December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Wasting time and bandwidth on Bell
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 7 Jun 1996 08:29:56 -0400 (EDT), Declan McCullagh wrote: >Excerpts from internet.cypherpunks: 6-Jun-96 Re: FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS >by jim bell(a)pacifier.com >> Not quite yet, anyway. I'm very disappointed to have waited over a >>year for >> some slick lawyer to show me how I'd be violating some law or another >>to do so ... >A few observations: >1. Not many readers of cypherpunks are lawyers I've noticed quite a few, actually. I don't know how many are regular readers but there seems to be enough to maintain a steady undercurrent of legal thinking on the issues associated with digital commerce, some anonymity and First Amendment issues, a sprinkling of criminal law topics, and of course, banking, intellectual property, SEC, antitrust, general contract, and related commercial law. >2. Of the laywers who do read cypherpunks, many may not choose to spend >their time researching what laws AP may violate. Or they're not "slick" >lawyers; take your pick. Or they automatically delete any posts that come from or relate to the puerile bullshit Bell is infamous for, and choose not to get dragged into this type of time- and bandwidth- wasting garbage. Of which this post is just another, of course, but i get so damn sick and tired of the constant imposition of 'AP' and related nonsense on this list. Of late, the trolls seems to be particularly effective among people who should know better, and an aura of credence or relevance has developed around some of this crap. Can't we just ignore it, and move on? Maybe if we ignore him he'll go away. >3. Congress would have no problems passing a law outlawing AP, if one >does not exist already. > >-Declan I would be satisfied if they just outlawed e-mail about it.

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Re: Anonymous stock trades.
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu writes: > >He's a Cato fellow. I don't think that implies anything more than > >he he gets some money from them. > > Nope, he is listed in "senior staff". He's listed in the staff section, but he's clearly labeled as a fellow. P.J. O'Rourke is also listed in the same column as a fellow. I suppose he's working at Cato full time and only moonlights at Rolling Stone. The fact that neither of them lives within striking distance of Cato headquarters (O'Rourke lives in New Hampshire) makes your claim ever more interesting. > I'm working on digital signature systems under a DARPA contract. We shall therefore have to declare you to be a U.S. Government employee. .pm

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RE: Anonymous stock trades.
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu >The farmers want to get a freebie handout while pretending that they >are not on >welfare. This leads to a mechanism which is attempting socialist >policies ... [etc.] ............................................................. Okay, but what does this have to do with anonymous stock trades? > .. >Blanc

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Re: [NOISE] Banking's Physical Security
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Sean T Carnes <crisper(a)ascensionet.com> > We all know that banks are very highly protected as far as their money = > goes but how safe are there computers? I live very close to a computer = > database collecting company that collects the data related to many banks = > in the area. It is all done through land lines and is not very well = > protected. They aren't very careful about who or what they let into the = > building also. If someone were to cut the lines the banks in the area = > would be out for days and they wouldn't have a means to do interbank = > transactions outside of the immediate area. Has anyone else seen this = > in there area or heard of it. Wouldn't it be a better idea to do the = > transactions by satellite. There's a big difference between a real bank and a data collection outfit. I used to work at a major money center bank in the Wall Street area. To get to the data center I had to: 1. Walk into the building, past an armed security guard. 2. Within sight of him, use my badge stripe to get through a turnstile - most employees had badges which were limited in the times they would work. 3. Take an elevator to the (unadvertised) correct floor. 4. Use my badge in a reader to get out of the elevator lobby - most badges were restricted in the floors they would open. 5. Use my badge to get through an unmarked door, into the 'airlock'. In the airlock, I'd hold my photo ID up to a reader, so the guard downstairs could. a. Compare my face against that on the photo ID. b. Check that I was authorized to enter the data center. c. Check that there was no one else in the airlock with me. If he was satisfied, he'd open the inside door remotely. 6. The data center was manned by at least two operators (usually more), 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Only they were permitted to touch terminals connected to operational systems. (There were other security features I won't go into.) Sure, our fiber optic lines to CHIPS and the Fed occasionally went out - that's what backup dialout phone lines are for. If we had phone problems, the lines were fixed in a couple hours, not days. At a pinch, I imagine you could use now a cellphone and modem to keep things moving. Peter Trei

