December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Where to get the latest PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) FAQ
by Michael Paul Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP) (Last modified: 11 August 1994 by Mike Johnson) WHAT IS THE LATEST VERSION? There is more than one latest version. Pick one or more of the following that best suits your computer, patent restrictions, and export restrictions. Some countries (like France) may also restrict import or even use of strong cryptography like PGP. |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Platform(s) | Countries | Allowed Use | Latest Version | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | DOS, Unix, | USA & Canada | Commercial | Viacrypt PGP 2.7 | | or WinCIM/CSNav | | Personal | | | | | Research | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | DOS, Unix, Mac, | USA & Canada | Personal | MIT PGP 2.6 | | OS/2, others | | Research | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | DOS, Unix, Mac, | Most of the | Personal | PGP 2.6ui | | OS/2, others | world except | Research | ui=unofficial | | | the USA. | | international | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Mac Applescript | Most of the | Personal | MacPGP 2.6ui v 1.2 | | | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Mac Applescript | USA | Research | MacPGP 2.6ui v 1.2 | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Amiga | Most of the | Personal | Amiga PGP 2.3a.4 | | | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | PGPAmi23a_4.lha | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Amiga | USA | Personal | Amiga PGP 2.6 0b0.6 | | | | Research | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Atari | Most of the | Personal | Atari PGP 2.3a | | | world except | Research | | | | the USA. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Atari | USA | Research | Atari PGP 2.3a | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| | Any of the | Countries | Commercial | Any of the above | | above | where IDEA | Personal | | | | is not | Research | | | | patented and | | | | | cryptography | | | | | is not | | | | | restricted. | | | |-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------| Note: there are other versions available, but these are either old, or outside of the mainstream PGP project. Look for new versions from one of three sources: Viacrypt (Commercial), MIT (North American freeware), or mathew(a)mantis.co.uk (the unofficially non-designated holder of the unofficial international version that parallels what Philip Zimmermann and the rest of the PGP development team is doing in the USA. Note that the MIT PGP 2.6 is illegal to export from the USA or Canada, but using it outside of the USA and Canada for noncommercial use is not illegal in most countries. In spite of the best efforts of MIT and the other primary developers and distributors of PGP not to violate the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, MIT PGP 2.6 is available on some of the same sites listed for PGP 2.6ui, below. The noncommercial use restriction comes from both the RSAREF license and the patent on the IDEA cipher in Europe and North America. WHAT IS ALL THIS NONSENSE ABOUT EXPORT CONTROLS? For a detailed rant, get ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/cryptusa.zip The practical meaning, until the law is corrected to make sense, is that you are requested to get PGP from sites outside of the USA and Canada if you are outside of the USA and Canada. If you are in France, I understand that you aren't even supposed import it. Other countries may be worse. WHAT IS THE "TIME BOMB" IN MIT PGP 2.6? As a concession to the RSA patent holders (in return for endorsement of the legality of the freeware MIT PGP 2.6), MIT placed an inducement in MIT PGP 2.6 to encourage upgrade from the alledgedly patent-infringing PGP 2.3a to the MIT version. The nature of this inducement is a change in a packet ID byte that causes PGP 2.3a and earlier to reject messages created by MIT PGP 2.6 after 1 September 1994. Altering MIT PGP 2.6 to bypass this annoyance (though technically an easy change to the LEGAL_KLUDGE), invalidates the blessing of Public Key Partners on the licence of MIT PGP 2.6. Therefore, it is a bad idea. On the other hand, it is trivial to hack PGP 2.3a to accept these packets, and that (plus a few other bug fixes) is essentially what PGP 2.6ui is. None of the versions of PGP greater than 2.3 have problems reading the old packet ID values, so for maximum compatibility, the ideal is to write the old value and accept either value. Unfortunately, this time bomb has a negative effect on Viacrypt PGP 2.4, as well, which never infringed on anyone's patents. Viacrypt's solution was to issue PGP 2.7, which, by default acts just like MIT PGP 2.6, but has a config.txt option (explained in the release) that allows compatibility with both PGP 2.4 and PGP 2.6. Naturally, this also allows compatibility with PGP 2.3a. The time bomb is annoying for those who still wish to use PGP 2.3a, and for those who use Viacrypt PGP 2.4 and don't want to spend US$10 to upgrade to Viacrypt PGP 2.7, but considering the magnitude of the concession made by Public Key Partners in legitimizing the freeware PGP for use in the USA, it was worth it. ARE MY KEYS COMPATIBLE WITH THE OTHER PGP VERSIONS? If your RSA key modulus length is less than or equal to 1024 bits (I don't recommend less, unless you have a really slow computer and little patience), and if your key was generated in the PKCS format, then it will work with any of the mainstream PGP versions (PGP 2.3a, Viacrypt PGP 2.4, MIT PGP 2.6, PGP 2.6ui, or Viacrypt PGP 2.7). If this is not the case, you really should generate a new key that qualifies. Philip Zimmermann is aware of the desire for longer keys in PGP by some PGP fans (like me), but wants to migrate towards that goal in an orderly way, by first releasing versions of PGP in for all platforms and for both commercial (Viacrypt) and freeware (MIT) flavors that ACCEPT long keys, then releasing versions that can also GENERATE long keys. He also has some other neat key management ideas that he plans to implement in future versions. WHAT ARE THE KNOWN BUGS IN PGP? These are the most annoying: MIT PGP 2.6 -- the function xorbytes doesn't. Replace the = with ^= to fix it. The effect of this bug is that RSA keys aren't quite as random as they should be -- probably not a practical problem, but worth fixing if you are going to compile the code yourself. MIT PGP 2.6 -- DON'T SET PGPPASS when editing your keys, because if you do, and if you don't change your pass phrase, the key is lost. (If this happens, rename your backup