December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

German home banking (fromn RISKS)
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Tue, 23 Jan 1996 17:32:56 +0100 From: Klaus Brunnstein <brunnstein(a)rz.informatik.uni-hamburg.d400.de> Subject: Homebanking NonSecurity demo A German private TV channel (SAT 1) displayed, Monday Jan.22 night (10 pm), a demonstration of how easily homebanking may be attacked in Germany. In this demo, a person used T-Online (a navigation tool similar to CompuServe) to send his ID, PIN, the amount to be transferred (500 DM) and the account to which to transfer, plus a transaction number (TAN) via telephone line. All these data were intercepted on a portable connected to the user's phone line in the basement of the building (indeed, most telephone boxes are rarely locked). Actions of the customer and the "hacker" were shown in parallel, so one could see all data (including PIN which was not displayed on the Customers' screen) on the hackers' display. Before the customer could start the booking process on the bank computer by sending the requestor, the hacker interrupted the telephone connection. As he now possessed all relevant "secret" information of the user, he now started an order to transmit 5,000 DM from his victim's account to another one, successfully (as the customers' vouchers proved. After the demo (about 10 minutes), a short interview (with the author of this report) discussed evident risks; it was made clear that software solutions are available since some time, to replace the old PIN/TAN structure with digital signatures and to encrypt sensitive data using asymmetric encryption. Risks? Presently, there are several risks in telephone-based homebanking. First, ALL sensitive information is transmitted in cleartext. Secondly, interception of line-based communications of German Telekom is easily possible at several sites, from the basement of a customers' house where lines from different customers are collected in a unit, to units collecting lines from several blocks, streets etc. Thirdly, in contracts between banks and customers, the latter will often have difficulties to prove that an order carrying their personal ID, TAN etc was NOT issued from them, esp. when there is evidence that the order came from the customers' telephone line (though not from his telephone :-). Customer protection (both technically and legally) therefore requires immediate action, as Chaos Computer Club commented in press. Interestingly, German banks offer enterprises a secure solution based on RSA-licensed encryption software. So far, this is NOT offered to private customers as it canNOT interoperate with T-Online. Financial institutions are discussing presently a solution (either with a chipcard including sort of DES or a solution using an RSA-implementation with 784 bit key, which may be distributed via diskettes) but it is unclear when this solution will be available. As long as such solution is not available, "every day may become payment day even for the most lousy hackers" as one German newspaper (TAZ) wrote. Klaus Brunnstein (Jan.23,1996) ------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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Re: Hack Java
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:47 1/24/96 +0100, Christian Wettergren wrote: >(In my darker moments, I feel that the whole field of computer security >is in a major crisis. Ever heard of the Emperor's New Clothes? ;-)) We reduce the problem of an infected Java Interpreter to the previously unsolved problem of virus protection in general. I think it is possible to build highly virus resistant systems, but the cost in user retraining will be huge. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Articles re Crypto
by Tim Philp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI In the January issue of InfoCanada, the front page has what amounts to a press release on Digital Equipment's Digital Internet Personal Tunnel for Windows 95. There is also info on a companian product for Unix. I am trying to get some information on this. Has anyone heard of this technology? In the January 18th 96 issue of EDN, Pg 57 has an article about secure wireless designs. In this article they talk about securing devices such as garage-door openers, and keyless entry systems for cars and buildings. It is a little shy on cryptographic info, but they do talk about crypto applications for these products. =================================== For PGP Public Key, Send E-mail to: pgp-public-keys(a)swissnet.ai.mit.edu In Subject line type: GET PHILP ===================================

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Re: Crippled Notes export encryption
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:28 1/24/96 -0800, Lucky Green wrote: >I agree. The reason for enforcing ITAR is to keep good crypto of the >*domestic* market. If ITAR no longer accomplishes that, new laws will be >passed. I think this is likely to be an oversimplification. While there are probably a number of people in e.g. FBI, DEA, DOJ who want to restrict domestic crypto, I suspect there are also a number of people in e.g. NSA who are sincerly interested in using SIGINT to protect the US from foreign threats and want strong domestic crypto as part of that protection. As always, public policy is a compromise between competing interests (INSIDE the beltway). However, the current policy is a holdover from the days when strong crypto was a closely held trade secret. Since this assumption is no longer true, the policy becomes more and more disfunctional every day. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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disk randomness
by Donald T. Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rich salz posted to this list a message i sent him about a portable way to gather disk-noise for a true rng. he also was kind enough to forward a reply to me from the list, because i wasn't subscribed at the time. the reply's author pointed out that my approach is not a practical one, and that NOISE.SYS gathers disk timings and other noise more efficiently, anyway. now that i'm subscribed, i'll answer on my own behalf: i agree that my algorithm isn't practical. in fact, that's why i agreed to rich's request that i let him post my message here. i don't recommend paging-timings to my clients, because it's not a workable approach for production-quality code. memory-paging's only virtue as a noise-source is that it's uniquely portable. i failed to emphasize this, in the message rich forwarded for me. the code needs no device-specific calls, and the only OS-specific call is the gettime() call. even with this virtue, i don't recommend it as a production-quality algorithm, unless the process that needs the rng is already memory-bound. i'm sorry that my original msg was unclear on this point; that's my fault, not rich's. by the way, i think the "interesting work" of mine to which rich referred, is my paper on disk randomness, which appeared in the crypto '94 proceedings. it presents work i did at mit from '88-9, and shows mathematically why disk-timings can contain true entropy: a disk's speed variations come from air turbulence, which now is known mathematically to be unpredictable in the long run. my coauthors were p.r. fenstermacher, a chaos-theory physicist, and r. ihaka, a statistician. -don davis, boston

