December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: FW: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"blancw(a)accessone.com" "blanc" 10-JUL-1996 06:04:36.86 > As Tim said, the selective application of drugs or persecution = >regarding their use points to a great hypocrisy (and deterioration of = >character), and the more widespread the acceptance of hypocritical = >double-standards, the higher the rate-o-meter goes up in favor of = >statism. At the very least, all the confusion surrounding drug use will = >create "disrespect for Authority" (which in turn will inspire statists = >to propose further crack-downs, pardon the pun, on "criminals"). Actually, my Ritalin was one of the things that led me to come to the conclusion that drug laws were nonsense. It's a Schedule II drug that I never felt _any_ addiction to; I was off it on evenings, weekends, and during holidays. So at least in my case it had a pro-libertarian effect. > It makes me think of those Communist countries (remember them?) where = >political dissenters were been labelled insane - the protesters were the = >ones identified as having the problems, not the State. The imprisoned = >troublemakers were then drugged, thus taking care of their "irrational" = >behavior and lack of appreciation. The matter is that Ritalin isn't acting as a mind control pill, or whatever the hysterics are claiming. Indeed, I nominate it as one of the more transhumanist drugs I know of (for adults with ADHD and children), and I've done somewhat of a study of the subject. -Allen

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asking for beeing in your mailing list
by Victor M. Hernandez 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would ask for being include in your mailing list How can I do that? thanks in advance -- //// ~O¿O~ pgjeags(a)infosel.net.mx

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Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts? (fwd)
by gimonca＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: David Mazieres <dm(a)amsterdam.lcs.mit.edu> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts? > > My last phone bill said that Nynex is now giving out people's names in > addidtion to their phone numbers over caller-id. I therefore called > Nynex and told them to block caller-id on my phone line. > > They said no problem, but... They said nothing I can do will block it > when I call 800 numbers. "The people with 800 numbers have special > software, and there is nothing you can do to block your identity when > calling them. Not even *67." > > Wow. Maybe I'm not paranoid enough, but I never expected this. I can > never again call an 800 number anonymously to get information about > something unless I go out to a pay phone. What an incredible > inconvenience, and how truly depressing. > This has been true for years. On 800 numbers, the receiver gets ANI, not CID. Check newsgroups like alt.dcom.telecom, comp.dcom.telecom, etc.: there's always somebody talking about CID and ANI. In the back of my mind, I remember hearing about an anonymizer for 800-number calls. Maybe at WilTel. Check the search engine of your choice. Personally, I like Caller ID, because it gives individuals a service that formerly only governments and corporations could get. --gimonca(a)skypoint.com

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Re: Destabilizing China's Government with Strong Crypto
by t byfield 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:10 PM +0000 on 7/12/96, Deranged Mutant wrote: > On 12 Jul 96 at 0:04, Timothy C. May wrote: > [..] > > And this is yet another example of the negative effects of the U.S. > > restrictions on crypto export: where widespread crypto tools might be used > > to destabilize repressive governments, the lack of these tools integrated > > into common applications makes it harder for freedom-fighters in China, > > Burma, Iran, France, etc., to use them. > > The US has a sad history of supporting its own 'friendly dictators' > though. Makes it hard to support flow of decentralizing tech to > destabalize countries like Iraq but keep countries like El Salvador > in the fold. Me too. In fact, citing "freedom fighters" to justify relaxing ITAR is neither more nor less disingenuous than citing "international arms traders" to justify maintaining or tightening it; and given the litany of imbecilic, corrupt, rump, and reactionary regimes and factions the US has supported over the past decades, it isn't exactly going to win over hearts and minds in the agencies that have a strong hand in ITAR. Ted

