December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

wired wankers
by Hard Media 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did anyone read the cover article in last months US Wired? About why Walter Wriston , the ex-head of Citibank, is acting like a cypherpunk???? I can't believe that a man responsible for countless third world deaths is being called a cypherpunk by Wired!!! Citibank is a major player in the third world debt crisis...this seems to be news for Thomas Bass, who interviewed him...then Bass goes on to ask if "Walter" has made any "bad loans" ie to dictators and other nasty sorts....jeez sorry but there's naivity and there's stupidity ....seems like very few people know who or what cypherpunks are - good or bad? Zaid

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Re: Netescrow & Remailers?
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Would it make remailers more reliable to use a netescrow >system, so that if a remailer goes offline, the others can request its >keys, and continue moving its messages? Do you operate a malicious remailer? Have you just recieved a message from a person, encrypted for another remailer? Want to know who this person is communicating with? Bomb the next remailer in the chain or do whatever else to force it to reveal it's keys. Once that's done, you can peel away that layer of encryption and then go to work on bombing the next remailer in the chain to obtain it's keys. Repeat until you've peeled off all the layers of remailer encryption and can see the final destination address. Tell us, what have you done with the _real_ Adam Shostack? ;P

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Re: Netescrow & Remailers?
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here were my thoughts on the subject when this was mentioned to me a month and a half ago. -matt [by the way, please note that I don't read cypherpunks, so please include me in any reply that you want me to see. Thanks.] ------- Forwarded Message To: Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> cc: peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Job for netescrow ? (was Secure anonymouse server protocol... In-reply-to: Your message of "Fri, 06 Sep 1996 14:22:23 BST." <199609061322.OAA01150(a)server.test.net> Date: Fri, 06 Sep 1996 18:50:00 -0400 From: Matt Blaze <mab(a)nsa.research.att.com> Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> writes: > >Peter Allan <peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk> writes on cpunks: >> In the talk about replyable nym-mailers I haven't >> yet seen netescrow mentioned. >> >> You DID all read this ? >> >> [Matt Blazes Oblivious Key Escrow paper] >> >> This all hinges on a policy to be followed by archive holders defining >> the conditions under which they release their shares. >> This could be receipt of a signed request from the owner (remailer). >> >> Maybe the table relating nyms to reply addresses could be stored in >> netescrow style so that captured remailers reveal nothing. The problem >> of operator coercion is not addressed by this. > >Just to clarify, if I understand correctly you are proposing a penet >style system with the database held in `netescrow'. > >The remailer in normal operation has access to the database by making >requests satisfying the conditions of the secret share holders. > >When the remailer is compromised the memory resident key is lost when >the machine is switched off, and the owner refuses to release the key. > >Is what you are proposing? > >It sounds like a cross between Matt's netescrow and Ross Anderson's >eternity file system. Your penet database is being stored in a >distributed file system, with shares, and the identity of the share >holders is concealed. However the aim is not to prevent others >censoring your publically available writings, but to allow a second >avenue of access only in the case of `mob cryptography'. > >This changes the system over storing the database encrypted on the >remailer machines own disk in these ways: [well-thought-out stuff deleted] This is the first I've seen this proposal to use Oblivious Key Escrow (OKE) as a store for a remailer database; apologies if all this has been discussed already (I don't ready cypherpunks very often these days). My original idea for OKE was as a way to backup long-term, slow-changing sensitive data without also introducing a single point of failure for either security or availability. The remailer model is a bit different, and I'm not sure it's a good fit, in particular because I haven't thought about the various new failure modes in this application. But let me think ``out loud.'' Suppose we want to build a persistent-reply address anonymous messaging service (like the late anon.penet.fi) with the following properties: a) The database that maps anonymous addresses to real addresses is secure against erasure or other permanent loss of availability b) The database is also secure against accidental or coerced disclosure. Requirement (a) implies backups and persistent storage. Requirement (b) implies that both access to both operational and backup copies must be carefully controlled, preferably by technical means. So far, this looks