December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: "Industry Group Rebuffs U.S. on Encryption" (NYT 8Nov95, C3)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:50 PM 11/8/95 -0800, you wrote: >A group of 37 companies and trade and privacy associations sent a >letter to Al Gore yesterday, complaining about Clipper-II and crypto >export controls, and promising to send their own policy proposals >to Congress and the Administration within six months. We talked about this at dinner - what kind of proposals can industry offer, other than "128 bits and honest escrow" or "64 bits and no escrow"? "128 bits now, with no escrow if you want any campaign contributions this fall" or simply "get stuffed, we're all buying our crypto from Europe and including it in all our products" ? According to one of the newspaper articles, the gang of 37 is a Jerry Berman/CDT coordination, so I don't expect one of the more radical answers from them, but maybe they'll do the right thing. The fact that Netscape is including secure email in their Navigator next release can be a big lever pushing the Feds toward giving up, and perhaps deserves some publicity once the release version is out the door. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Coding-Export Limits Opposed
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, November 9, 1995, p. D4. Coding-Export Limits Opposed The political right has joined the opposition to the Clinton Administration's proposed restriction on the export of data-coding systems. A group of 12 conservative organizations -- including the National Rifle Association, Americans for Tax Reform and the Competitive Enterprise Institute -- sent a letter yesterday to House Speaker Newt Gingrich protesting Administration efforts to limit the export of cryptographic software and hardware. Calling the proposal anti-consumer, anti-business and anti-progress, the groups urged Mr. Gingrich to support the relaxation of export controls. "The Administration's approach is the wrong policy for today's marketplace," the letter stated. The letter to Mr. Gingrich followed one sent on Tuesday to Vice President Al Gore from 37 corporate and publicpolicy groups, including the Microsoft Corporation and America Online Inc. The letter to Mr. Gore opposed Administration efforts to strike a compromise that would limit the strength of encryption software exports and require an escrowed code-key system, which would contain trapdoor access for American law enforcement agencies. [End]

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Re: (cpx) Re: ecash speed
by Donald E. Eastlake 3rd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is certaily no need for an extra connection from the merchant back to the customer. See draft-eastlake-internet-payment-00.txt. Donald (not on cybpherpunks) On Thu, 9 Nov 1995, Robert Hettinga wrote: > > --- begin forwarded text > > Date: Wed, 8 Nov 1995 21:08:51 -0800 > From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: ecash speed > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> writes: > > >Hal writes: > >> The point is that if the anonymity afforded by ecash is too costly in > >> terms of time, then we may end up stuck with a non-anonymous system > >> simply because that is the only one efficient enough to work. It would > >> be good to find out if that is a serious problem. > > >I suspect that as CPU speed exponentiates this will become less and > >less of a problem. It doesn't especially worry me. > > Consider, though, what happens in the current ecash system if it were > used to charge a penny per page. You would click on a link in your web > browser to go to the new page. It would set the GET request to the > remote server as usual. > > The server would fire up a CGI script which will run the shop software. > That software will make a TCP stream connection back to your ecash wallet > software which is running on the system where your client is. It sends a > request to get payed $.01. Assuming the wallet is configured to > automatically approve such a payment, it will send a one penny coin to > the shop software along the opened link. (This may also involve doing a > PK encryption on the coin as an anti-theft measure; this aspect of the > current ecash system is not documented AFAIK.) > > The shop software then opens a TCP stream connection to the bank, and > forwards the coin there. The bank receives it, and checks the public > key signature in the coin. It then compares the coin against every other > coin which has ever been spent (within the validity period of the coin) > to make sure it is not being doubly spent. If this all checks out it > sends back some authentication message to the original server. The shop > software then delivers the new page to the client browser. > > This all has to happen whenever you click on a link in your browser. > Even with fast CPU's I think the extra step of connecting to the bank, > having it check against all coins, and getting approval will be > considerable for each link traversal. > > Hal > --- end forwarded text > > > ----------------- > Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) > Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 > USA (617) 323-7923 > "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell > >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<< > > > ===================================================================== Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1 508-287-4877(tel) dee(a)cybercash.com 318 Acton Street +1 508-371-7148(fax) dee(a)world.std.com Carlisle, MA 01741 USA +1 703-620-4200(main office, Reston, VA)