keyring files to the primary files before you do anything else). PGP 2.6ui -- Conventional encryption -c option doesn't use a different IV every time, like it is supposed to. (PGP 2.3a had this problem, too). WHERE CAN I GET VIACRYPT PGP? Versions are available for DOS, Unix, or WinCIM/CSNav Commercial software. Call 800-536-2664 to order. If you are a commercial user of PGP in the USA or Canada, contact Viacrypt in Phoenix, Arizona, USA. The commecial version of PGP is fully licensed to use the patented RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms in commercial applications, and may be used in corporate environments in the USA and Canada. It is fully compatible with, functionally the same as, and just as strong as the freeware version of PGP. Due to limitations on ViaCrypt's RSA distribution license, ViaCrypt only distributes executable code and documentation for it, but they are working on making PGP available for a variety of platforms. Call or write to them for the latest information. The latest version number for their version of PGP is 2.7. Upgrade from Viacrypt PGP 2.4 to 2.7 is free if you bought version 2.4 after May 27, 1994, otherwise the upgrade is US$10. Viacrypt's licensing and price information is as follows: ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 1 user $ 99.98 ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 5 users $ 299.98 ViaCrypt PGP for MS-DOS 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 1 user $ 149.98 ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 5 users $ 449.98 ViaCrypt PGP for UNIX 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 1 user $ 119.98 ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 5 user $ 359.98 ViaCrypt PGP for WinCIM/CSNav 20 users or more, call ViaCrypt If you wish to place an order please call 800-536-2664 during the hours of 8:30am to 5:00pm MST, Monday - Friday. They accept VISA, MasterCard, AMEX and Discover credit cards. If you have further questions, please feel free to contact: Paul E. Uhlhorn Director of Marketing, ViaCrypt Products Mail: 2104 W. Peoria Ave Phoenix AZ 85029 Phone: (602) 944-0773 Fax: (602) 943-2601 Internet: viacrypt(a)acm.org Compuserve: 70304.41 WHERE CAN I GET MIT PGP? MIT PGP is Copyrighted freeware. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu, log in as getpgp, answer the questions, then ftp to net-dist.mit.edu and change to the hidden directory named in the telnet session to get your own copy. MIT-PGP is for U. S. and Canadian use only, but MIT is only distributing it within the USA (due to some archaic export control laws). 1. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/mitlicen.txt and agree to it. 2. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt and agree to it. 3. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu and log in as getpgp. 4. Answer the questions and write down the directory name listed. 5. QUICKLY end the telnet session with ^C and ftp to the indicated directory on net-dist.mit.edu (something like /pub/PGP/dist/U.S.-only-????) and get the distribution files (pgp26.zip, pgp26doc.zip, pgp26src.tar.gz, MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx, and MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx). If the hidden directory name is invalid, start over at step 3, above. File names (shortened file names are for DOS BBS distribution): pgp26doc.zip - documentation only pgp26.zip - includes DOS executable & documentation pgp26src.zip - source code pgp26src.tar or pgp26src.tar.gz - source code release for Unix and others macpgp26.hqx or MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx - Macintosh executable & documentation macpgp26.src or MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx - Macintosh source code mcpgp268.hqx or MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx - Macintosh executable for 68000 pgp26os2.zip - OS/2 executable (may not be on the MIT archive) RSA and IDEA algorithms licenced for personal and noncommercial use. Uses RSAREF, which may not be modified without RSADSI permission. Contains "time bomb" to start generating messages incompatible with PGP 2.3 and 2.4 on 1 September 1994 as an incentive for people to not use PGP 2.3a in the USA, which RSADSI claims infringes on their patents. Mac versions are not yet Applescriptable. This version is not intended for export from the USA and Canada due to the USA's International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Canada's corresponding regulations. You can also get MIT PGP 2.6 from: ftp.csn.net/mpj ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26os2.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.tar.gz ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/mac MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/amiga/ pgp26-amiga0b0.6-000.lha pgp26-amiga0b0.6-020.lha pgp26-amiga0b0.6-src.lha amiga.txt See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? See ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's export control methods. ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26.zip ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26src.tar.… ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ MacPGP2.6.sea.hqx ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ MacPGP2.6.src.sea.hqx MacPGP2.6-68000.sea.hqx See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's export control methods. TO GET THESE FILES BY EMAIL, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message for instructions. You will have to work quickly to get README.MPJ then the files before the ??????? part of the path name changes again (several times a day). ftp.eff.org Follow the instructions found in README.Dist that you get from one of: ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/README.Dist gopher.eff.org, 1/Net_info/Tools/Crypto gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Net_info/Tools/Crypto http://www.