December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Computer CPU chips with built-in crypto?
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Martin Minow <minow(a)apple.com> > I'm not sure if I can answer this but, at last week's SF cypherpunks > meeting, an Intel engineer asked whether there might be any interest > in a computer chip with some sort of encryption mechanism built > into the chip. As I understand it, this chip would process an > encrypted instruction stream. I.e., it could not execute a program > unless the "key" for that program was first loaded into the chip. > > An interesting idea: does anyone have more information? This sounds like something which might be used in a set-top-box or "information appliance" application where pay-per-use programs would be loaded from a CDROM or network connection. People have been dreaming about pay per use software for many years. It is a similar idea to the "mini application" concept which would replace the monolithic super-apps, the Microsoft Words and the giant do-everything web-browsers/newsreaders/mail-clients, with small, single function utilities. This is part of the idea behind Apple's OpenDoc and Microsoft's OLE. In the same way, instead of buying a big program for hundreds of dollars, you'd just download and use the functionality you needed for a small fee. Yet in practice it is not clear whether either of these trends will have any market success. Monolithic applications seem to be doing very well, with more integration being the trend, not less. And the whole idea of introducing metering to a market which is used to paying just once for access is one which is bound to meet resistance. Look at AOL which is going to single-charge unlimited access to the net. So in both cases the trend looks to be going in the opposite direction. Another possible application for the built in encryption is software piracy protection. You'd unlock software for your CPU but it would not run on anybody else's without a different key code. Here again there is not much benefit to the end user, unless software prices come down dramatically when this device is used. But otherwise the computer manufacturers are selling computers which have features which will limit the powers of the buyers, and having to sell them more expensively to boot because of the special chip. In these days of razor thin profit margins in the PC business it is hard to see how this will sell. Hal

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Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) > At 1:39 PM 11/17/1996, Simon Spero wrote: > > Create a number up public/private key pairs, blind them, then do the > > cut-and-choose thing with the security officer. He signs the blinded key, > > then returns it. Unblind the remaining pubic key, and you've got a public > > key with the appropriate signature on it. > > Okay, this would work. But, it requires that all (or at least many) of the > Members of Parliament cooperate. If not, then the security officer will > be able to make very good guesses about who is speaking. > > Parliamentarians may not cooperate for a variety of reasons. They may > not wish to be attacked by terrorists for the words of others. They > may believe that cowardice is not to be encouraged. They may not believe > in anonymity. It might be too hard for them. > > What I would like to see is a method which relies only on published > public keys and no other cooperation from the people who are (more > or less) being used as shields. This may be impossible. The 4th method of Chaum's, from Eurocrypt 91, somewhat satisfies this, as does a method from the Eurocrypt 94 paper. Each person can choose his own public key g**x for a discrete log system. However, the problem is that all members of the group have to choose the same prime p as the modulus, and generator g, for their discrete logs. The issue of using a common modulus in discrete log systems has been somewhat controversial. I think when the government first proposed DSS they planned to do something like this, one modulus with everyone having different secret x values with corresponding public keys y = g**x mod p. This has the advantage that public keys are smaller since everyone uses the same g and p. So all you need is one value for your public key. Without this you have to have g, y, and p be your public key so it is 3 times bigger. The problem is that the way the main discrete log algorithms work, once you have broken one discrete log for a certain g and p you can break all the others very easily. So the particular g,p pair which is chosen for everyone to share becomes one very big, fat target to try to apply discrete log algorithms. Now this is not necessarily as bad as it seems. Unlike the case with RSA, there is no secret information which could be leaked to make solving these discrete logs easier. Nobody knows how to do it. So the only way it can be done is by a massive operation roughly similar to factoring an RSA modulus the size of p. Choosing p of 1000 or 2000 bits should still make it effectively impossible for anyone to do this. The numbers are simply far too large. Still the consensus of opinion with discrete logs is that the advantages of slightly smaller keys have not been great enough to justify the risk involved in having eveyone share a modulus, even though that risk is seemingly insignificant. On the other hand maybe for cases like this the additional advantages to common moduli would be enough to tilt the argument in the other direction. Hal