like a good candidate for distributed security, in the style of OKE, Mike Reiter's Rampart service, or Ross Anderson's Eternity service. Actually, I think the best solution would be for the remailer itself to be a distributed process, split among enough places to make it difficult for anyone to attack enough nodes to compromise or recover the address translation database. It is not at all obvious how to do this in practice, however, since any solution would need to combine secure distributed computation (to calculate the mapping for each message sent without revealing to any party, including the sender, what the mapping is) with anonymous networking techniques such as mixes to prevent traffic analysis from revealing the mapping. There are a number of unsolved theoretical and practical problems here, and I think working out the details of such a system would make for a good PhD thesis or two (quite seriously, and I'd be interested in talking with anyone who wanted to pursue such a line of research). So for now let's limit ourselves to existing tools and techniques, or at least tools and techniques that are close to existing. Let's say, for the moment, that we wanted to base the system on OKE. Assume an unconditionally trusted remailer operator whose goal is to construct a system that resists attempts to force him or her to UNILATERALLY reveal the database. That is, it should not be possible to force the remailer operator to reveal the database contents without also enlisting the aid of the (collectively anonymous) oblivious key holders. My (not carefully considered) first thought is that the address database would be encrypted and stored locally, using a key that is escrowed using OKE. The key would never be locally stored; preferably, the key would exist only in memory. The operating system on which the remailer is run would delete this key ``at the drop of a hat,'' e.g., any time the system was rebooted, any time someone logs in, any time unusual activity of any sort is detected. The key release policy is controlled by a public key, for which the secret key is stored in a more persistent manner (e.g., in the file system). Whenever the database key is deleted, the OKE recovery process is used to recover the key automatically, and the database is re-encrypted with a new key that is distributed to a new set of shareholders. Under normal operation, this might happen once a month or so, and might entail (because of policy-based delays and the time required to collect shares) a few days of downtime. Under unusual conditions that might precipitate some kind of coercive situation, the remailer operator (or some automatic process on the remailer machine) would delete the signing key as well as the database. It might be reasonable, for example, to delete this file any time someone logs in to the remailer machine (which shouldn't be needed ordinarily). The OKE share policy would require that the shareholder operator examine unsigned key requests manually before releasing them. If the keys were deleted because of a false alarm or machine failure, the remailer operator would send a message saying something to the effect of ``Hey, I blew it. Please send me the key shares once you're convinced no one has a gun to my head.'' In the event of a public safety emergency, the police are free to attempt to issue their own appeal for key shares, but the ability to for them to do this is not a design goal, but rather a side-effect of the design. I see a number of problems with using OKE for this. In particular, key recovery is moderately expensive and key distribution with the oblivious multicast protocol in my paper can be very expensive. If keys are deleted regularly, the downtime could be unacceptable. I'm not sure OKE is entirely workable for this application, but perhaps a more clever design could prove me wrong. There are a whole bunch of engineering issues here, particularly related to automatically detecting ``unusual'' situations. So can this scheme be improved upon? Is there a better way to run a persistent-reply-address remailer? These are interesting, and I think largely open, questions. - -matt NB The oblivious key escrow paper that I presented at the Information Hiding workshop at the Isaac Newton Institute in May, is available at: ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/netescrow.ps ------- End of Forwarded Message

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No Subject
by Butler, Anthony 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

22/10/96 WASHINGTON - US First lady Hillary Rodham Clinton unveiled a new Superman comic book for Bosnian children during an East Room ceremony Monday. The comic book, written in three languages, shows the mythical American hero flying down to save two little boys in Bosnia- Herzegovina. The comic books will be distributed throughout the country. With several Bosnian children standing nearby, Mrs. Clinton pulled the drape on a blown-up reproduction of the cover of the comic book. Mrs. Clinton said the initiatives show the United States' "clear commitment to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina." She said "Superman wlll bring a special message" to the Bosnian children.

