December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

$2500 for a class c.
by faried nawaz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Blind-Carbon-Copy To: hungry(a)hungry.com Cc: chris(a)uidaho.edu, people(a)kuoi.sub.uidaho.edu Subject: $2500 for a class c. Date: Tue, 07 Jan 1997 15:19:25 PST Message-ID: <7130.852679165(a)bear.cs.uidaho.edu> From: faried nawaz <nawaz921(a)bear.cs.uidaho.edu> (two messages follow) From: gjohnson(a)dream.season.com (Reality is a point of view) Subject: IP allocation goes fee based soon?! Newsgroups: ba.internet Date: 6 Jan 1997 16:08:04 GMT Organization: season.com [205.179.33.0] Path: news.uidaho.edu!newsfeed.orst.edu!newshub.tc.umn.edu!spool.mu.edu!newspump.sol.net!howland.erols.net!agate!news.ucsc.edu!news.scruz.net!gjohnson Lines: 18 Message-ID: <slrn5d28r9.34.gjohnson(a)dream.season.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: 205.179.33.42 Xref: news.uidaho.edu ba.internet:12066 Take a look at http://rs.internic.net/arin for a quiet bombshell, especially Section 2.3. A Class C block for $2,500? If you think that isn't funny there are a few people that agree with you in threads elsewhere. Try a dejanews search on $2500 Class C. You might also want to take a peek at http://www.iahc.org for news about a commentary period that ends in the next few days. - -- Gary Johnson "Wahoo." gjohnson(a)season.com Remember why... later in the thread -- From: davidm(a)them.com (David Mandala) Subject: Re: IP allocation goes fee based soon?! Newsgroups: ba.internet Date: Tue, 07 Jan 97 19:10:07 GMT Organization: Them Productions Path: news.uidaho.edu!newsfeed.orst.edu!news.uoregon.edu!marlin.ucsf.edu!overload.lbl.gov!agate!spool.mu.edu!newspump.sol.net!howland.erols.net!news.bbnplanet.com!cam-news-hub1.bbnplanet.com!news-xfer.netaxs.com!news.texas.net!news1.best.com!nntp1.best.com!davidm Lines: 32 Message-ID: <5au72j$rnn(a)nntp1.best.com> References: <slrn5d28r9.34.gjohnson(a)dream.season.com> <e3mca8.3mx(a)oriole.sbay.org> <southernE3MJxJ.FKq(a)netcom.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: davidm.vip.best.com X-Newsreader: News Xpress 2.0 Beta #2 Xref: news.uidaho.edu ba.internet:12120 I've since heard that their contract run out in 1998, now since they have gone from a small nothing company to a widly known disaster, if follows that they are making money hand over fist. So before the contract opens we need to make enough noise with the goverment that the contract is NOT relet to them but rather to open bid, or to a true non profit alliance of Internet professionals to provide the service at cost (which in reality is quite small). Only we can make the difference. In article <southernE3MJxJ.FKq(a)netcom.com>, southern(a)netcom.com (Shawn) wrote: >In article <e3mca8.3mx(a)oriole.sbay.org>, George Bonser wrote: >: Billions and Billions of IP addresses are right around the corner >: and they are going to use the current shortage to set a precedent >: (sp?) of charging $2500 per block of 256? That would put them in a >: position to make an absolute KILLING when IPv6 comes out. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > >Give that man a ceegar. > >That is, I believe, the point. > >All, of course, at $50/year per domain name. > >With that kind of income, they might give Microsoft a run for their >money as being one of the most profitable computer companies in the >world. <tounge FIRMLY in cheek> :-) > >Shawn /************************************************************* David Mandala Them Productions San Francisco, CA Internet: davidm(a)them.com CIS: 74156,221 AOL: dism *************************************************************/ faried - -- i don't hate people. | my other car is a cdr why, some of my closest | linux, the ms-dos of the nineties friends are people. | <zorgo> cable and internet.. who needs a life? -- stevi(a)aa.net | http://www.hungry.com/~fn/ ------- End of Blind-Carbon-Copy