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Re: Censor John Gilmore -- EFF is a disgrace!
by Dave Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Multiple CC's trimmed, I don't think anyone at msn.com cares...] > #From Phrack 49, file p49-09 published this month: ... > File 09 of 16 > by Dr.Dimitri Vulis (KOTM) > A Content-Blind Cancelbot for Usenet (CBCB) ... > And what follows, is Dr. Dimitri, defender of freedom of expression, > champion of the anti-censors on the net, posting code to the world to > engage in exactly those activities that everyone has been ranting about > as being so utterly "horrifying (forged cancellations etc)" as it > were. You call yourself on cypherpunks, and you blithely assume that a Phrack author actually signs his real name? Either I thought you guys were *real* hackers and you aren't, or this is a very funny troll. ------ Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave(a)jetcafe.org Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet "Better to be safe than to be sorry" is a remark of value only when these are the actual alternatives.

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Re: Does John Gilmore...
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:04 ìì 17/11/1996 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >> Given that the free market rule is "he who has the money makes the >> rules", please explain how anything less than "subsidized speech" (as >> you put it) is anything close to free speech? >> >> [For those who's assumptions rule their perception: I am *not* arguing >> that all speech should be subsidized. I am merely pointing out that >> the organization that is spending the money to broadcast is >> controlling the speech, hence it is *not* free speech in terms of >> freedom or cost.] >Again, you confuse free speech with free broadcast. Well, I propose a solution to this problem: I don't mind paying fees in fact, if the prices are reasonable. For instance THIS text was _paid_ for, since I pay my Internet provider a certain amount of money every month. It would be unthinkable, however, that my Internet Provider would mess around with THIS text, or with ANY opinion of mine (I am sure you agree). Now, a mailing list has _some_ similarities to the services of an Internet provider, except (usually) the _cost_. I am sure Mr. Gilmore would be more than happy to be _paid_ for the (faulty) services he provides (to his list-members), since e.g. 1900 members times $1 per 2 months (shall we say) would earn him (shall we say) 950 dollars a month; Not much perhaps in some countries, but enough in most places as compensation for the services he provides. The problem with Mr. Gilmore (apart from being an asshole) is really that he is rather a thick-minded proponent of censorship of his list's 'eccentric' members, that such subtleties don't even cross his mind. >Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures >Finger for Public Key Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern >Vote Monarchist Switzerland "Heaven is a place policed by the English, cheered-up by the the Greeks, and organized by the Germans. Hell is a place organized by the Greeks, policed by the Germans, and cheered-up by the English." ...And what have the noble Swiss got to with this shit? They are the bankers for both! :-) Regards George