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/ COMPUSERVE The NCSA Forum sysops have a library that is available only to people who send them a message asserting that they are within the U. S. A. This library contains PGP. I have also seen PGP 2.6 in some other places on Compuserve. Try searching for PGP26.ZIP in the IBMFF forum for up-to-date information on PGP in selected other areas. The last time I tried a search like this, PGP 2.6 was found in the PC World Online forum (GO PWOFORUM) new uploads area, along with several PGP shells and accessories. I've also heard that EUROFORUM caries PGP 2.6ui, but have not confirmed this. Compuserve file names are even more limited than DOS, so the file names to look for are PGP26.ZIP, PGP26S.ZIP (source code), and PGP26D.ZIP (documentation only). Colorado Catacombs BBS Mike Johnson, sysop Mac and DOS versions of PGP, PGP shells, and some other crypto stuff. Also the home of some good Bible search files and some shareware written by Mike Johnson, including DLOCK, CRYPTA, CRYPTE, CRYPTMPJ, MCP, MDIR, DELETE, PROVERB, SPLIT, ONEPAD, etc. v.FAST/v.32bis/v.42bis, speeds up to 28,800 bps 8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity, as fast as your modem will go. Use ANSI terminal emulation, of if you can't, try VT-100. Free access to PGP. If busy or no answer, try again later. Log in with your own name, or if someone else already used that, try a variation on your name or pseudonym. You can request access to crypto software on line, and if you qualify legally under the ITAR, you can download on the first call. Download file names: pgp26.zip (DOS version with documentation) pgp26src.tar (Unix version and source code) pgp26doc.zip (Documentation only -- exportable) macpgp26.hqx (MacPGP executables, binhexed .sea) macpgp26.src (MacPGP source, binhexed .sea) mcpgp268.hqx (MacPGP executables, binhexed .sea for 68000 processor). (303) 772-1062 Longmont, Colorado number - 2 lines. (303) 938-9654 Boulder, Colorado number forwarded to Longmont number intended for use by people in the Denver, Colorado area. Verified: This morning. Hieroglyphics Voodoo Machine (Colorado) Jim Still (aka Johannes Keppler), sysop. DOS, OS2, and Mac versions. (303) 443-2457 For free access for PGP, DLOCK, Secure Drive, etc., log in as "VOO DOO" with the password "NEW" (good for 30 minutes access to free files). Other BBS and ftp sites do have these files, as well. I noticed that PGP26.ZIP is being distributed on FIDONET. WHERE CAN I GET PGP FOR USE OUTSIDE OF THE USA? The latest for outside the USA is the "Unofficial International" PGP 2.6 for most platforms, MacPGP 2.3aV1.2 for the Mac (although 2.6ui is under development and should appear very soon), and 2.3a.4 for the Amiga. The latest amiga version is fully compatible with MIT's PGP 2.6. Copyrighted freeware. Version 2.6ui released by mathew(a)mantis.co.uk. Amiga version 2.3a4 released by Peter Simons <simons(a)peti.gun.de> These versions do NOT use RSAREF. No RSA patent problems outside the USA, but this version is not legal for commercial or extensive personal use in the USA. IDEA licensed for presonal use only in countries where the IDEA patent holds. The freeware version of PGP is intended for noncommercial, experimental, and scholarly use. It is available on thousands of BBSes, commercial information services, and Internet anonymous-ftp archive sites on the planet called Earth. This list cannot be comprehensive, but it should give you plenty of pointers to places to find PGP. Although the latest freeware version of PGP was released from outside the USA (England), it is not supposed to be exported from the USA under a strange law called the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of this, please get PGP from a site outside the USA if you are outside of the USA and Canada. Even though the RSAREF license associated with PGP 2.6 from MIT no longer prohibits use outside the USA, it still carries the not-for-profit restriction that the original RSA code in PGP 2.6ui doesn't have. On the other hand, patents on the IDEA cipher may limit PGP use in your country to nonprofit applications, anyway. Indeed, I understand that there are some countries where private electronic mail is not legal, anyway. These listings are subject to change without notice. If you find that PGP has been removed from any of these sites, please let me know so that I can update this list. Likewise, if you find PGP on a good site elsewhere (especially on any BBS that allows first time callers to access PGP for free), please let me know so that I can update this list. Source code (gzipped tar format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig.gz * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26ui-src.tar.gz.sig.gz Source code (zip format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uis.sig * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uis.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uis.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uis.zip * _TW:_ ftp://nctuccca.edu.tw/PC/wuarchive/pgp/pgp26uis.zip Executable for DOS (zip format): * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uix.sig * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26uix.zip * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uix.sig * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp26uix.zip MacIntosh: * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/mac /MacPGP2.6ui_beta.sit.hqx * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/PGP/MacPGP2.6ui_V1.2sources.cpt.hqx Other sites to look for the above mentioned files at: ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de /pub/virus/crypt/pgp This site has most, if not all, of the current PGP files. ftp.wimsey.bc.ca /pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXX/PGP (U. S. and Canadian users only) See /pub/crypto/software/README for the characters for XXXXXXXX This site has all public releases of the freeware PGP from 1.0 through 2.6 and 2.6ui. black.ox.ac.uk (129.67.1.165) /src/security/pgp26uix.zip (MS-DOS executables & docs) /src/security/pgp26uis.zip (Unix, MS-DOS, VMS, Amiga sources, docs, info on building PGP into mailers, editors, etc.) There are several other versions of PGP here, including the MIT release. ftp.csn.net /mpj/public/pgp/ contains PGP shells, faq documentation, language kits. ftp.netcom.com /pub/dcosenza -- Some crypto stuff, sometimes includes PGP. /pub/gbe/pgpfaq.asc -- frequently asked questions answered. /pub/qwerty -- How to MacPGP Guide, largest steganography ftp site as well. PGP FAQ, crypto FAQ, US Crypto Policy FAQ, Steganograpy software list. MacUtilites for use with MacPGP. Stealth1.1 + other steganography programs. Send mail to qwerty(a)netcom.com with the subject "Bomb me!" to get the PGP FAQ and MacPGP guide if you don't have ftp access. ftp.ee.und.ac.za /pub/crypto/pgp soda.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp (DOS, MAC) ftp.demon.co.uk /pub/amiga/pgp /pub/archimedes /pub/pgp /pub/mac/MacPGP ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de ftp.funet.fi ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security/crypt/PGP ftp.tu-clausthal.de (139.174.2.10) wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/aminet/util/crypt src.doc.ic.ac.uk (Amiga) /aminet /amiga-boing ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de /pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2A.zip (OS/2) iswuarchive.wustl.edu pub/aminet/util/crypt (Amiga) nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) /pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z ftp.uni-kl.de (131.246.9.95) qiclab.scn.rain.com (147.28.0.97) pc.usl.edu (130.70.40.3) leif.thep.lu.se (130.235.92.55) goya.dit.upm.es (138.4.2.2) tupac-amaru.