December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Who's afraid of an uncensored forum? Good riddance to forger
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mj(a)creative.net writes: > > Tiny Tim is > >happy to bend over and let Declan (or Sandy or any other self-appointed > >censor) decide which of Timmy's rants are worth publishing. > > <snip> > > Look, I'm new to this list and don't know the history of these disputes - I > have neither information nor prejudices - but you must be aware that it's > difficult to take anyone who talks like this seriously. Or even to keep > listening. If you have a problem, you can killfile me or go to a modereated list. There are plenty of them. > <snip> > > > >I'm not the only victim of Declan's lies and forgeries. E.g., the Center for > >Deomcracy in Technology (CDT) complained to Declan's employer, Time Warner, > >about Declan's lies, forgeries, and misrepresentations of CDT's position. > > > > Can you document this? Yes, but I have better things do to. Search the list archives. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Welcome to OANDA financial services
by webmaster＠olsen.ch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Fred Cypherpunk, Thank you for registering with OANDA! You may begin to use your account (cypherpunks) immediately to access any of the following services: - OANDA's advanced financial forecasting services. Refer to our pricing plan to find out how to best use your free credit. Please note that starting December 1, 1997, all of our prices are handled in US dollars. - OANDA's Customizable Currency Converter. Now you can customize OANDA's popular 164 Currency Converter with the look and feel of your Web site. Feel free to try your own customization. It's free for designing and testing. Please refer to our Customizable Currency Converter for information about how to activate your customized currency converter. We would be glad to help with any questions you may have. Thanks again for using our services. Explore and enjoy! The OANDA Team e-mail: oanda-info(a)oanda.com http://www.oanda.com

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by 34705164＠25955.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) This remailer list is somewhat phooey. Go check out http://www.publius.net/rlist.html for a good one. Last update: Thu 23 Oct 97 15:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ------------ 5:03:45 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#**#**### :34 95.82% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org #*##*+#**** 2:00 95.44% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++ ++++++* 19:18 95.27% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -- ---+--- 2:34:19 95.16% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++***+ ++ 11:26 95.11% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *** 10:06 94.93% arrid arrid(a)juno.com ----.------ 8:50:34 94.41% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --------- 3:38:29 93.53% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +*+*+*+ 16:32 92.80% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + +*-++++ 24:14 92.79% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -..-..---- 9:59:18 92.22% neva remailer(a)neva.org ------****+ 1:03:02 90.39% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -36.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net 1:01:28 -2.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rashidk(a)mailexcite.com (Rashid Kaman) > X-No-Archive: yes > >Shades of McCarthyism.... > > Such big words, my my! :-) Sorry, I forgot you were from DataBasix, where most words are four letters in length. (Hint: I wasn't talking about CHARLIE McCarthy...) > >Strangely enough, a search of the public database of listed telephone numbers > >turns up nothing for you. > > Why did you look for it? To be a champion of privacy you first have > to respect privacy. Of course I respect privacy. Your phone number would only have been there if you'd CHOSEN to have it listed by the phone company, right? And if you'd chosen to have it listed, then it would be logical to assume that you WANTED people to have it. It's not like I went to your phone company and demanded that they turn over a listing of their unlisted numbers. (Your buddy Burnore, OTOH, did demand a list of all the users of the Huge Cajones Remailer from their logs. In case you're unclear on the concept, people use remailers so that people like Gary and Belinda WON'T have access to their e-mail addresses.) It was Gary Burnore and Belinda Bryan who've been denouncing "hiding behind" anything, so I found it sort of ironic that all of them have unlisted phone numbers while whining about my unlisted e-mail address. (Should I adopt Burnore's tactics and start calling the denizens of DataBasix "Unlisted Assholes"? Nah!) > >> >If remailers were shut down, I'd lose my ability to post. > >> > >> Why is that? > > > >For the same reason you'd no longer be able to post from mailexcite.com if > >someone decided to shut it down! > > That's not an answer, it's a cope out. "Cope out"? Sorry, I don't have a DataBasix-speak dictionary, and am not familiar with your in-house (or outhouse) jargon. Regardless of whether it is a "cope out" or not, it is an answer. Sorry if you don't approve. If the remailer I use for posting were to shut down, I obviously would no longer be able to utilize that resource, just as you'd no longer be able to use mailexcite.com if that were to be shut down. Something about that too difficult for you to understand? You might feel differently if Billy "Wotan" McClatchie had gone after Mailexcite rather than Mailmasher.