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Remailer thoughts
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Adam, Forwarded message: > From: Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> > Subject: Re: Remailer chain length? > Date: Tue, 4 Jun 1996 22:57:10 -0500 (EST) > > Jim Choate wrote: > > | > I don't think multiple remailers at the same site help anything. > | > > | > | I agree completely. If traffic analysis is going to be done on a single box > | it isn't going to matter how many remailers are there. The monitor will > | simply grab them all. At this point it simply maps them thusly: > > | incoming message > remailer #1 > .... > remailer #n > outgoing > | > | > | That this really maps to is obvious: > | > | > | incoming message > remailer #1-#n > outgoing > > Analyzing the traffic through three remailers is more > difficult than analyzing the traffic through one. One remailer with > three N messages per day is more secure than an equivilant remailer > with N mesasges. Not if they are on the same box, simply treat the box itself as the remailer. The internal mechanics are for the most part irrelevant to this issue. N messages go in, N messages with (number of remailers)(# of cover traffic/real message) messages of cover. My contention is that it does not matter how many remailers are on a single box. It is the number of connections in and out of the box available. The above equation is clearly linear and therefore not what I would consider computationaly challenging. If I may introduce some terminology (unless their is an existing stnd.), x number of messages y message multiplier N#() remailer number # R#() number of remailers on machine # C() number of cover messages/original messages E# number of connections on machine # T() total traffic through remailer system $i() cost per message, incoming $o() cost per message, outgoing C fixed cost items of operation (eg rent) Note: each of these represent a family of functions. My contention: T(R#(n)) is equivalent to T(R#(N1(x), N2(x)..., Nn(x))) Where, T() = R#(n)(2N#(x) + C(yN#(x))) The term 2N#(x) represents the number of valid messages the remailer handles. x incoming & x outgoing, hence 2x. The total income of such a remailer: $(T(x))=$i(x)-$o(T(x)-x)-C It is important to recognize the profit dependancy on the input/output message ratio. If it gets too high, you got nothing to spend on yourself. Your contention (if I may translate): N1(3x) is more secure than N1(x), assuming identical remailer configuration. Do you consider N#(ax) equivalent to aN#(x)? May I inquire into your reasoning? > [much good thought deleted.] > > | 5. Automaticaly limits spamming unless a remailer allows cloning > | AND all recipients share a commen private key. > > Or unless the remailer mails to a mail to news gateway. This is a limitation of the mail-news gateway and not of the remailer technology. What it points to is a serious shortcoming in mail-news gateway software. The technology required for truely efficient newsgroup handling is something sorely in need of work. > | 6. It maps 1:1 onto the physical remailer model with the same limits > | on information at each stage. This allows one to directly apply > | the current history of precedence involving anonymity and > | physical remailers. > > With physical remailers, you can open the inner envelopes and > read the message, leaving the end user to wonder where the post office > lost the message. With 'real' remailers, the lost message can't be > read, only not delivered. If the encryption technology is secure. The point I am making here is that the encryption envelope is 'secure' only so long as nobody is trying to crack it. Sooner or later somebody is going to decrypt your message, if not the entire encryption system. This is synonymous with the physical model. The paper envelope is secure as long as somebody isn't breaking the law by tampering with the mail. > | This is the basic model that the Austin Cypherpunks are working on at the > | currrent time. The big problem we have right now is determining if the body > | is actualy encrypted. We have done some basic tests of encryption-spoofing > | using pgp and it is looks to be a thorny problem. It simply is not trivial > | to look at a block of characters and determine if they are actualy > | encrypted. You can't rely on the wrapper around the data put there by the > > I'm not sure I see why this matters? If you check that the > message is not obviously readable, why not assume that its well > encrypted? You're rarely required to contort yourself to ensure your > customers are obeying the law (weaponsmiths, cryptographers, and banks > excepted.) Ok. Let's for a moment assume that to send a message to 'president(a)whitehouse.gov' with 'Die Bill!' is a crime. Would it not be a crime to foil a packet of encryption by inserting 'Die Bill!' messages in clear text in the encryption block? To date, provided no attempt at actual decryption is attempted, there is nothing in the standards that prevent this other than digital signatures. And again, a specific program has to be executed. A person might very well look at it as plaintext w/o ever running digital signatures (or they just assume its always right). Would this also be a crime? Jim Choate "Reality is observer dependant" \ \ \\///// | | (.) (.) ===========================oOO==(_)==OOo========================== Tivoli an IBM company CyberTects: SSZ Customer Support Engineer SOHO Consulting/VR/Robotics 9442 Capitol of Texas Highway North 1647 Rutland Suite 500 #244 Austin, TX 78759 Austin, TX 78758 Email: jchoate(a)tivoli.com Email: ravage(a)ssz.com Phone: (512) 436-8893 Phone: (512) 259-2994 Fax: (512) 345-2784 Fax: n/a WWW: www.tivoli.com WWW: www.ssz.com Modem: n/a Modem: (512) 836-7374 Pager: n/a Pager: n/a Cellular: n/a Cellular: n/a ===================================================================