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Re: Another bad idea
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com" "Deranged Mutant" 10-JUL-1996 05:02:42.84 >Great idea. Get some (possibly) innocent techie in an oppressive >country thrown in jail or executed. If these countries didn't value their technical people and what they can do, they wouldn't be allowing them on the Internet (even in a restricted way) in the first place. The above would only be a likely scenario if the effort wasn't big enough - didn't cover enough people. China almost collapsed (pity it didn't) with the Cultural Revolution; I doubt many in government there who remember that time want to go through it again, particularly considering the current level of instability there. >Or perhaps s/he gets offended, >contributing to the notion that all Westerners are evil perverts >out to corrupt them. This is a possible problem with the pornography approach, yes; some form of human rights information may be more suitable, even in countries in which one of the main crackdowns on the Internet is anti-sex. >> An extension of this for web sites, which I understand as possible >> but difficult, would be to swap anyone from such a country trying to get >> acces to a technical web site to instead receive "subversive" information or >> pictures. (The pornography mentioned above would probably be more effective >> in picture format; other pictures might include information on human rights >> abuses). >Damn aggrevating for that user, and it could get him/her in trouble. Yes. One possible solution for the aggrevation problem would be to include material on human rights, cryptography, etcetera _and_ the tech info that the person was looking for. While this would still give these countries easy access to the technical info (a bad outcome), it would also lead to the people getting information that the country's government didn't want. >On a wide-scale it could provoke responses from those countries. >Imagine this list being bombarded with propaganda, or perhaps >somebody here looking at an anti-censorship web page getting >pro-censorship messages from religious fundamentalists. If you look at someone's web page and A. they haven't made a contract with you to do otherwise and B. you haven't been smart enough to go through an anonymizing web server or an anonymous account, you need to realize that they are likely to keep info on you. I customarily don't use my own account for web viewing for that reason. Bombardment of lists like these with propaganda, etcetera, is an admitted possible problem. We're currently seeing something of the sort on alt.religion.scientology, but (according to what I've gathered) they seem to be dealing with that pretty well. I have my doubts how effectively the Chinese, etcetera governments are likely to be in carrying out such attacks; they aren't noticeably good at Internet-awareness. >Or it could encourage them to use special firewalls which filter >content and disallow graphics... (probably many US-based companies >would be all-too-happy to sell them the software to do it), or even >close themselves off from the Internet altogether, perhaps form >separate, unconnected Family/Islamic/Chinese-values networks. How, precisely, is one going to filter out graphics from web sites in Chinese? Ascii text and ideographs don't exactly get along. One interesting option would be text, possibly varied to disable practical OCR, in the form of graphics. This is more of a problem for web sites in English, although simple denial of such to such countries has its advantages (as per some earlier discussions). In the latter case, they aren't going to get the technical information that's their reason for getting on the Internet in the first place. These countries are largely third-world in locally understood technology, anyway; the exception is for those who have gotten training in the West - note that one of the biggest trade _surpluses_ of the US is in graduate education in technical fields. -Allen

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RE: FW: [RANT] Giving Mind Control Drugs to Children
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: E. ALLEN SMITH Actually, my Ritalin was one of the things that led me to come to the conclusion that drug laws were nonsense. It's a Schedule II drug that I never felt _any_ addiction to; I was off it on evenings, weekends, and during holidays. So at least in my case it had a pro-libertarian effect. ........................................................................