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Re: Holding Netscape's and Microsoft's Feet to the Fire
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The truly frightening thing here is that Bill gates has come out more often on the strong crypto side than Netscape, Apple, IBM and just about everyone else. Why is this? Has Justice crapped on him once too often, and now he's looking for payback? At first I thought that it may be that Microsoft has big financial transaction plans. If this were true, they would probably get the leniency that banks and others get for crypto. So what is it? Here is my theory, if you will indulge me for a minute; It was a dark and stormy...uh middle of the afternoon in Redmond. Bill is at his desk reading the latest sales figures for Windows and Office 95. "600 million, hot shit! But I grow bored with commonplace software, I need new money schem..uh challenges". Somehow Bill finds his way into Building 666 on the Microsoft campus. The building is home to Microsoft's Security and Crypto division. He hails a young minion. "Here my son, what have you done for me today?" The young man gulps, "Uh well let me see Mr Gates...". Suddenly Bill notices the boy's shirt. It is black, on the front are printed the words; "This T-Shirt is a Munition". Under the words are a few lines of code. Because they are not Basic, Bill is confused. He blurts out,"Say that isn't Java is it!". "No Mr. Gates, it's Perl. This is the RSA code implemented in it." Bill says,"I see, carry on my boy". The young man scurries back to his office. Suddenly it strikes Gates like the first time he envisioned the DOS liscening scheme. "Munitions! Hot shit, weapons on a floppy I could make billions! I could arm the whole world with Microsoft weapons of software and dominate any governments who got in my way! Then I could have Larry Ellison and Marc Andressen and any other punks who made fun of me locked away". I'm sure it didn't happen just this way. It's quite possible that Bill gates never says "hot shit". ---------- > From: Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)got.net> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Holding Netscape's and Microsoft's Feet to the Fire > Date: Tuesday, October 22, 1996 8:59 PM > > At 4:11 PM -0700 10/22/96, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > >John Young wrote: > >> > >> 10-17-96, BuWi: > >> > >> "Apple, IBM, JavaSoft, Motorola, Netscape, Nortel, Novell, > >> RSA, and Silicon Graphics Announce PICA Crypto-Alliance" > >> > >> The PICA specification will also be designed to make the > >> task of developing differing domestic and exportable > >> security requirements much easier. [GAK alliance 2.] > > > > John, I think you are misreading the intent here. By making > >it easier to develop separate domestic and exportable > >versions of a product, we foil the government's attempt to > >force weak domestic encryption because it is too much work to > >maintain two different versions. > > Thwarting the True Intent of GAK by ensuring that domestic crypto is > completely unhampered, unhindered, unlimited, and unGAKked is terribly > important. A year or so ago, when Netscape folks issued assurances that the > "relative convenience" of having one "world version" would not be the > determining factor, and that Netscape would have two versions (times the > number of platforms they support), was an incredibly positive development. > > (And Bill Gates, of the Evil Microsoft, had already isssued scathing > denunciations of key escrow and mandatory crypto, so MS was already > effectively in our camp.) > > So, if PICA helps this (along with the Elites Alliance, a rival type), more > power to them. I wouldn't be surprised if the Feds try to exert pressure on > them to change this purpose that Jeff W. describes. Government will realize > that industry consortia are a way to "build consensus" on getting GAK built > in to even domestic products. (The renaming of Clipper/Tessera/etc. to key > escrow and then to "key recovery" is essential to this strategy....got to > convince U.S. software companies that Mr. Policeman is Our Friend...not an > easy sell.) > > But I wonder if the PICA Alliance will be allowed to pursue this "dual > strength strategy." Mightn't it be a violation of the ITARs merely to > _conspire_ to keep domestic crypto unhindered and strong? > > (:-} for the :-}-impaired.) > > Though this is preaching to the choir, it's imperative that Netscape, > Microsoft, and the Other Minor Players remain committed to _never_ > compromising the security of _domestic_ products....Europe and Asia will > have to take of themselves, as the true