December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: ecash lottery (Was: ecash casino)
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:27 AM 11/30/95, Timothy C. May wrote: <snip> >My intuition (hand-waving) is that an anonymous lottery is possible, but I >haven't looked at the details. Certainly multiple trusted holders of keys >(escrow agents) would help make the lottery fair. Maybe bit commitment >would help (each player buys the right to play, then "commits" his number. >A public reading of the winning number occurs, and the winner can reveal >his winning number (anonymously if he wishes, providing he had registered >his hash....). My bet it would work a lot like anonymous voting schemes would, though I don't know how. It just feels like the same kind of thing... Cheers, Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 958-3971 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The NEW(!) e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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SKIP, NFS, SSL, etc.
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NFS is not a valid example of a one-vendor internetworking protocol. In the early days of NFS Sun worked amazingly hard to get all the major Unix players to support it. They all but lent out engineering staff; they hosted several 'connectathons', where everyone tested interoperability, made the license minimal cost (if not free), etc. And, of course, there was nothing competing. /r$

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Internet gambling
by thad＠hammerhead.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My favorite numbers game is "fixed". Choose a number from 1 to 1000. The least chosen number is the winner, and it pays off 1000:1. This least chosen number would have to be published in some non-repudiatable way, but that's not too hard. The fun thing is that you get to play with the minds of all the other players...when would be the first time that the same number was the winner two days in a row? Or how many times with 666 be the winning number? Or whatever. Bet all numbers, and it's a wash. thad -- Thaddeus Beier email: thad(a)hammerhead.com Technology Development vox: 408) 286-3376 Hammerhead Productions fax: 408) 292-2244

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Your faith is PGP is charming and quaint, but wrong
by Hroller Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

All of these articles from people claiming to be me! I repeat, for the slow learners, that I consider PGP to be untrustworthy, at least on my machines. I don't want those Mounties to do to me what they did to Mulroney en passant. You in the southern colony are free to use PGP, but I prefer other means of establishing my uniqueness. Style, for example, cannot be easily copied. I am, as always, Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. I. A. M. A. M. O. R. O. N.

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Re: The future will be easy to use
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >From: Rich Salz <rsalz(a)osf.org> >Date: Wed, 29 Nov 1995 08:54:33 -0500 >Bingo! This is one of the hard parts of certificate authorities; just >what are you attesting to? The American Bar Association has a big document >for public review that addresses what this might mean; there are a couple >of RFC's that specify CA policies (one from COST in Sweden, I think), and >RSA and/or Verisign will give you their policy in hardcopy. > >In x.509v3 certificates, there is an extensible field where the key-signer >can put arbitrary data. The intent is apparently that you put the ISO >object-ID (you know, those funny 1.3.2.11.... numbers) of the policy >document. Ah, yes. Here's another example of the problem with ASN.1. That field could equivalently be just a URL for the policy document (or, if short enough, the policy itself). However, ASN.1 seduced folks into indirecting this through some object ID -- bringing all these documents into the one master hierarchy of things in the world. Some people just like hierarchies, I guess. :) >There is, of course, no way to interpret the semantics of this electronically. Of course not. In the end, a human needs to make the decision based on ASCII text. >It will be interesting to see how various companies address this issue, >for example as they start to support arbitrary CA's in browsers or servers >while doing commerce over the web. Yup. - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)tis.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |Trusted Information Systems, Inc. http://www.tis.com/ | |3060 Washington Road PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2| |Glenwood MD 21738 Tel:(301)854-6889 FAX:(301)854-5363 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBML3JY1QXJENzYr45AQHWIwP/VzoZuonIoMbIYHaA+noZpwnmNnxXc+jx elJNQkHglyE7U1pBfC90s8IewujeG5T97v5g5e9bAXi/gysIPoguAXYSdIufvjz+ +WpCDrxn4UlfRzfOrTOgpZ1KQwPUllywOo1Yehd2h35ctJ8P7sa27mS/AEyET85E rUvKlVpN/04= =EhTO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Applied Cryptography Questions
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple questions about Applied Cryptography (Second Edition) 1. What on earth is a Neural Net? 2. Consider the Chinese Lottery attack vs a processor bank. ADVANTAGES Distributed computing, no easy bombing target. DISADVANTAGES 39% inefficient Need specialized hardware [for speed] or transmission of alogrithms for any specific alogrithm Not on all the time If value(crack) * cracks/chip > cost of chip, then why not have the gov buy the chips? Its probably cheaper that way. 3. How does one cryptoanalyize a Feistel Network? I've read a bit on this and it doesn't seem that the papers are consistant, for example, one claims that 2^32 chosen plaintext is unreasonable for a 64-bit block cipher whereas DES's cryptanalysis requires something like 2^42. 4. Does there exist an n such that a keyspace of 2^n is trivial to crack [ie a matter of miniutes] on a PC but is difficult to crack for a big commercial company or even a major government? [this question relates to Merkle's puzzles, when a 40-bit key seems a bit weak.] 5. Is there an errata yet?

