December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[NEWS]
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

American Banker: Wednesday, October 23, 1996 Citi Tech Chief Fears Massive Fraud on the Net By JENNIFER KINGSON BLOOM Few bankers know as much about data security as Colin Crook - and few are as wary about the Internet. "I personally do not do financial transactions on the Internet," said Mr. Crook, Citicorp's senior technology officer. At a telecommunications seminar in New York last week, Mr. Crook was generally optimistic about the commercial potential of the Internet and its World Wide Web, which he billed as both "a threat and a promise." He is unsure when Citicorp will deem the Web secure enough for financial transactions. Today's banks on the Web are conducting exercises in "risk management," Mr. Crook said. "The notion of electronic commerce is quickly losing its narrow focus as an electronic payment system," he said. "It is now viewed in a much broader context of electronic customer contact, multimedia, interactivity, advertising, and enterprise restructuring." At the seminar, sponsored by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers of Piscataway, N.J., Mr. Crook underscored his concern that the Internet offers wrongdoers the opportunity to "perpetrate fraud on a massive scale." While a waiter holding a customer's credit card in a restaurant has only a limited time to pirate the number, Mr. Crook said, the "nonlinear" nature of the Internet makes time less of a constraint. Thousands of credit card numbers could be pilfered in an instant, he said, and precious corporate brand names could be sullied. "One disgruntled customer will have the ability to do enormous damage in cyberspace," Mr. Crook said. In one example of "electronic grafitti," Mr. Crook pointed to the infiltration of the Central Intelligence Agency's Web site. "Hackers transformed it to the 'central agency for stupidity,'" he said. "And that was just a crass example." Warnings aside, Mr. Crook expressed confidence that Internet commerce would grow rapidly. He cited estimates that $20 million in sales took place on-line in 1994, and $500 million in 1995. By 2000, he said, varying researchers project $5 billion to $30 billion of transactions will be conducted electronically, with 150 million to 200 million people using the Web. "In technology, we tend to overestimate the short term and underestimate the long term," said Mr. Crook. "It's not clear to me that the case for electronic cash is very good" in the short term, he said. "Plain old money is very effective." Citicorp has spent years developing a hardware-based electronic cash scheme known as the Electronic Money System. Sholom Rosen, the system's chief architect, recently received another of several patents on the system. Mr. Crook said digital cash technologies like Electronic Money System -- as well as those of Digicash Inc. and Mondex -- were not ripe for widespread use, despite the liberal attitudes of regulators. "You would think this would be an amazing source of trauma" for the regulators, he said. In the near term, Mr. Crook said the Secure Electronic Transactions standard approved by Visa and MasterCard held promise for safe credit card payments on the Internet. And the development of E-check by the Financial Services Technology Consortium (of which Citibank is a founding member) might be the vehicle to project a check-like instrument into the on-line world. Digital money, he said, "really holds the promise of a radical transformation in the long term." Trained as an engineer at the City of Liverpool's College of Technology in England, Mr. Crook has been at Citicorp since 1990. He previously worked at Motorola Corp., British Telecom, and Data General USA. In 1981, he became the youngest person ever elected to the United Kingdom's Royal Academy of Engineers. "When you get into cyberspace, you can't trust anything," he said. "How do you establish relationships with customers in cyberspace?" Maintaining the interest of "the MTV generation" will be another challenge, he said. "We're going to be dealing with a bunch of customers who get bored very easily." --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fundamentally, you won't stop the buying of candidates unless elected politicians have nothing to sell. Technology won't fix that :-) What technology _can_ do is make sure that bribes/contributions can be delivered quietly and untraceably, and that the contributors can let the contributee know who gave the money and what sort of favors they're interested in. It can also simplify private coordination of soft money - letting contributors know what newspapers to put privately-funded ads in, generating astroturf letters to editors, announcing press releases from "Citizens for Better Health Care", "independent political polling" to find what issues the public thinks are important or could be manipulated into caring about by a good campaign, "marketing focus groups" by various front groups that can be leaked to the campaign, etc. Then of course there's leaking rumors about the opponents' Nasty Habits, complete with nicely-morphed pictures, providing lucrative speaking opportunities for TV "journalists", producing slick pre-produced video-bytes for the TV stations, etc. You might get politicians to agree not to accept direct contributions in return for giving them our tax money to spend, but that won't stop the "advance auction of future services" - it'll just raise the stakes. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk Imagine if three million people voted for somebody they _knew_, and the politicians had to count them all.