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Re: NSA says strong crypto to china??
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"perry(a)piermont.com" 9-JAN-1996 12:05:32.69 Alex Strasheim writes: > If this is true, it's great news. It would mean that the NSA is adopting > both cypherpunk analysis and tactics. Who would have thought? An NSA > remade in Tim May's image. I suspect that the NSA was thinking in our terms long before many of us were aware of cryptography. I actually think that in many cases, their behavior is perfectly rational. Their goals are merely different. If you are in SIGINT, I believe that the possibility of totally losing a valued intelligence tool must heavily weigh on your mind. Of course, they are hardly monolithic, and different groups at the NSA necessarily have different goals. Once SIGINT becomes much harder regardless of their previous attempts to stop it, I suspect that the NSA will become a friend and not an impediment. By that time, of course, the "we have to protect our people" types will be the only ones producing results and getting funding, and the "we have to gather information" types will have long ceased to produce. Thats probably a decade or more off, though. --------------- I suspect that the NSA can basically be divided into four groups: A. Those who are interested in protecting American individual liberties, and are thus (possibly potential) allies. This bunch may have a subgroup of those who already are allies, who have unfortunately been rather unsuccessful (or perhaps we simply haven't seen their successes). B. Those who realize about the potentials for individual liberty from cryptography, but believe that something else about America is more important. For instance, they may believe that the voters in a democracy should be able to institute whatever rules they like. Various left- and right-wing viewpoints are also possible here; the former would include worrying about lost tax dollars because of wanting big government, the latter would include concerns about pornography, etcetera. C. Those who are in the NSA because they want power, and strong cryptography's dissemination would hinder this. This group is likely to be concealed as one of the other groups. D. Those who haven't thought about it, and are simply following orders. I suspect that this is the largest group; while the overall level of intellect at the NSA may be higher than in the average population, the intelligence mindset of "need to know" may be keeping many people from realizing everything the NSA is doing. -Allen

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None
by Mr. Nobody 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <9601241720.AB13251(a)envirolink.org> Daniel Miskell <DMiskell(a)envirolink.org> writes: > Mr. Nobody writes: Dr. Nobody, to you. > >In article <Pine.LNX.3.91.960123192018.1008D-100000(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> > >zinc <zinc(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> writes: > >> i got this in the mail this morning. here's another blatant case > >> of illegal export. names and exact addresses removed to protect the > >> clueless. > > > >Why exactly did you post this message? I personally don't mind, but > >am just curious. > > Why exactly did YOU post this message? I personally dont mind, but am just > curious. I thought it was pretty clear from my message: curiosity.

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Re: Crippled Notes export encryption
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I can see two practical ways to build a netscape product outside > the US. The first is to export the source code for the Navigator > with the crypto code removed. All of the calls to crypto would > have to be removed as well. I've heard some people claim that the > government could come after us on the grounds that we were taking > part in a conspiracy to export strong crypto. Why not just print out all of the source code to Navigator (crypto and all) in a nice OCR font? Paper is exportable. Then you would 'only' have to scan it back in and debug it. andrew

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Re: IPSEC == end of firewalls
by Rick Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Discussing firewalls, ses(a)tipper.oit.unc.edu (Simon Spero) writes: >What do you need as well as crypto before you can remove all firewalls? What firewalls do is they allow an independent group of people to track external network access and enforce rules over a large population of hosts. Given that just about any security installed on a workstation can be overcome (inadvertently or consciously) by someone with physical access to it, I doubt firewalls will ever go away entirely. Today's techniques will no doubt evolve and change in varous ways over time. But I'd be surprised if the function went away entirely. Until Netscape came out I suspected that desktop crypto wouldn't make the bigtime soon, simply because there are too many ways to do it wrong. Netscape has demonstrated that doing it wrong is no impediment to deployment. Organizations that want to do crypto well are probably going to concentrate crypto services in a few closely managed hosts to reduce the risk of messing things up. Rick. smith(a)sctc.com secure computing corporation