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HP's crypto technology
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was poking about on the hp web server, trying to get some more hints about the technology they are pushing: <URL: http://www-dmo.external.hp.com/gsy/press/sevcik.html> > Date: 7/11/96 > > Rich Sevcik, vice president and general manager of the Systems > Technology Group, testified to a U.S. Senate subcommittee June 12 on > the importance of cryptography to Hewlett-Packard's ability to compete > in the international marketplace and to the nation's high-technology > competitiveness. > > [...] > > In conclusion, he introduced HP's technology called the International > Cryptography Framework (ICF). Products based on ICF would contain a > suite of cryptography capabilities of various strengths and types, > all non-functional. A customer then could enable the desired types and > strengths of cryptography in conformance with export and host government > regulations by obtaining a stamp-size smart card (known as a "policy > card"), programmed to turn on the particular cryptography capability > allowed. This would protect the right of each nation to establish an > independent policy governing cryptography in digital communication and > storage. Sevcik showed the subcommittee members a prototype cryptography > unit and several policy cards. He said HP plans to have an initial > ICF product available later this year as part of a total smart card > system solution offered due to an alliance with Informix and GEMPLUS, > with other ICF-based products planned for next year. > > U.S. export license authorities are finishing their review of this > first-phase implementation of ICF. "We have been extremely pleased with > the responsiveness and cooperation of these agencies in the review of > our technology," Sevcik said. "We have every reason to believe that > the cryptographic unit and host systems will be granted liberal export > authorization consistent with our expectations for ICF." <URL: http://www.hp.com/csopress/95sep26.html> > Press Release > > HP Announces Alliance with Gemplus and Informix to Deliver Personal > Information Cards for Consumers > > U.S. Government Reviewing Industry-backed HP International Cryptography > Framework > > September 26, 1995 > > PALO ALTO, Calif., Sept. 26, 1995 -- Hewlett-Packard Company, Gemplus > and Informix today announced the formation of an alliance to develop a > secure infrastructure that will enable corporations to speed new services > to consumers via a credit-card-sized personal information card. > > These cards will carry several thousand times the amount of data carried > by currently available smart cards. Additionally, the data on these cards > will be fully encrypted for secure international communication, so the > card will be able to be used anywhere in the world. HP believes that > the U.S. government will authorize the export to commercial enterprises > of products in Phase I(1) of HP's international cryptography framework > standard -- one of the underlying technologies in the infrastructure > that will enable the international use of personal information cards. The > framework is based on HP's open cryptographic structure. > > [...]

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Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:23 PM 11/17/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 11:43 AM -0800 11/17/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: > For the specific example Peter cites, of a member of Parliament who doesn't > like the possibility of anonymity....well, he wouldn't be part of the > DC-Net would he? Generally, there are no cryptographic solutions that will > encompass the case where some member wants to speak anonymously, but no one > else does. If a message originates from "someone in Parliament," but only > one member of Parliament is set up to speak anonymously, then of course by > simple elimination he is the speaker. As before, this is beyond any > cryptographic solution. It turns out - amazingly enough - that this is not true! Hal Finney mentioned on Friday a paper by Chaum and Heyst entitled "Group Signatures." It was presented at EuroCrypt '91. I scanned this paper today and it has four schemes, the last of which requires no participation of a trusted party or the other people one wishes to hide amongst. So long as everybody has published their public key, the rogue Member of Parliament can sign messages without revealing his identity, yet demonstrating that he is in fact a Member of Parliament. (Thanks Hal!) It uses a zero-knowledge proof. Hal said earlier that it was not clear to him that this could be turned into a non-interactive proof. It isn't clear to me, either. Whatever the case, I consider the problem solved. It would be nice if it were non-interactive, but the rogue MP need only demonstrate his identity to ten or so publicly trusted parties to have enough basis to make statements that the world will consider to be credible. > There may be easier to implement approaches, such as the ones people have > proposed involving distribution of "voting tokens" (blinded, for anonymity). > Anonymous voting is, in fact, formally equivalent (with some hand-waving > about some details) to the problem of untraceable speaking. The example > Peter cited, of a MP wanting to "speak anonymously" is equivalent to > wanting his vote--on Northern Ireland, for example--to be anonymous. I would say that it is slightly different in that anonymous voting requires that you guarantee that each voter votes only once. Clearly these are similar problems. Tangentially, I would really enjoy the privilege of verifiable anonymous voting using my computer. As it is now, I have no way of telling whether my vote counts or not. The entire process is handled by people I don't know and have no particular reason to trust. > A simple form of this is "blackballing." Members have white and black > balls, and place one of the balls in an urn. Properly implemented, this > gives anonymity. I always wondered where that term came from. Chaum and Heyst's protocol above could be used for blackballing in cases where only one black ball can make the decision. For instance, some clubs have a rule that any current member can "blackball" prospective members. (Sounds harsh? Not as harsh as learning that a *majority* of the club didn't like you!) Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:32 PM 11/17/1996, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >At 1:23 PM 11/17/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >>At 11:43 AM -0800 11/17/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >> For the specific example Peter cites, of a member of Parliament who doesn't >> like the possibility of anonymity....well, he wouldn't be part of the >> DC-Net would he? Generally, there are no cryptographic solutions that will >> encompass the case where some member wants to speak anonymously, but no one >> else does. If a message originates from "someone in Parliament," but only >> one member of Parliament is set up to speak anonymously, then of course by >> simple elimination he is the speaker. As before, this is beyond any >> cryptographic solution. > It turns out - amazingly enough - that this is not true! It turns out - not so amazingly - that Tim is right! See Hal Finney's post of about this time. It turns out that the other Members of Parliament do have to cooperate. Sorry about that. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Emergency powers
by Charles Platt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course, Michael Froomkin is right in everything he says about presidential emergency powers. But an unconstitutional abuse of power is surely not acceptable merely because it has become a routine method for accomplishing everyday legislative tasks. First, it allows significant possibility for future abuse; and second, if the Constitution is routinely circumvented, this diminishes its general power (as any law loses its power when it is routinely flouted). The situation is all the more troubling because it receives so little publicity, outside of militant "extremist" groups (i.e. those that are crazy enough to believe that presidential power should be limited in accordance with the law of the land). When a president can take almost action under the excuse that it's a "national emergency" (when in fact there is no emergency), and he doesn't have to answer questions till later, and most citizens are unaware of this, we have a potentially dangerous situation. They key word here is "potentially." Michael Froomkin seems relatively sanguine because the potential for great harm has not been realized. I am not so easily reassured. --Charles Platt

