December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[Noise] Re: Responding to Pre-dawn Unannounced Ninja Raids
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:16 PM 7/22/96 -0500, snow wrote: > Yeah, and to a fscking statist you give your all to the state. ^^^^^^^ This is assuming that the state is corrupted and needs to be remounted. (Or is not considered clean opon boot.) Which might not be a bad assumption... Assuming that it can fix the errors it finds in the state in the first place. Sorry. Too much time spent fixing corrupted disks today. (I hate cheap hardware.) --- |"Computers are Voodoo -- You just have to know where to stick the pins."| |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Re: Bare fibers
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* Carbons sent to: In: jimbell(a)pacifier.com -=> Quoting In:jimbell@pacifier.com to Harka <=- In> The fiber is usually coated with a very thin layer of clear plastic to In> protect against moisture and abrasion, and the diameter is around 0.5 In> to 1.0 millimeters in diameter. Doesn't that make it vulnerable (detectable) to Tempest attacks? Harka ___ Blue Wave/386 v2.30 [NR]

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Re: Netscape
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 13:27 7/22/96, Tom Weinstein wrote: >Well, for starters, the genius who put it out there put out a beta, >which has an expiration date, instead of waiting for the final release. >Secondly, millions of people don't use PGP. I am sure the final release will be exported the day you release it. The government will not go after you because some third party violated the law. Remember, even PRZ was only harassed, never charged. It is my opinion, and that of many of the legal folks on this list, that the ITAR are unconstitutional. Netscape is being intimidated by a bluff. And no, I do not fault Netscape for not forcing the issue. >Also, notice the simple verification system MIT was allowed to use, and >the complex one we're required to use. Sure. The feds are learning. They know that they can't prevent export. They even know that their regulations don't have a leg to stand on. But they also know that they can make the life difficult for anyone wanting to make strong crypto available domestically , thereby reducing the number of shrink wrap quality programs available for domestic users. Which, let there be no mistake, is the true reason for the ITAR including software crypto. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November. Vote Harry Browne for President.

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Brute Force DES
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:32 AM 7/22/96 -6, Peter Trei wrote: >Any one up for a distributed brute force attack on single DES? My >back-of-the-envelope calculations and guesstimates put this on the >hairy edge of doability (the critical factor is how many machines can >be recruited - a non-trivial cash prize would help). I volunteer my 120 MHZ Pentium. A lot more Pentiums are out there now than a year ago. That makes it more feasible. A lot more people with full net connections. Like most Americans, I have a flat rate net connection and a flat rate local phone connection so could run a cracking session permanently (as long as no one tells my ISP). We need a full test of the Winsock cracking client in any case. It wasn't working very well last time. DCF

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Preaching to the Choir?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:44 PM 7/22/96, hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu wrote: >Your analyses are almost always junk because you only analyse one >side of the argument and deny that there is another side. You are >great at preaching to the choir Perry, problem is that you don't >convert anyone who isn't already converted. I think there is very little "converting" of those with well-developed views, of whichever side. Thus, solid libertarians are not converted by liberal/left arguments on this list, solid liberals are not converted by libertarian arguments, and so forth. We've had Religious Right folks (though not vocally in a long time), Greens, and several other flavors. (We also have several professional lawyers, law professors, economists, and the like, and I doubt the beliefs they have settled on in 10 or 20 or more years of thought will be changed by our arguments.) What _does_ happen is that people who have not given a lot of thought to some issues get exposed to views and can decide for themselves. Many student types arrive on this list with various half-baked ideas about the role of government, the effectiveness of laws, etc. _These_ folks are often influenced by persuasive points made here--they usually recognize the "common sense" in the best arguments presented. (At least this is what folks have told me, that they came to the list having ideas that crypto-privacy was important, but not realizing the full ramifications of the libertarian outlook until exposed to many people discussing them here.) So, I don't expect to convert David Sternlight to my views, nor to convert Phill H.-B. Nor do they, I am sure, expect to convert me. But I _do_ hope that the arguments here will have an effect on the thinking of many. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Digital Watermarks (long, getting off-topic)
by Alex F 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >>Isn't it odd that when music is sold, CD's are MORE expensive than cassette > >>tapes, even though you _know_ that the manufacturing cost of CD's is less? > > > >CDs sell for more because buyers decided that they wanted a wider range of > >titles with shallower sales (hence higher unit costs) rather than a narrower > I'm afraid that quantitatively, this is utter nonsense. > > A relevant data point is the fact that for about $1000, anybody can have > 1000 copies of a custom CDROM manufactured. That, by music industry The real; answer to all of these points is too simple. "Because they can" A lot has to do with percieved value. If consumers would have thought that the prices were way too high, then the market would have dictated a lower cost eventually. I think that the price of CDs vs tapes is more a marketing issue than a technical one.... Alex F =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Alex F alexf(a)iss.net Marketing Specialist Internet Security Systems =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