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Re: The Upcoming DES Challenge
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> There is nothing unglamorous about a known plaintext attack, if the > plaintext is choosen carefully. I don't know anything about bank ATMs > and the protocols they use, but I presume the PIN is stored on the card > single DES encrypted. If this is so, anyone can take an ATM card, attack it > to recover the key and then use that key to recover the PIN for any stolen > ATM card of that bank (or that branch). Hopefully, the ciphertext/plaintext > pair that RSA announces will be a real target like this, with the actual key > disabled. Once the key is recovered, the press can then claim that ATM > cards are not safe any longer. Stolen ATM cards are actually not that valuable. They have fixed limits and require physical presence to exploit. Try swift/forex/etc. secret des keys.. those are valuable. -- Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-986-8770 President FAX: 510-986-8777 C2Net C2Net is having a party: http://www.c2.net/party/ http://www.c2.net/ sameer(a)c2.net

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Re: Relative Strength of 40-bit Crypto Implementations
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:29 AM 1/7/97 -0500, Vin McLellan wrote: > A client asked me today about where he could find evidence of the >relative strength of different encryption algorithms, when all are >restricted to 40-bit keys. He assumed dot-Gov was going to restrict his >export product to the 40-bit limit, but he wanted to provide the strongest >security he could within that limitation. The best answer you can possibly give him is to move production overseas. Any 40 bit cipher is garbage. Period. It is easy to produce crypto overseas. Many medium sized companies are doing so today. Insiders claim that larger companies, such as Netscape, are in the process of setting up shop abroad as well. Clearly, one can't produce software containing crypto in the US and stay competitive at the same time. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://www.mersenne.org/prime.htm

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Re: Modified Token Posting Scheme
by ed.falk＠Eng.Sun.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How about this simple policy scheme: 1) posts from known list members forwarded to list automatically 2) posts with "approval cookie" also forwarded automatically 3) otherwise, forwarded only after approval by moderator, whose charter only permits spam filtering. People who don't want to use their own name in a post, and also don't want to be bothered with creating a cookie are the only ones whose posts are delayed.

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To pay credit when it's due
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Cpunks, I forgot to mention that during the design phase of my robomod I have received a number of thoughtful and helpful advices from Dr. Dimitri Vulis KOTM, mostly regarding authentication protocols, as well as some other programming matters. For example, a suggestion to add an option requiring all preapproved posters to sign their articles was originally made by him. - Igor.

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Re: Thoughts on moderation
by Douglas Barnes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Goodness knows most people who are fully engaged in a mailing list get involved in an unproductive discussion or argument from time to time. My main assertion about Sandy is that although he has his likes and dislikes (and is not shy about sharing them) I can't see him bouncing messages just because someone was disagreeing with him. There might be someone who is less opinionated, but I think that you need to find someone who cares enough about a subject to be interested in moderating it (one antonym of "opinionated" is "dispassionate" -- think about it.) The only way to tell if Sandy will be fair _as a moderator_ is to give him a chance. Years of knowing him as a friend, and four months of sharing an office indicate that while he's stubborn and opinionated, he's also extremely fairminded, and will not bounce for content he disagrees with. He also has a broad concept (some might argue too broad) of acceptable list topics, but since we're looking primarily to screen out the worst dreck & outright spam, he seems like a logical choice as moderator. I don't see this move as censorship of any sort -- cleaning the Augean stables is more like it. I am profoundly tired of wading through completely worthless and vapid trash accusing Tim and John of various sexual perversions. (Note that if the writers actually knew these folks, they'd at least be able to write better or more interesting libel.) At 10:35 PM 1/6/97 -0800, you wrote: >Douglas Barnes wrote: >> 1) I've known Sandy for a couple of years, and I trust him to >> use good judgement as a moderator. It will be important to >> develop guidelines so that the job can be rotated, but it's also >> important that the moderator be someone who doesn't have any >> major axe to grind. Sandy has his personal likes and dislikes, >> but I don't think he'll ever stoop to tossing out opinions that >> he disagrees with. > >Wishful thinking, Doug. Sandy will take an emotional (non-objective) >position on an issue, and argue it beyond any reasonable limit. I wish >I had all his replies to things I've said - you'd see what I mean. > >Not to promote anyone who I might not be a friend of, but, there are >people on this list who are "well respected" who are light-years ahead >of Sandy in areas that are important for a list moderator. > >Maybe Gilmore should have publicly announced for a moderator, and then >let the subscribers pick.... > >