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The Electric Library
by Hh Production-Mail system -- none 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Welcome to Electric Library! You are seconds away from using your free trial subscription to the Web's easiest, most comprehensive research service. The User Name and Password you requested are listed below. Just follow these simple steps: 1. Open your Web browser to the Electric Library site: http://www.elibrary.com 2. Enter your question in the text box next to the "Go" button. 3. Review your result list, and click on the title of the document you wish to view. 4. Enter your User Name and Password in the appropriate boxes under "I'm already a member". Your User Name is: cypherpunks Your Password is: cypherpunks 5. Click the "Continue" button. You may want to print out this e-mail as a record of your User Name and Password. If you have any questions about using Electric Library, please select "Help" from Electric Library menu bar, or e-mail elibrary(a)infonautics.com. If this message was received in error, please inform us. Thank you for trying Electric Library!

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Secure Ware (HannaH)
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am looking for any critical information on a security product named "HannaH" from a company called Secure Ware. If there is none and the product is worthwhile, then, great. But I need to know if it is smoke and mirrors from an independant source. Thanks in Advance. Matt

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Re: Anonymous Auth Certificates [was: Re: Blinded Identities]
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I don't see how authorization certificates solve this problem. How >would you determine if someone was qualified to receive an authorization >certificate? And what would you do to make them stop using the service >if they abuse it, and to stop them from getting new authorization >certificates? > >Thanks, >Hal I guess I was mistaken about how rigorous identification checking was performed at various CAs. Verisign used to advertise three levels of CA checking, although I can only find two on their Web site at this time. The lowest, Class 1, is simply tied to your email address and is inadequate for my purposes. Class 2 Digital IDs provide identity assurance by requiring third-party confirmation of your name, mailing address, and other personal information. Although by no means bullet-proof dependence on Class 2 might be a workable alternative to a substantial, up-front, money escrow (as suggested) which I believe would make my service unworkable. -- Steve

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CyberPromo out of service, near bankruptcy
by Will rodger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I rarely post re: anything but crypto policy, but what the heck - Cyber Promotions is down. It may never get up. Details at out site. http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/daily/961024x.html Cheers Will Rodger Washington Bureau Chief Inter@ctive Week -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.9 iQEVAgUBMnEl7kcByjT5n+LZAQFTyQgAzTJTT8SImOATbr59hq9qX+yPYePfLU5i nLZtXXf9zjC2aK13s/JwJsoLVc8Y47acEjrFQsi/hF2b+c+ifP3e6wgHp3f5Ully 241uu6iu4Ywu2lEeIOU/azwDqQ3zXxzOJXfjyU/emqRtJpp2+R714y4mvQQF/5Bs lGyzUp7dldEDltJgizBW6+l3MIoLU3+ELV0wv6GI+2JxMqpgniqZmBAsxPYFkC2Y AHSyosexhRbCxIiO0QaJ52+Y+7HNxX5ktBC4P1i6Hj4K9BTfAUdy0OImAOE+gbZp Wk2tonBX2XcpAoAbJG1RUc25UU0Miyt/uRk6P+dujxedNZfaQU4CIA== =i8dT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: http://www.clintongore96.com/ is hacked.
