December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

WebWorld 28
by Bubba Rom Dos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Feds reading this list, Jim Bell, and threats
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

snow <snow(a)smoke.suba.com> writes: > The Limey Apologist said: > > > At 1:51 PM -0600 4/4/97, null(a)myemail.net wrote: > > them as a sovereign nation that was the spark to the flame. Try > > reading "Lies my teacher told me" sometime. > > Given that the American revolution institutionalised slavery and > > I think slavery was an institution long before the White Man > came to the New World. If I remember correctly, slavery wasn't outlaws > in england until long after the United States was a soverign contry. A couple of weeks ago I and the family were in Washington DC and we dropped by the Museum of Natural History in the Mall. It's almost as cool at the Museum of Natural History in NYC. One of the things I noticed was a special "braining club" used by the Pacific North West indians. As some readers may know, PNW indians did not believe in accumulating wealth. Rather, they tried to build "reputation capital" (a la Timmy May) by conspiciously destroying wealth in ceremonies known as "potlatch". One indian would, say, publicly burn 10 sacks of grain. Another would try to outdo him by publicly burning 20 sacks of grain. (Somehow, this sounds like Cypherpunks.) Now, one of the ways indians showed off their wealth was by killing their slaves during the potlatches using this braining club. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: AP Revisited
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike Duvos wrote: > In a world with an indestructible Net, anonymous digital cash, > and strong privacy tools, AP will ultimately evolve, first in a > relatively benign form and then, once it becomes ubiquitous, in > the form envisioned by Bell. {excerpt from WebWorld 24} "Assassination Politics," originated by Jim Bell, had been just a theoretical exercise during his lifetime, dismissed by most who read it as a thinly veiled joke, at best. Bell, however, had developed a workable autobot which instituted his system, albeit in a very rudimentary way. Basically, his procedure was analogous to a lottery system where the players were contributing to a prize that could be collected, not by chance, but by anyone who fulfilled the preconditions of those contributing. And the precondition was that, in order to pocket the 'prize', one had to assassinate the person targeted by the contributors. Since Bell's system used anonymous remailers, his system would allow individuals and groups to anonymously defend themselves from all types of aggression. Eventually someone modified Bell's 'Assassination Bot' to serve as a useful tool for political polling. Someone else took it a step further, and it became a valid electoral tool. Then, inevitably, just before the Channel Revolution broke out, it's newly refined features were once again modified to serve Bell's original purpose, and all hell broke loose when established geo-political figures began dropping like flies, or resigning in terror when they realized that the people were indeed speaking, and doing so by putting a price on the heads of their oppressors.

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Re: Crypto Dongel
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney wrote : > However if the system is designed to make it easy when it does become > necessary, it will probably be easy to at least occasionally activate the > feature accidentally. The result will be the loss of your keys. For what little it is worth, key zeroization is built into almost all US government crypto gear, usually with prominent switches on the front panel marked "zeroize" for emergencies. And most all of this gear has tamper switches that activate the zeroizing logic when any of the covers of the equipment are removed - and often there is more than one zeroize circuit in a system in case the primary one fails to work. My understanding is that the NSA has rather specific and detailed requirements for this feature in gear being designed for them, and one can certainly see why it would be a requirement in military systems that might have to be quickly rendered useless to an enemy in the moments before capture. So it is hardly a new idea. Dave Emery die(a)die.com

