December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

test
by uunet!in1.uu.net!news.mathworks.com!tank.news.pipex.net!pipex!warwick!bsmail!mail!lwmdcg＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Just testing the post
by uunet!in2.uu.net!news.sprintlink.net!news.utech.net!＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Post Test -- John G. Jones Director, Computer Services UTDS, Inc. <http://www.utech.net> <mailto:john@utech.net> 1593 E. Chestnut Lompoc, CA 93436 (805) 735-4447

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Needed: Dongles and "Crypto Boxes" on Ports
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:56 PM 3/5/96, Hal wrote: ... >It will be just as easy to steal the mixmaster executable as to steal a >script file containing a pass phrase. And it might even be possible to >run the stolen mixmaster directly to decrypt intercepted incoming mail >messages, without even having to type in the pass phrase. Failing that >the attacker could easily extract the pass phrase from the mixmaster >executable file. > >The other suggestion that was made here, that the operator would have to >manually type in the pass phrase every time the computer rebooted, would >be a way of avoiding having the information in the clear on the disk. >However it would probably not be a practical method of operation given >the reliability of at least the Unix operating systems that I am familiar >with. And even then the information is in memory. An attacker who could ... It seems to me that we get some of the advantages of "secure hardware" (and I don't mean in a formal NSA "Orange Book" sense) by having secure dongles attached to serial or other ports on machines. "Dongles" are the much-hated copy protection devices used with some products: they typically are a small plastic-packages doodad plugged into a serial port on a PC. (The Mac versions are less common; don't know if Unix boxes have ever used them.) In the case described by Hal, there might be two imaginable modes of operation: 1. The dongle feeds a passphrase at boot time. This is not very secure, as means could be found to either intercept the supplied passphrase and/or find system commands that would trigger the providing. But at least the passphrase is nominally not stored on a disk accessible to outsiders. (The passphrase is still presumably in memory, as noted above by Hal, and by others. But at least it's not on a disk.) 2. Some sort of zero knowledge protocol in which the dongle possesses the secret knowledge and does part of the decryption, etc. Seen more broadly, this dongle might actually be a separate PC box, 386- or 486-based, and connected to the main Unix box. The main box would still do the usual stuff, but the "secure box" would have a constrained set of operations--maybe running a stripped-down Linux or FreeBSD a la our discussions a few years ago--and would essentially only operate as a crypto box. A separate crypto box could be quite cheap, and one could imagine measures to make it less prone to physical tampering (*) and certainly less prone to network snooping. (* Tamper-resistant vs. tamper-responding. See the FAQ. Basically, there is no such thing as a "tamper-proof box." But "tamper-resistant" can mean PC boards potted in epoxy, locked lids, no floppies, alarms, etc. And "tamper-responding" means there is evidence given that a security barrier has been breached.) A "crypto box" could in fact handle most of the mix functions directly, bypassing the Unix box. The Unix box--the one hooked to the Net in the usual way--would get the incoming packets, send them to the crypto box, then get back the processed messages. If done right, the crypto box could ensure that no records are kept of the mapping between incoming and outgoing messages. A court order to produce the mapping could then be honestly responded to with a "no records are kept, or can even possibly be kept." (Without modification of the software/hardware, something which Digital Telephony II could certainly mandate, but it doesn't exist now.) I think a "crypto box" based on a cheap 486 box, a reduced functionality Linux, and very limited storage capabilities (possibly no disk, only RAM), could be an interesting way to solve both the passphrase-snarfing and LEA-subpoenaing problems. While not as secure as either a Chaumian tamper-responding digital mix (cf. the 1981 paper in CACM) or as a software-based DC-Net, it sure does beat the current model of multiuser Unix boxes running remailers out of user accounts! (A word on separating the functions into a "network box" (what I've also called a "Unix box") and a separate "crypto box." There is no reason one box cannot do both....but by separating the two functions and linking the boxes via a secure connection, one faces less temptation to add more capabilities, storage, and users to the "crypto box." So, I think it better for remailer operators to continue to have their powerful, capable, net connection boxes and then have a stripped-down, possibly RAM-only box that only does limited things. It's also possible to have several boxes, just with different Net addresses, but there might still be the temptation to give the "remailer box" more capabilities. My intuition is that it would be easier and more secure to just have the crypto/remailer box as a slave or dongle to the more capable box.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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FT on Crypto Cloud