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Re: Cybercensor in Singapore
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:15 PM 11/8/95 +0100, Anonymous wrote: > The Government has blunted an uncensored > Internet forum on Singapore political life by assembling > a group of users who make sure the Government's views are > represented. That is censorship? I visited the Singapore forum a few months ago -- When I visited Cuba (physically) everyone was visibly afraid. When I visited the Singapore electronically, they were not afraid. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Mime/multipart (was Re: PGP Comment feature weakens remailer security)
by Dave Crocker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:56 AM 11/9/95, Laurent Demailly wrote: >I've waited a bit, but as nobody seem to have pointed out, you can >definitly find a unique stream in a *single* pass (but maybe what you >really want is no pass at all ?) engineering versus math. you can do it in zero passes, sort of. Generate a heafty pseudorandom number and convert it to a heafty ascii string. What are the odds that that string will appear in ANY kind of data you are generating? Low. Measured in years and probably decades. As you do the mime encapsulation, also scan for a collision. When you get it (once every 20 years or so), abort the processing and start over. d/ -------------------- Dave Crocker +1 408 246 8253 Brandenburg Consulting fax: +1 408 249 6205 675 Spruce Dr. dcrocker(a)brandenburg.com Sunnyvale, CA 94086 USA http://www.brandenburg.com

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Re: Pegasus Mail 2.20
by Scott Staedeli 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Rich Salz <rsalz(a)osf.org> > Date: Thu, 9 Nov 1995 07:50:44 -0500 > To: scottst(a)ionet.net > Subject: Re: Pegasus Mail 2.20 > Cc: cyperphunks(a)osf.org > I sure hope some tells David Harris that his program is now export > controlled. From my reading of his message, it seemed like he thinks he > "beat the system" because he didn't include actual crypto code. > > Software that says "plug your own crypto here" is considered an anciliarry > device according to the ITAR. Or, as I heard some NSA people call it, > "the classic 'crypto with a hole'." Seems kinda silly that the hole is > the crypto, but hey that anciliiary device clause, you just gotta love > it. > > If Pegasus mail were written to support generic user-loadable content > transforms, that would be different. But even then, you have to be careful > how that's done. If just did some global search-and-replace and came up > with "keyed compression" you wouldn't get past anyone. But if you had an > opaque state block that the user modules could set/use/clear, and you > passed that along with your in/out buffers, then you'd be safe. Of course, > they'd know what is really going on, but are powerless to prevent it. > /r$ > Actually, David Harris is a citizen of New Zealand. If the US government tries anything, at least we'll know if ITAR applies to foreign written freeware. --scottst@ionet.net------http://www.ionet.net/~scottst-- >~<^xXx | "The Internet is simply a means of xX # | communication. Efforts to stop infor- (XXX) # | mation by enjoining it are doomed to (XXXXXXX) | failure in a free society." DON'T TREAD ON ME| -- Prof. Frank Tuerkheimer ======================================================== =========NSA trip phrase of the week: DEUTERIUM=========

