December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: anonymous companies
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> At 06:42 PM 5/16/96 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: >> > I'll just give one problem: the principal-agent problem. How do owners of >> > the company make sure the managers operate the company in their best >> > interest? >On Fri, 17 May 1996 jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: >> Actually looting of companies happens a lot right now today, and very >> seldom leads to criminal charges. Twice I have lost a job because the >> company I worked for went under, apparently due to looting. At 08:37 AM 5/18/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: > Be careful to distingiush "owner" from "employee." All to common a > mistake I fear. > Until someone passes a constitutional right to not be fired, well, you're > employeed at the will and by the good grace of the owners and your boss. I was of course referring to looting by the management, not the shareholders, as should have been obvious from context. >> In others, such as net startups, >> I see no solution other than increased reliance on personal individual >> capital. >Still, vulnerable to last round problems. Reread: Your above statement makes no sense in context. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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two people
by bryce＠digicash.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.19 - 27 Reps Urge President to Abandon Key-Escrow Encryption Policy
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:35 PM 5/17/96 -0400, Bob Palacios wrote: > CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 19 May 17, 1996 > >The bi-partisan call to President Clinton to abandon the Administration's >key escrow policy is yet another encouraging sign of increasingly strong >Congressional support for reform of US encryption policy. Congress is >currently considering several bills designed to encourage the widespread >availability privacy-protecting technologies for the Internet by lifting >export controls on strong encryption: > >* HR 3011, the "Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act of > 1996", sponsored by over 30 members including Reps Goodlatte (R-VA), > Campbell (R-CA), Eshoo (D-CA), Boucher (D-VA). > >* S. 1726, the "Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era (Pro- > CODE) act of 1996, sponsored by Senators Burns (R-MT), Leahy (D-VT), > Pressler (R-SD), Dole (R-KS), Wyden (D-OR), and Murray (D-WA) > >* S. 1587, the "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996", also > sponsored by Senators Burns and Leahy. > >Hearings on HR 3011 (Rep Goodlatte's bill) and the Burns/Leahy S. 1726 >(Pro-CODE) are expected in June. You know, I really would appriciate it if CDT didn't present S1587 as if it is just another "relax restrictions on encryption" bill. We raked that bill over the coals, found it seriously flawed, and generally pro-encryption people don't seem to be defending it at all. It contained many aspects which have the prospect of future danger to the use of encryption. And, S. 1726 seems to contain most of the desireable aspects of S.1587, and few of the negatives. Add to that the fact that Leahy (as described above) seems to be supporting S. 1726, there is no need to make it appear to an uninformed person that S. 1587 that it is anything other than a mistake. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Crypto-News: Congress tells Clinton "Dump key escrow/Clipper schemes" (5/17/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| TWENTY-SEVEN MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES URGE CLINTON TO ABANDON KEY ESCOW AND "IMMEDIATELY LIBERALIZE EXPORT CONTROLS ON ENCRYPTION PROGRAMS AND PRODUCTS" Date: May 17, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents News Text of letter from House members to President Clinton Text of press release from Rep. Goodlatte How to receive crypto-news ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEWS Today a band of twenty-seven House members signed a letter to President Clinton urging him to abandon key escrow schemes, and immediately liberalize export controls on encryption programs and products. The letter argues that "a key escrow approach will not adequately address security concerns", citing security as a "prerequisite to exploiting the potential of the Global Information Infrastructure." Rep. Goodlatte led many of the signatories on the letter to introduce and cosponsor H.R. 3011, the Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act" earlier this year, which liberalizes export controls on encryption products. Copies of the letter to the President, the press release, and H.R. 3011 can be found on the Encryption Policy Resource Page at http://www.crypto.com/ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- TEXT OF LETTER FROM HOUSE MEMBERS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON Congress of the United States Washington, DC 20515 May 15, 1996 The Honorable William J. Clinton The White House Washington, D.C. 20500 Dear Mr. President: We are writing to ask you not to proceed with your Administration's key escrow encryption policy proposal and instead to immediately liberalize export controls on non-key escrow encryption programs and products. Many of us have sponsored H.R. 