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TRW sells your credit data to British firm
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Assoc. Press 11/14/96: A British retailer and credit checker said Thursday it was buying Experian Corp., a former subsidiary of TRW and one of the biggest credit-rating business in the United States, for $1.7 billion. The deal is part of an effort by Great Universal Stores PLC, which owns the Burberry retail chain and is Britain's largest catalog retailer, to position itself as a global supplier of credit and marketing information. [I wonder what recourse I have if GUS gets my credit data wrong? Or decides to share it with MI6? -bd] Great Universal, known more commonly as GUS, said it would pay $900 million in cash and borrow the rest of the price for Orange, Calif.-based Experian, which TRW sold in September. GUS plans to merge Experian into its credit information business, CCN. Experian chairman D. Van Skilling said the two companies have many customers in common and will be able to provide them easier access to credit information around the world. [...] Experian is one of the largest providers of credit reports on consumers with information on 93 percent of U.S. households and 12 million businesses. Experian says its database may be the broadest and most current in the country. The company also helps businesses identify potential customers. Great Universal entered the credit information business in 1980 and now has customers throughout Europe and has operations in Asia, South Africa, and the United States. TRW completed the sale of Experian for $1.01 billion less than two months ago. An investor group led by Bain Capital Inc. and Thomas H. Lee Co., both of Boston, bought the company. TRW kept a 16 percent stake in Experian. [I wonder who the "investor group" is comprised of? I wonder why TRW would sell something for $1B that is apparently valued at $1.7B? Reminds me of the local paper which was sold for $X to an investor group that included Sen. Howard Baker and (Pres. candidate) Lamar Alexander. The investor group then resold the paper for $2X or $3X. What business accumen! -bd]

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. nym.alias.net is back up. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 18 Nov 96 6:48:35 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca * ********** 14:29 99.94% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com - ********** 5:32 99.81% replay remailer(a)replay.com - **++****** 9:22 99.69% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net - ***#***--# 24:20 99.57% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net - +**+ ++** 37:22 99.46% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++-++- 2:11:49 99.16% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com - -.- * +-- 1:53:39 98.71% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++++++++* 35:42 98.50% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de - ++--+-++ 2:19:11 98.29% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net +*-- 1:16:19 98.24% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com - + ++++++++ 42:33 98.05% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com - -+..+++++- 2:00:45 96.31% nym config(a)nym.alias.net #* *#*# :42 95.87% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com .--------- 9:21:36 92.07% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com - -++-- 3:39:00 69.30% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ## 7:06:33 41.67% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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