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E-Data Systems ~ patent #4,528,643
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think this has made the rounds here, already. If it hasn't, any comments? Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 7 Jun 1996 15:53:52 GMT X-Sender: jnferree(a)postoffice.worldnet.att.net Mime-Version: 1.0 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: "J. Neil Ferree" <jnferree(a)worldnet.att.net> Subject: E-Data Systems ~ patent #4,528,643 Has anyone else received the *Amnesty* documentation from E-data Systems of Secaucus, NJ regarding their patent on: ... system for reproducing information in material objects at a point of sale location ... "The patent generally describes the system and methodology whereby products composed of digital data are purchased and embedded electronically at a point of sale location from a host computer. The products are typically delivered in usable form only after payment is made. The purchaser requests delivery after the money requirements are satisfied and authorized for the delivery is granted. In today's vernacular, the patent covers on-demand electronic distribution". [taken from the accompanying brochure] Their licensing agreement (with fee schedules) addresses; 1) Content providers; Owners and sellers of products which are sold and delivered electronically by the provider or through a distribution network owned by another within the scope of at least one of the E-data Systems patent claims. 2) Resellers; Distributors who provide a distribution network for content providers to sell products within the scope of at least one of the E-data Systems patent claims. 3) Service providers for Electronic Distribution Applications; Providers of various services, (ie) encryption, locking, unlocking metering, etc. who provide applications for content providers and/or resellers within the scope of at least on of the E-data Systems patent claims. Contact information for E-data Systems regarding how to obtain a license .... Tele 800-406-1668 Web www.3wnet.com/corp/edata e-mail gift(a)planet.net --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: Anonymous stock trades.
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:52 AM 6/7/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >... As >any free market economist would tell you, the way to stop a resource >from being destroyed is not to pray that people won't buy it but to >assure that someone has an ownership stake in the resource, thus >assuring that their investment would be destroyed if the resource >vanished. Thats why, for instance, timber companies happily clear cut >government land that they have leased (after all, not clear cutting >would mean that they wouldn't extract maximum value for their lease >under the idiotic terms that the leases are made under) but will >almost never clear cut their own lands, because that would reduce >their long term value. I find this analysis a bit superficial because it does not consider the difference between short-term and long-term value. To use Perry's example of the timber industry. Before the late 1980s, the lands owned by Pacific Lumber were managed for long-term production. When the company was taken over as part of the "maximize present value" movement in the late 1980s, the management goals changed to increase timber production without regard to long-term production. (I seem to remember that the takeover was one of Michael Milken's deals.) My conclusion from this example is that if your interest is in the long-term preservation of ecosystems, you need institutions that are structured so they take a long-term view, and can not be subverted by short-term trends in markets. As far as I can tell, the US National Park Service, for all its faults, does as good a job of preserving ecosystems as any other institution, and better than most. (If you disagree, please provide examples of institutions that do as well.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: NSA/CIA to snoop INSIDE the U.S.???
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a fucking big story. Allowing the CIA and NSA to snoop domestically, and using only a handful of suspicions and anecdotes about cybernastiness and evil cryptohackers to justify this major policy shift -- well, it's fucking amazing. Nunn's proposal, unfortunately, was more than a "suggestion." But Rory's right. DC *is* in the throes of Internet fever, and it'll just get worse as the summer gets hotter and hotter. It's almost 80 degress right now. -Declan >What?! What the *@#!! is wrong with the people who supposedly smart >people representing us?! > >Ern > >-------- From SJ Mercury: > > NET FEVER ON THE HILL > > Published: June 6, 1996 > > BY RORY J. O'CONNOR > Mercury News Washington Bureau > > WASHINGTON -- The White House wants a coordinated task force to fight > terrorism on the Internet. Some senators think the CIA should be > allowed to work hand in hand with the FBI to fight computer crime on > U.S. soil. Meanwhile, the federal courts are deciding a major First > Amendment case that might ban certain information from the Net. > > The nation's capital is in the throes of Internet fever. > > For the past several months, the condition has become acute, and by > the end of the year the Internet itself may look far different as a > result: more tightly regulated, more carefully monitored and more > expensive. > > The latest symptom: a suggestion Wednesday for the elimination of laws > that prohibit U.S. intelligence agencies -- notably the National >>>> Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency -- from snooping <<< >>>> on home soil. The reason: The potential for computer crime and <<< > terrorism is so great, and the Internet so decentralized and > international, that police and the FBI must combine forces with spy > agencies in order to successfully analyze the threat and investigate > criminal activity. > > ''If we're going to live in this kind of world, we're going to have to > link the intelligence world with law enforcement,'' said Sen. Sam > Nunn, D-Ga. > > For many people in government who work on computer and law-enforcement > issues, the course of the disease seems painfully slow. They often > describe the Internet as the Wild West that's sorely in need of a good > marshal. But for many people who use the Internet, the government's > efforts are moving far ahead of any real knowledge of a technology > that, two years ago, almost nobody had heard of. > > ''There are not dead bodies in the street,'' said Donna L. Hoffman, a > professor at Vanderbilt University who studies the Internet. ''It just > doesn't make sense to rush into legislation.'' > > [ SNIP ]

