December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: POISON PILL
by pierre＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Panzer Boy <panzer(a)drown.slip.andrew.cmu.edu> > [...] > Blowing things up is nice and all but also lacks style (unless you nuke). ROTFL ... I'd also second whoever mentioned not destroying evidence (and your own data remember? if there is actually a chance you get it back) > Basically a permently encrypted harddrive would be fine. Every boot up > you need to enter a password. If the screen saver kicks in, you have to > enter a password, or it reboots. Stuff like this. Yes, that's probably the best way as otherwise moving disks to an other machine would bypass the protection. Still booting if no or wrong password is good too. But let's add something else: It may be possible (easy?) to hide a partition on the disk: buy two hard drives from a family with different capacity and same packages. Move the labels of the small one to the big one. Discard the small one :-) Use partitions corresponding to the capacity of the small one to store boring un-encrypted material, software, etc... Fix the scsi controller on the drive (re-program) to self-identify with the smaller format, but to obey access commands to the hidden area. You now have a computer and disk drive that boots as a boring system, with a medium size drive, but if you know about it, you can access an other partition of encrypted stuff. The (even not so) casual inspection of the stolen or confiscated system reveals only stuff that is not worth spending time on. Only a very detailed inspection, or a leak, reveals the encrypted stuff, still encrypted... Very frustrating. Of course, if your backups were not encrypted or if you wrote down the keys... This solution is even compatible with using a BIOS ROM glued to the motherboard that prevents unauthorized use of the computer. The hard drive and the motherboard are protected by two different mechanisms. Pierre. pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Unsubscribe (temporary)
by Reply to: hahn＠lds.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unsubscribe I will be away for a week and my sys admin will not like all c.p. stuff accumulating and taking up disk space. I'll re-up on 11-Oct-93. Thanks.

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Re: POISON PILL
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> 2) Refuse, and spend the rest of your life in jail for contempt of court. You can't be placed in jail for life for contempt. Eventually, they release you even if you haven't given them the information. Perry

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Re: POISON PILL
by dmandl＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: jet(a)netcom.com (J. Eric Townsend) > > The US Gov policy for the disposal of any media that has been used to > store classified data is: > > wipe -- demagnatize with a *massive* demag unit > grind -- toss in a thing that'd make ground chuck out of godzilla > incenerate -- at some amazingly high temperature. > > -eric At last! I've always wondered that the mysterious "certain government conventions for wiping files" in the Norton Utilities Wipe Disk program referred to. Glad I never selected that option. --Dave.

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Re: Media declassification
by eb15＠postoffice.mail.cornell.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can you suggest the best overwrite programs for other platforms and where to get them? Ned > LAT sells the only overwrite program that has been approved >for Unix platforms. > > --Bob

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TRAVELLER'S ADVISORY
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Punksters, Here's a scary (but so far imaginary) news item: MILLIONAIRE HIPPIE HACKER ARRESTED FOR SMUGGLING WAR MATERIEL (San Francisco) Silicon Valley entrepreneur and self-styled "cypherpunk," John Gilmore, was arrested today at San Francisco International Airport. A Secret Service spokesperson said Gilmore was attempting to smuggle restricted software to England where he was to have been a speaker at a hackers' conference. The spokesperson added that the Secret Service has reason to believe that Gilmore intended to meet with members of a radical Islamic terrorist group, but declined to elaborate on this charge. Apparently, airport security personnel received an anonymous tip that Gilmore had hidden the software in his laptop computer. The computer and several computer disks were seize as evidence. Think it couldn't happen? I'm not so sure. It would be child's play to plant PGP in someone's seized laptop or to put a PGP disk in their luggage. While they were at it, a little marijuana or crack cocaine could be put in there too. Think of the photo op as John is lead away in handcuffs. What a PR coup for the Feds. I think this is a real danger for outspoken Cypherpunks or other high-profile individuals such as Phil Zimmermann. Unfortunately, I don't have any bullet-proof solutions. Suggestions? S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Single Value Pseudonyms
by Hastings＠courier8.aero.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone posted a way to resist altered bank notes if the consumer's random blinding factor signed by the bank wasn't really so random, by something called (if I remember right) a "cut-and-choose" protocol. To make things very simple for a bank, I suggest having fixed value digital pseudonyms for each value of bank note. For example, the Bank of Hastings on Kent would use "AU 500 mg from HoK Bank" as the user name for all signed 500 milligram gold certificates. When a merchant or ultimately the bank verifies the note, it will see "AU 500 mg" as the message, or will not accept it. No worry about spoofing. Kent - <jkhastings(a)aol.com>