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No Subject
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> And I would ask whoever DID post the PGP key under my name, to please > issue a revocation certificate. > > > Alice de 'nonymous ... > > ...just another one of those... > > > P.S. This post is in the public domain. > C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E. > > Pretender. I'm the real no-pgp Alice. Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: Netscape gives in to key escrow
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jeff wrote: > sameer wrote: > > http://www.cnet.com/Central/News/govt.html > > Bad. Very Bad. And I was almost starting to like Netscape. > Please don't give up on us yet. [...] > PS - you won't find a LEF(sic) in the soon to be released SSL Version 3 spec... > Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist I've been trying to figure out the boundary conditions of the speech - what's the best and worst interpretations that can be placed upon it. I was not at the show. Worst: Netscape will put GAK into every server and browser it sells or distributes. Best: Out of context, misinterpreted quote, referring to the Fortezza support in the newest version of SSL. Fortezza (and the earlier, related Tessera) are PCMCIA cards with Clipper chips. Clipper, as we know, *is* escrowed. There's a lot of interest within the USG for using Web-based technologies for distributing information, some of it confidential. With a Fortezza-based laptop and a Fortezza-enabled browser, a government employee would be able to securely obtain text and graphics info while out in the field - for example, a social worker looking up case histories while at a client's home, to choose a fairly uncontroversial example. At a W3C meeting a few months ago, some NSA employees demoed a Tessera enabled Mosaic client and server. Netscape (and other SW companies) would like to sell to the USG - it's a big market. Adding support for USG supported security systems expands that potential market. Jeff, this does not let you or Netscape off of the hook. A *lot* of people are wondering just exactly what Jim was alluding to,. and would like to see a full, in-context quote. speaking only for myself (whatever that is worth :-) Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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Re: The future will be easy to use
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Jon Lasser writes: >> However, if you have optional linking of ID and name, shippers will only >> ship to keys with such attributes. Because just ID and address, it could >> be a "hit and run" type attack shipped to a safe maildrop. At 03:19 AM 11/30/95 -0500, Futplex wrote: >People who steal credit cards prefer to order goods to be delivered somewhere >they can grab them. Presumably all of us seek a ecash and echeque system somewhat better than a human readable sixteen decimal digit number: Indeed, what I had in mind was 1024 binary bit number -- we should be working to a world in which a self generated secret PGP key performs the functions that a credit card number does today. (Often this is just the front of the rightful owner's >home, while Holly the Homeowner is off at work.) But that's just another >reason