3011, the "Security and Freedom Though Encryption (SAFE) Act" which would ensure the continued ability of Americans to use and sell good encryption and would permit the export of generally available software with encryption capabilities and other such software and hardware under license when certain conditions are met. We understand that the Administration has developed a key escrow encryption proposal and is not at this time willing to ease export restrictions on encryption programs and products which are widely available from domestic and foreign companies and the Internet. We share the concerns of a wide range of businesses and privacy interests that a key escrow approach will not adequately address security concerns. The ability of companies and individuals to ensure that the information they send over communications and computer networks is secure is a prerequisite to exploiting the potential of the Global Information Infrastructure. For example, U.S. small businesses are beginning to harness the Internet to enter foreign markets. The Internet in effect lowers the barriers to entry for these companies. But they will not be able to rely on the Internet if their information is not secure. We also have serious concerns about the impact of the Administration's policy on the U.S. economy and job creation. (Indeed, it is our strong belief the U.S. economic interests must be a primary consideration in encryption policy discussions with other countries, the OECD, and in other forums. It is not clear that this has been the case in the discussions held up to this point). A recent report entitled "A Study of the International Market for Computer Software With Encryption" prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the National Security Agency indicated that U.S. companies will lose market share given the availability of stronger encryption products overseas. The Computer Systems Policy Project estimates that unless the U.S. relaxes out-of-date export controls, the U.S. technology industry will lose $60 billion in revenues and 200,000 jobs by the year 2000. As Congress begins to consider H.R. 3011 we would greatly appreciate knowing whether the Administration plans to publish a final rule implementing a key escrow encryption proposal or, alternatively, will relax export controls on encryption programs and products which do not have a key escrow feature. Sincerely, Tom Campbell Bob Goodlatte Anna Eshoo Eliot Engel Zoe Lofgren Bob Barr Carlos Moorhead Patricia Schroeder Barney Frank Sam Gejdenson Howard Coble Rick Boucher Fred Heineman Sonny Bono Vernon Ehlers Randy Cunningham Charlie Norwood Randy Tate Donald Manzullo Helen Chenoweth Thomas Davis Roscoe Bartlett Sam Farr Ken Calvert Linda Smith Joseph Moakley Lynn Woolsey ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE FROM REP. GOODLATTE NEWS FROM: Congressman Bob Goodlatte Virginia's 6th District 123 Cannon HOB Washington, D.C. 25515 Phone: (202) 225-5431 DATE: May 16, 1996 CONTACT: Doug Clark 202-225-5431 REP. GOODLATTE ASKS PRESIDENT NOT TO PROCEED WITH ENCRYPTION POLICY Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), lead sponsor of S.A.F.E., the Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act, was joined by Tom Campbell (R-CA), Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), Anne Eshoo (D-CA), Bob Barr (R-GA), Eliot Engle (D-NY), and a bipartisan group of 21 of their colleagues in the House in writing President Clinton asking him not to proceed with his Administration's key escrow encryption policy proposal and instead to immediately liberalize export controls on non-key escrow encryption programs and products. "I have received recent information that the Administration is circulating yet another version of a key escrow proposal for comments from selected individuals. In my opinion this proposal is a non-starter and will not do. It's just a back door approach for more big government intrusion into every American's privacy," said Goodlatte. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:44 PM 5/17/96 -0500, snow wrote: > How about this as an idea: > > Get a few (3 to 5) accounts in a high density market (i.e. lots of >ISP's locally) set up a unix machine on a cheap machine. Have the anon >messages get sent to the pop accounts. Once an hour (or less depending on >budget) have the unix box poll the different pop accounts mix the messages >and resend them the next hour. > This could be further obfuscated by batching the messages up and >posting a whole chunk of messages to a different similar remailer else >where, or by just plopping an encrypted tar'd file on a ftp site where >another remailer grabs them and splits and remails them. It seems to me that if we consider that there are two separate functions remailers provide: 1. Anonymization. 2. Jurisdiction swapping Then perhaps one way to improve the robustness of remailers against copyright-type legal attacks is to provide remailers with temporary (1-2 week) remail-only sites. All material would be processed by the front end, then delivered in bulk to the other site. This sounds similar to the idea you described. That way, the remailer's "front end" can stay around for years, developing reputation. Any attack on copyright would simply be an attack on the back end, which wouldn't last anyway. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Netscape 128-bit