battle always has and always will > be about the U.S. government's desire to surveil us and tap our > communications at will. > > (Anyone who doubts this should reread the recent comments of Janet Reno, > Louis Freeh, Jamie Gorelick, and all the others talking about the need to > read the communications of criminals and suspected criminals. The real goal > is to head off crypto anarchy, as the summary by Black Unicorn made clear > just a day or two ago.) > > --Tim May > > "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM > that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." > [NYT, 1996-10-02] > We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. > ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. > "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > > >

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:57 AM 10/23/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: > >> At 08:13 PM 10/22/96 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: >(snip) > >> Sure, you can't keep people from talking. However, one way to sabotage the >> usefulness of telling is to allow everybody else as well to make the same >> claim, with essentially no way for the candidates to tell who is REALLY >> giving the money. Make the lie just as credible as the truth, and the value >> of knowing the truth is destroyed. If nobody can trust anyone else's word, >> then no candidate could know who REALLY ought to be rewarded for a campaign >> contribution, breaking the circle of quid-pro-quo. > >Sorry, but this would depend upon equal access to a number of things. >Primarily, John Q. Public does not have sufficient real world access >to politicians to assert that he is the one who donated. Lobbyists, >OTOH, most certainly do. Secondly, access to the timing of donations >is something only the donor can know. > >"Wink, wink. Nudge, nudge, Senator. Look at your account balance >tomorrow. Never forget the National Association of Manufacturers was >there for you" (Obviously a completely random selection 8-) While I have worked through essentially none of the details, if the system can be implemented well enough, all this kind of information will be blinded into oblivion. Donations won't be tallied individually, and news of their arrival will be disguised, possibly by limiting the size that is credited to the candidate per day and thus in effect splitting up a donation to make it "arrive" over a period of a week or two. Only overall totals will be reported, possibly rounded to only two significant figures, and even then possibly only on a weekly basis. >> The candidate still gets the money, of course, and the contributor is still >> free to both donate and speak...separately. The thing that's been cut off >> is the association between the money and the speech...which is exactly what >> the problem is, isn't it? > >See above for why the connection is not. Try again. Rather than trying to prove that a system won't work, why not help develop one that will? >And the problem is >generally not money, but rather the delivery of votes. A candidate >will do whatever it takes to get elected. Often this means $$$ for >campaign expenses. More often it means vote delivery. But "vote delivery" can't be proven, or even demonstrated with a strong degree of assurance. >Get rid of the career politician and you get rid of the motivation >behind the pursuit of political money and vote delivery. I'd LOVE to "get rid of the career politician." And every other kind of politician, as well! > I hate to >actually advocate term limits, but a critical vote in Congress is >much harder to control when the rep is only interested in serving the >public because there is no chance of re-election. After all, it is >not donations that are the evil here, it is the control of gov't >action, right? What I consider wrong is that government affects way too large a fraction of our lives, without apparent Constitutional justification. If the government at all levels were only, say, 1/10th of its current size, there would be much less motivation for corruption. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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But first, something completely different... (fwd)