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Re: Produce 7 Hertz Frequency
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, On Thu, 25 Jul 1996, Jerome Tan wrote: > Does anyone know how to produce a 7 hertz frequency? No, but hum a few bars and we'll fake it. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Digital Watermarks for copy protection in recent Billbo
by Alex F 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >> To go to trial, an indictment would be needed. How likely is this? > > > >The likelyness is irrelevant to the point. Possibility is relevant. > >Probability is not. > > "Likeliness" is _always_ relevent when discussing law. I disagree. The CDA is not likely to ever get enforced. Does this mean that we should just ignore it because likeliness is zero to none? > Thus, the guy who buys a bicycle that later turns out to have been stolen, > will usually lose the bicycle, but is not knowingly receiving stolen > property and hence is guilty of no crime. And no DA will charge him; the > courts and jails are already clogged up enough. Uhh, if the DA has a personal vendetta against the guy w/ the bike he *COULD* charge him, if he wanted to, and it would be 100% legal. What we are talking about here are laws that allow for harrassment under the guise of the legal system. Granted, laws are not necedssarily bad, people are, but still.... This stuff CAN and DOES (there goes the "likeliness" theory) happen all the time. Your point of view strikes as one from a text book where people are not crooked (nothing wrong w/ that), but the sad fact is that there are people out there who can and will take advantage of any legal loophole in order to get done what they want done. Alex F > I maintain that this "wiggle factor" in the law is not something to get > worried about ("But they _could_ arrest me for buying a book stolen 10 > years ago! We've got to do something!) and is, in fact, essential in any > justice system. There just is no "automated" or "formal" system, and > probably/hopefully never will be. > > --Tim May > > > > Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! > We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. > ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. > "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > > > > =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Alex F alexf(a)iss.net Marketing Specialist Internet Security Systems =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