by zalchgar＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Do you have to buy the 128 domestic version of Netscape? They used to make it available on their FTP sites, but now they are all 40-bit exportable versions. If you don't have to buy it what is the procedure to get it? -Erinn L.T

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:37 PM 5/15/96, Timothy C. May wrote: >We used to discuss remailer architecture, topology, functionality, and >"ideal behavior" quite a bit a few years ago, but seldom do here on the >Cypherpunks list anymore. Various reasons: same old discussions, >commercialization of Mixmaster-type remailers (so I hear, and Lance >Cottrell can clarify this if this is indeed a factor) may be inhibiting >free discussion of planned features, and perhaps the discussion is going on >elsewhere (on remailerpunks, or the remailer operator's list). > The commercialization of Mixmaster fell through some time ago. It is back to being completely free of encumberments. A second implementation is also in the works (by a better programmer than I). -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Why does the state still stand:
by Nathan Syfrig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I normally don't read or post to this list, so I'm hoping e$pam will pick up any relevant replies or people Cc: me personally (information overload). My ignorance is probably showing, but it seems that we have a real fundamental problem here. IP numbers of re-mailers, whether free or commercial, are easily identified and therefore become easy sniffing targets. This means that the choke points currently used to censor and otherwise restrict information can easily come into play - i.e. ISP's (we've already seen censorship being applied to at the ISP level, so we have sufficient aggregation to filter and sniff). Therefore, in the abscence of roving remailer destinations that change quick enough to evade some sniffing (notice, I didn't say avoid), it seems that there really is no anonymity. Even if we could randomize destinations (a la Pirate Radio with roving dial locations), that would defeat the purpose - the ability to allow anybody to use anonymous remailers. So, if we feel this capability is important (and I do), how do we solve the problem? Nathan (usual "views are my own" diatribe here) On Sat, 18 May 1996, e$pam wrote: > Forwarded by Robert Hettinga > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > Date: Thu, 16 May 1996 07:19:39 -0700 > From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> > To: EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU > Subject: Re: Why does the state still stand: > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > > From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU> > > I did not > > include offshore.com.ai in Anguilla due to its high cost; I consider anything > > over 25$ a month to be impractical. > > > > _Country/Area_ _Name_ _Email_ > > Anguilla Cable & Wireless webmaster(a)candw.com.ai > > [...] > > Thanks very much for making this list. However I would not be so quick > to reject http://offshore.com.ai. It is run by long-time Cypherpunk > Vince Cate, apparently specifically for the kinds of purposes we are > discussing. His project was discussed in a recent issue of Wired, I > think the May issue. (I have no contact with Cate, and have never met > him as far as I can recall.) > > For doing something like running a remailer which will post material > which is illegal and/or copyrighted in the U.S., you are going to need a > service which can stand up to pressure. Presumably some monetary > incentive is going to be a necessity. Of course by this standard $25 a > month is pretty inconsequential. > > One issue is whether these banking-secrecy countries like Anguilla are > followers of the Berne convention or other international copyright > regulations. Banking secrecy and software piracy don't necessarily go > hand in hand. I hear a lot about copyright violations in China but not > in the Caribbean. So actually it isn't clear that this country is the > right location for a remailer that can post arbitrary material. > > As for the costs to the remailer operator, he simply passes those on to > his customers. I think in the long run onshore remailers will be forced > to take measures to restrict copyright-violating posts. So if your > choice is between paying nothing and not getting your whistle-blowing > message posted, or paying $10 and getting it out on the nets, then > hopefully it is worth that much to you. > > We have discussed for-pay remailers and the consensus has been that no > one would use them when others run for free. However now I think the > false premise is being exposed, that free remailers simply will not be > able to run in the current mode for much longer. Once a single remailer > operator has been fined thousands of dollars because somebody posted some > copyrighted message, I don't think you will find many people eager to > sign up as operators. So this dream of a volatile collection of > remailers popping up and going away just doesn't work in my view. Why > would anyone offer a service knowing that he was exposing himself to > liability like this? It would be just a game of Russian roulette, > waiting to see whether it is your remailer which gets the bullet in the > form of a post which violates the copyright of someone with deep > pockets. > > Hal > > > > -------------------------------------------------- > The e$ lists are brought to you by: > > Take Your Business Online with Intertrader Ltd, Edinburgh, U.K. > Visit http://www.intertrader.com or email info(a)intertrader.com > > Making Commerce Convenient (tm) - Oki Advanced Products - Marlboro, MA > Value-Checker(tm) smart card reader= http://www.oki.com/products/vc.html > > Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion > http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk > > See your name here. Be a charter sponsor for e$pam, e$, and Ne$ws! > See http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ or e-mail rah(a)shipwright.com > for details... > ------------------------------------------------- >