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Financial Times, March 6, 1996, IT Section, p. V. Network Security: Operating under a cloud of uncertainty Companies face a complex web of technical, legal and moral questions The IT security threat has long been depicted in terms of wild-eyed hackers hunched over terminals late into the night. But while there is real cause for concern about criminal activity over computer networks, large corporations are very worried about another threat to their use of electronic communications. Meanwhile, government restrictions on the use of data encryption codes in various countries are limiting the ability of commercial organisations to protect themselves. Cryptography is at the heart of this dilemma. Governments all over the world rely on specialist intelligence units to break down data transmissions from other nations and individuals while encrypting their own messages. The US National Security Agency and the UK's Government Communications HQ are the best-known of these agencies. The NSA is notorious for obsessive secrecy. Meanwhile, in the UK, the GCHQ has lifted its traditional reticence in recent years to offer advice to British companies concerned with data security. Mr Roger James, chairman of Cheshire-based communications software specialist Boldon James, has worked with GCHQ to define data standards for UK government departments. Mr James plays down the cloak-and-dagger imagine of GCHQ, but instead he describes his contact with its staff as "horribly technical". He also portrays the Cheltenham code-breakers as "very down-to-earth people". There are two ways of looking at security, he says "one is the practical approach, which means accepting that perfect security is impossible to obtain. The other is the Ivory Tower approach, which involves dreaming of a world in which security is absolute. There are a lot of 'practicalists' in GCHQ". Mr James, whose clients include the Britannia Building Society and the German Navy, is active in the European Electronic Messaging Association. He is concerned at the lack of a co-ordinated European policy on encryption. And he fears that effective security measures could become illegal with the advent of future legislation curbing the availability of encryption software. It is illegal at the moment to use strong cryptography techniques in France without first depositing the key to unlocking your codes with the French government. UK companies developing sophisticated security programs find their software classified as munitions and subject to tight export restrictions, even within the EC. In the US, the author of strong encryption program, called 'Pretty Good Privacy', found himself facing a Grand Jury and possible charges of exporting prohibited technology. The NSA has proposed that all personal computers made in the US contain the Clipper Chip. This security feature would give easy access to any data communications, however the user chose to encode it. The proposal is currently stalled, having met with ferocious opposition. Both suppliers of information technology and industry at large need to clear a path through this international maze. The legal structure surrounding the use of encryption technology is of particular concern to anyone working in electronic commerce. "The Clipper Chip debate raised a fundamental moral issue," says Mr James. "Software technology means that strong encryption, previously available only to the military, can now be obtained by the public. If governments then find messages hard to break, it leads immediately to a conflict of interest." One company that has confronted this apparent conflict of interest between state and commerce, with its attendant uncertainty, is the Anglo-Dutch oil giant, Shell. Mr Nick Mansfield, a Shell technical consultant specialising in information security, says the company is enthusiastic about the potential for eliminating paperwork across its sprawling global operations -- "we are committed to electronic trading," he says. "We have a vast electronic-mail network. But there is still a section of our business where we have to use paper". Contract agreements are at issue here. Until security can be absolutely guaranteed, bilateral agreements must be seen to be tamper-proofed. Shell is about to deploy technology to secure personal computers and PC servers across the world. This e-mail security system will cost around L1m in software purchasing plus L100,000 a year to run. It will have 4,000 users. Far from escalating costs, Mr Mansfield explains that expenses are falling as security improves. Shell used to run a secure telex network that cost L4m in technology and required L200,000 a year to support 120 sites. This was superseded by a secure fax network costing L1m in systems, plus L100,000 in annual maintenance for 200 sites. The latest system will expand secure messaging beyond the fax network's remit. But setting up this security system involved Shell in a long and involved process. Its chosen security software is subject to close scrutiny by the UK authorities, who worked with Shell to customise the program before it could be released for use overseas. While Mr Mansfield is pleased that Shell's security system is so strong, it required an export licence and he echoes the concerns of EEMA's Mr James -- "it's a cart and horse situation. Until governments agree on policy and relax some restrictions, industry won't be encouraged to development extreme standards of encryption". There needs to be a broad European debate on this issue. Until this complex web of technical, legal and moral questions are resolved, secure commercial data networks will be operating under a cloud of uncertainty. Michael Dempsey [End] Note: Shell's Nick Mansfield was a speaker at the OECD cryptography conference in Paris in December. This issue of FT includes a 22-page special section on Information Technology.

