December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Raid on Jim Bell story may actually be real....
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I spoke with Jim Bell last night at his home in Vancouver, WA, and he confirmed the story. He has not been arrested but his equipment has been confiscated. No e-mail possible until he gets access to other machinery. He says he's surprised that it has taken so long for Sam to respond. He can be reached at 1-360-696-3911 Now this assumes that the person I spoke to is Jim Bell and not the USG in AP clothing, and that the entire AP gambit is not a sting.

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PGP-Domo...
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On another mailing-list, there has been a lengthy discussion going on about encrypting the list-traffic or not. Although I personally agree, that encrypting a public mailing list is kind of useless I would like to know from a technical perspective if PGPdomo supports _both_ PGP and plain-text simultaneously on the same mailing list (if no public key available, send plain-text, otherwise encrypt). Also, considering the time it takes to encrypt/sign a message for each individual user (assuming they use pgp), isn't that too much overhead for the list-server, when we deal with a few hundred people and maybe traffic like on cypherpunks? Any experiences from PGP-Domo users/admins would be greatly appreciated. Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! -> http://www.epic.org */ /* E-mail: harka(at)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail pref'd) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ ... Microsoft - "Where do you want to crash today?" ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBM0NCbTltEBIEF0MBAQFasAf+ODKv3pX/bCZy66coA9SCGaB2BUgWEPfv n42WokKZY9HY/WrRLJ4vTtbiJs+p7i9vJA37VUy7I/vAZJ5fFQOHYCWS9g8Mpxtn kOmDoIj7grfNXDEgYa91+Shv5xEJXo62bGnW+YlX7TNeb3buQj2H91ova4Jk3oci sBKFSRLf5EDtOjBOBXcxy1V232k2wLoefSvVORWmjHtEyzCdstenCv4jjEf5LF+E uIzBr7+MmzJPK49lM17izHTpBv/LALBvyD2lq1IfJl0psnfbFtL2SMJeOAVdkQe/ Hqn8qeNHpLwuvPTO/QZP85aMRnHCNVVJaeHJpLJnX3pMVrLjCOGC3g== =7xD4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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DigiCash press release
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 4 Apr 1997 01:46:54 +1000 (EST) From: Andreas Furche <afurche(a)cs.newcastle.edu.au> To: e-payments(a)commerce.net Subject: DigiCash press release MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: e-payments-owner(a)cs.newcastle.edu.au Precedence: bulk +----------------------------------------------------------------------+ This message was addressed to: e-payments(a)lists.commerce.net +----------------------------------------------------------------------+ --------------------------- PRESS RELEASE --------------------------- Release date: April 2, 1997 Tokyo, Japan =========================================================== Nomura Research Institute licenses ecash(tm) technology for Japan's first true electronic money system =========================================================== Nomura Research Institute (NRI) and DigiCash today announced that NRI will be the first company in Japan to license ecash(tm) technology for the development of an electronic money payment system. NRI will use ecash(tm), denominated in Japanese yen, for a unique intranet based system that will allow NRI employees, departments, and associated companies to exchange value in real time, without the need for smart cards, paper, or complex systems. Licensees of the ecash(tm) system include Mark Twain Bank (USA), Deutsche Bank (Germany), Merita Bank/EUnet (Finland) and Advance Bank (Australia). At the moment making transactions over the Internet or an Intranet usually means sending credit card details over computer networks, but credit card transactions are relatively expensive and therefore are not efficient for low value purchases. Many smartcard- based systems are also being developed, but they require that each consumer installs special hardware. Many forms of "electronic cash" are competing for attention in Japan, but the NRI project is unique, using a low cost, real-time method of payment that is secure, easy-to-use, and which will meet the future requirements of banks, and Government regulators. DigiCash's patented ecash(tm) system allows payment of amounts as low as one yen, and all payments are made with the same security technology currently used by large