December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Need to Declare Policies on Remailer Record-Keeping
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I hope this is not considered "off-topic" by anyone.) It would be nice if the operators of the current remailers made clear their archiving/record-keeping policies on remailer traffic. An "ideal mix" is like an "ideal op amp": very hard to build in practice, but very useful as a concept. David Chaum's 1981 paper anticipated many of the issues some of us later discovered, and which are dwell upon at length on this list. Some brief descriptions of the "ideal mix" (remailer): 1. Records. No records kept of incoming or outgoing traffic (in Chaum's mix, done by tamper-resistant hardware implementing software that keeps no records; in DC-Net approach, no single entity knows traffic, so only collusion can reveal traffic). Score: Many remailers keep records/logs, either explicitly ("to help in debugging") or by default (Unix records, system requirements, etc.) I have been shocked on a couple of occasions--a useful, educational shock--to get e-mail messages from the operators of remailers, saying things like "I couldn't help noticing your comments--I agree with you that...." Now partly this was my problem, in that I was not using PGP to chain my transmissions (in which case no snooping remailer operator will be able to get my true name except by colluding or traffic analyis), but it also indicated that some remailers are not taking a sufficiently hands-off policy...more on this point later. 2. Encryption, obviously, to hide mapping between ingoing and outgoing traffic. Score: Pretty good (no pun intended), though use of encryption is reported to be low. PGP has helped immensely. 3. Latency: some number N of messagers needs to be stored (securely, unobservably, as in #1) and then sent out in an order that obscures order of arrival. (Lex order, for example.) Score: Someone has been trying to implement this, but it is not widespread. (People want fast response, and in a low overall message volume environment, this could be impossible. If N = 100, could be a very long wait.) 4. Padding of message lengths in such a way that messages cannot be tracked by message length. Score: I don't think this is being implemented. We've talked about "quantizing" to several standard message lengths ("short," "medium," and "long," uncreatively enough) for this reason. 5. Other issues can be found in Chaum's papers, in the attacks on DC-Nets (one of which I distributed with the 70 pages of printed material handed out at the first Cypherpunks meeting), and in the many messages on remailers here on this list. Hal Finney's analysis, for example. In light of the recent subpoena, I urge that #1, record-keeping, be addressed quickly. If the authorities are seeking sources of crypto material, or routes used in conveying such material, they may conceivably issue subpoenas for site records. Some suggestions, which protect the remailer operators and the users: a. Keep no records, use scripts to delete records that may be generated that you have control over. b. The "best" remailers will be on systems under the control of the remailer operator himself (there seem to be a few of these), as he can control archiving and logs. c. Remailer operators should announce their policies on logs, announcing their philosophy (e.g., "to protect myself, I keep copies of all traffic through my remailer," or, "I keep no records whatsover--once it's through my system, all traces are deleted."). d. Trust in what they remailer operators say is another big issue...if the FBI operated a remailer, would you trust what they say? One avenue for helping here is to have independent agents reporting on their experiences, and perhaps confronting the remailers with evidence (such as the "helpful messages" I 've sometimes gotten) of their actual policies. e. Increased use of encryption. Lots more here. For now, just getting the remailers to publically state their policies will be helpful. To us, in allowing better market choice in which remailers we use, and to them by making their lack of record-keeping (for example) a matter of public record. Let's plan ahead for the day when Cypherpunks traffic, and remailer records, get subpoenaed. That _could_ be the next test case. I don't think I'm being paranoid. In any case, there are some fairly easy _social_ changes to the remailer system that we can make that will improve the security against traffic analysis and subpoenas. -Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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Cypherpunks & GOPHER