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Re: Anonymous Mailing Lists
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Toto wrote: > > I'm not certain, being far from an expert on remailers and > > majordomos. I've had one person indicate that majordomos could > > be configured to keep all users anonymous, but didn't know > > if it could be done selectively in the case of anonymous > > remailers. He is supposed to get back to me on it. A few years ago, I maintained a low-traffic mailing list in which the users could be anonymous to each other - I was the only person who knew the recipient list. I used perl scripts to manage it, and manually edited messages which requested anonymity (it was a digest-style list). A perl script individually mailed copies to about 600 recipients. It worked, but was not scalable to higher traffic volumes. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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Re: [off topic] Feds reading this list, Jim Bell, and threats
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Young writes: > On Phil Hallam-Baker's rejoinder to Paul Bradley' defense of AP: > Virtually all of Phil's charges against AP apply equally well to > state-sponsored killing in the natonal interest, including that > arranged by highly educated, cultured, philosophical, nuclear > physicists and electrical engineers. > That's the issue. Who gets to decide who lives and who dies, and > how close the killer is to the slaughter, unprotected by law, by > public consensus, by popular will, by apologetics for the security > of national interest. I think John has here hit the crucial point. *Any* form of killing in cold blood - whether state sponsored executions, AP-sponsored killings, or just plain hired hit-men, has the initiator of the killing taking onto him or herself the power of life and death over others. This is not a power which I feel can be used in an ethical manner, since it's exercise is totally irrevocable. Thus, I oppose the death penalty, even in the most egregious cases. Deciding who should live and who should die is simply not a proper power for a State, nor for any person. I have much less of a problem when a person is killed in an act of defense, in the heat of the moment. [Yup, I know that that leaves a big fuzzy area in the middle, but most cases are pretty clear]. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 7 Apr 97 6:49:56 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net #-#.-#*#-+## 1:14:20 99.98% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++++-++-+ 2:33:28 99.95% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++ +++++++ 33:24 99.88% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net #.## #**+.-# 2:35:38 99.88% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++++--+-+ 2:37:55 99.84% replay remailer(a)replay.com *-+- *+-.-*- 3:09:40 99.77% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *+++*+ + +++ 39:58 99.53% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -.-_.-__..-* 29:08:06 99.52% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com * +# #** ### 1:49 99.49% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ----------- 3:11:08 99.38% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #* * #**#* * 1:31 99.24% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca * *** ** 8:57 99.06% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ++ + ------ 1:16:05 99.04% shaman remailer(a)lycaeum.org - ++++*++ 22:31 97.05% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -*___.-- 36:06:40 89.33% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net +.-+ - - 1:41:18 50.25% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Our tax dollars used to pay the Usenet forger Pidor Vorobiev
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Dr. Hecker, I would like to know whether the notorious Usenet forger and canceller Pidor V. Vorobiev is still employed by your laboratory and why.

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There's no such address as 'ca@dm.com'!!!
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One finds the weirdest things in the orphan mailbox... >Date: Sat, 5 Apr 1997 03:06:00 -0800 >From: Intertain Online Help <help(a)intertain-inc.com> >Message-Id: <199704051106.DAA00810(a)intertain-inc.com> >To: ca(a)dm.com >Subject: Intertain Online Membership Expiration > > >Your membership at Intertain Online (Member Name 4313672) will expire >on 97/04/10. We are constantly adding new videos and >promotional pictures to our show rooms. You can re-register any time >by simply going to our home page (http://intertain-inc.com/) and >select the New Member option - please choose a new username. > >You have a credit of $39 in your account that will be applied >towards any purchase you make at our site before your membership expires >- it cannot be credited back to your card. > >If you have any questions please email us at help(a)intertain-inc.com > > >Looking forward to hearing from you soon, > >Your Friends at Intertain Online > >http://intertain-inc.com >Intertain Online - Customer Support

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Re: Another Article on Jim Bell from the Oregano
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rich Graves wrote: > On Sat, 5 Apr 1997, Alan Olsen wrote: > >>On Thursday, Environmental Protection Agency agents were at Bell's home with > >>a hazardous waste removal contractor analyzing chemicals found by the IRS > >>raiders. One of the chemicals reportedly was cyanide. Since the article doesn't mention the quantity, or other details, one has to wonder if it was a type of rodent or roach poison that many people commonly keep around the house. Did Ma and Pa Bell purchase a little something to take care of a mouse problem? Does this make them co-conspirators? Did the local hardware man suggest the product? Is he part of the plot against the government? I am reminded of the Campaign Against Marijuana Production in Northern California, where TV's and chainsaws were regularly seized as "articles used in marijuana production." At least in Northern California the small town newpapers were honest enough to poke fun at the federal bullshit rather than using it as an opportunity to overblow every minor aspect of the situation. > >They seemed to be unable to nail Jim on free speech issues, so they nailed > >him on "other things". > > No, they never tried to nail him on free speech issues. Read the Friendly > Affidavits at http://www.parrhesia.com/jimbell/ > > The government wasn't even aware of the AP essays until seven months after > they began legal proceedings on "other things." You have it backwards. The > government is using his speech in an attempt to nail him for tax evasion > and conspiracy. It's hard to get an all-encompassing search & seizure > warrant merely to fish for evidence of tax evasion and conspiracy to > harass IRS agents, but throw in an alleged Internet-based murder racket > and the judge will happily bend over and allow you to seize everything of > value. There was so much bullshit in the application for the search warrant that it had to be done by a real fisherman, practiced in the art of enlargening the size of the one that got away, in an attempt to justify asking the judge to let him use a net, instead of trolling. -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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