December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

worked MTTF examples
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

..for the end of the MTTF paper document -------- - Carl ====================================================================== \pagebreak \section{Examples} Let $\lambda = 0.5$ failures/year, assuming a node fails on the average once every two years. Let $\mu = 52.0$ repairs/year, assuming a node can be repaired in a week. These assumptions result in the following system MTTF values, in units of years: \begin{tabular}{||r|r||r||} \hline $N$ & $K$ & MTTF \\ \hline 2 & 1 & 107.00 \\ 3 & 1 & 3747.67 \\ 3 & 2 & 36.33 \\ 4 & 1 & 98405.50 \\ 4 & 2 & 955.50 \\ 4 & 3 & 18.50 \\ \hline \end{tabular} If $\lambda = 0.5$ failures/year and $\mu = 350.0$ repairs/year (to follow the Stratus practice) we get the following system MTTF values, in units of years: \begin{tabular}{||r|r||r||} \hline $N$ & $K$ & MTTF \\ \hline 2 & 1 & 703.00 \\ 3 & 1 & 164270.33 \\ 3 & 2 & 235.00 \\ 4 & 1 & 28788554.16 \\ 4 & 2 & 41185.50 \\ 4 & 3 & 117.83 \\ \hline \end{tabular} One could also consider the MTTF of a posting on USENET News. $\lambda$ and $\mu$ might be the same as above, but $N$ is the number of News servers to which the posting has propagated and $K$ is 1. The underlying model is different because it must take account of limited connectivity of News servers, but it is clear that a posting's MTTF becomes effectively infinite once it has left its home node. \end{document}

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Re: Net Regulation
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger(a)lehman.com> > Admittedly, if someone could put a *loyal* armed soldier over > everyone's shoulder on earth they could control everyone. How, though, > could they manage to do this? by getting them dependent on network connectivity for even the most basic communicatiosn between themselves other that face to face communications, and then using AI agents as the soldiers.? just athought! LUX ./. owen

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Re: TEMPEST
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well this posting provoked another. ***** FOR SALE ****** Van Eck Radiation Evesdropping Monitors Good for All SCAN Rates. USES: Evesdrop on your bosses CRT, your enemies CRT, your Lovers CRT, Spy on the local Spies, what does your local FBI Agents monitor say about you. Find out for sure, with the proper antenna these monitors will repeat VDTs up to 1 KM distant. RANGE: with proper Antennas 1 KM You are are responsible for checking on whether your National/Provincial/Local laws allow the importation of this device. COST $8,000.00 US Dollars (Supply is Limited) A public key and encrypted remailer block follow to allow you to place your orders. Payment Terms will be sent to you following receipt of a PGP encrypted order. To reply to I/We please use the enclosed public key to encrypt your message back to us. The anonymous remailer encrypted return block may be used for now but if current(known to be good) paths are needed look for the latest in cypherpunks(a)toad.com. Please encrypt ALL mail sent to us... -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAizMFlcAAAEEALPYHDpT3OhTyO0qfEcqnbwY30pZb3ET6JUP70jfIQPiTrkA i7WJFYnDWv0FBk3aMxfH2DpI0fauCQKLnJJrc0/WHi5AgZVJh7KTwfCyAS+Zr2xM 7xjFZlwd9Q0Ow5k3hLfO4LQpTOW8IBMATV8or1g/+Zv3m87WjLgMmjAEwDypAAUR tDxibGluZHBpcGUgPHVzZSBjdXJyZW50IHJlbWFpbGVyIGJsb2NrIHBvc3RlZCB0 byBjeXBoZXJwdW5rcz4= =IHVG -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- --------8<--cut here-->8-------- :: Encrypted: PGP -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.3a hEwClqx1g6tk6KcBAf9Nly0MsbjTHys9iZwvkew2KEls/4T+4uXG+Ri8gtJnA9P0 5NvGZYIU0A40CHeHWttwE+cjwVyREWWcCPUVeMqcpgAAAYWHYP4OYPHDdUFKrs1i FW2F5lMQ1m4pU475xcLJH+NqQUYToSqmTlyH5dlOLmkC0s97n2OMQKJyDkUHkIbZ nqEg42KQkjAWotu85dBuXFjgLyShkACvah/VBXYcKHMsgfO41tCbCQiWVkg022/F TheZmlX5mPj0pgLFlpd+nYYIsGcH2memKLXWuhaY4yThRPYCu5OEYBlQEE1TtQTs glC6926Nu1RHvs4ivD3OabzeLdl2Kh2wZI2IcznUKOIKhH3nsXgI9ZvuHVkrKkmw 5ABXnhj2rgWW6/SxOT6XejUKH6WHu82HBjnEi6dDviB5pnGL8D2ayxw+ySwjNZ94 lJyrGVeq40XVG4HywxUbmrSbM/a6OOvH2f5zmXQAccoj2iwWa0khPJ0kjlndV/I9 FSLeIP8BZZSHU1tA9/genoDd3auQDAregfuzA10KjVr96+TcLdlh/7eM9TfQDaPz VtCrLR+X/n2J083WtmyzbZhpeI2qzjL7YqPXNlRsofenVucl3E1k0A== =WPI/ -----END PGP MESSAGE----- <To reply, save everything below the "cut here" marks above <into another file. Type your reply here (below the blank <line three lines above!) and mail to remailer(a)utter.dis.org

