December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:52 PM 11/7/1996, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: > Look around at all the laws in a community that are unenforceable and > largely ignored by significant sections of the community. Taxes are a > classic with many people receiving cash and not declaring it..I suppose > you could say they just opt not to pay taxes while law abiders (to varying > degrees) opt in to pay tax. I agree. It would be necessary to marshal widespread public support to eliminate strong crypto. If the Four Horsemen scenario is available, this support would be available. > It is estimated here where all dogs, for example, are required to be > registered, that only 40 percent are in fact registered (ie pay the dog > tax). The authorities simply do not, with their current technology, have > the ability or political will to break down everyone's front door and > complete house to house dog searches then deal with court cases and bring > eveidence as to the actual owner of the animal where this is a relevant > matter to be proved. Sure, it's not really worth the effort. How much effort will you go to prevent your children from being kidnapped? > Consider the difficulty of actually outlawing say PGP and making it > stick. To ban its use on a network compliance measures such as routine > traffic scanning would be implimented. So users may say resort to direct > modem to modem systems thus forcing authorities to routinely tap > telephone calls, identify modem calls, and analyse these calls. The > authorities start to use scarce resources provided by those members of > the public that choose to pay taxes to them. In the case of a largely compliant public, this isn't all that expensive. > The authorities have to spend even more resources on publicity and scams > to align privacy advocates with terrorists. Some privacy advocates may > even become terrorists who before didn't really care for such tactics. This is a highly likely scenario. But in the scenarios proposed by the GAKers, even the privacy advocates would be reluctant to defend crypto. > Assume the snail mail route is effectively sqaushed what then? Well you > could voice call your friend and read the encyphered text to them over > the phone and they could then run it through pgp and decrypt it. If the > authorities effectively made this too costly (in terms of risk etc) then > you could always just jump on a plane and tell them the message > personally or send someone else to do that for you. Gee, I hope you don't have to send many messages if you have to travel across the country to deliver them. How will you operate an anonymous business this way? It doesn't sound like cryptoanarchy to mean. > The costs of compliance increase as the authorities take measures to put > the genie back in the bottle. Stealth versions of popular programs get > released, and further technological advances are made so that the problem > becomes greater with respect to compliance as do the costs to the > taxpayer of ensuring compliance. Encrypted data that cannot be easily > distinguished form noise would require routine analysis and attempted > cracking of every bit of data transmitted..a task that would soon bring > even the great US economy to its knees assuming the people didn't put a > stop to the madness before it reached that point. I think people probably would put a stop to the madness. But, under the Four Horsemen scenario, most people, even Mr. Huge Cajones Remailer, would not consider it to be madness. > Just as an aside, I am sure the various spook angencies in the 'free > world' are well aware of these issues and no doubt other issues I have > not imagined and such considerations have played a part in so far stalling > an outright ban on the use of effective encryption programs and devices. This is interesting. I would be quite interested to see real evidence that various spook agencies have been foot dragging on the GAKers plans. > There are always costs to a government in the reduction in freedoms, and > the ultimate cost to any particular government is that it may stir the > beast so much that it awakens and takes away that governments authority > whether by democratic means or otherwise. Yes, this is correct. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Blocking addresses by default
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> With remailer abuse becoming more popular and remailers going down >> because of complaints, there seems to be some interest in remailer >> software that will block all email by default and will only pass >> along email that is explicitly unblocked. Rich wrote: >I think this threatens serious security problems for the remailer >network in two ways: >1. You'd create a list of people interested in anonymous information, > which could potentially be obtained by police or other armed thugs. >2. The traffic would go down so substantially that traffic analysis > would be trivial. Yeah. If you keep a centralized list, it's too risky. I've been thinking about how to implement a related approach - when the mailer receives anonymous mail for you, it sends a message saying Subject: Anonymous message #<cookie> Hi! You've got an anonymous message! Here's how to retrieve it / block future messages / accept all future.... <disclaimers, explanations, etc.> and you can send back the cookie to retrieve the message. Blocking or accepting also using the cookie, to reduce denial-of-service and spam attacks. This approach is primarily useful for terminal remailers, but if you set up the syntax carefully, you can get the things to relay to each other. It's not particularly useful for posting news, though. Since it is good for terminal remailers, that may make it less hassle to run them. