the requirements on law enforcement officials can be lifted by executive order. Am I wrong, or are all the news accounts wrong? Please let me know if there is any flaw in my analysis. Roger Schlafly rschlafly(a)attmail.com (Please CC me on any followup, as I only occasionally read this list.)

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