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Re: on the term `signature'
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: rjc(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu (Ray) > L. Detweiler () writes: > > Consider the term `signature' in the conventional connotation of a > > handwritten scrawl. What are the *critical* properties of a handwritten > > signature of a person [x]? > > > > 1) no person [y] can `forge' the signature of [x] > > 2) the signature of [x] is unique to [x] > Well (2) is untrue since I know people who can forge signatures with > great precision (even my own). However if they forged your name on one of your checks, you wouldn't take such a blase attitude to it would you? And in such a case you have an opprtunitty to prosecute them for their criminal act of forgery should you be able tpo prove it. Digital signature systems need to include the ability to track and succesfully prosecute criminal forgery, or digital signatures are worthless for transactiuons that require reliable accountability. IMNSHO > Since we're going for an ideal Brave New Cyberspace where forging > ids is impossible, I've got some suggestions. These should make you very > happy: > > 1) Phase out handwritten signatures in society and switch to finger prints, > retinal scan, and DNA codes. Whenever you sign anything, the store/business/ > govt office will require a blood test (for DNA), retina scan, and finger > print. With today's technologies, these can be made painless and quick. > > 2) Require everyone to have a global positioning tracker installed under the > skin so they are "accountable" at all times. This worked great in > demolition man. > > 3) Mandatory caller-id, video-id for everyone. No one should be able to > make calls without the other person knowing who you really are. Payphones > should have finger print/retinal scanners for verification. > > 4) all new computers should come equipped with finger print recognizing > keyboards. No more spoofed messages posted on people who leave their terminals > accidently logged in (in the computer lab) > > 5) get rid of cash! we can't have unaccountable transactions taking place > in the economy. Banish the free market. Nationalize all businesses under > NSA control. What makes you think that the bleak vision of the future reflected in your satire above isn't exactly what the typical power/control-freak government types want to impose? > > If a person cannot be traced based on their digital signatures, where > > is the accountability? What if a person signs a document with a > > `digital signature' and *breaks* that contract? you have no recourse > > unless the identity is ultimately identifiable and you can take `that > > body' to court. > Get a clue for god's sake. Digital signatures won't exist in a vacuum. > No one is going to accept the validity of a signature unless it is signed by > some trusted/certified authority and that authority would be liable for the > person's true name or actions. right, so where are the systems that certify trust and authenticity? and who is designing them , and what are the design criterea, and what happens if the government decides they don't want to, and..... LUX ./. owen

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signed mail + steganography = ?
by baumbach＠atmel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What if you couldn't tell when a letter was signed unless you new the public key of the person signing it? How could this be done? Encode the digital signature with steganography. Is this possible when steganography alters the very message you wish to sign? I don't know. The benefit of this is signed and unsigned messages look like each other. People can't be lazy anymore and just assume the signature is yours. Your boss isn't likely going to notice you used pgp to sign your mail. Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