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Re: Timed-release crypto and information economics
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:58 PM 11/9/95, Beavis B. Thoopit wrote: >Does there exist a storage device that, due to _dynamics_ (or other >factor), prevents the total contents being read in one instance? > >Bubble memory device? Torsion wire memory device? "All crypto is economics." There's a literature of sorts on "tamper-resistant modules," or "tamper-responding modules." Chips or packages that either resist tampering (= reading, opening, etc.) or that give indication they have been read, opened, or otherwise accessed. "Quantum cryptography" aims at providing a "read only once" system. Consult the vast number of articles and comments available. Basically, any secret stored in (traditional) hardware can be gotten with enough money. The issue is the amount of money it takes, and how many tries, to open the hardware. (And it may take a lot. Or destroy a lot of chips in the process. The similarities to bomb disposal are obvious: it may be _possible_ to disarm a bomb, but a lot of "learning" is likely to take place first.) Search the archives if you wish for previous articles I and others have written on reverse-engineering chips with electron beam probes, for example. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Caching Cash (ecash speed)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:14 AM 11/9/95, Bill Stewart wrote: >For penny-a-page on-line services, unless ecash transaction costs are >_radically_ >cheap, it probably makes more sense for the service to sell its own tokens, >bought with (anonymous or non-anonymous) ecash, which you then trade for pages. >No calculation required, just an on-line lookup for double-spending >and you don't get your page if you double-spend. An alternative to them >picking the token numbers is for you to give them the numbers and them >to keep them in their database, but that's probably unlikely to be done >and doesn't really buy you much privacy. > >If that's not anonymous enough for you (because your IP address could be >traced when you buy the tokens, and coordinated with them later), >use a packet laundry, or connect from your dialup access provider, >which will tell the newspaper you're port43.server29.netcom.com or >something equally uninformative; or dial in from the public library or cafe. Tokens, coupons, gift certificates, etc., are all good examples of _caching_. As, looked at in a certain way, ordinary folding or jangling cash is an example of caching. (Yes, quibblers, it is true that we view folding money as "real money," but really it's a series of claims against some store of value, formerly gold and silver, and now...?) Instead of constant interactions with a bank, we place money in "cash memory" (I mean, "cache memory"). The concerns Hal raises about ecash speed are important. CPU speeds are not the problem, network speeds are---many home and small business users have very fast CPUs, able to funtion as Web servers all by themselves, but have relatively slow network connections. So, various schemes for reducing the network bottlenecks will be likely. Tokens are a good example. And as Bill notes, token laundries can make them _effectively_ untraceable, good enough for many of the low-value transactions for which they are intended. (As usual, more security means more computation, more delay, all other things being equal. "TANSTAAFL"--There Ain't No Such Thing As A Free Lunch.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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New patent rules
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reading the latest Foresight Update articles in the sci.nanotech newsgroup, I came upon an analysis of upcoming changes to the patent laws. With the signing of the GATT treaty the laws will change next year. here is one of the changes, quoting from the article: Infringement. Present U.S. patent law grants to a patent holder the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention in the United States. After about January 1, 1996, a patent holder has the right to exclude others also from offering for sale patented products or products made using a patented process. Thus, under the law as amended, the mere offer for sale of a patented product may be treated as an infringing act. In addition, it will be illegal to import a product covered by a U.S. patent. At first I thought this would not have much impact on crypto software, which is of course heavily patented. The current laws already prevent people from making, using, or selling software which uses patented algorithms. The new restrictions on products made using a patented process would not seem to be relevant. But there is a possible interpretation which would be very significant. What if data which has had cryptographic transformations applied were viewed as a product of a possibly patented process? An RSA-signed or -encrypted message might then be such a product. A blinded coin or other credential, a key signature or certificate, virtually all of the things we are interested in could be thought of in those terms. We have occasionally discussed setting up offshore servers and such to perform patented cryptographic algorithms. But if the resulting data is itself illegal to import, that would make this strategy much more difficult. Would it become illegal to "import" messages from non-RSAREF versions of PGP, or to hand someone a Chaum-type cash token issued by an offshore bank in a jurisdiction where his patents don't apply? I wonder if the lawyers on the list have any thoughts about whether such an interpretation of the GATT rules is likely to stand. Hal

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Pegasus Mail 2.20
by Scott Staedeli 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The new beta release of Pegasus Mail (one of the better e-mail apps available) has a new feature: -------------------------------------------------------------- Runtime-loadable encryptor/decryptor modules for Pegasus Mail. Pegasus Mail System, Copyright (c) 1990-95, David Harris, All Rights Reserved -------------------------------------------------------------- The hot topic on everyone's lips is "privacy". And, as usual, the computer industry is in the process of confusing and disrupting the issue beyond recognition... We have factions all over the place each arguing passionately for its own most beloved encryption scheme, and some of the rhetoric is getting pretty heated. Add to the proliferation of interests the USA's ridiculous export laws on encryptors and the sum is trouble. As far as I can tell, encryption is going through what seems to be an industry-standard cycle of chaos: everyone suddenly realises there's a lack/opportunity/need and rushes to promote the idea they like best; a small war develops during which the users and peripheral developers are left bemused and bewildered amongst the welter of extravagant claims and counter-claims, then eventually (usually after two or three years of total pandemonium) the group with the most clout (although not necessarily the best product) will win out and become "the standard". I've been through this rat race several times and have no desire whatever to go through it again; on the other hand, my USERS have very legitimate concerns about privacy. So what do I do? Easy - I pass the buck. WinPMail v2.2 and later supports third-party, runtime loadable modules to handle encryption and decryption of mail. A special mechanism has been defined that allows Pegasus Mail to detect that a third party encryptor has been used and to determine whether the matching decryptor is available on the system. The built-in encryptor will remain available for those sites who only need moderate levels of message security. WinPMail will define an open interface for third-party encryptors and it is then up to other people to write the code. What I envisage actually happening is people writing "shell interfaces" for WinPMail - i.e., modules that take the calls I make and translate them into calls to other programs, such as PGP or whatever, returning the result. Let the games begin. --scottst@ionet.net------http://www.ionet.net/~scottst-- >~<^xXx | "The Internet is simply a means of xX # | communication. Efforts to stop infor- (XXX) # | mation by enjoining it are doomed to (XXXXXXX) | failure in a free society." DON'T TREAD ON ME| -- Prof. Frank Tuerkheimer ======================================================== =========NSA trip phrase of the week: DEUTERIUM=========

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