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this forward is on the edge, but notice the request for increased wiretap capability. Besides, it is funny. --Lucky ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 23 Oct 96 11:10:26 PDT From: Bruce Erickson <be1(a)ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM> To: ca-firearms(a)lists.best.com Subject: But first, something completely different... Motorcycle gangs, Banditos and Hell's Angeles, in Scandanavia have been fighting for a couple years. A previous story in this paper described how Hell's Angles broke into a Danish prison to throw a hand grenade into the cell of the Banditos' president. Our friends who want to ban mouse guns don't know what trouble is possible. It is possible to get anti-tank missiles on the black-market. [story] "Nordic summit on Biker Violence" Saskis Sissons "The Eurpoean" 10-16 October 1996 Denmark's justice minister justice has called a summit to discuss a joint Nordic campaign against the biker gangs whose violent confrontations are posing an increasing danger to the public throught the region. Bjorn Westh, who is said to be shocked and furious at the latest violence which left 2 people dead and 19 ingured after a rocket attack in Copenhagen, will meet his cunterparts from Sweden, Norway and Finland to consider strategies against the gangs. A justice ministry spokeswoman said: "It will ve an exchange of ideas between the ministers. It's a very serious situation in Denmark at the moment abd these levels of violence could easily spread to other parts of Scandanivia. Westh is looking into the possibility of a total ban on the gangs but his priority is to secure the safety of civilians." Westh's initiative follows a meeting on 7 Octobe bwtewen Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Tasmussen and Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, who promised their countries would fight the bikers together. Calls for concerted national and regional action against the escalating gang warfare have been mounting. Only last week 1000 staged a demonstration outside the Hell's Angles compound at Titagade in Copenhagen's Norrebro district. A few days later were awakened in the early morning by an anti-tank rocket exploding in the bikers' clubhouse. [btw: this is the second missile attack on the HAs this year. the first was in the late spring] After months of prevarication the Danes have resolved to take tough action against the gangs. Parliament is this week rushing through legislation which will prevent members of the feuding Hell's Angles and Banditos meeting at their clubhouses in populated areas, and a national task force has been set up to combat the gangs. Commander Per Larsen, who is heading the new unit, said: "The new legislation is good news for us and we are pleased with the initiatives of the prime minuster and justiice ministers. But we would like to see parliament giving us further powers to bug and phone-tap suspects and to search houses secretly." The feud, which began in 1994, has claimed 9 lives and injured 50 people throughout the region. [end story] Diane: "We need stronger tank missile controls. Ban the sale of cheap easily concealed tank missiles. Require licensing and training classes. Store them at missile clubs" Tanya: "There is already total prohibition on the possession of tank missiles by private citizens and murder is still illegal." Diane: "Be quiet, this is a fund raising event."

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Montgolfiering aka P Information = P * log_base_infinity P (fwd)
by cypher＠cyberstation.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A cryptogram Montgolfiering aka P Information = P * log_base_infinity P What does it mean? First of all, I apologize for taking so much of many reader's time on the subject of whether the EUREKA algorithm is a "SOFTWARE" OTP or not. As I have restated over and over and over again, time after time, after time, it is a PRNG, it is a stream cipher, so we will leave it there. We are taking the OTP question off the table, but I am sure that the list eupatrids will continue to beat that horse forever. Accordingly, henceforth Eureka will be referred to as a stream cipher, a PRNG stream, and we will joust on their muddied pedantric playing field! I also want to apologize once more to all of the readers for having to go down into the gutter where PM insists on duking it out, but he leaves me no choice. I told you that I would fight no more with him, forever; but my word is obviously not as good as Chief Joseph's. He is wounding me by spreading his mendacious misrepresentations to the point that I must respond. He is also threatening me, with his malevolent baseness. That is the reason that he wrote that one message as private mail, not so that you readers would not have to suffer through more of his, and yes my, garbage. It is patently evident that he wrote that message so that he could threaten me and you readers would not know about it, and that is the only reason that I went public with it back to you. Then he