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Shamir Sharing
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following code may be useful in applications to share secrets a la Shamir. Beware the warning about pseudo random numbers! #if 0 Shamir Sharing Warning!! We use the stock random number generator. You must replace it if you really want to keep a secret!! 67 is prime and 67^4>2^24. We use the field of integers modulo 67. We want to produce k<67 versions of a secret so that we may reconstruct the message when q (0<q<k) versions of the secret are available. ("q" for quorum) We use polynomials of degree q-1 over the field. If one knows values of p(x) for q distinct arguments x_0 ... x_k then the polynomial may be determined. To code the secret we let each byte of the message have its own polynomial of degree q-1, but we speak here as if the secret were just one character long. The secret character is s. We choose the polynomial p such that p(0) = s. We choose the polymomial otherwise to have random (mod 67) coefficients. Version j of the secret is p(j) for 0<j<67. Suppose for some set S of q integers we know p(i) for each i in S. To compute s = p(0) we apply Lagrange's interpolation formula: ' p(x) = sum (i in S) (p(i) * (product (j in S but not i) (x - j))/ (product (j in S but not i) (i - j))) We use the special case where x=0. The routines below deal in secrets < 67^4 which conveniently codes three arbitrary bytes. Each resulting version is four bytes but each of those bytes is < 67. Adding '0' to each version byte results in portable ascii characters. Program logic: "u25" is a type that gives 25 bit (or more) unsigned integers. Routine "void it(void)" initializes multiplication and division tables modulo 67. mt[i][i] is i*j mod 67 if 0<=i<67 and 0<=j<67. j*dt[i][j] is i mod 67 if 0<=i<67 and 0<j<67. Routine "void split(u25 sec, int quor, int dis, char w[N][4])" splits the secret (sec) into dis parts. A quorum of size quor is necessary to recover the secret. The parts are placed in the array w. w[0] will hold part 1, and w[quor-1] will hold part quor. As the parts are distributed to the custodiens, each part number must be included! Routine "u25 join(int quor, char w[N][4], int c[N])" takes quor parts and recomputes the secret which it returns as a function value. w[0] thru w[quor-1] are the parts and c[0] thru c[quor-1] are the respective part numbers. Routine main provides a fairly general test invocation of this code. The following stuff is missing from <stdlib.h> and libraries in some systems claiming to be ANSI C! typedef struct{long quot, rem;} ldiv_t; static ldiv_t ldiv(long a, long b) {ldiv_t A; A.quot = a/b; A.rem = a % b; return A;} #endif #define N 67 #include <math.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> typedef unsigned long u25 /* 32 bits */; static char mt[N][N], dt[N][N]; static void it(void){int i, j; for(i=0; i<N; ++i) for(j=0; j<N; ++j) mt[i][j] = (long)i*j % N; for(i=0; i<N; ++i) for(j=0; j<N; ++j) dt[mt[i][j]][j] = i;} static char M(char a){if(a<0) return a+N; return a;} static u25 join(int quor, char w[N][4], int c[N]) {char sx[4]; int k; for(k=0; k<4; ++k) {char q = 0; {int n; for(n=0; n<quor; ++n) {char p = w[n][k]; {int m; for(m=0; m<quor; ++m) if(c[n]-c[m]) p = mt[p][dt[N-c[m]][M(c[n]-c[m])]];} q = M(q + p - N);}} sx[k]=q;} return sx[3] + N*(sx[2] + N*(sx[1] + (u25)N*sx[0]));} static void split(u25 sec, int quor, int dis, char w[N][4]) {if(sec >= (u25)N*N*N*N) printf("Foul value\n"); if(quor > dis || dis >= N) printf("Committee size must not exceed distribution and " "distribution must be less than N\n"); {ldiv_t A = ldiv(sec, N), B = ldiv(A.quot, N), C = ldiv(B.quot, N); char a[4]; a[3] = A.rem; a[2] = B.rem; a[1] = C.rem; a[0] = C.quot; {int k; for(k = 0; k<4; ++k) {char coef[N-1]; coef[0] = a[k]; {int m; for(m = 1; m<quor; ++m) coef[m] = 22/*...*/ % N;} {int n; for(n = 1; n<=dis; ++n) {char q = 0, m; for(m=quor-1; m>=0; --m) q = M(coef[m] + mt[q][n] - N); w[n-1][k] = q;}}}}}} #define C 4 int main(){it(); if (0) {int i, j; for(i=0; i<N; ++i) for(j=0; j<N; ++j) if(mt[i][dt[j][i]] != j) printf("Ouch, %d, %d\n", i, j);} {char dx[12][4]; split((u25)12345678, C, 8, dx); {int i, j; for(i=0; i<8; ++i) {printf("%2d ", i+1); for (j=0; j<4; ++j) printf("%c", '0' + dx[i][j]); printf("\n");}} {int q[C] = {8, 3, 7, 1}; char dz[C][4]; {int i, j; for(i=0; i<C; ++i) for(j=0; j<4; ++j) dz[i][j] = dx[q[i]-1][j];} printf("%ld\n", join(C, dz, q));}}}