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Re: Can the inevitability of Software privacy be used to defeat the ITAR? (fwd)
by Cindy Cohn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:38 AM 7/11/96 -0400, Michael Froomkin wrote: >Here's a fun legal issue that cropped up on the cypherpunks list Nice try, but no cigar. The problem with all of the "ITAR loophole" ideas is that they only work where the rules are clearly articulated and carefully followed by the administrative agencies. Neither of those exist with the ITAR.. There are no restrictions on the ODTC's ability to interpret the ITAR however they see fit and to change those interpretations as they wish to meet their goal: stopping folks from getting strong crypto easily. The best example of this is the mislabelled "crypto with a hole," in which ODTC interprets the regulations as allowing them to limit software with no cryptography in it at all but only hooks which could allow the insertion of crypto later. The ITAR says that they only regulate "software with the capability of maintaining secrecy" and so on its face would not extend to software which only has hooks for crypto. But this doesn't stop ODTC and there is no mechanism in place to allow anyone else to stop them short of a lawsuit or a change in the law by Congress. So, having said that, here's where I think they could fit in the "piracy" sublicense maneuver: First, entering into the sublicensing agreement could be interpreted as a "defense service." By giving them a license you are "assisting the foreign person" because, presumably, life is easier for them if they have a license. Second, call the sub-license agreement "technical data" since it is related to the crypto. Or, as they did with Zimmermann, they just assume that the company had something to do with the unauthorized export and begin an investigation. If it goes to indictment, better hope you have iron-clad evidence to convince the jury that you had nothing to do with it. If you've gone ahead and sub-licensed afterwards, making money off of the illegal act, I think it would be difficult to convince a jury that you didn't have something to do with it. Gotta write a brief now, Cindy Cohn > >A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) >Associate Professor of Law | >U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu >P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin >Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's hot here. And humid. > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Date: Thu, 11 Jul 1996 04:06:05 +0000 >>From: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott(a)hrnowl.lonestar.org> >To: cypherpunks mailing list <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> >Subject: Can the inevitability of Software privacy be used to defeat the ITAR? > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >All software companies who sell (really licence) software >must deal with the inevitability of software piracy. It >is a brute fact that any usefully product sold in the U.S. >will eventually appear as an unauthorized copy for sale >abroad. This fact must be recognized in the software companies' >business plan. > >The question occurs to me "why can not this fact be used to >defeat the ITAR?" > >What is to prevent a U.S company to licence a foreign company >to sublicence and distribute a Crypto product abroad, if that >foreign company obtains that product on the pirate market? > >I am not a lawyer, but I look at the definition of "export" >on page 612 of Applied Cryptography and nothing seems to >obviously apply. > >The scenario I imagine is this: U.S. company produces a crypto >product. To be generally useful, the product supports all languages. >(Those CDROMs really do hold a lot of data.) >After all, Americans do need to do business with foreigners. >The company licences and distributes the product in the U.S. >taking special care not to distribute the product to any foreign persons. >When inevitability, the product appears in the pirate market outside >the U.S., the company makes a contract with a foreign company >allowing it to distribute it and sublicence it. The foreign company >can get their copy from the pirate market, being authorized to get >the copy by the U.S. company. When this deal is cut copies >have already been exported and are already being sold by the >pirates, against the will of the U.S. company. > >In this scenario, the U.S. company had done everything >it possibly could to prevent the illegal export of its product. But >when its efforts have inevitably failed, it makes money by >sublicencing. > >When I look at the definition of Export on page 612 of applied >cryptography, I see one clause that defines transferring registration >as export, but only for aircraft, vessels and satellites. > >OK, cypherpunk legal types, there has got to be something wrong >with this idea. There are a lot of smart people in the world, >so if this idea was good, somebody else would have thought of >it before now! But what is specifically is wrong with it? >I want to be educated! > >- -- >Paul Elliott Telephone: 1-713-781-4543 >Paul.Elliott(a)hrnowl.lonestar.org Address: 3987 South Gessner #224 > Houston Texas 77063 > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.3 >Charset: cp850 > >iQCVAgUBMeR9nvBUQYbUhJh5AQGkYAP/bN0lmkjF6uZ92MmWIqdZwVmLmsiIUg9L >XbtYaeawNCMdi2BnkDUu4j/G1rNngFuAmRwABE9UxKOnwjMU5lfmxHev5RP9/CBF >81AnYc1bWeh52EuKJCKu47LMDn9PqfiCIGBwfRehgkZ72gO0+ywIP1fZrkwNNCF+ >Md76LqUE5Z4= >=k7M5 >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > ************************ Cindy A. Cohn McGlashan & Sarrail, P. C. 177 Bovet Road, 6th Floor San Mateo, CA 94402 (415) 341-2585 (tel) (415)341-1395 (fax) Cindy(a)McGlashan.com http://www.McGlashan.com