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To a large extent, it's a volume question - if there's too much widespread use, it's too hard to control, prevent, or ban later. If the volumes of traffic and users are low, you can track users. So the government's working hard to keep volume down, both by export controls, FUD attacks on Phil, and constant offers to deal, such as Clipper I, II, III, and IV, all of which both delay widespread use of real crypto and try to introduce pre-wiretapped crypto instead. Strong vs. weak crypto isn't the real issue - for most business use, weak crypto is obviously unacceptable, but strong crypto with GAK is ok as long as it doesn't interfere with use (and as long as the government bureaucrats don't sell too many keys.) After all, any corporation, and most businesses, can be forced to keep and produce records when the government wants them to; a government-held master key doesn't change their "legitimate" access, only the convenience of legal and illegal access. Key Recovery, on the other hand, implies that you're required to either use GAK or use Weak Crypto, which is obviously Bad. Most businesses are far more opposed to things that make them wait for bureaucratic action in their day-to-day business than to the privacy issues, and they're more concerned about control and convenience than the economic rights issues (otherwise they'd be refusing to pay taxes....) The government might be able to stop new Netscape versions from using strong crypto - threatening to confiscate the company's ill-gotten gains from aiding and abetting money launderers might help, and threatening to confiscate PCs that use unapproved crypto. But it's tough to use a widespread threat like that on popular software once it's out there. A friend of mine lives in a kleptocracy; the local thugs haven't stolen his email provider's computer yet, mainly because the hardware doesn't work very well without software and administrators. But he's not willing to risk using PGP very often, because the volume is small enough they can watch everything (they give him enough trouble occasionally for using his native language on the phone instead of the local languages.) And sending stego isn't likely to be a good solution for a while, since mail volume is low enough to his remote area that sending lots of scanned photographs would be a big impact on email costs. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk

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WinKrypt
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"WinKrypt's marriage of highly sophisticated technology -- such as the advanced, not-for- export 256-bit GOST encryption algorithm contained in the KeyMail program -- with a user-friendly interface virtually redefines the PC security category," said Syncronys. http://www.syncronys.com.

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Need a new word for non-violent-censorship
by Bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I often have the same difficulty when speaking with Objectivists. They define "censorship" as "silencing the speaker by force", which is a fine and useful definition, but suppose we want to talk about a similar phenomenon which does not involve force? For example, the magnate who owns all the newspapers, television stations, bookstores and movie theatres in a small town decides that never again will homosexuality be publically mentioned in any of these venues. Force? No. "Censorship"? Not by _that_ definition, but what _is_ it? We need a new word, or else we have to continue using "censorship" to mean both of those things. I sometimes use "violent-censorship" and "non-violent-censorship" in conversation. As long as we continue to try to overload "censorship" we will waste much of our dialogue energy on semantic quibbling or pure misunderstanding. Regards, Zooko -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 iQB1AwUBMoMarEjbHy8sKZitAQGzZQL+OuobcXVKg8bU1FIgdIZl/0i2QZ/5McmC W//HUMtT+5D4sejWstVqkk2taB+jD9ctyKtgFIjIXOJdddsAAbd/Tbjr0TjuCMC4 FmagUDtrDD3tQOwiIXnb2rDit+GrfGPB =X6N3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:25 PM 11/7/96 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >At 5:12 PM 11/7/1996, jim bell wrote: >> BTW, some of your confusion is probably based is the false assumptions in >> your last sentence above. "..wide use of strong cryptography results in >> widely unpopular activities such as sarin attacks and political >> assassinations." > >No, you're confused, but it's probably my fault. We don't really know >what cryptoanarchy will be like. We all have ideas about it. Some >we share and some we don't. But we won't really know until we see it >happen. Well, uh, with all due respect, but while it's obviously true that we won't know EXACTLY how it'll be, that doesn't mean that no portion of we imagine will come true. This is particularly true on the big issues. For example, you hypothesized that "wide use of strong cryptography resuts in widely unpopular activities such as sarin attacks and political activities. I pointed out, almost certainly correctly, that these are wrong: 1. To believe that use in cryptography will result in greater numbers of random attacks on innocent civilians. As I pointed out, the exact opposite should be true: A greater ability to target the guilty means less reason to kill the innocent. 2. To believe that political assassination will be unpopular even if the ordinary citizen has an effective say in who's going to die. In other words, based on my understanding these beliefs are diametrically opposed to the truth. Not simply a difference in extent, we're talking a 180-degree change. Your response is a sheepish, "but we won't really know until we see it happen." Harrumph! >My whole point is based on the proposition that the doomsayers are right. Which doomsayers? What version of "doom"? >I believe D. Denning has suggested that cryptoanarchy will result in >the breakdown of our society. I suppose that depends a lot on what a person means by the phrase, "our society." Used as you (and maybe she, as well) this sounds like a code-word. To a statist, "society" is basically the stratification system that has developed to let one group of people control another. By that standard, cryptoanarchy WILL "result in the breakdown of our society." But that's all for the good. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Return address forgery [was Judge Kozinski...]