tries to cover up his abhorrent conduct by trying to make you believe that he was trying to SAVE YOU from suffering as a labor of love. That is the only message that he has sent privately, and he did it so that you would not find out what he had done. I am sure that most of you can see through crass deception, you are smarter than that. And by the by way, thanks, to the many of you that have written in support, even if most of you do not want to take on the powers to be by expressing your feelings in public - keep it up, I will be most discreet. It takes a sick mind to do things like that. I further believe that Perry may be libeling me by asserting that Adam has already cracked my algorithm. Although I have now told him 22 times that is a falsehood, he insists on repeating it, even after it has been denied by Adam. That is a factoidal jactitation as evidenced below. One writer today told me that Adam, John Pettitt and Paul Bradley had cracked both my algorithms in one day, and that the new one was worse than the old one, and that Perry Metzger had personally confirmed it. At least, unlike some readers, he had part of the message right, the part about two algorithms. The current algorithm web page has now been visited by over 4,500 people and all of them know that Perry is engaged in some sort of propaganda campaign to spread disinformation for some purpose because the algorithm has almost nothing, just a tiny fragment, to do with what has been posted previously. And as all of you readers tuned in at that time know, you were told that that was not the algorithm and never has been. I question whether Perry may have a pecuniary interest in these affairs? Does Perry have an insider, or other position, or interest in one or more of the RSA interest? Does he have any interest in PGP, Inc., though I rather doubt that? I am making no allegations, I am only asking the question of why he would deliberately set out on a campaign of disinformation without arming himself with the truth, it is so easy all he has to do is go to the web site and see for himself. Instead, he ignores that and engages in propaganda. Why? At least Hal Finney had the intellectual, and moral honesty to disclose that he was now a part of the PGP Inc, team. In any event to clear up any misunderstanding, let us examine what my ALLEGED algorithm was, and compare it to the actual algorithm. > Adam > | > The algorithm is: > | > > | > for ( ; ; ) { > | > for (i=0; i<63; i++) { > | > a[i] = (a[i] + b[i]) % c[i]; > | > d = (d + a[i]) & 255; > | > *data++ ^= d; /* xor with data */ > | > } > | > } > | > > > As I have told Perry and Paul, both several times, at the time it was first reported and later, and indirectly to all of you several times, the above algorithm is not the algorithm posted at: www.netprivacy.com/algo.html All anyone would have to do to determine that is to take a few seconds and look. Yet Perry and Paul, did not do that, instead they spread the malevolent message around that they have broken the algorithm. In Paul's case, it may just be confusion resulting from Perry's incessant jabberwocky. To those of you who might want to know the truth, I have been forced into the position of taking your time to disclose the algorithm here, The algorithm to follow, is the only one that has ever existed, as most readers should know but do not because of nazi like propaganda. In a highly abbreviated form, only to show how stupid this argument about which algorithm is which, the actual algorithm is: A highly condensed version of the Eureka Algorithm: Given a key, user, message, etal specific parameter set derived from a truly random key, in this instance, 256 bytes long, 10^616 entropy, then : All of the parameters below, vary with each generator key, except where the variance is limited by range factors - for instance, there are only 49 to 79 possible Juncture Values, JV values, so that number must be one of those corresponding values. Starting values derived from the key, as modified by message number and other variables. That is slightly in excess of 2^54 possibilities for the initial D1, D2, D3, and D4 values, the differential variables. D1 = 1,691 D2 = 1,194 D3 = 3,564 D4 = 483 JV = 34 (I) A(I) B(I) C(I) 0 11908 7109 17581 1 2252 11863 16589 .................................. ................................. 