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Re: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts? (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts? > Date: Fri, 12 Jul 1996 19:37:42 -0400 (EDT) > From: "Michael H. Warfield" <mhw(a)wittsend.com> > > Eric Murray enscribed thusly: > > > Caller ID isn't for people, it's for businesses who want to > > track callers. They're willing to pay for that service, enough > > to make it worth the while of the phone companies to spend many > > millions on a campaign of lies (excuse me, "PR") to convince us > > that we need CID for "safety". > > number was to be able to log and track that information. Every wonder > about those local companies who still had you call a 1-800 number. Guess > what. That was the easiest (and sometimes the cheapest) way to get ANI. > I ran a Harris 20/20 PBX switch for a company over 6 years ago and remember > looking over and discussing the ANI specs with the management. We decided > not to pursue trying to get ANI on our DID lines but the switch supported > it and that switch was considered out of date technology at THAT time! > I can verify this ability of telephone switches and number tracking. From 1984 to 1990 I worked for the University of Texas at Austin in their Physical Plant Telco shop. I worked on a NT SL-1 based switch feeding voice, data, and analog signals all over campus as well as interfacing to SWBT's trunk lines. I personaly used the system to track on campus phreak and hack attacks as well as feeding the universities computerized security system. We used a Charles Rivers 68/35 running building control software. With it we could track various aspects of the telephone switch and log them offline. We used the system strictly for input of signals for physical security (ie door switches, mag-locks, PIR's, etc.) over the dry pair of the switch. Watch your 6's. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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RE: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts?
by Bill Olson (EDP) 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What's worse, is that if you just want to call and get information about a particular product, they can log you for their marketing database. >---------- >From: David Mazieres[SMTP:dm@amsterdam.lcs.mit.edu] >Sent: Friday, July 12, 1996 8:55 AM >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts? > >My last phone bill said that Nynex is now giving out people's names in >addidtion to their phone numbers over caller-id. I therefore called >Nynex and told them to block caller-id on my phone line. > >They said no problem, but... They said nothing I can do will block it >when I call 800 numbers. "The people with 800 numbers have special >software, and there is nothing you can do to block your identity when >calling them. Not even *67." > >Wow. Maybe I'm not paranoid enough, but I never expected this. I can >never again call an 800 number anonymously to get information about >something unless I go out to a pay phone. What an incredible >inconvenience, and how truly depressing. > >I know 800 number owners probably used to be able to get lists of >calling phone numbers on their phone bills, but this is less >disturbing as it would take significant effort to match up the lists >after the fact. I just want to be able to call up companies and say, >for instance, "If I buy your product, can it do X?" as opposed to, for >instance, "I'm stuck with your product, can it do X?". People are >often more helpful in the former case. Now, though, they'll know >exactly who I am before they even say hello. > >David >

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Re: Can't block caller ID in Massachusetts?
by Dana W. Albrecht 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Mazieres writes: > My last phone bill said that Nynex is now giving out people's names in > addidtion to their phone numbers over caller-id. I therefore called > Nynex and told them to block caller-id on my phone line. > > They said no problem, but... They said nothing I can do will block it > when I call 800 numbers. "The people with 800 numbers have special > software, and there is nothing you can do to block your identity when > calling them. Not even *67." > > Wow. Maybe I'm not paranoid enough, but I never expected this. I can > never again call an 800 number anonymously to get information about > something unless I go out to a pay phone. What an incredible > inconvenience, and how truly depressing. > > I know 800 number owners probably used to be able to get lists of > calling phone numbers on their phone bills, but this is less > disturbing as it would take significant effort to match up the lists > after the fact. I just want to be able to call up companies and say, > for instance, "If I buy your product, can it do X?" as opposed to, for > instance, "I'm stuck with your product, can it do X?". People are > often more helpful in the former case. Now, though, they'll know > exactly who I am before they even say hello. > > David 800 (And 888/900 etc.) numbers use a different mechanism (ANI) than caller ID to provide your telephone number to the person you are calling. This has been around far longer than caller ID, and really doesn't have all that much to do with the caller ID service, which is entirely different. So in essence, nothing's really changed with regard to 800 numbers, except that people are now becoming _aware_ that the called party has access to their telephone number. If you want additional information, I'd recommend starting with the FAQ for the alt.2600 newsgroup. Dana W. Albrecht dwa(a)corsair.com

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