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Nov 08 20:20:02 1996 The Bovine remailer wrote: > On Wed, 6 Nov 1996, Bill Frantz wrote: > > > At 4:39 AM 11/6/96 -0500, Jim Ray wrote: > > >Judge Kozinski wrote: > > >> ... Perhaps the answer > > >> is that the post office should not accept mail unless there > > >> is a clear indication of who the sender is [...] > > In the case of postal mail, return address forgery is so easy [...] > Yes the failure to forsee this did stand out a little in the discourse > :). Well, in the judge's defense, note that he used the word "perhaps" above. I like this judge, which (obviously) isn't something I can say about too many judges...I think he was just trying to sharpen our thoughts and arguments, and that he DOES agree with us on many, many things. His fears about the misuse of anonymity in a police state, for example, come from his personal experience in a former socialist paradise. I think (hope) that being exposed to "cypherpunk issues" by as many good thinkers as he was, in a relaxed, non-courtroom setting, has broadened his understanding of the many issues involved and will help "our" side immensely if these same issues ever do come before him. I have decided, however, to cease my very enjoyable conversation with him about these issues, from now until after Judge Patel's Bernstein case has been decided and appealed, because of this very possibility. I am already concerned that an ambitious U.S. Attorney, using Alta Vista, could attempt to argue that "cypherpunk terrorists have been secretly trying to subtly influence Kozinski's thinking, and that therefore he should be removed from the case in favor of some judge who has no clue whatsoever about the 'Net, encryption, anonymous remailers, etc." [I am sure the argument wouldn't be put quite that way <g> but that's what the U.S. Attorney would mean.] There is now a judge with some idea of these issues who will IMNSHO probably be fair to "our" side. It is a rare opportunity, and I don't want to "blow it." JMR Please note new 2000bit PGPkey & new address <jmr(a)shopmiami.com> This key will be valid through election day 2000. PGP id.A7D63DA9 98 1F 39 BA 93 86 B4 F5 57 52 64 0E DA BA 2C 71 Please avoid using old 1024bit PGPkey E9BD6D35 anymore. Thanks. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEPAwUBMoPcRjUhsGSn1j2pAQHtVAfPd+F3jXHov9TgaZJSsKNcfi0dn30K9Dgs 2PQwFFLp8UuHFQGybBdorw4V9DQuGTehLVuiBttKdbBZYWVMhWv/TptZ+sagbexO EX0TrcD8gU3dtSK9xLH94TO8YMY5U/sk/8LIC1Q4cehXiZ3MOK/yxxR7V8uooJuI 6g4+HSxUOU2CBPIfYyHjzALxYkjn2/YYjo8VdFbxE7fRnjycnvr+qn2l70az4nnx E2l9qvXJYgNiEhSQVk4o3b+hlybCuFA1jtNLnkHa1qYQz2xP7xoF6QiDcscl4Jev HVQfUg52JyxS6DxsZ8K9/64aUlJWAXZYZbg4bn80OV4ETg== =gQWe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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So there's a cypherpunks newsgroup? mail.cypherpunks
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 17:12 1996-11-07 -0800, jim bell wrote: >Simple analogy: Suppose you put two people into a room with a deck of >playing cards and a table, instructing "Person A" to build a house-of-cards, >and telling "Person B" to stop him from achieving his goal. Who do you >think will win? Obviously, the latter will win: It's vastly easier to >knock such a structure down than to build it in the first place, and all >"Person B" has to do is occasionally take a whack at the structure. What if Person A is better armed? Could that change the outcome?

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Re: [rant] Race
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Thu, 7 Nov 1996 18:15:17 -0800 (PST) > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: Sean Roach <roach_s(a)alph.swosu.edu> > Subject: [rant] Race Sean Roach wrote: > Sandy Sandfort wrote: >> ... >> >What you mean WE, white man? ... > At first I was afraid to comment, as I have been more than vocal in the last > 24 hours, but then I decided that I thought this important enough to bring up. > This was the first time on this list that I noticed such an obvious > reference to race, granted I'm fairly new to the list,(quite new in fact), > and when I think about it, there were several references to Russians and > Jews in some of the other posts about Dr. Vulis and his practices. [...] I think Sandy is actually refering to an old joke: ------------------------- The Lone Ranger and Tonto found themselves cornered in a box canyon by 1,000 Apache braves, all screaming for the LR's blood after he had [grossly offended them in some arbitrary way]. As the Redskins approached from all directions, arrows and tomahawks struck the bodies of Silver and Scout, behind which the two brave vigilantes had taken cover. Suddenly, the Lone Ranger ran out of ammunition (silver bullets are expensive). Turning to his faithful Native AmerIndian companion, the LR saw that Tonto, too, was down to his last bullet. With tears staining his mask, he said: "Well, old friend, it looks like this is it - I don't see any way we can get out of here alive." Tonto looked back at his mentor and master of so many years, deep in thought, and came to a decision. Reaching into his shirt he produced an eagle feather. Sticking this in his hair, he leveled his gun at the Lone Ranger, and said: "What's this 'we' bit, White Man?" --------------------------- ObCrypto: Is it true that "Kemo Sabe" is Abanake for "Horse's Ass"? Peter Trei trei(a)process.com Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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