financial institutions to protect large international money transfers. "This launch in Japan represents an important collaboration between the premier electronic cash company and the leading electronic commerce innovator in a country that is growing rapidly in Internet usage," said Dr. David Chaum, inventor of electronic cash and founder of DigiCash. He added "Internet users and corporations have come to understand the unique ability of the ecash(tm) electronic cash system to empower them, using their own computers, to protect their own privacy. Leading banks, both in the region and globally, are beginning to observe this and see the strategic importance of operating their own electronic cash systems. We are thrilled to have NRI as a partner as we pioneer the use of ecash(tm) in Japan". "A great deal of discussion on electronic money in Japan has been focused on smartcard-based ones, such an example represented by Mondex. However, we, Nomura Research Institute, Ltd., believe network-based 'ecash' is equally important for the accelerated development of cyberspace economy in Japan. Introducing 'ecash' to the Japanese yen world, NRI will propose a new model of utilization of ecash, that is, `ecash in INTRANET'", said Mr. Teruyasu Murakami, Director of Advanced Social Systems Division, NRI. Ecash(tm) is the only Internet payment system that creates actual electronic cash coins. This concept increases security and reduces transaction costs. It gives increased control to the user of the system and provides consumer privacy. Merchants will also appreciate the ecash(tm) system, where payments are quickly authenticated and their cash value is immediately deposited in the bank, preventing disputes and delivery delays. This system gives a great opportunity to merchants selling low cost goods, information and services online. Craig Welch, Director of DigiCash Pty Ltd said: "Japan is growing so fast in the use of payment methods, that it was only a matter of time before the use of ecash(tm) became essential. NRI have proven to be the ideal partner to make this technology a practical implementation in Japan." Contact DigiCash bv Contact Nomura Research Institute, (Amsterdam): Ltd. (Tokyo) : Mr. Robert Zipplies Mr. Naohiko Araki Ph: +31 20 592 9999 Ph: +81 3 5255 1981 Fax: +31 20 665 1126 Fax: +81 3 5255 9312 email: press(a)digicash.com email: kouhou(a)nri.co.jp http://www.digicash.com/ http://www.nri.co.jp Contact DigiCash Pty. Ltd. Contact DigiCash Pty Ltd (Singapore): (Sydney): Mr. Craig Welch Mr. Andreas Furche Ph: +65 9639 2670 Ph: +61 2 375 2316 Fax: +65 745 2731 Fax: +61 2 375 2121 email: craig(a)digicash.com email: andreas(a)digicash.com (DigiCash and ecash are registered trademarks and should always be referred to as such) * * * DigiCash: Company background (summary) ====================================== Founded in 1990, DigiCash is the leading pioneer in the development of electronic payment systems that provide security and privacy. Available for open, and closed systems and network use, DigiCash's products are based on patented developments in public key cryptography devised and owned by Dr. David Chaum. DigiCash's first product was DyniCash, a road-toll system capable of collecting fees from pre-paid smartcards carried on moving vehicles that was developed for the Dutch government. In recent years increasing media attention has been focused on ecash(tm), DigiCash's software-only form of electronic cash developed especially for use on the Internet. It can be used online (via the World Wide Web) or via email, and is suitable for implementation with many other digital media. There are already five ecash-issuing banks on the Internet and a rapidly growing number of cyber- merchants. With enthusiastic responses from financial institutions interested in ecash-licenses for the future, and the continuing support of industry opinion-makers, the company's team of experts is now making presentations around the world. Banks already supporting- or issuing ecash(tm) include: Mark Twain Bank (Missouri, USA), Merita Bank/EUnet (Finland), Deutsche Bank (Germany) and Advance Bank (Australia). DigiCash's leading position in cryptographic technology has already enabled it to develop smartcards for a diverse range of applications including CAFE, the smartcard-based payment system operated by the Headquarters of the EU in Brussels. The CAFE project started as a scientific project (ESPRIT) funded by the EU, just one of the several EU technology projects with which