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (137.226.112.31) ftp.etsu.edu (192.43.199.20) princeton.edu (128.112.228.1) pencil.cs.missouri.edu (128.206.100.207) StealthPGP: The Amiga version can be FTP'ed from the Aminet in /pub/aminet/util/crypt/ as StealthPGP1_0.lha. Also, try an archie search for PGP using the command: archie -s pgp26 (DOS & Unix Versions) archie -s pgp2.6 (MAC Versions) ftpmail: For those individuals who do not have access to FTP, but do have access to e-mail, you can get FTP files mailed to you. For information on this service, send a message saying "Help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com. You will be sent an instruction sheet on how to use the ftpmail service. Another e-mail service is from nic.funet.fi. Send the following mail message to mailserv(a)nic.funet.fi: ENCODER uuencode SEND pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip SEND pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip This will deposit the two zipfiles, as 15 batched messages, in your mailbox with about 24 hours. Save and uudecode. For the ftp sites on netcom, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing the word HELP in the body of the message. World Wide Web URLs: (Thanks to mathew(a)mantis.co.uk) _________________________________________________________________ MACPGP 2.3 Program * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/MacPGP/MacPGP2.3.cpt.hqx * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx * _US:_ ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx.gz Source code Requires Think C. * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/MacPGP/MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx -- version 2.2 only * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.pgp * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/macpgp2.3src.sea.h qx.pgp Documentation PGP is rather counter-intuitive to a Mac user. Luckily, there's a guide to using MacPGP in ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/qwerty/Here.is.How.to.MacPGP. _________________________________________________________________ OS/2 PGP You can, of course, run the DOS version of PGP under OS/2. * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/pub/virus/crypt/pgp/2.6ui/pgp26ui-os2.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp26os2.zip ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ for the ??????? _________________________________________________________________ AMIGA PGP 2.3 * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a_3.lha * _US:_ ftp://ftp.wustl.edu/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a_3.lha Source * _DE:_ ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a3_src.lha * _US:_ ftp://ftp.wustl.edu/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a3_src.lha _________________________________________________________________ ARCHIMEDES PGP * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/archimedes/ArcPGP23a _________________________________________________________________ DOCUMENTATION ONLY * _US:_ ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/pgp26doc.zip * _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp26doc.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26doc.zip * _US:_ ftp://ftp.ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26doc.zip _________________________________________________________________ LANGUAGE MODULES These are suitable for most PGP versions. I am not aware of any export/import restrictions on these files. German * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_german.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/PGP_german_docs.lha Italian * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/PGP/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz Japanese * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-msgs-japanese.tar.gz Lithuanian * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp23ltk.zip Russian * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26ru.zip (MIT version) * _RU:_ ftp://ftp.kiae.su/unix/crypto/pgp/pgp26uir.zip (ui version) * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp26ru.zip Spanish * _IT:_ ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/PGP/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz Swedish * _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_swedish.txt * _US:_ ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/public/pgp/pgp_swedish.txt _________________________________________________________________ OTHER SITES Some cryptographic software is available from ftp://van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca/pub/crypto/software/. Read the README file and proceed from there. BBS sites: Colorado Catacombs BBS (See also the entry above for PGP 2.6) (303) 772-1062 Longmont, Colorado (2 lines) (303) 938-9654 Boulder, Colorado (free call from Denver CO, but 1 line) For free access: log in with your own name, answer the questions, then select [Q]uestionaire 3 from the [M]ain menu. Verified: This morning. Hieroglyphics Voodoo Machine (Colorado) Jim Still (aka Johannes Keppler), sysop. DOS, OS2, and Mac versions. (303) 443-2457 Verified: 5-2-94 For free access for PGP, DLOCK, Secure Drive, etc., log in as "VOO DOO" with the password "NEW" (good for 30 minutes access to free files). Exec-Net (New York) Host BBS for the ILink net. (914) 667-4567 The Ferret BBS (North Little Rock, Arkansas) (501) 791-0124 also (501) 791-0125 Special PGP users account: login name: PGP USER password: PGP This information from: Jim Wenzel <jim.wenzel(a)grapevine.lrk.ar.us> If you find a version of the PGP package on a BBS or FTP site and it does not include the PGP User's Guide, something is wrong. The manual should always be included in the package. If it isn't, the package is suspect and should not be used or distributed. The site you found it on should remove it so that it does no further harm to others. ARCHIE WHO? There are many more sites. You can use archie and/or other "net-surfing" tools to find a more up-to-date listing, if desired. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7 mQCNAi4PT2QAAAEEAPPCZnrshEJ9PSnV+mXEwjM4kzJF0kyg2MnLMzo83vWI40ei jogncqdkXT0c2TQWg+Bsu9ckFoXdId0utumYv0aqd8yI/oU/DwJ1zJrqRL2PFbxe ZLofHoKFjvq1TiNiJq9ps3jW6iYS4IU1SzyKhjmyE+K0+WyrPPX0zg8FAL9FAAUR tCdNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQGNzbi5vcmc+IG1wajiJAJUCBRAu G3chZXmEuMepZt0BAZtAA/0Rw5mintlUDgHycNbeoyIiMHoLu8jWaCSaiGSt+dDU 1A/bUCo+gorv5TYxOClRf3XHjD6zSooWyUz3ehotrzPYLunhVOE2YBxPU+OvKFOc 37mcZrnXGBlF5NblnSYxp0186tGaTm7WMWx7NDlHT4GvhzHJQSOoo48ykDkKm/mk LIkAlQIFEC4PWbs/ZwY8hTPrxQEBKyMD/A7kv91C1ZZIRtkbC9k9lsWOgOnO8wG8 bGMajaco465Z5llWD+Y8QCMdSWcowtOBGfW0Wv1bZ1uebeCpg1L66pJ7C+BOExrk gPqRVCstLLiVerKGeSOZo3yXtxYKYX7mHQPrHp98ef7fUG4IiKS+S+znmGxpJwrV sHZRlhJ3hXUsiQCVAgUQLg9ZefX0zg8FAL9FAQFBTAQAh4u4Vun7WhPuL6fsXiXm paaGfeLtd3biRj/aOMAG1eHuhVdWejx71ormyKTdNB2YV56bpsE3JQ/KhBuYDo0N SkRnqeM2S+Ef7aZEg6Q44uXG52pqCZUldtCeYfOs3aLCR9SMlc6Y3zmpSwB1wKP0 5+tN9zruNYVKKBLWEIFAY7W0K01pY2hhZWwgUGF1bCBKb2huc29uIDxtLnAuam9o bnNvbkBpZWVlLm9yZz60IE1pY2hhZWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQG5ldGNvbS5jb20+ tChNaWtlIEpvaG5zb24gPDcxMzMxLjIzMzJAY29tcHVzZXJ2ZS5jb20+tCtNaWNo YWVsIFAuIEpvaG5zb24gPG1wam9obnNvQG55eC5jcy5kdS5lZHU+tC1EbyBub3Qg dXNlIGZvciBlbmNyeXB0aW9uIGFmdGVyIDI3IEp1bmUgMTk5Ni4= =rR4q - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAgUBLkq2xfX0zg8FAL9FAQFTNgP+MRZEelkRWavsKsLKgTpZEXix++Bhk8CW s1jgJkyFEgEjS5EDPsKUOZKT+peohlfSmMO1dvO4125b+g+jg3rI/BQQOnWA65PT 8ylmelaoQSrzPhbYvPCk/a7zzOqoGnfa3x4C3ECJBRKFvofaZOgo1pzzCxwwa/wW PtYKpgCtp34= =H24Y -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Zimmermann & Johnson at Sept. RMIUG
by mpjohnso＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I have been told that noted Colorado crypto experts Phil Zimmermann > and Mike Johnson, along with Phil's attorney, Phil Dubois, will be > panelists at the September meeting of the Rocky Mountain Internet > Users Group. The meeting will be on Tues. 9/13, 7-9 pm at NCAR in > the Sovereign Republic of Boulder. Duane Thompson tells me that cookies will be served starting at 6:30pm, so the early comers get more than the good seats. :-) I'm not sure if I'm REALLY a crypto expert, but I plan to be there. :-) ___________________________________________________________ | | |\ /| | | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | \/ |o| | PO Box 1151, Longmont CO 80502-1151 USA Jesus is alive! | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ | PGPprint=F2 5E A1 C1 A6 CF EF 71 12 1F 91 92 6A ED AE A9 | |___________________________________________________________|

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RE: Tommy the Tourist's New Home
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- werewolf(a)io.org (Mark Terka) wrote: > > Soda was down for a week while it was moved to a different location. The > > new address is "remailer(a)soda.csua.berkeley.edu". I'm told that the old > > address will continue to work for a limited time, but it's best to get in > > the habit of using the correct one. > > Ok, I take it this is the one that posts directly to the USENET groups? Yes it is, although I haven't seen any posts from "Tommy the Tourist" for several days, now. A test post sent a few days ago has still not shown up. Also, there seems to be some sort of problem with soda's public key on chained remailings. Even when the Usenet gateway was operational, chained posts where the message to soda was PGPed seemed to go into the bit bucket. Also, FYI, Matt Ghio's remailer now offers Usenet posting as well. > > I also understand that the crypto archives have also moved, but I'm not > > really sure of the details. > > Well as of about 3pm EDT today they seemed to still be at > ftp.soda.berkeley.edu as I scooped a couple of files from that > site at that time. Through the magic of dual entries in a Domain Naming server somewhere, no doubt. Next time, you might try the new "csua" name and see if that's working, too. --- Diogenes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLk4kXORsd2rRFQ1JAQGjkQP+NVQ8X5Q/W40MpdMEah7aKZY7jT4HaR++ vZbegzYPZOX3dKhxPnVizr2znj+qYnJQeBwsHb0BvvI+V711U8UYpl6JFsGqFIRj MZzofuhDQzXvqaWmKaOvKlhmbgWHOIdlRCnLU3W3fLw6zvGJlUj0MNTxmnZmnkSh ycL6mXhzPq8= =I+lP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Re: Ecash beta test
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:22 PM 8/14/94 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: >I assume we all signed up for the e$ beta test. Has anyone received a reply >yet? heh- eh. maybe he's only gonna use Real Players, not us lowly enthusiasts and wannabes. Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

1 0

t-shirts & general info
by Ari Y. Benbasat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey there... I was interested in the availabilty of your "Cypherpunk Criminal" shirts and in some general information about your organization... Any information which you could provide me with is greatly appreciated... thanks ari ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ari Y. Benbasat | What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason, Pigsfly(a)unixg.ubc.ca | how infinite in faculty, in form and moving how Engineering Physics UBC | express and admirable, in action how like an angel, Court Jester in Training | in apprehension how like a god! ERTW | - Hamlet II ii 305-8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Finger for World Wide Web Homepage URL and PGP 2.6 Public Key. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2 1

Problems of anonymous posts
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- (This is from Hal; I still can't post from Portal.) After going to enormous efforts to create a network of anonymous remailers, we are hoist by our own petard, as our list receives strange, irrelevant, and argumentative posts through our own anonymous remailers. (Not all anonymous posts are like this, but there have been quite a few in the last few weeks which fall into these categories.) This should challenge us to reconsider the value of anonymity and remailers. Are we working only to make the net safe for the immature and incoherent? I would say not, but these posts should remind us of how incomplete is the infrastructure needed for successful use of anonymity. A brief recap of the benefits of anonymous mail: presently, on the net, all mail is tagged with the sender and destination. This means that not only the recipient, but any net snoopers and sysops at systems through which the mail passes, may be able to know that person A is sending mail to person B. This kind of information can be used to build up dossiers of who talks to whom. Worse, as we move into an era of electronic commerce, more and more of our lives may begin to take place on the net. We may shop, find entertainment, do business, even work for a living across the network. This will open up even more opportunities for collecting data about how we live our lives. In my opinion, the best way to preserve our privacy is to make it impossible to collect this data. Anonymous remailers, and their cousins, IP bouncers (which perform an analogous