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Re: Net Regulation
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger(a)lehman.com> > Admittedly, if someone could put a *loyal* armed soldier over > everyone's shoulder on earth they could control everyone. How, though, > could they manage to do this? By getting everyone to obey the "policeman inside" (concept due to Wm. Burroughs, recently quoted by Wm. Gibson in WIRED Sept/Oct). Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com

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Re: Apple, AOCE, and key pair security
by catalyst＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - From the MacWeek article: >validity. To get your own digital signature from RSA, you take a form to >a notary public, who verifies your identity, notarizes the information >on the form, and then mails the form to RSA. The form contains your name, address, etc, and a printout of your public key. >Based on the notary >public's authority to say you are who you claim to be, you eventually >receive a disk in the mail with your personal electronic signature. _Not_. The disk contains a PEM style certificate, authenticating your public key. On your local machine, where you generated your private key, is a file (your private key) called a signer. This file is your private key + software to make it sign things, so the whole thing is a self contained application -- but it refused to function until you bind it to a certificate. >Your >electronic signature has a two-year expiration date, and includes some >verification information. Certificate, not signature, just like RSA has been trying to sell them all along. >If someone wants to make sure your signature >is valid, he or she contacts the issuing authority listed in the >certificate. Wrong again. Validation occurs locally because an entire chain of certificates is provided in the signature >There will be issuing authorities other than RSA. For >example, Apple Computer's security department plans to issue signatures >to all Apple employees with employee badges." Not signatures, certificates. All key generation takes place locally. RSA does not generate the keys. These articles are a woeful misrepresentation by over simplification. I will happily provide clarification to the authors if they call me. If anyone wants, I will demonstrate this software at the next Bay Area cypherpunks meeting. Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLMw0nSmBKTQiZpaHAQFWOwQAqnD+C7cO0XDzCrbh7hxjzTSDEhbbtxZZ B4+dXNghqSSI24c+T8FZC/gwBIhDq4Q1z0iEml2d84VcFZoHdLJL2Vi803go179E 86uwlggClAPVT+vhqE/LG7NrOC7+r8gTBk5S4gi5fX4hCkMQXdjcNOaWvgQ/slOF XbH+g4vjhF8= =Kn0e -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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Digital Signatures
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Earlier, L. Detwiler posted a message which listed some desirable properties of digital signatures. (I won't comment on the rest of the post since I'm behind in list mail and haven't read up). Signatures (real and digital) ideally have the following properties, and maybe others: 1) Unforgeable. The presence of the signature shows the signer attached it on purpose. Also, the signature should convince another party that the signer signed the document (i.e. the signature can be linked to somebody or a pseudonym or whatever satisfies the recipient). 2) Not transferable. If the signer signs one document, it should be impossible to transfer the signature to another document. (Beware signing random documents - see a previous post on the "Notary Protocol" or Judith Moore's paper on protocol failures). In the digital world, transfering a signature should make it invalid. 3) Can't repudiate. The signer can't claim he/she did not in fact sign a document which bears the signature. 4) Can't alter. A document which is signed can't be altered without invalidating the signature. I don't know if a signed contract with white-out, strike-outs, and various inserted edits is still valid, but a good digital signature should contain information (secure cryptographic hash like md5, md4, snefru, snefru256, etc.) about the text signed. For instance, PGP and RIPEM signatures contain an md5 hash of the message text, so altering the document after it's signed will invalidate the signature. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLMxYWoOA7OpLWtYzAQHARQQAm9m28LRxWWXMeCDN9uNvTc58+4vndkpZ +2VCAGQ5x4EMYOCWCWV81+kJ3qHS6lXZ3crpRONCcXINi58tB4+mr+XWEKsB98Ms 1C5yCS8P+jGMREq4RNiNWf+LNS4oMXtMi/66a0ytEHvNE5v8vYgOsM14FYe5fQ/u wmorJXkuetE= =OSlu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Error in Shamir sharing
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please substitute 'rand()' for '22'. '22' was an artifact of debugging! Get the full copy by ftp at netcom.com:pub/Silk/shamir.c

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