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

They are not very hard to set up and run. I think any blinding is likely to be simple header faking. Totally insignificant security compared to something like Mixmaster. I proposed a system some time back based on message pools, but it attracted little interest. The down side of the proposal is the large amount of bandwidth required. Each remailer has to receive all messages for all remailers in the pool. The upside of the proposal was that it allowed secure reply blocks (ones that can't simply be tracked forward). -Lance >I would really like to see a remailer that is somehow blinded. > >I don't know enough about how mail paths are generatered, but is it >impossible to conceal the origin of remailer postings? > >Postings made to remailernym(a)alpha.c2.org would be spit out somewhere but >without accountability? > >Impossible? Would do wonders defeating traffic analysis. > >I'd consider running a remailer, but after listening to the response to >the anonymous poster a while back, it sounds like there are few if any >simple options which do not require major time and effort to setup and >run. > >--- >My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li >"In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est >Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti >00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information >Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell(a)pacifier.com ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: marginal cost of ecash transaction
by Frank O. Trotter, III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ecash Marginal Costs Ecash transaction costs are a cost-accountants brain tease. Here's my take on the topic (this will likely display why I trade currency and bonds and market payment systems and don't do cost accounting, but since I do have overall responsibility for the cost and revenue of ecash it does matter quite a lot to me directly). Hardware - We own and have paid for boxes to run the system. Once we run out of space or CPU power we have to buy more. Thus we have a step function that could be allocated across the transactions being done at a particular time, but is in fact not really marginal. Our experience suggests that the steps are quite high. Telco - Same as above to a degree - we pay for telco and a variety of connection "items". If the volume goes off scale we have to upgrade, making this another step function. It is a periodic bill, and can change, so it is not strictly a "sunk" cost like hardware. People - Here is the likely marginal cost. Bryce correctly notes that when we have to hire a variety of people to take care of more volume we have what can look like a marginal cost. But this is not marginal by transaction, it is marginal by manual or semi-manual item like account set up, money transfer, email or phone conversations, etc. It is entirely concievable that the one penny transactions described in previous posts create no need for additional people, and conversely a high dollar corporate transaction book might suggest a lot of hand holding and manual costs. You should look at most of this cost / benefit stuff on an account basis, not on a transaction basis. The regular banking costs of mailing statements (still required), collecting desposits, producing payments outside of ecash, etc are in fact the bigger parts of the cost. There are also asssociated costs on accounts of holding reserves with the Fed, paying FDIC insurance where appropriate, and explaining the system and its implications to our own executive staff, regulators, and accountants. In all the system and the attending transactions are not considered marginal at this time by me. In time, interbank clearing and currency stuff will generate genuine marginal costs. We have sunk and ongoing hard costs, and perhaps someday some revenue and balances to offset the costs. To my analysis the marginal costs revolve around the manual functions that could become a huge factor depending on the profile of customer that becomes the main user. If they are substantially inactive in manual operations, we may have low marginal costs, if they all need a lot of handholding and manual transactions then each account will cost a lot to handle. Hardware needs, of course, vary with the style of transaction. Marcel made a quick pass at this in a recent post to the ecash list. Just a start off the top of my head. FOT Frank O. Trotter, III - fotiii(a)crl.com www.marktwain.com - Fax: +1 314 569-4906 --------------------------------------------

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