function for telnet-type connections), can prevent the collection of this kind of information by hiding exactly who is communicating with whom. These services can serve as the basis for the other privacy-protecting technologies we've been discussing, such as digital cash. There's not much point in using digital cash to prevent tieing customers to vendors if monitoring the net will provide that information anyway. This isn't just a futuristic concern, either. Already today the government is taking steps which could, under some not-so-far-fetched extrapolations, get people on the list in trouble. Many people on this list have communicated with Phil Zimmermann, for example. What if email logs were used to track all those people down, and they became suspects in this criminal investigation that the government seems to be pursuing? It's not even impossible that the government could someday try to paint the cypherpunks themselves as a subversive organization. Think how much more difficult any such diabolical attack would be if people subscribed to the list via remailers, under digital pseudonyms. These days, with the shaky legal status of cryptography, we of all people should be able to see the benefits of anonymous communication. The problem is, then, how to gain the benefits of anonymity, while avoiding the abuses. One solution which we have long discussed is reputations and pseudonyms; another is making people pay to use remailers. The way reputations work is that people would digitally sign their anonymous postings. This way someone could post anonymously and build up a reputation by means of a series of postings signed under the same name. As time went on, they would no more want to damage the reputation of their pseudonym than they would want to damage their reputation under non-anonymous posting. To make this work, people need to be able to easily filter their mail on the basis of the pseudonym it came from, rather than the (irrelevant) anonymous remailer which sent it. Then they can choose to accept and read mail from anonymous posters who have built up a good reputation while ignoring that from those who have ruined their good (pseudo) name. Karl Barrus has done some experiments along these lines. He described some time back a system he had for working with the elm mail reader, one of the most common Unix-based mail agents. The software will display the true originator of PGP-signed posts (anonymous or not). This allows readers to apply the same standards to signed anonymous mail as to regular mail. It raises anonymous posters to the same level, and holds them to the same standards, as other posters. This software could allow anonymous posters to build up their reputations, encouraging more responsibility on their part. The other solution, pay-for-use remailers, has also been pioneered by Karl. His idea is to make the remailer a little harder to use by forcing the user to include some digital postage (based, I think, on what Tim May called "poor man's postage stamps"). This could help reduce the volume of anonymous mail and make it less likely that joke or trivial messages would be posted. (We could even consider applying Karl's approach to the list as a whole; people would have to apply ahead of time for posting tokens in order to post. This might force people to take a little more care and time in their postings.) I don't think Karl's efforts have been sufficiently appreciated here. He is quietly working to create the tools needed to allow anonymity to be a useful and important part of the net architecture rather than the annoying sideshow that it sometimes seems to be becoming. We need to support Karl, work to bring his innovations into other remailers and other mail agents, if we want to gain the benefits from what we have done so far. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLMFf3qgTA69YIUw3AQEp9QP/UyEvuQgM6GKiKdkZtHJw4/NhMwQDihrs 2D8weSeUQpKHPpxEnXiDEG6qswI0B4auq+hK3EDYIzccA6c6/+0Xa7SzESsujtjs VDRY7BNphAQ8ix6vd4Ti2vuk8sWa7IHasuAF+UytJrUXPaMbJgH1u/84M9HstA4t kNQ3venrgh4= =CFWw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

5 4

Re: ANON: mail concerns
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >:: >Request-Encryption-To: X > >If user ID X is on the remailer's pubkey ring, the outgoing message is >encrypted to X. This could be usefull for anonymous return-address blocks. Encryption should be the default. Err on the side of caution. Eternal!Optimist(a)anon.penet.fi (copyright 1993, Eternal Optimist [Ha Ha Ha]) 0) 0) =:()]-< <na26436(a)anon.penet.fi> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLNgXzIjvfLxJbYYtAQEK4AP9HrSaMSOnlsxzEjgLbAgvsCSw3vMxLJ4u 856ZbKI2cZTNLoPzyWLNW68gZ7kcNeaF7MHKzWbI9tLEDePpWN34sB11wBlpfzcf WzcYVLI6JBLVERq2seyKU3cqAhWuxldSDeAlsKkMsrzI0tGgOaLkxCxhxn9weZf8 58mZeANd3sg= =8F9u -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Article V - an analysis
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ARTICLE V. [Constitution: how amended; proviso.] The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions of the three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which shall be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it's equal Suffrage in the Senate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Congress can propose amendments if 2/3 of both houses agree Or when Congress is directed by 2/3 of the state legislatures a convention can be called for *proposing* amendments Irrespective of which of the above two processes causes an amendment to be considered a part of the Constitution when 3/4 of the state legislatures vote for it, or by the constitutional conventions called in 3/4 of the state agree on it. The decision of which method to use may be *proposed* by Congress. It's after 1808 and we're not considering state representation in the Senate so I'll skip the last two phrases. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The only sticky wicket I see is the ...proposed by Congress. Does this mean that Congress can decide which of the two it will recognize? Or does it mean that Congress can merely express its desire? Or does this apply only to the bills that were developed in the Congress? There's no time line for Congress to decide, could this be used to hinder such a process? Note that it's important to recognize that we're talking about 3/4n conventions and not a single convention attended by 3/4n representatives of the states. The tense of the sentence leaves no doubt. ____________________________________________________________________ Technology cannot make us other than what we are. James P. Hogan The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

3 2

Changing to Moderated Cypherpunks -- How?