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No Subject
by anonymous＠miron.vip.best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NOVEMBER 11, 1996 INFORMATION WARFARE U.S. sitting duck, DOD panel predicts BY BOB BREWIN AND HEATHER HARRELD (antenna(a)fcw.com and heather_harreld(a)fcw.com) The dependence of the United States on computers and communications systems to run its critical power, finance and transportation systems places the country at risk in the event of an information warfare (IW) attack, according to a report prepared by a top-level Defense Department advisory panel. This reliance, it said, has "created a tunnel of vulnerability previously unrealized in the history of conflict" and could have a "catastrophic effect on the ability of [DOD] to fulfill its mission." The report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information Warfare-Defense (IW-D), obtained by Federal Computer Week, called the threat of an IW attack "significant," adding that the nation's "vulnerabilities are numerous, [and] the countermeasures are extremely limited...." Citing a specific example, the DSB report said one building in Savannah, Ga., (a Bell South switching facility, FCW learned) houses not only a vital communications hub but information technology systems supporting key electric power and transportation companies. Because Savannah serves as a vital port of embarkation for Army troops based in that area, an IW attack against that one building would "make it impossible to deploy military forces at the pace specified in operations plans." The DSB task force, chaired by two former assistant secretaries of Defense for command, control, communications and intelligence (ASD/C3I), Duane Andrews and Donald Latham, viewed the IW problem as so severe that it urged the Pentagon to embark immediately on a crash course to protect against this new form of warfare, providing detailed policy, funding and legal recommendations. These recommendations included a controversial call for the Pentagon to have the legal power to protect nongovernmental portions of the infrastructure in the name of "the common defense." To defend DOD and critical nongovernmental systems against IW, the report recommends new legal authority that will allow "DOD, law enforcement and intelligence agencies to conduct efficient, coordinated monitoring of attacks on the critical civilian information infrastructure...." In carving out a position for DOD to take on this role in the civil sector, the report bluntly summed up the problem: "We should not forget information warfare is a form of warfare, not a crime or an act of terror." It took an equally blunt approach on how the Pentagon should respond to such an attack or intrusion. "The response could entail civil or criminal prosecution, use of military force...diplomatic initiatives or economic mandates." DSB, which said it has urged immediate and concerted action on the IW-D front for the past three years, had a number of recommendations on how DOD should get its own information warfare act together. The report said it would take $3 billion over the next five years to translate these recommendations into reality. This includes establishing the ASD/C3I as the single focal point for IW-D within the department - a necessary step to spread the diffusion of IW responsibilities among the services and Defense agencies, according to a source familiar with the thinking of the task force. Emmett Paige Jr., ASD/C3I, said he had read a copy of the DSB briefing to deputy secretary of Defense John White. Paige said, "I saw nothing in that briefing I do not agree with. I strongly support everything in their briefing." DISA's Role The Defense Information Systems Agency would take on a pivotal IW-D role, based on the recommendations in the report. It called for DISA to set up an IW operations center to provide tactical warning, attack, assessment and emergency response with infrastructure restoration capabilities, and it pegged funding for this center at $275 million over five years. DISA also should establish a joint office for system, network and infrastructure design, the report said, with funding estimated at $225 million over five years. DISA director Lt. Gen. Al Edmonds has already acted on these recommendations, setting up last week a Global Operations and Security Center and a Programs office (see Intercepts). Edmonds said DISA decided not to wait to have these recommendations approved. "We're doing this on our own. We want a new focus here...and we're funding it out of our own budget [by] prioritizing on Information Warfare-Defense. The DSB is right on target, and they got us rolling." The Pentagon also needs to refocus its IW research and development, the report said, recommending $580 million over five years. This poses a tough challenge, DSB said, because "prior R&D efforts have been in areas such as computer and network security.... Little attention has been paid to surviving willful malicious attack, or detecting and eliminating corrupt software." The DSB task force also took some potshots at some well-established and well-entrenched DOD IW policies and programs. Looking at the national debate over the key escrow encryption systems backed by the Clinton administration, the DSB report dismissed encryption as a "distraction.... Encryption simply does not solve all of the information security problems some are led to believe." The National Security Agency's long-running Multilevel-Secure Information Systems Security Initiative also received short shrift from the task force, which suggested commercial products such as security "tokens" rather than passwords could go a long way in the near term toward resolving DOD's security problems. The task force also brought sober realism to the theme of "information superiority" promulgated by all the services during the past several years to such an extent that it has become almost a mantra. "The doctrine of information superiority assumes the availability of information and information technology - a dangerous assumption.... Published service and joint doctrine does not address the operational implications of a failure of information and technology," the report said. The intelligence community's ability to handle IW also came in for a similar assessment by the task force, which called IW "a nontraditional intelligence problem [that is]...not easily discernible by traditional intelligence." Traditional intelligence skills "are largely irrelevant in the information warfare environment." Percy Pierre, an electrical engineering professor at Michigan State University and a member of the DSB task force, said DOD's interest in protecting critical infrastructure is a result of "the recognition that the Defense Department is dependent on private-sector assets for logistical support and other types of support." Any move by government toward civil electronic defense must be delicately balanced to avoid antagonizing the private sector, said Winn Schwartau, a security consultant and author of several information warfare books. "For them to blatantly say, `We want to monitor,' that creates a huge problem," he said. "If the government says, `You don't worry, private sector, we're going to take care of you,' they're going to have a problem." You must register to read this week's news or to use the search or forums. If you haven't signed up yet, fill out the registration form. Mail questions about this Web page to webmaster(a)fcw.com. URL: http://www.fcw.com