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Re: hashcash spam prevention & firewalls (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 20:24:59 -0800 > From: Bill Frantz <frantz(a)netcom.com> > Subject: Re: hashcash spam prevention & firewalls > I think there needs to be a story for mailing lists. It might be > acceptable for the first pass to allow spamming of mailing lists but not of > individuals email addresses. (Apologies in advance to list moderators.) We have a moderator? This is news to me and I suspect the other CDR operators. Who is this person please, I would very much like to discuss a couple of issues with them... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Plot to Overthrow U.S.Government: three indicted
by ichudov＠Algebra.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wow, this is a colorful story. As usual, I am not sure how much of it is true. igor Three Indicted in Alleged Plot to Overthrow U.S. Government AP 13-DEC-97 LITTLE ROCK, Ark. (AP) Three men charged with planning a revolt against the United States government wanted to create a new republic limited to whites while allowing polygamy to build its population, prosecutors say. Chevie Kehoe of Colville, Wash., and Daniel Lewis Lee of Oklahoma City were charged Friday with murder, racketeering and conspiracy in a seven-count federal indictment. Kehoe, 24, directed the group, and Lee, 24, carried out the orders, the indictment said. Faron Lovelace, 40, of Sandpoint, Idaho, was charged with a single count of racketeering for allegedly being Kehoe's assistant. Prosecutors say Kehoe and the others wanted to create the Aryan Peoples Republic through a campaign of murder, robberies and kidnappings. Once the U.S. government was gone, their new country would grow quickly "by recruiting certain white people into the Republic and by engaging in polygamy so that the number of these white persons would greatly increase," the indictment said. The indictment did not detail threats or name targeted officials. Kehoe and Lee were previously charged in state court with the 1996 deaths of William Mueller, 52; his wife, Nancy, 28; and Mrs. Mueller's daughter, Sarah Elizabeth Powell, 8. Kehoe and Lee allegedly robbed Mueller, a gun dealer in Tilly, Ark., to support their cause, and the circumstances surrounding the deaths gave the Arkansas grand jury jurisdiction. Prosecutors said state murder charges would be dropped to allow the federal case to advance. Authorities say the Muellers and Kehoes knew each other and were associated through gun shows and militia group activities. Kehoe is accused of directing crimes that also include theft, interstate transportation of stolen property and money laundering. Part of Lee's job was to carry out four murders, and Lovelace's duties included one murder, according to the indictment. Kehoe and Lovelace are accused of transporting stolen goods from the white separatist community of Elohim City, Okla., to Spokane, Wash., in March 1995 and again from Arkansas to Washington after the Muellers were killed. Lovelace was convicted this year of killing Jeremy Scott, 23, in 1995 out of fear Scott was a government informant. Lovelace also has admitted kidnapping and robbing a Washington state couple in 1995. He held them captive for five hours after stealing their weapons and extorting several thousand dollars from them. Kehoe and his brother, Cheyne Kehoe, 21, made national headlines in February when they were allegedly involved in a shootout with Ohio police. It was caught on videotape by a camera mounted on a police car. No officers were wounded but a passerby was injured by a bullet fragment. Kehoe and his brother were fugitives until June, when Cheyne surrendered and told authorities where to find his brother. Cheyne was not named in Friday's indictment. Kehoe was being held in Ohio awaiting charges stemming from the videotaped shootout. Lee was jailed in Arkansas on capital murder charges, and Lovelace was being held in Idaho. Copyright 1997 & The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. `