51 14544 9349 17964 52 15759 11836 17021 And the three tables: DISP, Displacement Table - a table of the values 0 through 4095, randomly scrambled, by the hardware sourced truly random key. DIFF, Diffusion Table - a second independent table of the values 0 through 4095, randomly scrambled, by the hardware sourced truly random key. DETR, Determinate Table, a third independent table of 16 sets of the ASCII values, 0 through 255. EXKEY is an 8192 byte key expanded from the 256 byte key, thus only 2^2048 bits of entropy, at the most. IN PSEUDO CODE, the algorithm for medium level security, level 5, is: LEV5 SECURITY I=0 DO DO JV=JV+1 IF JV=53 THEN JV=0 REM JV<53 is for Level 5, it ranges from 49 to 79. A(JV)=(A(JV)+B(JV)) MOD C(JV) WHILE (A(JV) AND 16384) = 1 D1=(D1+A(JV)) AND 4095 D2=DISP((D2+D1) AND 4095) F=DETR(D2)<<8 D3=(D3+D2) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I))=BUF(DIFF(I)) XOR (F+(DETR(DISP(D3)))) D1=(D1+D3) AND 4095 F=DETR(DISP(D1))<<8 D4=(D4+D1) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I+1))=BUF(DIFF(I+1)) XOR (F+(DETR(DISP(D4)))) REMARK SWAP D1 AND D4, and D2 AND D3 so that the REMARK SELECTION COUNTERS ARE NEVER CONGRUENTIAL, EVEN REMARK FOR TWO SUCCESSIVE SELECTIONS SWAP D1,D4 SWAP D2,D3 REMARK SWAP VALUES IN BOTH THE DISPLACEMENT TABLE AND REMARK THE DETERMINATE TABLE TO INSURE THAT THE TABLES REMARK CONSTANTLY MUTATING - THEY ARE NEVER STATIC REMARK CANNOT CHANGE THE DIFFUSION TABLE UNTIL REMARK DIFFUSION HAS BEEN COMPLETE FOR 8192 BYTES SWAP DETR(D1),DETR(D3) SWAP DISP(D2),DISP(D4) REM REM - A NEAR DUPLICATE BUTTERFLY SECTION TO INSURE THAT REM - EVEN AND ODD CHARACTERS CANNOT BE BLOCKED REM DO JV = JV + 1 IF JV = 53 THEN JV=0 A(JV)=(A(JV)+B(JV)) MOD C(JV) WHILE (A(JV) AND 16384) = 1 D1=(D1+A(JV)) AND 4095 D2=DISP((D2+D1) AND 4095) F=DETR(D2) D3=(D3+D2) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I+2))=BUF(DIFF(I+2)) XOR ((DETR(DISP(D3))<<8)+F) D1=(D1+D3) AND 4095 F=DETR(DISP(D1)) D4=(D4+D1) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I+3))=BUF(DIFF(I+3)) XOR ((DETR(DISP(D4))<<8)+F) REMARK SWAP AS BEFORE EXCEPT USE DIFFERENT D VALUES SWAP D1,D4 SWAP D2,D3 SWAP DETR(D1),DETR(D3) SWAP DISP(D2),DISP(D4) REMARK CANNOT SWAP DIFFUSION TABLE VALUES BUT WE CAN REMARK MUTATE THE KEY SOME MORE, SO THAT WE CAN REMARK EVENTUALLY RESCRAMBLE THE DIFFUSION TABLE SWAP EXKEY(D2),EXKEY(D3) I = I + 4 WHILE I < 4096 REMARK IF JV<16 THEN RESCRAMBLE THE DIFFUSION TABLE REMARK THIS WILL HAPPEN APPROXIMATELY 30% OF THE TIME LONG IF JV < 16 I=0,M=4096 DO SEL=(SEL+EXKEY(I+2300)) MOD M SWAP DIFF(I),DIFF(I+SEL) I=I+1 M=M-1 WHILE I<4095 END IF Now I ask a candid world. Is that the same algorithm as the one Perry says that Adam broke, the first one above? Is it the same one that Paul claims to have broken as detailed in his message? Both claim that they are one and the same. Are they? You can see the answer know the answer to that. This is just an example of how the haughty eyed will use their malevolence to intimidate the rest of you. I belive that Perry is deliberately distorting the truth, as this proves. Paul on the other hand, may only be confused by Metzger's montgolfiering. The above algorithm has been condensed considerably to show that it is not the one that Perry and Paul are referring to at all. If you are going to analyze it in any depth, go to the web site and work with the full algorithm, that is URL: www.netprivacy.com/algo.html If you have questions from the brief description set out above, visit the web site and I believe that your questions will be cleared up. There are also almost 200 megabytes of raw encryptor stream output at the site, you do not need known plain text, it is there for all to see. What is the key that generated the text, or what is the next 100 characters of encryptor stream for messages 1 through 6? Bet you cannot figure it out! How about the cryptogram? Montgolfiering aka P Information = P log_base_infinity P Most of you have it figured out, n'est pas? With every best wish, Don Wood > >

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I'm Confused about Algorithm Patents in Canada
by janke＠unixg.ubc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a library of crypto goodies that I would like to release, but am kinda stuck on the copyright: I read in a very new book that algorithms cannot be patented in Canada. In AC2, however, Scheneier mentions several of the algorithms as being patented in Canada. Today, I visited Ascom's home page and noticed that IDEA is not patented here, so I get the feeling the law might have changed just recently. If anyone can tell me anymore of what they know about the status of algorithm patents in Canada, or if they could point me to a good source of info on the net, I would be very appreciative. (Since my library will be free, you might be helping more than just me too. :) ) Thanks, Leonard (Visit http://www.interchg.ubc.ca/janke/index.html#lcrypt for an ouline of what I'd like to release, if you like.)