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Returned mail: User unknown
by Mail Delivery Subsystem 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The original message was received at Mon, 4 Mar 1996 17:28:57 -0800 from cmyk.warwick.com [198.102.205.163] ----- The following addresses had delivery problems ----- <majorodomo(a)toad.com> (unrecoverable error) ----- Transcript of session follows ----- ... while talking to toad.com.: >>> RCPT To:<majorodomo(a)toad.com> <<< 550 <majorodomo(a)toad.com>... User unknown 550 <majorodomo(a)toad.com>... User unknown ----- Original message follows ----- To: majordomo(a)toad.com Subject: unsubscribe cypherpunks From: cypherpunks(a)warwick.com Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 15:11:06 -0500 unsubscribe cypherpunks

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new netscape servers
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the Netscape home page: "Netscape also announced FastTrack Server 2.0, an entry-level Web server that combines all the new capabilities of the next-generation Netscape Servers into one easy-to-use package. FastTrack comes with SSL security, Java and JavaScript support, and Netscape Navigator Gold content-creation software - for only $295." There are two reactions we can have to this. On the one hand, it's a good thing because it's going to make SSL servers a lot more popular. But at the same time, it raises some serious questoins about how Netscape plans on dealing with competitors. It's not clear whether or not the $295 price tag includes a certificate or not. But is it coincidental that people who want to use alternative technology like apacheSSL will have to pay the same price for the cert along as Netscape's customers will have to pay for a plug and play package? (The rest of this post is based on the assumption that you do get a cert with the "fast-track" server. That's not clear, so if I'm wrong, I apologize to the folks at Netscape.) There are two things keeping an organization like c2.org from competitng with Netcape on price: verisign and the licensing fees on rsaref. Both companies have close ties to Netscape. It's imperative that we challenge Netscape's control over the CAs. Obviously they can preinstall whatever CAs they want in their browsers. But that doesn't mean we're powerless. I think we ought to: (1) form a new non-profit low cost CA (2) make a concerted effort to explain the issue to the public and encourage people to ok the new CA. (3) try to create a sense that using a preinstalled CA is a form a collaboration (this will be hard, but I think it's true). If enough people will use a new CA, then it will be as good as one of the pre-installed ones. We can't let this sort of power concentrate in Netscape's hands. It's not a question of whether or not they're good people. It's just a bad development for everyone. -- Alex Strasheim, alex(a)proust.suba.com

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Welcome to cypherpunks
by Majordomo＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Welcome to the cypherpunks mailing list! If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, you can send mail to "Majordomo(a)toad.com" with the following command in the body of your email message: unsubscribe cypherpunks cypherpunks(a)warwick.com Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in case you don't already have it: About cypherpunks ----------------- I. Administrivia (please read, boring though it may be) The cypherpunks list is a forum for discussing personal defenses for privacy in the digital domain. It is a high volume mailing list. If you don't know how to do something, like unsubscribe, send mail to majordomo(a)toad.com and the software robot which answers that address will send you back instructions on how to do what you want. If you don't know the majordomo syntax, an empty message to this address will get you a help file, as will a command 'help' in the body. Even with all this automated help, you may still encounter problems. If you get really stuck, please feel free to contact me directly at the address I use for mailing list management: cypherpunks-owner(a)toad.com Please use this address for all mailing list management issues. Hint: if you try to unsubscribe yourself from a different account than you signed up for, it likely won't work. Log back into your old account and try again. If you no longer have access to that account, mail me at the list management address above. Also, please realize that there will be some cypherpunks messages "in transit" to you at the time you unsubscribe. If you get a response that says you are unsubscribed, but the messages keep coming, wait a day and they should stop. For other questions, my list management address is not the best place, since I don't read it every day. To reach me otherwise, send mail to eric(a)remailer.net This address is appropriate for emergencies (and wanting to get off the list is never an emergency), such as the list continuously spewing articles. Please don't send me mail to my regular mailbox asking to be removed; I'll just send you back a form letter. Do not mail to the whole list asking to be removed. It's rude. The -request address is made exactly for this purpose. To post to the whole list, send mail to cypherpunks(a)toad.com If your mail bounces repeatedly, you will be removed from the list. Nothing personal, but I have to look at all the bounce messages. There is no digest version available. There is an announcements list which is moderated and has low volume. Announcements for physical cypherpunks meetings, new software and important developments will be posted there. Mail to cypherpunks-announce-request(a)toad.com if you want to be added or removed to the announce list. All announcements also go out to the full cypherpunks list, so there is no need to subscribe to both. II. About cypherpunks The cypherpunks list is not designed for beginners, although they are welcome. If you are totally new to crypto, please get and read the crypto FAQ referenced below. This document is a good introduction, although not short. Crypto is a subtle field and a good understanding will not come without some study. Please, as a courtesy to all, do some reading to make sure that your question is not already frequently asked. There are other forums to use on the subject of cryptography. The Usenet group sci.crypt deals with technical cryptography; cypherpunks deals with technical details but slants the discussion toward their social implications. The Usenet group talk.politics.crypto, as is says, is for political theorizing, and cypherpunks gets its share of that, but cypherpunks is all pro-crypto; the debates on this list are about how to best get crypto out there. The Usenet group alt.security.pgp is a pgp-specific group, and questions about pgp as such are likely