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InfoWarCon Europe 1996 Updated Schedule
by winn＠Infowar.Com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Revised Short Draft DOI: 18 Jan 96 ---------- P L E A S E D I S T R I B U T E W I D E L Y InfoWarCon (Europe) '96 Defining the European Perspective Brussels, Belgium May 23-24 1996 Sponsored by: National Computer Security Association Winn Schwartau, President and CEO, Interpact, Inc. Robert David Steele, Chairman & CEO, Open Source Solutions Group May 22, 1996 17:00 - 20:00 Pre-Registration 18:00 - 21:00 Hosted Cocktail Party with Music Most conference speakers will be in attendance. Meet Mr. Schwartau and Mr. Steele. May 23, 1995 07:00 - 08:30 Registration 07:00 - 08:30 Sponsored Continental Breakfast PLENARY SESSIONS 08:30 - 09:00 Keynote Speech Major General William Robbins Director General of Information and Communications Services Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom (Invited) 09:00 - 10:00 "Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway" Winn Schwartau, President and CEO, Interpact, Inc., USA 10:00 - 11:15 East Versus West: Military Views of Information Warfare Moderator: Robert Steele East: General Nikolai Ivanovich Turko, Information Warfare Expert Russia (invited) West: Captain Patrick Tyrell Assistant Director, Information Warfare Policy, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom 11:15 - 11:45 Sponsored Break 11:45 - 13:00 Law Enforcement in Cyberspace: Cooperation is the Key Moderator: Winn Schwartau Miguel Chyamorro, (invited) Executive Assistant Director, Interpol Sweden Netherlands--Rotterdam Police (invited) 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch 13:30 - 14:00 Special Luncheon Presentation BREAKOUT SESSIONS 14:30 - 16:00 Breakout I: Threats to European Civil Prosperity Moderator: Winn Schwartau:) Private Businesses Germany, France, UK Breakout II: Information Warfare: Support for Conventional War Fighting Moderator: SHAPE - NATO (invited) Panel: US - Gen. Jim McCarthy USAF (Ret) Russia: Admiral Vladimir Semenovich Pirumov (Ret) Chairman of Scientific Counsel of the Russian Security Counsel (invited) Sweden - (Invited) 16:00-16:30 Sponsored Break PLENARY SESSION 16:30 - 18:00 "Hackers: National Resources or Merely Cyber-Criminals?" Co-Moderators: Mich Kabay, Ph.D., Director of Education, NCSA and Robert Steele, President, OSS, Inc. Panel: Rop Gonggrijp - Hactic and The Digital City Amsterdam, Netherlands Chris Goggans, co-founder Leagion of Doom, US CHAOS Computer Club, Germany (invited) "Frantic" Convicted French Hacker (invited) 18:00 - 21:00 Hosted Reception 21:00 - 23:00 "Dutch Dinners" for Birds of a Feather Rallying points will be provided. May 24, 1996 07:00 - 8:30 Sponsored Continental Breakfast 08:30 - 9:00 Keynote Speech "Efforts to Maximize Information As New Age Weapon" General Pichot-Duclos, France PLENARY SESSIONS 9:00 - 10:00 "Creating Smart Nations Through National Information Strategies: Intelligence And Security Issues" Robert David Steele, President, OSS, Inc. US 10:00 - 11:15 "The Convergence of Military and Commercial Vulnerabilities" Moderator: Winn Schwartau Panel: Bob Ayers, DISA, Department of Defense, US Dr. Leroy Pearce, Sr. Tech. Advisor, representing MajGen Leech, Asst. Dep. Minister, Defence Information Services, Canada Holland / Belgium Captain. Pat Tyrell, Ministry of Defence, UK 11:15 - 11:45 Sponsored Break 11:45 - 13:00 Societal Impact of Information Warfare Moderator: Winn Schwartau, Panel: The Croatian View: Pedrag Pale, Chairman InfoTech Coordinating Committee, Ministry of Science, Technology, and Informatics. General James McCarthy (ret) US 13:00 - 14:30 Lunch 13:30-14:00 Special Luncheon Presentation BREAKOUT SESSIONS 14:30 - 16:00 Breakout I: Legislation & Personal Privacy: A Global Electronic Bill of Rights? Moderator: Dr. Mich Kabay, NCSA Simon Davies, Electronic Privacy International, UK Breakout II: "Industrial Espionage: An Update" Moderator: Winn Schwartau Phillipe Parant, Diecteur, DST, France (invited) Miguel Chamorro, Exec. Director, Interpol (invited) Kroll Associates US 16:00 - 16:30 Sponsored Break PLENARY 16:30 - 18:00 Defining War in the Information Age "The New National Security" Brief comments by Winn Schwartau and Robert Steele - and then a lively interactive audience debate. 18:00 - 18:10 Closing Comments 18:00 - 20:00 No-Host Reception To obtain the latest edition of this program, send EMail to: euroinfowar(a)ncsa.com For more information about NCSA: WWW: http://www.ncsa.com CompuServe: GO NCSA EMail: info(a)ncsa.com Sponsorships for various InfoWarCon (Europe) 96 events are still available. To find out how to sponsor portions: Contact Paul Gates at the NCSA: pgates(a)ncsa.com To reach: Winn Schwartau: Winn(a)Infowar.Com Robert Steele: ceo(a)oss.net V 1.3/1.18.96-Short Peace Winn Winn Schwartau - Interpact, Inc. Information Warfare and InfoSec V: 813.393.6600 / F: 813.393.6361 Winn(a)InfoWar.Com

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