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hashcash spam prevention & firewalls
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am looking at writing some hashcash (http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/hashcash/) based spam prevention software. The motivation for writing spam prevention software is that spam is better combatted with technical methods than legal or political (we do not want clueless politicians coming in ham-fisted and requiring "Internet Drivers Licenses" or anti-spam legislation or anything else, such actions will be hazardous for the future of remailers, in my opinion). (Hashcash is a way of proving that the sender has consumed a tunable amount of CPU time. The verification process consumes negligible CPU time. This allows us to require the would be spammer to spend say 20 seconds per mail, which will slow him down considerably, over his current tactics of 1000 long Bcc lists allowing him to hand off spamming tasks to mail servers.) So what we want is a filter to bounce messages without the required hashcash postage, we ideally want this to happen at the ISP or organisational SMTP server end, rather than at the recipients end, because a) it is simpler for 1 service provider to install software than 100,000 neophytes, and b) it reduces bandwidth consumption on dial up users pay per second lines as the spam is killed before they see it. The Right Way to do it perhaps is as an SMTP extension, however I consider this impractical in the short term because as far as I know there is no SMTP extension plug-in mechanism (other than access to the source code, and lots of development time) and because there are a large number of mail servers in use, and it will be expensive in developer (that's me) time to provide patches for them all (exarcebated by the fact that in many cases source will not be available). So these problems leave us scratching around for other more generic approaches. One method is to create a proxy which receives mail on port 25 (as the SMTP server normally does) filters examining for correct hashcash postage, and bounces if the postage is missing, and forwards the mail on to the real SMTP server if the hashcash postage is valid. The real SMTP server would then be set to run on another port... say port 26 which is reserved, and have the mail forwarded to it at that port. (You would want to disable non-local access to port 26 either at firewall or with SMTP server configuration if that is possible). Alternatively run the real SMTP server on another machine inside the local network. A few problems with this approach, firstly it may not be possible to configure some SMTP server software to run at ports other than 25. (I know you can do it with sendmail: OOPort=26 does it.) (If this is not possible with a given SMTP server you can still run a proxy by running the real SMTP server on another machine inside the network). Secondly the proxy approach prevents some of the SMTP server functions from operating properly because the process on the other end of the socket is our hashcash proxy on localhost rather than the remote mail hub (modern sendmails can be configured to perform reverse name lookups on IP addresses, call ident (ident sucks anyway IMO), or block based on IP address or domain, etc.) Is this kind of thing likely to be a big problem? Another approach is to try to hook in a hashcash SMTP proxy filter at the firewall. I am not that familiar with firewalls. Anyone have thoughts on the sorts of filtering you could install at the firewall level, and how portable this would be based on installed base of types of firewall? (ie It is not interesting if you can do nifty proxy functions with foobar firewall software if it is used by <1% of sites, and the function is impossible with other firewall software). The required filter functionality is something like this in order of desirability: Accept the SMTP session. Use an EHLO extension HASHCASH to say that this server expects hashcash. (Extended HELO is a method of specifying SMTP extensions (I think)). Accept the headers, and if a valid hashcash postage is not included, hand off to the real mailserver a site configurable bounce message. If the postage is valid, replay the headers to the real SMTP server (with IP masquerading so that the IP address appears to be coming from the originator, so that the SMTP server will not get upset about reverse DNS look up mismatches etc). Then act as a dumb proxy for the rest of the connection passing data through to the normal hashcash server. This still leaves open the question of the user generating their own hashcash postage. Again this could be problematic for neophytes. One solution is to include a URL for a web page including a javascript hashcash generator -- this means that no new software must be installed, the user cut and pastes the generated hashcash into their message. However things would be a whole lot simpler short term if the mail originators ISP created the hashcash for him at the ISPs SMTP hub where the user hands off his mail for further delivery. The main problem with this is that the SMTP mail hub would be overloaded by the CPU intensive task of generating hashcash. There are a few techniques to reduce the overhead of preventing spam with hashcash. One is to require valid hashcash only on the first message to a given address. (Spammers being hit and run types, and even having to generate hashcash for each spamee once would be expensive for a spam list of 10 million unwilling spam recipients). Better, is to require valid hashcash on all mail, _until_ the recipient replies to a mail. This is good because people rarely reply to spammers. Ordinary users who chit-chat backwards and forwards in mail generate little added overhead for the hand off SMTP server -- the only overhead being to generate say 5 seconds CPU worth of hashcash for each new recipient the user sends to. Then you add some hashcash accounting so that users who overspend (consuming more than say 1 minutes CPU consumption on the server in a 24 hour period have their email bounced with explanation of how to generate their own hashcash as a heavy user). Figures would need tuning to see how they worked out in practice, however it seems that it would be feasible to handle the whole operation entirely at the sending and receiving SMTP servers. Comments? Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Re: hashcash spam prevention & firewalls
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk>: > How about this alternative which achieves the same functionality and > removes the juicy supeona target: > Turn on hashash database for all mails. That means hashcash gets put > in the database to prevent double spending. .... > So now when you reply to a message, on it's way out via the mail hub, > you remove that hashcash token from the double spending database. > This means that the sender can cache sent hashcash tokens, and re-use > them when after he gets a reply. Doesn't this invite the spammer to Bcc an accomplice with the target ISP ? The accomplice replies; thereby freeing the coin for reuse. > I am told by one subscriber to look at TIS firewall toolkits imap > program. You may have meant "smap". -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

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The closed Nym list
by Daniel J. Boone 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: > Declan decided that rebroadcasting articles out of Nym would not be > allowed, but he said nothing about not mentioning its existence. (Nor would > I have agreed to be on a list whose very existence I could not disclose.) > Anyway, tonight when I mentioned its existence as I was posting an article > here that I wrote for the Nym list, I half-expected some comments from > Dimitri. > > But I didn't expect someone to post the subscription instructions > (anonymously, of course). Hint: it wasn't I. > > Anyway, I suppose that by mid-morning tomorrow Declan is going to have to > decide how to deal with subscriptions by Vulis, Human Gus-Peter, Toto, and > all the others. The Nym list appears to be closed. (The web page says so -- so I didn't try.) This state of affairs may even be my fault. The history, for those who care, is appended. It's a shame -- if David Brin really is posting there as one of Tim's recent messages suggested I'd be very interested in seeing his posts. (Thanks, Tim, for reposting yours here.) I still don't think it makes much sense to have a conversation about the use of nyms and then try to protect the posters' words from public view. If posters are concerned about public scrutiny, why not use a nym? Not to mention the fact that one would have to keep the list closed to have a prayer of enforcing the no-repost rule. --Daniel Boone History: Robert Hettinga was briefly forwarding "nym" posts to e$pam, where I saw them. Declan publically requested that posts not be forwarded. I sent Robert a message asking if he was going to comply -- and expressed (to Robert) my lack of respect for a no-forwarding policy. Robert (that notorious cross-pollinizer that he is) forwarded my message to Declan, which was unfortunate -- as Declan no doubt considered my message insulting. (Addressed to Declan, it would have been.) I got a very chilly "response" from Declan about how he had no duty to entertain me with his list traffic. I took the opportunity to ask him how his no-repost rule would fare when someone using a nym started reposting the traffic publicly. He responded with "the list is now closed" or words to that effect. I realized too late he may have thought _I_ was threating to do the evil reposting deed.

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