December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: AW: Binding cryptography - a fraud!
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Verheul sez: [..] : I agree to some extend that our system could be used in a totalitarian country, to make : certain censorship possible. On the other hand, it doesn't make their job especially easy: : they can forbid and control any type of "strange" data, i.e. encrypted data. One could : argue that our system at least gives security between citizens. : The whole problem is that you don't trust your government, well I do (till some : extend). I get the impression that this is a typical USA problem. Which part of the 'IRT enquete' made you trust our government ? : Eric -AJ- -- " The way to combat noxious ideas is with other ideas. The way to combat falsehoods is with truth. " -- Justice William O. Douglas, 1958

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The winsock remailer does not accept plaintext messages. The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 14 Oct 96 6:47:45 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca *--**+**-*** 34:04 99.98% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ++--+++--+++ 1:45:22 99.97% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net -*-++++-*+* 56:03 99.92% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ** ###-+-*## 23:32 99.88% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *###**# -### 20:05 99.76% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++++++---+++ 3:26:12 99.74% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ----------- 4:19:40 99.69% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +--------+++ 2:39:05 99.55% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +---++++-+++ 1:06:16 99.44% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---_. ----- 10:55:12 97.50% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com *-****** *** 21:59 96.47% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com - ---- . - 4:47:12 94.79% replay remailer(a)replay.com ****++- * 26:40 93.91% winsock winsock(a)c2.org -+++------ 3:00:33 78.61% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

Re: Anatomy of a Hoax
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: perun!news2.panix.com!panix!feed1.news.erols.com!howland.erols.net!news.sprintlink.net!news-peer.sprintlink.net!uunet!news-in2.uu.net!news.callamer.com!news(a)twizzler.callamer.com From: "Brian G. Hughes" <bhughes(a)slonet.org> Newsgroups: alt.shenanigans Subject: Anatomy of a Hoax Message-ID: <3260422F.115654B7(a)slonet.org> Date: Sat, 12 Oct 1996 18:13:19 -0700 Organization: Call America Internet Services +1 (805) 541 6316 Lines: 47 NNTP-Posting-Host: boobs.eorbit.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit The press release went out in mid-week. "Arm the Homeless to Donate Firearms, Training to S.L.O Homeless Community." Modeled after a similar ATH hoax done a few years back by some OSU students in Columbus, Ohio, this version had the press jumping. "[F]or someone in the underclass, a firearm works as 'the great equalizer,'" the press-release read. "[A] homeless person with a gun is just as powerful as his wealthy or politically powerful counterpart..." The answering machine I set up to take ATH calls was soon swamped with interview requests from the local newspaper and newsweekly and the local television station. I wrote up a bulletin and schedule of events for our fictitious organization, including fund-raising rallies, interviews with homeless folks, and weapons training. I then called some friends and enlisted their help. Early the next week, we arranged to fake an officers meeting to discuss our interviews with homeless folks and decide which ones to donate guns to. We then invited the press. The first to show was the K--- camera crew. Shortly after they arrived, a confederate dressed somewhat bum-like showed up, rolling a shopping cart full of junk. One of the items was three firearms wrapped in a ragged blanket. The camera crew went nuts, and our confederate explained that he'd managed to pick these up on the cheap and they only had to be doctored a little. The newspaper and newsweekly reporters showed up next. Even though the newspaper reporter had found out about the Columbus hoax on the web, the reporters stuck around and covered our meeting. They so much /wanted/ to believe this great story that they were willing to buy any story I gave them. We were the top story at six and the number two story at eleven. Alas, the police got interested, and we didn't really want to get them upset (you wouldn't like him when he's angry), so we fessed up. But it was good while it lasted.