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: jmr(a)shopmiami.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Oct 25 16:35:55 1996 > I am not certain how long this will stay up, so those with mirrors who > are > inclined should visit soon. As of 1630 CST it was still there. Should that cease to be, it's now mirrored at: http://www.prairienet.org/bureau42/clinton.html Share and enjoy. dave - ----- David E. Smith, P O Box 324, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63702 dsmith(a)prairienet.org http://www.prairienet.org/~dsmith send mail with subject of "send pgp-key" for my PGP public key "Better living through chemicals" - unattributed -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMnEyyzVTwUKWHSsJAQHhrAf9EassLGw5U+zR4Yj7z71adDNAcaZR/Z9w Xe4EKIl4V4JtAjb/dmdtjDkzsyCNFhUc1n0r8MYGpumDxRRkYSBZObkQNc7vGOji zmxYBrG6dOC0Dp8YxEqx9oXdGpOnDMDj2PD4Stq4BEDY8QHQlD4s/JbZVovU4KXF E76NnO3yIOd7VXskzi2AL2oLmiNc04/hKqQAIWA8akHfVnbAJceMxg77271db1RE 6TIbJcVpKE6EqbM107TH5x0vUvvUU134dJzOwZUq5yeV7H//s2krm1FN/GrLPC8z /9G3e/mlVT+ZitIf8UeEvsQP6XGkPC8zeQMs4aqaRXjkK7RCjOlefQ== =rxac -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I apologize to the list for this last post by Murder, Inc. My last piece of mail was sent privately to Mr. Bell. He apparently thinks it proper to quote private mail in public. Whatever. > >I wanted to take this crypto-irrelevant discussion off the list. > > If you think the applications for the use of cryptographic blinding > techniques is "crypto-irrelevant" then you're even more clueless than I'd > previously surmised. See Chaum's article of August 1992 if you doubt this. What exactly are your credentials. Your reputation, of course, precedes you. Given that I should have stopped this idiocy a long time ago. > The money will eventually be spendable. But information as to the number > and timing and size of the donations will be disguised using blinding > techniques. Re-read my comments. Explain, please, how you would budget in this situation. Oh, I forgot, when the world realizes that Jim is right, everyone will learn to live their lives like Jim. > Nobody said politics had to be easy. They'll adjust to the new reality; > they always do. see above. > >My point is, Jim, that your idea is unworkable in reality. > > Since you obviously don't understand it, and you also don't understand > cryptographic blinding, why should anybody pay attention to your opinion? Hmmm. How long have you been on the list? What is it I don't understand, specifically. And in private e-mail. > > In theory it would be nice to have complete anonymity. In reality it won't > >work. > > Always overstating your case, I see. For the application I described, it > isn't necessary to have "complete anonymity." What's needed is a healthy > dose of fog and uncertainty, making sure that the candidates can't trust any > claim that a donor has made a donation of any particular size. Explain to me how many campaigns you have run. Explain to me at least a paper you have written (I dont particularly care if you do or dont have a degree, my opinions are based upon your ability to assert and defend a thesis). How many people support your ideas? The revolt must be stealth. Yeah, that's it. > Since today's campaign contribution limits seem to be inherently a violation > of freedom of speech, why not embrace my solution, which doesn't do this? You are right, they do. In your world, there must be only two solutions. Jim's way or the current way. Or better yet, just spout off. > "Constitutionalist"? Hell no! I subscribe to the idea inherent in the > joke, "The Constitution may be bad government, but it's better than what we > have now." I think there's no doubt that a government based scrupulously on > the US Constitution would be a vast improvement. However, we've never had > such a thing. What is your alternative, Jim. Oh yeah, kill all the politicians. Look to the archives folks. **PLONK** > Such "proof" will be easily faked, BTW, which is part of the reason this > system will work so well. I could go to some candidate and claim that I'd > made a $10,000 contribution to his campaign. Jim, how many politicians do you have regular contact with. There were CongressCritters at my wedding, but you know what? If I told them I just made $10,000 donation to their campaign they would not believe me. You know what else? You couldn't get close. Every office on the hill knows of the resident nuts. Its the essence of a killfile, nuts are handed off to the intern. The players are known. I don't particularly care if you believe me. Again what is your experience? > Let's say I'd show him a > (forged) cancelled check. What could he do about it? Would he risk pissing > off a valuable contributor? If he has already raised 100's of thousands of dollars before, he would have no need to deal with you at all. Especially since, I assume from your prior statements that you would get rid of contribution limits. > Sure about that? Let me provide some contrary evidence. Every once in a > while, you'll see on the TV networks a report about corporate (and labor, > BTW) campaign giving, and they will occasionally point out that a given > corporation (or PAC, etc.) gives money BOTH to the Republicans and the > Democrats. They have no reason to do this, except that they think they will > get some benefit in the future from the "access" that contribution produces. Corporate donations? Look it up. Yep, they do. And after you blind the donations, the access will continue to be bought. Politicians can use laws of probability to figure out