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Cypherpunks, I'd like to announce the Cypherpunks Gopher Site - dedicated to putting up information for access, and meant to be a list resource. I'm running the gopher site at chaos.bsu.edu, thanks to Chael Hall, who graciously donated an account to me to be used for any and all projects. This is something I've been wanting to do for quite some time but have been unable to. But now I have an account and a sympathetic system administrator...! Chaos.bsu.edu is 147.226.53.28, and the port is 2000. That is port 2000 and not the usual port 70 - when Chael and I have some more time I will ask him to perform the various and necessary incantations (chown) and I'll move it to the usual place. So: try 'gopher 147.226.53.28 2000' and browse around. The site doesn't have much stuff yet... I plan to add more information sometime in the future. Currently the site consists of some old back articles from the list, some faq's, etc. I plan to sift for more stuff, especially Clipper related, and add it in. In posting back articles, I have attempted to give proper credit at the BOTTOM of the article, unless a signature already appears. I figure that posts sent to the list are meant to be seen, but if the original author of something wants is taken off, mail me. If lots of people want stuff removed, I'll probably just solve the whole problem with 'rm -rf ~/gopher-data' I will sift through my archives of the list, incomplete as they are, and add files when I have time. Direct questions to: klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLJuILIOA7OpLWtYzAQFcjgP+K2MOSFKX1M+Y903DKTSdEAOoVdLSl/N4 /1eukQ5B8f09Rw6zU2AjpxcGa4uQcKQ2brNGXzEG4n3+SK5WcEq5t5+oLQ679jrM /aWcWLJWT9sNoiJPQt0li26BWhKhFQSanqbDr+MZ+5JRWu5FBIFgM4cOe0gwK3p1 5S9NokdBBfE= =gMFB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: meaningless rumor
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From a high-level source in contact with an *extremely* high level source: Rumor: Moby Crypto was targeted because G. Ward intended to include PGP on distribution disks. The investigation is primarily PGP oriented, and G. Ward is just a bystander who got caught up. PRZ & PGP is the essential target. Notes (1) phrasing of the subpoenas definitely confirms this -- PGP is mentioned in both. (2) can we find any Usenet postings where G. Ward announced intent to distribute PGP with Moby Crypto to help confirm this? Ward posted a note that (in essence) asked for help in evading the ITARs. (Well, I suppose it could have been someone forging a posting...). He went so far as to offer to provide mailing labels to someone abroad who would redistribute Moby Crypto, though from a country where that would be legal -- but never said how the first copy would get to the trans- shipment point. Some reasons were given why this sequence was going to be technically legal -- but if you were a U.S. attorney investigating the export of cryptographic software, it's the sort of thing that almost has to be investigated. Face it -- if Ward *wanted* to generate a test case, he couldn't have done a much better job; a private note to the authorities could have been ``misfiled'', but an announcement to tens of thousands of readers around the world? C'mon -- they may or may not be stupid, and they may or may not be paranoid, but their entire raison d'etre is to wield power, and Grady just slapped that authority in the face. Spitting at your local traffic cop would have been a lot safer. As for PKP -- *somehow*, it wandered out of the U.S. Probably, someone in power decided that that finally needed investigating in detail, to see if a law was broken. And Sternlight is right -- if they decide to indict, they may throw in charges of importing IDEA, though I doubt that they'd indict just on those grounds; in an era of key escrow, they'd certainly like a court to rule they had the power to exclude subversive foreign crypto.... --Steve Bellovin