better asked there than here. Ditto for alt.security.ripem. The cypherpunks list has its very own net.loon, a fellow named L. Detweiler. The history is too long for here, but he thinks that cypherpunks are evil incarnate. If you see a densely worded rant featuring characteristic words such as "medusa", "pseudospoofing", "treachery", "poison", or "black lies", it's probably him, no matter what the From: line says. The policy is to ignore these postings. Replies have never, ever, not even once resulted in anything constructive and usually create huge flamewars on the list. Please, please, don't feed the animals. III. Resources. A. The sci.crypt FAQ anonymous ftp to rtfm.mit.edu:pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt The cryptography FAQ is good online intro to crypto. Very much worth reading. Last I looked, it was in ten parts. B. cypherpunks ftp site anonymous ftp to ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany. There is a glossary there that all new members should download and read. Also recommended for all users are Hal Finney's instructions on how to use the anonymous remailer system; the remailer sources are there for the perl-literate. C. Bruce Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_, published by Wiley This is required reading for any serious technical cypherpunk. An excellent overview of the field, it describes many of the basic algorithms and protocols with their mathematical descriptions. Some of the stuff at the edges of the scope of the book is a little incomplete, so short descriptions in here should lead to library research for the latest papers, or to the list for the current thinking. All in all, a solid and valuable book. It's even got the cypherpunks-request address. IV. Famous last words My preferred email address for list maintenance topics only is hughes(a)toad.com. All other mail, including emergency mail, should go to hughes(a)ah.com, where I read mail much more regularly. Enjoy and deploy. Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence. Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and couriers. Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from speaking about their experiences or their opinions. The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy. But to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best to defend it. Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography. Cypherpunks wish to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of it. Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social structures. Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to defend it. Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good cryptosystems. Cypherpunks love to practice. They love to play with public key cryptography. They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail forwarding and delivery. They love to play with DC-nets. They love to play with secure communications of all kinds. Cypherpunks write code. They know that someone has to write code to defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write it. Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Cypherpunks realize that security is not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress. Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write. Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed. Cypherpunks know that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy. [Last updated Mon Feb 21 13:18:25 1994]

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Re: (Fwd) Gov't run anon servers
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:43 PM 3/5/96, Andrew Loewenstern wrote: (my mention of secure "remailer boxes" elided) >While a solution like that would be optimal, even just a version of >Mixmaster that can use a secure RSA card would do wonders for security. The >secret key is protected in the card and can't be stolen, even by root, >without physically stealing the card. As long as the most of the remailers >in your chain don't have compromised secret keys, it probably won't matter >too much if the individual ops can examine the messages flowing through their >remailer. > >The cards are getting cheaper and can be bought off the shelf (for now). >The hardest part of retrofitting existing remailer software would probably be >extracting the data from the remailer packet and formatting it properly for >the card to do encryption operations on it (and back). I just wrote and sent off to the list some thoughts on using cheap PC hardware to do the crypto and remailer functions, thus taking the onus off the networked box to do the same. The idea of a _card_ is a good one, and one we did in fact kick around a couple of years ago. Recall the days of the "Hardcard"? A Winchester mounted on a card that plugged into a PC slot (this was back in the days when slots for cards were sometimes much more available than spare drive bay slots). A crypto card is an elegant approach, but may be less hacker-available than a really cheap PC. (And in my more paranoid moments, I imagine taking a nice, steel-cased cheapo PC and welding it shut...won't stop someone from seizing it and cutting it open, but you'd probably know if it happened...or, a return to sealing wax and seal rings! A low-tech solution to physical security, but something that may still be useful as an option.) --Tim Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Bidzos on CNBC, discussing Leahy's Bill
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm watching Jim Bidzos being interviewed on CNBC...mainly about Leahy's bill (he's in favor of it)....(One of the benefits of having CNBC business news on all the time while I'm here online.) He thinks it's a good bill, good for U.S. industry, good for California...says some of the language in the bill still provides for "key escrow" of some sort (I think he means the criminal use of crypto provisions....). He still thinks customers absolutely do not want any other parties to hold their keys ("You don't give copies of the keys to your front door or your filing cabinets to the government now, so why should you just because the medium changes from filing cabinets to computer form."--paraphrased). No further word on RSADSI going public, though. (I'm constantly surprised that this hasn't happened, what will all the later-comers going public, and the general hyping of "Internet security" (not that it isn't important, just that it seems that any company with these magic words in its name or prospectus zooms through the roof on IPO). --Tim Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Mail loop?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It looks to me like the mailing list got subscribed to itself again. I saw the intro message go by... Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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