who has, will and will in the future donate. They can also eliminate a whole bunch of folks. > not the opponents. If they thought it necessary, they would lie about > making a contribution to the other candidate. How many lobbyists do you know Jim? > >Let me ask you this. Do you enjoy the net of today (AOL, Spam, > >XXX-rated transfers bogging down traffic) > > Why should I mind the particular characteristics ("XXX-rated transfers") of > the traffic jams? What are you, some kind of Born-again christian or > something? And while I don't like the spam, either, I am under no illusion Did you protest the COS crap? Well shit Jim, I dont care about the content. Nevermind. > It sounds like you're making a contradition. Previously, you suggested that > a privatized system wouldn't work, but at the end of the last paragraph you > seem to be saying that the blame falls on "the legislature"'s doing > something wrong. Hmm. Blame and workability. What is the connection. Maybe we can all take up a collection so that Jim can go to logic class. > And if you object to being rooked in a company's bankruptcy, complain to the > government who makes itself a preferred creditor in almost all circumstances. I thought we couldnt complain to the Governement? Jeez. Jim, your confusing me. God I must be dumb. Or maybe you are really writing in a style that can easily be decrypted to mean something else. Yeah, Jim, that's it. > If it's "perfectly legal" yet "inherently unfair," it sounds like much of > the blame lies with the legislature, since it is the legislature that is > responsible for the laws. Huh? Blame, workability, its like trying to teach a student with no brain. > >Try looking at election results. > > You still haven't proven your case. How many times do I have to explain probability to you? Jesus, look it up. > You are coming to conclusions without support. As I said before, you've > convinced yourself that you KNOW that a particular election went a > particular way precisely because of "public employees." Sigh! See above. Oh yeah, uh, Jim, you can use that nifty scroll button, > >Actually, in my small city, with under 2000 active voters, it is > >fairly easy to discern the number one identifiable group. I DONT > >deal in theory. I deal in reality, you should try it. While your > >theories are enticing they are TOTALLY without the ability to be > >realized. > > You STILL aren't supporting your claims! Probability. Anyone want to send him a Statistics Textbook? > >Politics deals with probability not certainty. If you had ANY real > >world experience you would know that. Budgets are all dependant upon > >reasonable probabilities. Its really not that hard to grasp. > > How much longer do you intend to waste my time? Oh, Im sorry. You must be planning on taking over the world. Oh yeah, I heard all of your friends jumping to your support. All of the political ties you made with all of your experience are jumping to your aid. I hear only one solitary sound. ***PLONK*** > > > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com > > ++++==============---------------------------- Matthew J. Miszewski |The information revolution has changed wealth: |intellectual capital is now far more important mjmiski(a)execpc.com |than money. -Walter Wriston ----------------------------==============++++

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Re: http://www.clintongore96.com/ ...
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: dsmith(a)prairienet.org, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, jimg(a)mentat.com Date: Fri Oct 25 18:02:44 1996 I was mistaken, and I now think it's a spoof, not a hack, but regardless it's a good anti-Clinton site, although still the best IMO is: http://www.realchange.org/index.htm Real People For Real Change, a non-affiliated, independent political action committee with nothing nice to say about *anyone*. ^^^^^^^ [I played a small part in convincing them to say bad things about Browne(!) on the theory that bad press is better than no press at all.] Following notes on a Browne-campaign staff -- National Party staff conflict-of-interest, the Real Changers say: "This being the Libertarians, other people argued that the other campaigns should have hired them, too!" To know us is to love us, especially if you are the highest bidder. JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMnE5DW1lp8bpvW01AQFo3AP+KwFdFegX73+2NIyy8l1CseTMb7bH03JN L1r3/waMvrwI3NDUyVoOpHT4o5rQomnQwzbprb8L1yOaM2hv/y2MM6zs5HTtdwpG z6y/Ku9JxWGE4xAw7g2MyYbtBhppNrJxBmwI48ruZk2OPy7tpGqCXWzmVv5QkZ+U Rd9mXSIIeOk= =llKb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: slander and call for lawyers. :)
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Oct 25 20:29:30 1996 [I sent a version of this note privately to Ray, Sandy, and Unicorn, and now I've decided to send it publicly to the list. Hi Dmitri, you've finally done it.] Uni wrote: > If you don't watch it I'll have a pair of my staff represent him free of > charge. I hereby transfer my pledge of a shipment of guava pastries (that was me) from Sandy's meeting to Black Unicorn's lawyers if he chooses to go ahead with this, since the "let's Meet Dmitri" meeting seems to be off anyway. ;) JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMnFbcm1lp8bpvW01AQEaaAQAj8xsx5RZv56xKKEZhuthlvf9gNZANE+L f82rFV7FRj3BBJyo2phbiYlU8+dXMKIEHv2w5lhqzS2PB9hgwVcap+iOVcd0EqB6 KDOx+ez86gjYqv+Q7bcxxI+cB7iXq/01R+1JUeSTSFnrw6+Vnts8e02DHaTnGxMz qPKFUupyYd4= =u3SP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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