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U.S. crypto-czar appointment -- "Crypto Imperalism" in HotWired
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 03:50:17 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: U.S. crypto-czar appointment -- "Crypto Imperalism" in HotWired http://www.hotwired.com/netizen/ HotWired, The Netizen Global Network Crypto Imperialism by Declan McCullagh, Kenneth Neil Cukier, and Brock N. Meeks Washington, DC, 23 October The US offensive for international controls on strong encryption will soon become a fusillade. In the next week, the Clinton administration is set to create the position of a roving ambassador whose job will be to marshal international support for a controlling new US crypto policy, the Netizen has learned. The crypto-czar will lobby foreign governments to change their laws to comply with the US regulations announced on 1 October, which temporarily allow businesses to export slightly stronger data-scrambling applications if they pledge to develop a "key recovery" system. In such a system, a still-undefined "trusted third party" would hold the unscrambling key to any encryption, and could be forced to give it over to law enforcement officials with a warrant. The catch, of course, is that such a system permits continued government access to encrypted communications. But for that plan to work, an international "key recovery" framework must be established. "What we need to do very clearly is to spend a lot of time with other countries," William Reinsch, the US Department of Commerce's undersecretary for export administration, told The Netizen. Reinsch said the newly annointed crypto ambassador would be responsible for helping these countries move "in the same direction" as the US by "helping facilitate that process and helping to reach any agreements that need to be reached between us and them." Reinsch said the position would defy the label "crypto-czar," because the position isn't "a czar in the policy sense.... We don't envision this person as one who would be giving a lot of speeches on the subject and operating as a kind of public defender of the process." Rather, the person would work within "a context which is largely private, not public," Reinsch said. The president can confer the rank of ambassador on a political appointee for up to six months without Senate confirmation, the State Department said. And with ambassadorial rank, the czar will be able to speak for the president. The administration is currently considering a "short list" of candidates "in the low single digits," drawn from current government employees and private citizens, Reinsch said. If a current government employee is chosen, he or she would be at the ambassadorial level, he said, and the crypto duties would simply become an additional responsibility. If chosen from the private sector, it will be someone with "significant stature," Reinsch said. That person would have "a close association with the administration and the president and would be viewed by the other countries as a senior representative who could speak for the president with some confidence," Reinsch said. If a private citizen is chosen, they would "do it for free and we'd pick up the travel I guess." The announcement should come "fairly quickly," he said. "I would hope next week we could ice this one." This bypasses the ongoing public debate in Congress over lifting crypto export controls through legislation - Sen. Conrad Burns (R-Montana) has pledged to keep fighting next year - and in the OECD, says Marc Rotenberg, the director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. "This is backdooring the backdoor." While others - notably Clint Brooks and Mike Nelson - have played the role of crypto spokesperson before, this move represents a redoubling of the administration's plans to impose its will internationally. Yet international observers say the United States may find its plans thwarted in the global arena, where many governments - already uneasy about America imposing its hegemony on regional politics - will likely resist another cryptocrat, even if the person comes with an ambassador's honorific before his or her name. "Europe would consider that unacceptable and arrogant, no question," says Simon Davies, director of Privacy International and a fellow at the London School of Economics. "There would certainly be a backlash, and it would cause immense suspicion. This whole business has become extremely sleazy, and the Americans appear to have taken it all very personally. I would be very surprised if it was taken seriously here." Viktor Mayer-Schvnberger at the University of Vienna Law School, an expert on international crypto policy, said that "if the US ups the ante and brings in a sort of a quasi-diplomatic person to push European countries further, I think we'll see tremendous arm-twisting." "It may backfire," says Mayer-Schvnberger. "The US put tremendous pressure on Europe and that is going to increase if the US government makes such a bold move as to appoint someone to do nothing but lobby for key escrow." Many countries, he said, "have been very apprehensive of the US coming in as the 'big guy' and telling the world what is good and what is bad" regarding encryption. ###

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