1 0

fwd: Privacy on the Internet
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: oldbear(a)tiac.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Mon, 14 Oct 1996 08:48:23 -0300 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu (Digital Commerce Society of Boston) From: The Old Bear <oldbear(a)arctos.com> Subject: fwd: Privacy on the Internet Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: The Old Bear <oldbear(a)arctos.com> INTERNET USERS VALUE THEIR PRIVACY The 1996 Equifax/Harris Consumer Privacy Survey for the Internet reveals that Internet users place a high premium on their online privacy, relative to non-Internet users. Sixty percent of the Internet users interviewed said their anonymity shouldn't be compromised when they visit a Web site or use e-mail. Only 45% of non-Internet users were sympathetic to the desire for online anonymity. About half (49%) of the Internet users who participated felt that the federal government should be restricted in its ability to scan Internet messages, compared to only a third (34%) of non-users. Seventy-one percent of Internet users did not want online service providers to track their Web surfing patterns for marketing purposes, while 63% of non-users felt this activity was intrusive. The telephone survey of 36 million people also found that Internet users tended on average to be better educated, earn more money and have a somewhat more liberal outlook than non-users. source: BNA Daily Report for Executives October 10, 1996 - page A24 CONSORTIUM TO DEVELOP NET PRIVACY PRINCIPLES A group of companies involved in electronic commerce via the Internet have banded together to develop a set of privacy principles for doing business over the Net. The Privacy Assured group includes WorldPages, Inc., Four11, I/PRO, Match.Com and NetAngels.Com, and was sparked by recent reports of database services such as Nexis/Lexis providing sensitive information to paying customers. Privacy Assured, which is a pilot program of the Electronic Frontier Foundation's eTrust project, will post its blue PA logo on Web sites that adhere to its standards. These standards include: not knowingly listing information about individuals that has not been volunteered for publication; not allowing reverse searches to determine individuals' names from e-mail addresses, phone numbers or other information; releasing only aggregated usage statistics, not individual information; and giving individuals the option to delete personal information from lists. source: Broadcasting & Cable October 7, 1996 page 87 via edupage ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To unsubscribe from this list, send a letter to: Majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu In the body of the message, write: unsubscribe dcsb Or, to subscribe, write: subscribe dcsb If you have questions, write to me at Owner-DCSB(a)ai.mit.edu --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

1 0

Re: Blinded Identities [was Re: exporting signatures only/CAPI]
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> >Steve Shear <azur(a)netcom.com> writes: >>> I've been charged with developing an Internet service which needs to assure >>> its clients of anonymity. However, we fear some clients may abuse the >>> service and we wish to prevent the abusers from re-enrollment if >>> terminated for misbehavior. > >At 04:28 PM 10/13/96 -0400, "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" ><froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> wrote: >>Stefan Brands has a protocol that probably does what you want. >.... >>http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/oceanno.htm#ENDNOTE286 > >Looks like a really nice paper on anonymity issues; at 485K, it'll take >a little while to read :-) Yes, it was quite a load, but very good material. > >The fundamental difficulty in this problem is that you need some >demonstrable proof of uniqueness for human users; if you don't have that, >you can't transform it into a unique-but-anonymous identity.* >The issues are similar to privacy-protecting voter registration problems. > >Brands's protocol starts with the user going to the bank with proof of ID, >and getting a numerical ID which can be blinded and signed. >It's a nice approach; you can do cruder approaches by hashing your >universal-citizen-unit-ID-number or whatever, but that can be >dictionary-searched >by feeding all the possible ID numbers through the hash. > >For some applications, mapping back to a unique human isn't necessary; >if you do something like map back to a bank account which has a high >minimum balance for setup, this discourages the type of users who >don't want to spend $100 just to send spam. > >Blinding a Verisign signature isn't enough, though - they support >personna certificates without proof of identity. Is it possible to determine the level of Verisign signature to screen out personna certificates? > >[ * There are non-universal-identifier methods for preventing double-use. >Voter registration in many places just depends on identification and >affidavit, and is often abused (e.g. Chicago graveyard voters and >Nevada absentee ballots), but usually not massively abused. >Some third-world countries don't even require registration or literacy - >they dip your thumb in ink after you vote, using a kind of ink that >won't come off for a couple of days. Attacks against this protocol >include better solvents :-) ] Of course, if elections were very infrequent, they could cut off a finger each time you vote :-) You all have given me much to think about. Thanks.

1 0

Re: FLY_not
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:30 AM 10/14/96 -0400, John Young wrote: > 10-13-96. CoWo: > > "Encryption confusion" > > Reminded of the secret Clipper algorithm, I sought > details from IBM. I asked a spokeswoman why the company > hadn't just put out a nice, snappy white paper > explaining its new approach to key recovery. "We spent > three months trying to do that, quite literally," the > spokeswoman said. "It's pretty confusing stuff, and > whenever we get it on paper, we aren't happy with it." That's interesting...whenever they get it on paper, _we_ aren't happy with it either! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

1 0

Clinternet?
by Tom Lojewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How do I get off this list? >X-Sender: rah(a)tiac.net >Date: Fri, 11 Oct 1996 12:02:04 -0400 >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> >Subject: Clinternet? >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > >Hoo boy. > >I had the most amazing whiff of paranoia from the morning news. > >Clinton wants to buy the internet back for $500 million so he can watch us >better? > >Nawwww, 'course not... > >Cheers, >Bob Hettinga > >----------------- >Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) >e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson >The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/ > > > > --------------------------------------------------------- Tom Lojewski - ProNet Consulting - lojewski(a)earthlink.net