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IP: NSA RESPONSE TO KEY LENGTH REPORT
by farber＠central.cis.upenn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message-ID: <2.2.32.19960718184201.0070667c(a)linc.cis.upenn.edu> Date: Thu, 18 Jul 1996 12:04:27 -0400 From: Matt Blaze <mab(a)research.att.com> July 18, 1996 There is currently being circulated, to members of Congress and possibly elsewhere, a four page document entitled ``Brute-Force Cryptanalytic Attacks'' that calls into question some of the conclusions of the ``Minimum Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers'' white paper [1]. The document bears no author or organization attribution, but we are told that it originated from NSA. The NSA document argues that ``physical realities'' make parallel key search much more expensive and time consuming than our white paper estimated. However, the NSA document appears to have been written from the perspective of general parallel processing or cryptanalysis rather than exhaustive key search per se. It ignores several elementary principles of parallel processing that apply specifically to exhaustive key search machines of the type that our white paper considered. In particular, NSA argues that interconnections, heat dissipation, input/output bandwidth, and interprocessor communication make it difficult to ``scale up'' a key search machine by dividing the task among a large number of small components. While these factors do limit the scalability of more general purpose multiprocessor computers (such as those made by Cray), they do not apply at all to specialized exhaustive key search machines. The NSA argument ignores the most fundamental feature of brute-force key search: the processors performing the search have no need to communicate with other components of the system while they perform their share of the search, and therefore the system has no need for any of the global interconnections that limit scaling. Indeed, there is no reason that all the components of a parallel search machine must be located even within the same city, let alone the same computer housing. We note that one of our co-authors (Eric Thompson, of Access Data, Inc.) designs and builds medium-scale FPGA-based key search machines with exactly this loosely-coupled structure, and regularly uses them to recover keys for clients that include the FBI. The NSA document also calls into question our cost estimates for ASIC components, suggesting that ASIC chips of this type cost NSA approximately $1000.00 each. However, our $10.00 per chip estimate is based on an actual price quote from a commercial chip fabrication vendor for a moderate-size order for an exhaustive search ASIC designed in 1993 by Michael Wiener [2]. Perhaps NSA could reduce its own costs by changing vendors. Finally, the NSA report offers estimates of the time required to perform exhaustive search using a Cray model T3D supercomputer. This is a curious choice, for as our report notes, general-purpose supercomputers of this type make poor (and uneconomical) key search engines. However, even the artificially low performance results for this machine should give little comfort to the users of 56 bit keys. According to NSA, 56 bit keys can be searched on such a machine in less than 453 days. ``Moore's law'' predicts that it will not be long before relatively inexpensive general-purpose computers offer similar computational capability. /s/ Matt Blaze Whitfield Diffie References: [1] Blaze, M., Diffie, W., Rivest, R., Schneier, B., Shimomura, T., Thompson, E., and Wiener, M. ``Minimum Key Lengths for Symmetric Key Ciphers for Commercial Security.'' January 1996. Available from ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.txt [2] Wiener, M. ``Exhaustive DES Key Search.'' Presented at Crypto-93, Santa Barbara, CA. August 1993. ========================================================================= [Transcription of document circulated to various members of congress and others in June, 1996, apparently by NSA] BRUTE-FORCE CRYPTANALYTIC ATTACKS Two published theoretical estimates of cost versus time to perform brute-force hardware attacks on selected cryptography key lengths differ between themselves and differ significantly from what we find when we buy or build computers to carry out such attacks. The differences lie in assumptions made in the theoretical estimates, which are not fully spelled out by the authors, and in scaling up hypothesized small machines to ever larger ones without accounting for physical realities. The factors not accounted for are: o R&D costs for the first machine, typically on the order of $10 million. o As more and more chips are added to a machine, two effects occur: o Interconnections increase and increase running time; o Heat from the chips eventually limit [sic] the size of a machine. o Memory costs are not included. o When get [sic] to the very fast processing speed estimates, machines can become Input/Output bound; so [sic] it cannot achieve the estimated speed. o Assuming every algorithm can be tested in same amount of time and key length is the only difference. Table 1 are [sic] the average time estimates made for a given cost done by Michael Wiener of Bell Norther Research in 1995. These are published in Bruce Schneier's Applied Cryptography book. Note that these are average times, one-half of the total exhaust time. Table 2 are [sic] the estimates for total exhaust times using Field Programmmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) and Application Specific ICs (ASICs) done for the Business Software Alliance by Blaze, Diffie, Rivest, Schneier, Shimomura, Thompson, and Wiener in 1996. In addition to the above factors not accounted for they have assumed ASICs cost as low as $10. We find ASICs more typically cost $1000 and their capabilities can vary considerably depending upon the specific task. Table 3 are out estimates based on our experience with a Cray T3D supercomputer with 1024 nodes. This machine costs $30 million. [Tables 1, 2, and 3 not transcribed here.]

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One of the biggest problems with freedom
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What our biggest problem is, is that people want the government to protect them from the oh so evil terrorists, and they will willingingly have shackles put on them, and rejoice when it is done. I know people who WANT the government to take away their rights for security, and its a lot of people, and its far too many people. Example: "I don't care if the government has my keys for encryption. I don't do anything wrong, and if it helps FBI enforce our just laws, I am all for it. Since anyone who tries to get keys without legal means will end up in Leavenworth for the rest of their life, there is no problems with people getting access to those things." When I try to refute the logic: "I don't care about the bill of rights... I don't want to have to split my family up on separate flights so there is a chance of some of them arriving without dying. I want the security of knowing I can fly okay without being blown up, thank you very much. Signapore has little or no crime since the people give up their rights for a common good." Problem with freedom is people don't use it... and like a limb, will wither and fall off if not used. Our basic item should be trying to get the masses to figure out that freedom is important and should not be construed as a gift from the government.

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