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Re: your mail
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What do you put in the Subject: line of an encrypted or anonymous message? We need something standard to prevent traffic analysis on this field. My suggestion is always to put "Subject: Re: your mail", since so much mail already has that, due to a feature of the popular mailer elm. If there is no standard, one could correlate Subject: patterns with people. Notice this message has been sent through "fmt" (and almost through "spell") to remove more nuances. Next we need an English-to-bland-English translator that smooths over individual language features (unless you're practicing stegonagraphy, then you want one that inserts them!)

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Gopher access to Federal Register
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gopher to gopher.internet.com, port 2002, and you will find the Federal Register online. For most documents, you can only get the first 100 lines, but the use of the indexes is free, and many documents are useful in this form. You can pay them for access to the full documents, but they prohibit republishing online -- though you're free to print the documents out. What heart these guys have! John

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Source code
by David Colston 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In case any one is interested, I have the source code for a non-RSA public key system. I wrote it in Microsoft PDS 7.1, which is a version of quick basic. It does 1024 bit keys and I can out run PGP in Basic<G>. If anyone out there is a semi-mathematical type, I will also furnish a paper on the subject. Since this is non-RSA and I'm sure everyone reading this is in the U.S., I don't think I'm involation of ITAR<G>. Uncle Dave

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Re: Standard Headers for Anonymous Remailers
by Eli Brandt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Graham Toal) > Actually it wasn't the content of the articles that narked me, it was > that I actually wanted to *reply* to the authors. However the subjects > were way too off-topic to be worth responding to in public, which is > the only option the anonymous remailers allows. Though it's a bit clunky to use, the present remailers do support return addressses. I will admit that I haven't seen anybody supply one. Eli ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu

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GOPHER: now on port 70
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks, Chael has made the necessary changes, and the cypherpunks gopher now listens to port 70 as standard gophers do... So 'gopher chaos.bsu.edu' or 'gopher 147.226.53.28'. I will look into announcing the site to the gopher list maintainers at UMN; perhaps some sites that are able to look up chaos.bsu.edu consistently will consider including a pointer to us! Karl Barrus <klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu>

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jarthur is running pgp 2.3
by Eli Brandt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just tested a 2.3-encrypted message through here, and it seems to be working. Share and enjoy. Eli ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu

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MAIL: anonymous, positive reputations
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Earlier, Graham mentioned some concerns about anonymous mail; specifically it isn't easy to respond to the author, most messages are off topic, etc. (hopefully not referring to my posts sent through remailers :-) on topics like the cypherpunks gopher and caching remailers...) And some people are asking about marking anonymous mail (gopher plug: check the article "Why Mark Anonymous Mail?" at the gopher site in the "Anonymous Mail" section, contributed by Hal Finney sometime ago). Currently, I sign my posts sent through anonymous remailer, sometimes including my address at the bottom of the post itself. I know others do this as well - Hal Finney, probably others I can't think of. I am working on (and off as time constraints crop up) a positive reputation scheme for anonymous mail. My stab at this is somewhat modest: a program that sifts through elm mail folders (similar to the elm frm command) and produces a formatted list containing message number, email address of author (frm sometimes reports name and I like email addresses instead), and subject. BUT, instead of printing email address, if the message is pgp signed, report the signature instead. Under this program, the fact that an anonymous remailer was used is somewhat transparent since you would see who signed the document sent through a remailer. This would allow somebody to build up a positive reputation attached to a pgp signature (which could be fairly anonymous) and possibly help guide anonymous mail kill file users. Naturally, it would be best if it were easy to respond to an anonymous mail, if this were incorporated into mail programs, etc. but I have two problems: time constraints, and disk quota (I can't lay out the source code for elm, pgp, whatever else). I'm to the point where the script I include below does what I want expect check for digital signatures on letters. Since there isn't a pgp library (yet), the next step will be difficult since I'd rather not pipe the message through pgp just to get the signature, although for testing I'll implement something in the next few weeks. Here is the script: if anybody has input, speak up! I named it scan after the mh command it is a poor imitation of. Usage: 'scan foldername returns a formatted list of mail in the folder "foldername" Ug, I see an improvement I will make tonight: using getenv() to get my home directory instead of plugging it in directly: - ----------8< cut here >8---------- #!/usr/local/bin/perl #report email address and subject of messages in an elm folder #frm sometimes reports name and not email address - not that I # guarantee this works in all cases #simple version of mh scan command #Karl L. Barrus <klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu> chdir "/home/klbarrus/Mail" || die "Can't cd to ~/Mail\n"; while (@ARGV) { $file = shift @ARGV; if (-T $file) { if (-z $file) { #zero length folders with no messages print "Folder $file has no messages\n"; } elsif (!open(FOLDER, "/home/klbarrus/Mail/$file")) { print STDERR "Can't open $file\n"; } else { $state = 1; #Look for a new message $num = 0; while (<FOLDER>) { if (/^From[^:]/) { #Delimits a new message $num++; $from = ""; $subject = ""; $state = 2; #Look for From: and Subject: } if ($state == 2) { #Already found a message; looking for headers /^Subject: (.*)/ && ($subject = $1); #match subject /^From: (.+)/ && ($from = $1); #match "From: add" /^From: (.+) <(.+)>/ && ($from = $2); #match "From: name <add>" /^From: (.+) $(.+)$/ && ($from = $1); #match "From: add (name)" if ($from ne "" && $subject ne "") { #found both headers $state = 1; #go back to looking for message delimiter write; } } } } } elsif (-d $file) { print STDERR "$file is a directory\n"; } } exit; format STDOUT_TOP =

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