2 1

Re: FLY_not
by wa6ube＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Young writes: > >On 10/14/96 09:30:38 you wrote: > > 10-13-96. CoWo: > > "Encryption confusion" > > Reminded of the secret Clipper algorithm, I sought > details from IBM. I asked a spokeswoman why the company > hadn't just put out a nice, snappy white paper > explaining its new approach to key recovery. "We spent > three months trying to do that, quite literally," the > spokeswoman said. "It's pretty confusing stuff, and > whenever we get it on paper, we aren't happy with it." > > 10-12-96. InWe: > > "IBM Coalition May Not Fly" [Thanks, WR] > > "The relaxation on encryption is in many ways an > extortion of industry," said Bob Gargus, president of > the Atalla. "If this starts to happen for export, how > many companies will be able to support two standards? I > think every American should be worried." But Greg Simon, > domestic policy adviser to Vice President Al Gore, said, > "We're not looking for an answer that's universally > popular. We're looking for a solution that's balanced > and fair." > ----remainder snipped----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am curious, if there is this "coalition" of companies that have joined IBM on this new Key Recovery Plan, Has anyone yet found out who the other members of this coalition -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Personal Edition iQCVAwUBMmOndMDUh3vt7LRPAQEsnQP8Cs9yUdETZjTdZPar236cavjWRspQI/vU 9W7DKgUu0QeknOVmmmfbhQSRx8o6W/NcelVG67hXzIE8Zui5LPBefOpOIr6qHOqc ySzLUXS7l0lq5a7Radc/+WoXM/WoHZXYHX6eU7HsJ7dosn7vZiMG2p75+06BBKA6 MCO5n68h2BU= =jy/0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Patricia Gibbons <wa6ube(a)ix.netcom.com>

2 1

RE: RE: Binding cryptography - a fraud-detectible alternative to
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: everheul(a)mail.rijnhaave.nl > Hal Finney[SMTP:hal@rain.org] wrote: > >Another flaw with schemes of this time (in terms of failing to meet > >their goals) is that they cannot detect superencryption and other > >forms of non-standard encryption of the message body proper. All > >they can really do is verify from the outside that the same session > >key is encrypted for the two recipients (the intended recipient and > >the Government Access to Keys Party - let's not abuse the term by > >calling him a Trusted Third Party). But they can't be sure that the > >session key is sufficient information to decrypt the message. > We offered a solution for the *first* task not for the *second*; the > point is that criminals(!) do not gain any real advantage from using > the system in that way as they - among other things - still face the > key-management problem. The above dicussions are only relevant in > countries where the use of crypto outside the structure would be > prohibited. BTW, it is by such discussions that I believe such a ban > is ineffective and in fact counterproductive. I have not read your paper, but let me illustrate via what may be a similar scheme how criminals can use the key management infrastructure, create messages which look good from outside, yet which still cannot be read by the GAK (government access to keys) people. In ElGamal encryption we start with a message session key M which we want to send across. We have the public key y1 = g^x1 of the recipient (^ is exponentiation). We choose a random blinding factor xm, and calculate ym = g^xm. We send ym and M * (y1^xm). y1^xm equals g^(x1*xm), and the recipient can recover this by ym^x1. Now with two recipients, if we choose the same blinding factor xm for both, we send ym = g^xm, and both M * (y1^xm) and M * (y2^xm). We use the two different recipients' public keys y1 and y2. I believe this can be checked from outside by taking the ratios of these two factors (y1/y2)^xm and using known methods to prove that this is of the proper form. This can be circumvented though simply by replacing M, the true session key, with M' = M*(y1^xm), where y1 is the intended recipient (and y2 is the GAK party). We send M'*(y1^xm) and M'*(y2^xm). Outsiders still verify that this is of the proper form. And the intended recipient can calculate the true M by dividing twice by y1^xm instead of once (in effect M' is the El Gamal encryption of M for party 1). But the GAK party, who gets M'*(y2^xm) and recovers M', finds it useless in trying to decrypt the message. This shows how keys from a standard infrastructure can be used in a slightly non-standard way to confound your scheme. Granted, the parties involved have to share knowledge about using the keys in this non- standard way, but that is only one bit of information and not at all hard to distribute. Hal

1 0

(no subject)
by Jim Alexander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1 0