DigiCash has been involved, and designed smartcards that feature pre-paid cash replacement functions, loyalty schemes and access control. Founder: Dr. David Chaum ------------------------ Dr. David Chaum, Founder and Chief Technical Officer of DigiCash, received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of California at Berkeley, then taught at New York University Graduate School of Business Administration and at the University of California, and headed the Cryptography Group at CWI, the Dutch nationally-funded centre for research in mathematics and computer science, before taking his current position. He has published over 45 original technical articles on cryptography and also founded the International Association for Cryptologic Research. DigiCash Products ----------------- Facility Card: Complete Facility Management Smart-Card/Reader System Cash replacement, access control, and time/attendance system; now in schools, hospitals, industry, offices, recreation; interfaces to vending machines, point-of-sale, access control, copiers, phones, gaming; Downloadable & upgradeable card-readers work on-line and/or offline; There are already over 120,000 cards in use in the Netherlands. Mars Electronics International licensed the DigiCash facility management system technology in 1996, and incorporated it into their `Multicard Smart' product line which was launched worldwide in January 1997. Blue: Smart Card Technology For EMV & Prepaid With Dynamic Public Key. Conforms to joint Europay, MasterCard, Visa specifications. Multiple applications, including loyalty and closed systems. Superior data integrity in case of malicious or accidental interference or interruption. Requires only the smallest and most proven chips, e.g. SC-24 or ST601. Mask technology licensing. For more information on ecash please contact DigiCash. info(a)digicash.com, http://www.digicash.com/, fax: +31 20 592 9999 ------------------------- END PRESS RELEASE ------------------------- -- Andreas Furche Level 29 The Chifley Tower Managing Director 2 Chifley Square DigiCash Pty. Ltd. Sydney 2000, Australia e-mail: andreas(a)digicash.com ph +61 2 9375 2316 mobile (0419) 385 569 (NEW number!) fax +61 2 9375 2121 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- This message was sent by a majordomo-based automatic list manager. Subscriptions to and archives of this list are available to any person or organization. For further information send a mail message to 'e-payments-request(a)lists.commerce.net' with 'help' (no quotations) contained in the body of your message. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Re: FC 97 and www.offshore.com.ai offline
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:46 PM 4/2/97 +0000, Jim Burnes wrote: >Has anyone been able to reach www.offshore.com.ai for the last >several weeks. I've been trying to follow up with some email to >Vince about getting my fellow FC '97 attendees' email addresses, but to >no avail. > >If anyone on the list was at the conference, or has such a list I >would appreciate it. You may want to ask Hirschfeld, the conference chair. >BTW: hi to lucky green, eric blossom, vince and everyone that made FC >97 a wild adventure. Hi back :-) It was fun, wasn't it? -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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q.N2
by nadeshda＠mexred.net.mx 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To whom it may concern: Thank you for answering my mail, it was very useful for me, but at the end you asked me why do I think legislation would be needed? I have several opinions: In one part I think that it is not necessary to legislate, because as you said you have to protect your privacy from the gobernent, IŽm agree of that, but I have other situations: IŽm going to give you some examples: 1) I heard about several cases about individuals who use the Internet to attract children who are then raped and murdered, kidnapped and sold on the black market, many of these pediophiles work out in open in complete anonimaty, due to the structure of the Internet and many service providers. 2) And what about the terroists who use the Internet to comunicate with each other, gather information and funding establish methods, investigate methods of terrorism (how to make a bomb in your house using abono and household chemicals. This is an area that should be strongly controlled, but the question is how do you do it without restricting the rights of the average citizen?