by James F. Marshall 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Too much noise in the unedited list. How does one change to the moderated list? - -- James F. Marshall, Esq., Pasadena, California Subject "JFM Public Key" for PGP Public Key - -- OS/2 is to Windows as Stradivarius is to Yamaha -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNNf8UjbjGennrhqZAQETXgP/WFshRowrhi7qMnUZHUIADA7cCV0fEYFA WiAlynovwU9dyvc/gygz9N6aeJO/ghqiQl2/NqCSsKn5H1nTr1MHbK2iYJwt6AXh ZhMSfz5p1QzVWwm9lIFETipPayuJ+WzCkaakMZP3PPZXG8XUT/48NZG5hJgjfIM7 vqzMkCcHr+A= =2N5t -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

6 5

Re: Fwd: Big Brother Sees through walls (from the spyking list)
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: sunder <sunder(a)brainlink.com> > > 1)From: "George Martin" <gmartin(a)kic.or.jp> > Subject: News Release: High-Tech Surveillance > > Here's a sampling of how state and federal agencies are using this > terrifying technology to spy on Americans: > > * In North Carolina, county governments use high-resolution spy satellite > photographs to search for property improvements that might increase > property tax assessments. Was this cost authorized by taxpayers? > * On the Mexican border, police use a "gamma ray scanner" to check > tanker trucks for contraband, scanning right through the vehicle's metal > sides. Good!!! CM excerpt: # Those rumor-level stories about our government encouraging # drugs to reach the inner cities were weird. # # Remember, we've been having a Drug War for four decades now. # # I guess there is a certain logic to it. Obviously the government is into # hysteria on the matter: it is then possible that they would want to continue # having a drug problem so they could continue the hysteria. # # Even the Attorney General was drooling over drug forfeiture dollars, to the # point of shunting aside other cases. # # # Recently... # # : CBS 60 Minutes, Steve Croft reporting. # : # : Remember that story of the hero customs agent snagging a tanker truck full # : of cocaine? There is a strange twist to the story. # : # : The Federal agent's manager repeatedly tried to interfere with him making # : the bust. # : # : The agent's dog had flagged the truck; the agent weighed it and found a # : discrepancy. His manager said it must be in the tires. You can only check # : the tires for drugs he was told. # : # : But the agent persisted, and made the bust. His manager let the driver # : of the truck leave. The driver literally fled on foot back to Mexico. # # What the hell was that about??? # # Was it a single corrupt Federal agent? # # : CBS 60 Minutes, Steve Croft reporting. # : # : Standing at a fence about a hundred feet from the U.S. Customs lanes, # : Steve Croft and an ex-agent with a walkie-talkie tuned to the right # : frequency began videotaping the border crossings. # : # : Truck after truck drove right through the individual Customs lanes, # : not even stopping. "Nafta express lanes" explained the ex-agent. # : # : Truck after truck drove straight into the U.S. unmonitored. # : # : Then a message came through the walkie-talkie: "We got some cameras # : watching, better get out there and cover traffic". # : # : Suddenly several Customs agents came out of the booths and started # : inspecting trucks. # # That makes at least five people at a minimum! # # What the hell is going on??? # # # IF the rumor is true, THIS looks like it would be the smoking gun. # # How did our country get so twisted around that they can invade our # bodies to drug test, yet allow truck after truck after truck to # just wander right in knowing HUGE drug shipment after HUGE drug # shipment is crossing? Gosh, there's no drug problem with Mexican # police, military and even their president. # # * The New York Times, February 19 1997 # * # * Brig. General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, Mexico's top Military Drug War # * point man, was arrested on charges of receiving payoffs from Jaurez # * cartel kingpin Amado Carrillo Fuentes, Defense Minister Enrique Cervantes # * announced. # * # * U.S. Drug Czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey had weeks earlier called General # * Gutierrez "a guy of absolute unquestioned integrity." # # # And what if some terrorists wanted to sneak in an atom bomb? # # Put a NAFTA sticker on it and drive right on in, y'all. Welcome to the USA. # # If you want to really be certain, hide the A-bomb in a truck full of cocaine. # # If a terrorist nuclear bomb ever goes off in this country, # it drove in from Mexico. # # Meanwhile, Los Alamos National Laboratories developed technology that # allows an officer walking or driving down the street, as shown on MSNBC TV # 6/9/97 www.TheSite.com, to determine whether anyone on the sidewalk is # carrying a gun. # # The priorities are all out of whack. # # Apply Military technology towards securing the border, not by spending # billions and billions and billions each year to secure each and every # one of us. # # We don't put governing-monitors on all car engines to control speeding. # Get an Operations Research clue. # # # Is our government perpetuating the availability of drugs? # # The 60 Minutes report sure makes it look like it is. # # How could letting unchecked Mexican truck after unchecked Mexican truck # through not be? # # ! FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, Senate Judiciary Committee, June 4, 1997 # ! # ! NEW CORRIDORS HAVE OPENED TO CONTINUE THE FLOOD OF DRUGS INTO AMERICA. # # No shit, Sherlock! Ya don't nafta say another word. # # Every single truck can be checked using Military technology. # # But no, massive monitoring of people suspected of no crime is the # appropriate response. # # They were just warming us up for the CALEA telephone monitoring bill. # # ---- # # Here is part of the story on why we let trucks full of cocaine and # heroin just roll right into the United States. # # * "Diminished U.S. Role Below Border Plays Into Traffickers' Hands" # * # * By Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson # * Washington Post Foreign Service # * Sunday, September 8 1996; Page A01 # * The Washington Post # * # * Due to their new 'Mexicanization policy': # * Mexico became the main gateway into the United States for illegal # * narcotics, with the amount of cocaine making the journey