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Re: Sandy and I will run a cypherpunks "moderation" experim
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On or About 6 Jan 97 at 1:21, Dale Thorn wrote: > Ross Wright wrote: > > On or About 5 Jan 97 at 22:38, Black Unicorn wrote: > > > Excellent until the flames list is eliminated. > > > Yes I want to read this list, flames and all. I guess I'm just > > used to it by now. I don't filter it myself (except manually) so > > I don't want to trust someone I don't know to do it. > > Just one other thing, Ross. Don't assume that the stated purpose > and the real purpose are one and the same. Shit, I learned that in the service of my great country. Who's sig-line talks about liberty being taken away little bits at a time? As I said before freedom of speech has a price other than the blood of patriots. That price is the tolerance of IDEAS! Any fucking ideas that happen to come the fuck up!!!!! I'm gonna tolerate who-the-hell-ever I want to! There are not any grey areas when it comes to free speech. You censor one because of bad manners or downright bad taste, then you censor all. And fuck all you guys who *plonked* me over my last flame war with T.M., cause you just missed a great post! (I learned that in film school: you have to like your own work). So my question is: is there going to be a maximum number of times I can say fuck in a good post? Like a 3-fuck limit? Or will you take out the magic marker and draw through them? Ross

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Moderation
by thad＠hammerhead.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think that this is a completely fabulous idea, an commend John and Sandy for doing this. Let me add my own suggestion. This will fail if flames migrate from cypherpunks-flames to cypherpunks, I would attempt to prohibit threads that only exist in cypherpunks-flames being continued into the moderated list. This'll be hard to do, Sandy, I know, but if you could think of a way to do this, I think that your experiment is more likely to succeed. Phrases like "As I said in the letter that only got sent to cypherpunks-flames" should cause the whole article to be yanked, IMHO. thad -- Thaddeus Beier thad(a)hammerhead.com Visual Effects Supervisor 408) 287-6770 Hammerhead Productions http://www.got.net/people/thad