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Re: E-Data Systems ~ patent #4,528,643
by Yanni 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I think this has made the rounds here, already. > > If it hasn't, any comments? > > Cheers, > Bob Hettinga yea, we got a couple of them from those guys... whatever... how can you claim a patent on that stuff? geeezzz... -jon Jon (no h) S. Stevens yanni(a)clearink.com ClearInk WebMagus http://www.clearink.com/ finger pgp(a)sparc.clearink.com for pgp pub key What I just wrote is beta. Please report all bugs directly to me.

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I swear I am not making this up. (rec.music.white-power)
by ezundel＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: bb748(a)FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Milton Kleim) Newsgroups: news.groups,alt.skinheads,alt.politics.nationalism.white, alt.politics.white-power Subject: Statement Regarding rec.music.white-power Date: 6 Jun 1996 23:10:41 GMT Organization: The National Capital FreeNet Lines: 48 Sender: bb748(a)freenet3.carleton.ca (Milton Kleim) Message-ID: <4p7ohh$mq2(a)freenet-news.carleton.ca> NNTP-Posting-Host: freenet3.carleton.ca Now that the results for our newsgroup proposal have been issued, we wish to make a statement concerning our objectives. Three objectives were sought in the rec.music.white-power project: #1: Generate mainstream media publicity for the Aryan Resistance Movement and disseminate the Holy Cause of the 14 Words -- "We must secure the existence of our People and a future for White children." #2: Encourage revelation of Enemy activists' identities to facilitate counter-espionage and prevent many instances of "anti-racist" activism against the 14 Words. #3: Create a newsgroup for discussion and promotion of Aryan music. On objective one, we succeeded beyond all expectations. No informed North American is not now unaware of our existence on the Internet. National Public Radio, _USA Today_, the _St. Paul Pioneer Press_, and Minnesota Public Radio, to name a few media organs, gave us priceless free publicity for our ideas and our Holy Cause. On objective two, we also succeeded well. We now have a comprehensive list of Enemy agents who are active on the Net. Aryan Corps Counter- intelligence is now undertaking a classification and cataloguing project which will make our counter-espionage efforts much more effective. On objective three, we obviously failed, but this was expected. Nonethe- less, benefit has been gained from this defeat. The Aryan Corps succeeded in organizing hundreds of Aryan Resistance Movement activists toward a constructive goal, increasing the "esprit de corps" of our ranks. We would like to thank all individuals who, for whatever reason, voted in the affirmative for our group. A special thanks is extended to Mr. Michael Handler, our vote-taker, for his herculean efforts to process the massive results for our proposal. We wish him well. -- Milton John Kleim, Jr., Proponent, rec.music.white-power; Chief Organi- zer, Aryan Corps -- White Wolf (RH), Deputy Organizer, Aryan Corps And on behalf of the entire Aryan Corps Network.

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