climbing to # * an estimated 210 tons last year. # * # * Mexico's drug arrests plunged nearly 65 percent, from 27,369 the year # * before the policy changes to 9,728 last year, according to data that # * the Mexican government supplied to the State Department. # * # * Cocaine seizures in Mexico were cut in half, dropping from more than # * 50 tons in 1993 to slightly more than 24 tons in each of the last two # * years -- the smallest amounts since 1988, Mexican government figures # * show. # * # * The GAO report charges that Mexico's greatest problem is, in # * fact, the "widespread, endemic corruption" throughout its law # * enforcement agencies. Earlier this month, in an indictment of his own # * department, Attorney General Lozano fired 737 members of his federal # * police force -- 17 percent of his entire corps -- saying they did not # * have "the ethical profile" required for the job. In a recent meeting # * with foreign reporters, Lozano said it could take 15 years to clean up # * the force. # * # * In November 1993, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive # * No. 14, shifting U.S. anti-drug efforts away from intercepting cocaine as # * it passed through Mexico and the Caribbean, and, instead, attacking the # * drug supply at its sources in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. # # The President himself ordered them to stop checking!!! This is in the same # leadership vein as Reagan declaring himself a "Contra". # # And why did President Clinton change strategy? [snip] > * The Naval Surface Warfare Center has developed an "ion sniffer," > a metal box that analyzes the chemical makeup of the air -- and can detect, > for example, traces of cocaine through the skin days after drug use. Bad. > * In Georgia, the state's Department of Revenue will start using > NASA satellites to examine the state's 58,910 square miles for illegal > timber cutting. Good. > * In New Jersey, California, and other states, police use thermal > imaging devices to scan houses for unusual heat sources that could indicate > indoor marijuana growing operations. Houses can be scanned while police sit > in their cruisers on the street. Bad. CM excerpt: # Here is a more detailed example of how government expands surveillance # (and thus control) in a seemingly never-ending manner...consider this when # talking about a National ID Card: # # Is it okay for the government to look at your property while walking by and # if the officer spots marijuana plants growing to get a search warrant? # # Of course it is. # # * "The Right To Privacy", ISBN 0-679-74434-7, 1997 # * By Attorneys Ellen Alderman and Caroline Kennedy # * # * ...then the Supreme Court ruled that if the yard was big enough that "An # * individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted # * out of doors in fields," the Court wrote, "except in the area immediately # * surrounding the home." # * # * ...then the Supreme Court ruled that a barn sixty yards from a farmhouse # * was too far away from a house to expect privacy. # * # * ...then the Supreme Court ruled that aerial surveillance did not constitute # * a Fourth Amendment search. # * # * ...then the Supreme Court ruled that a "precision aerial mapping camera" # * that was able to capture objects as small as one-half inch in diameter did # * not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. # # ...then courts ruled that infrared surveillance of homes was permissible. # # # What is this? # # * Subject: Re: Law Enforcement Aviation # * From: aufsj(a)imap2.asu.edu # * Date: 1996/12/27 # * Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military # * # * What interests me is how new technologies will be interpreted. I recently # * inquired at the local Law School about the courts views towards the use # * of impulse radar, and they said "Impulse what the heck?" # * # * Basically it is a radar that "sees through" things (like, say, your # * house). # * # * Their capabilities vary widely, but the feds are already using # * them and I know that Hughes corp. is designing a low-cost set up # * specifically for major police departments. # * # * They are driving towards a unit that can be mounted on a police helicopter. # * # * Will the police need a warrant? Who knows. Since they are allowed # * to do airborne infra-red analysis of your house, why not an take an # * airborne "x-ray" equivalent? # * # * --------------------------------------------------------------------- # * Steven J Forsberg at aufsj(a)imap2.asu.edu Wizard 87-01 > * And in Arizona, the state's Department of Water Resources uses > spy satellite photographs to monitor 750,000 acres of state farmland, and > compares the images to a database to discover which farmers don't have > irrigation permits. Good, I guess. > Even worse: The federal government will spend another $4.5 million > this year to develop even more intrusive surveillance equipment. Bad. > Currently under development by the Justice Department: A "super > x-ray" -- combining traditional x-ray technology, ultra-sound imaging, > and computer-aided metal detectors -- to reveal items hidden under clothes > from up to 60 feet away. Bad. > The courts are currently wrestling with the implications of the new > technology, debating the limits of the government's power to "search" > individuals from a distance with high-tech gadgets. Several contradictory > court decisions have already emerged, for example, about whether > thermal-imaging searches are Constitutional. > > Meanwhile, Republican and Democratic politicians continue to look > for new uses of the technology -- with some government officials already > talking about using satellite surveillance to track items as small as > backyard porches to check for zoning violations and construction permits. Smart cards are transponders. Never forget that. > "In the name of fighting crime, politicians seem eager to obliterate the > protections against unreasonable search, with equipment that Americans used > to only read about in Tom Clancy technothrillers," said Dasbach. "It's time > for the American public to wake up and realize that Big Brother is here > today -- and he's got a gamma ray scanner in his hand." No amount of control over the population is enough for the U.S. Government. ---guy

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