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Key Revokation Scheme
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi there, I started thinking about the issue, how to set up a system to have somebody else revoke your key for you, if you don't have the means to do so yourself. The possible case I had in mind was, what if you're maybe a dissident, you get arrested and your apartment (incl. disks/keys) gets raided. You don't have any means to revoke the key yourself, don't even have e-mail in general, and with the "one phone call", that your hopefully entitled to, you can't really do much... It might have been discussed before, but here is what I came up with: Peter (the dissident) creates a signed key revokation certificate and a list of the intended recipients for it. He archives the files and then encrypts the archive conventionally. He then sends the encrypted archive file to his trusted friends (or relatives) Alice and Bob, without the passphrase though. (Note: For additional security, the files within the archive may be encrypted with A. and B.'s public keys). Then Peter gives a sealed envelope to his lawyer (or anybody he trusts and who would know, if something happened to him), containing the passphrase and the names of Alice and Bob, incl. their respective phone/fax numbers, e-mail adresses and snail mail adresses with the instruction to notify them if necessary. The lawyer however, does not have the archive itself. Now, in case of an arrest, Peter calls his lawyer (he'd very likely be the first one to know) and thus he knows, that Peter's keys have been compromised. The lawyer now opens the envelope and gets in touch with Alice and Bob, telling them of Peter's misfortune, and he gives them the passphrase for the archive. He also sends them the same information in an encrypted/signed e-mail. (Note: Of course, Alice and Bob have to have the lawyers public key and his key must be signed by Peter and vice versa. Preferably, Alice and Bob have met the lawyer at some point and have verified his key first hand.) Thus they know, it was really Peter's lawyer, who gave them the information, not somebody else, who might have gotten possession of the envelope... Alice and Bob, however, do not immediately send out the revokation certificate, but try to verify the information from the lawyer with independent sources, such as Peter's relatives, friends etc.. Only if one or better both of them (they should be in contact with each other too) has/have enough reason to believe, that Peter is really in trouble and that his keys have been compromised, they decrypt the archive and send his key revokation certificate to the intended recipients (friends, key-servers etc.). Note1: The entire system relies on the trustworthiness of Alice and Bob and their effort, to verify the information, before they send out the revokation certificate. Note2: The described chain of information/verification could go different directions. Even if Peter's mom is the first one to know, she could call Alice and/or Bob and/or his lawyer {...}, who in turn verify the information with others... Note3: As additional backup for the case, that the lawyer can't get in touch with neither Alice nor Bob, he could have the same archive file, encrypted with a different passphrase (which he doesn't know). If he can't talk to Alice or Bob within a reasonable time period (let's say 3 days), Peter could give him the passphrase and so his lawyer himself sends out the revokation certificate. Note4: In case, Peter doesn't even get the one phone call, but happens to be in a country, where one just "disappeares", having his secret keys compromised should be the least of his problems... But even then, chances are, that the word gets out and Alice and Bob could act upon it. Please let me know, if you think, that such a scheme could work (or not work). Also I'd be grateful, if you'd copy replies to my private e-mail adress as well, for I am currently not subscribed to the CP list... Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE * */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! * * */ /* * * */ /* E-mail: harka(a)nycmetro.com * * */ /* * */ /* Finger or E-Mail for PGP public key. * * */ /* Key Size: 2047 / KeyID: 04174301 * * */ /* Fingerprint: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 http://www.eff.org */ /* 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMtsI6zltEBIEF0MBAQHo7wf9GQTU5u72gFVZ0LMr7hhTWSikYVDFvzGF bGopD01j6bq3g9jYQC3YC0pRGfA+y8Q3qDLRbeJ5qMm3iXZgv7Axu2PVeri7ZE7r +GWZjfMk9EFGY1t9Jf2Fnm9mSAV0Cgq02vyhns8fLqTH1jcNuinZZ61Hq1+oSDFs f7/qttsqLZmxeHU+VI/47U0xkuh4NXQk/aZlNUOr9Au9+PhqJwpa7EGYzmCBKTzl pu4QRyjNnvgIuec2wkwVn8uNevvlc/aQB65uU55+NOQnMINl2V4S3lRim9F7gGH+ DV6NiZxmjxCXbX0y4K+33BX1YIwBgYz5EArM1O1j32lOpThIb03jmA== =stfG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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