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Re: Feds reading this list, Jim Bell, and threats
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri(a)netcom.com> writes: > I have argued with JB in the past over his ideas. while I think they > are reprehensible, a govt raid is an extremely chilling result. > I hope it doesn't have the effect of stifling the free flow of > discourse here (actually nothing ever has) but it seems likely > to have some effect. Well - at least they're not "moderating" the list, like Cocksucker John Gilmore did, and not lying blatantly about their moderation policies, like Sandy Sandfort, the C2Net salesman, did. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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DCSB: Stewart Baker (one more time...) on Clinton AdministrationCrypto Policy and Digital Commerce
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- No, there is *not* an echo in here... The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents (Again!) Mr. Stewart Baker, Steptoe & Johnson formerly General Counsel, the National Security Agency (who, along with the staff of the Harvard Club, was unable to get into Boston for April's DCSB meeting because of the April Fool's day snowstorm...) "The Clinton Administration's Latest Encryption Policy and What It Means for Digital Commerce" Tuesday, May 6, 1997 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Mr. Baker will discuss the details of the Clinton Administration's latest encryption policy, which seeks to encourage "key recovery" encryption by offering special export privileges to companies that support key-recovery systems. He will also discuss the reaction of American high-tech companies, foreign governments and consumers. Mr. Baker, formerly General Counsel of the National Security Agency, has an international and technology practice at Steptoe & Johnson in Washington, DC. He is a frequent contributor to WIRED and other publications on topics such as encryption, national security and Internet law. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, May 6, 1997 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men, and "appropriate business attire" for women. We will attempt to record this meeting and put it on the web in RealAudio format at some future date We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, May 3, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. NOTE: If we already have your check for April, and you're still coming, you *don't* need to send another one. :-) Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston". If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Planned speakers for DCSB are: June Philip A. DesAutels W3C Digital Signature Initiative July Win Treese TLS, Digital Commerce, and Export Issues August Duncan Frissell* MarketEarth September Christof Paar Elliptic Curve Cryptography October Peter Cassidy* Military Fiat and Digital Commerce *Invited We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com> . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . We look forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBM0QTIMUCGwxmWcHhAQHuDAf9FGyN9YiBVE8mSr9ylcFu2uiF2kDA38P0 0DKG0mND0gc+kZiGlMeboDrAecUtoOIR+dBk38YvMd2g7oBBIDQRsMcCOdvGavNY dvcLiHfj/hj1VMk2eIWGXJa+3169gO51r90yimG6AQo6HzF8KG1sZb0pwvkPUGhB G74ac/3T1KPAbX+t8KHYgULlci8l8dwoRmPj7p4EKBHyMTJKHZTVHTkjIK3gYo+2 UaDlp4qdoeCykkeZPf7cqof6etXzbts4+dF7TkoiiRNKfF/tu7eEzZQnLbAVf1br Rx6VWG8OJXcPXcHCUSOCNjSva1E6f1yJNj2iwG3HmPBn6+fkw3kZ+A== =tTIg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA Lesley Stahl: "You mean *anyone* can set up a web site and compete with the New York Times?" Andrew Kantor: "Yes." Stahl: "Isn't that dangerous?" The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Is this snake-oil?
by Eric Murray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I ran across this web page: http://www.da.com/swp.htm. They claim their 'Cyber-stone' scheme uses a "Pseudo-random Transposition Cipher" to vary the keys for an underlying symmetric cipher for each message. They also claim to have a patent on changing the keys for each message (which seems like something on the level of patenting the 'help' key on a keyboard, or the blinking block cursor. Sigh). I ask if it's snake oil because of the use of non-standard terminology and marketing bullstuff like "A New Way of Encrypting". However neither of those are anywhere near proof of uselessness, only an indication that's "food for thought and grounds for further research". They claim patents: 5,307,412, "Random Coding Cipher System and Method" 5,335,280, "Random Sum Cipher System and Method" 5,533,128, "Pseudo-Random Transposition Cipher System and Method" -- Eric Murray ericm(a)lne.com Network security and encryption consulting. PGP keyid:E03F65E5 fingerprint:50 B0 A2 4C 7D 86 FC 03 92 E8 AC E6 7E 27 29 AF

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Assassination Politics on Website
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Bell's "Assassination Politics" is at: http://www3.sk.sympatico.ca/carljohn/ -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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Re: hi-tech ROT-13