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No Subject
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS > From: mdiehl(a)triton.unm.edu (J. Michael Diehl) > I had heard a rumor that fidonet forbade encrypted e-mail, but I > had to find out for myself. Well, they do. No, they do not. This is a myth, and you have drawn a mistaken conclusion from your experiment. This thread has already run off into left field by the time I got to it, but to try to drag a little reality back in, I submit the following: FIDOnet has within it SECURENET, which is a netmail-handling network specifically for encrypted netmail. Mail points not wishing to handle PGPed or other encrypted netmail are provided with software to automatically remove PGP netmail and re-route it into the FIDO SECURENET network. FIDOnet has at least two conferences specifically for PGP and other public-key encryption system discussions and key exchange, PUBLIC_KEYS and KEY_DROP (if I remember correctly). Now, the point most internet people forget is that FIDOnet hosts are hobbyists with 100% privately-owned machines and generally pay for the entire participation of their userbase out of their own pockets, excepting a few who get some dollars here and there from their generous callers. As a completely justified consequence, they can decide if they allow encrypted traffic _on their individual BBSs_. In that there is considerable fear of the consequences of illegal activity being conducted on their BBSs via encrypted mail, many sysops (such as the one you mention, leaving aside, for now, that he apparently confused a PGP key with an encrypted message) do not wish to take the risk and forbid encrypted traffic. They also monitor e-mail, if only incidentally during the course of routine system maintenance, and notices to this effect are generally contained in log-on screens and new-user info files. In that these sysops are extremely, _personally_ vulnerable, they are generally more cautious than those internet folks who can hide behind institutions and businesses. In spite of this, there are a very large number of FIDOnet sysops who participate in SECURENET and encourage the spread of encryption technology to the general public.

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PGP in FIDO
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS > My question is this: how does he know that the mail is encrypted if he's > not examining the mail that passes through his system? If he *is* > examining the mail that passes through his system, it seems likely that he > is violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. In that FIDOnet mail points (or individual BBSs) are not required to pass or accept encrypted FIDO traffic under FIDOnet rules, some run a specific program that scans for the "PGP MESSAGE" string and bumps it to a SECURENET mail hub (or, in some cases, _kills_ it). It is not done by individual, personal inspection - at least not at mail hub level. Anyway, the ECPA is basically irrelevant in the BBS world, as 1] almost every BBS states at log-on that there is no such thing as truly "private" e-mail on the system as the sysop can, will and does see messages in all areas, and 2] he is personally _liable_ for any illegal activity on his BBS, so he can reasonably be expected to keep an eye on e-mail for anything that will put his ass in a sling. There has been a very heated war in FIDOland over PGP and other encryption. Considering the risk that sysops take on by permitting secure (?) communication on their BBSs, I must say I admire their courage when they allow it and participate on SECURENET. Personally, _I_ would never stick my neck out like that, though I convinced many FIDOnet BBSs to do so for my own political and purely selfish reasons. BTW, this message comes via FIDOnet and was originally PGP encrypted for the remailer, and the cypherpunks(a)toad.com mailing is converted to a conference on a FIDO BBS where I read the message to which I am responding.

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Re: POISON PILL
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

All this talk of booby-traps reminds me of this booby-trap expert who had written books and had his house set up completely. He was found dead one day when one of the traps got him... [This anecdote is vaguely remembered from a short note in Whole Earth Review. I remember seeing a review in the '70s on the book itself when it was originally reviewed.] Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com

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