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Andy Dustman wrote: > > The main problem I see with the various key-passing schemes is that they > aren't useful if the receipient is cryptographically-challenged, which is > why I'm presently inclined to stick with just the magic cookie exchange > without crypto (unless the recipient can supply a PGP public key). Andy seems to realize something that many people don't, which is that all of the cypherpunk discussions as to security, privacy and anonymity are just preaching to the converted unless the end result is a program that the average joe can actually use. I am personally GUI-challenged, but that is what most people know and can actually work with. Even then, the average user doesn't know enough about his or her system and software to do anything remotely exotic to install it. What you or I might consider simplistic (e.g. changes to a config.sys file), might be a journey onto dangerous ground for someone who may have to pay someone $50.00/hr or more in order to get their machine running again if something gets screwed up. The bottom line is that people want something that they halfway recognize and feel comfortable with, and is written to be self- installable by someone who actually knows what the hell all those things inside their computer do. I used to tell people, "I invented a pill that cures Alzheimer's, but it doesn't do any good, because nobody remembers to take it." If the goal is to make anonymous remailers available to those who need them, then one must also consider the computer knowledge and capabilities of those who have a genuine need for anonymity for safety reasons. Assholes and the spammers will always take the time to learn what they need to know to spread their bullshit, but what about people who have a one or two-time legitimate need to pass information along in saftey? Even though unencoded, direct use of an anonymous remailer is not that complicated, many people today think that a command line is "Sit, Rover, sit!" and if you ask them about syntax they look at you funny and say they think they paid it when they bought the condoms. Raph Levien's list of remailers is great, but he fails to give simple instructions as to how to get remailer help/instructions from different remailers. And some of the remailers autobot help replies are rather vague even to those who know computers well. The Anonymous Nymserver <anon(a)anon.nymserver.com> was a great, easy to use GUI interface that Jane Average could use, but it seemed to be some kind of interesting programming project to its author, who folded at the first hint of trouble, expressing great surprise that there are assholes in the world. After folding, his great concern seemed to be to find somebody to buy his software, which he had just finished explaining would cause a great deal of grief to anyone who chose to run it. (And if you act now, we'll stab you with the Amazing Ginzu knives!) Actually, however, he is still providing services for people who pay a slight sum ($20/yr ??), so he is actually furthering the spread of anonymous remailers, even if he is limiting them in some ways. (I had no problem with him wanting some reimbursement for his efforts in writing the software. It's just that he sounded like he wanted someone to pay premium dollars for his learning curve in order to buy his software so that they could run it as a free service to others.) If remailers are to survive, then programs have to be written that address the capabilities and morals of a new breed of user. Although I appreciate the efforts of many cypherpunks who originally had a hand in developing the remailer system, I am not so naieve as to think it was all done merely for humanitarian reasons, etc. The question is, now that many of the cypherpunks have moved on to busier lives, and the programming details that were once "fun" are now "work," are there still those who have a committment to advance the development of the remailers, at least partially as a public service, or to encourage and help those who may not have the expertise, but who are willing to learn? I have read complaints about the thanklessness of providing a service that provides an avenue for abuse, with little indication of actually providing essential privacy needs for those in genuine need of security in anonymous communications. Yet those most in need of this type of service for legitimate anonymity may only be a one-time user, and computer illiterate, unable to use anything other than a GUI. If the cypherpunks want to wax eloquently about good intentions then we must change the technology to enable those intentions to come to fruitation in today's Net climate, or remailers will go the way of the dinosaurs, being of use only to a few elite and a plethora of assholes. Although I have little expertise in the technical area surrounding remailers, I do not take lightly my call for the remailer theorists to actually walk their talk, and produce a product suitable for general use. I have risked my physical freedom in the past in order to bring information and knowledge to those in oppression, and will likely do so again in the future. (As a matter of fact, one of the items which I risked life and limb carrying into a fascist state was a cypherpunk product. Spooks who get caught doing this get 'traded' back to the home team, but ordinary citizens do not.) TruthMonger

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