to cut down unauthorized credit card charges, not a reason to restrict >what a rightful cardholder can do with the card. I _want_ to be able to have >stuff delivered to arbitrary locations, and I _don't_ want to give that up >just to make it tough on thieves. > >James Donald writes: >> This argument makes no sense at all: I am going to attack my >> enemies by paying people to send books, computers, and stuff >> to them? > >Ordering hardcore porno videos to be sent to, say, somewhere in Tennessee >might work pretty well in our sadly repressed society. > >-Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com> > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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cypherpunks at ietf
by Bob Bruen, MIT Lab for Nuclear Science 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought the following mail might be of interest. It's not my doing. Bob ========================================================================= From: SMTP%"MEYERUSA(a)aol.com" 30-NOV-1995 10:25:39.59 To: BRUEN CC: Subj: Re: DISCUSSION FOR IETF DALLAS Date: Thu, 30 Nov 1995 08:49:15 -0500 Sender:ietf-request@IETF.CNRI.Reston.VA.US From: MEYERUSA(a)aol.com Message-ID: <951130084914_120843907(a)mail06.mail.aol.com> To: rgm3(a)is.chrysler.com cc: ietf(a)CNRI.Reston.VA.US, SteveCase(a)aol.com Subject: Re: DISCUSSION FOR IETF DALLAS THE WWW MUST BE CONSUMER FRIENDLY IF IT IS TO SURVIVE. THE AVERAGE CONSUMER THRU A PC, OR A "DEDICATED WEB TERMINAL ON TOP OF THEIR TV SET", MUST BE ABLE TO USE THE WEB IN THE FUTURE TO: 1. SEARCH FOR CONSUMER GOODS; ORDER CONSUMER GOODS. 2. USE THE WEB FOR TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS AND E-MAIL 3. DOWNLOAD TIME SHIFT AUDIO & VIDEO 4. DOWLOAD MOVIES, SOFTWARE, AND P.P.V. EVENTS 5. HOOK ON-LINE TO VIDEO & AUDIO THE WWW AND THE ON-LINE SERVICES MUST BE ABLE TO DIAL OUT TO THE CONSUMER ALSO. OUR BIGGEST FUTURE PROBLEM IS THAT WE CAN NOT LET BILL GATES, NOR THE TELEPHONE COMPANIES, NOR THE CABLE TV COMPANIES, NOR THE MADISON AVENUE ADVERTISING AGENCIES GET CONTROL OF THE WWW. OUR CURRENT PROBLEM IS THAT THE AVERAGE CONSUMER CAN NOT COMPLETE AN ACCURATE SEARCH ON THE WEB. COMPANIES MUST BE ABLE TO PROTECT THEIR TRADEMARKS AND SERVICE MARKS, AND TO EMBED EVERY POSSIBLE KEYWORD IN THEIR SITE SO THAT IN THE FUTURE A CONSUMER COULD ENTER AT THE SEARCH LINE: "SHOW ALL DEALERS IN BALTIMORE THAT SELL CHRYSLER MINI-VANS" AND AN ACCURATE SEACH OF THE WEB WILL BE RETURNED. AT THIS POINT SO MANY CYBERPUNKS HAVE EMBEDDED SO MUCH GARBAGE ON THE WEB, THAT YOU CAN NOT COMPLETE AN ACCURATE SEARCH. OUR COMPANY HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE NEW YORK AUTO SHOW TO CREATE THE MOST HIGHTECH VIRTUAL REALITY MOTION SIMULATOR THEATRE FOR THE 1996 NEW YORK AUTO SHOW. DURING OUR RESEARCH, WE ENTERED "NEW YORK AUTO SHOW" IN OUR WEB CRAWLER (AMERICA ON-LINE). YOU COULD NOT BELIEVE ALL OF THE GARBAGE THAT WAS RETURNED FROM OUR SEARCH. ADDITIONALLY FOR EXAMPLE, IF ON AMERICA ON-LINE YOU NEED TO SEND AN E-MAIL TO DONALD TRUMP OR TO AOL'S STEVE CASE, WHEN YOU SEARCH THE AOL MEMBER DATABASE, WHO IS THE REAL DONALD TRUMP OR THE REAL STEVE CASE. IN SUMMARY, WHAT NEEDS TO BE DISCUSSED AT IETF IN DALLAS NEXT WEEK IS A STANDARD THAT PROTECTS TRADEMARKS AND SERVICE MARKS, AND ALSO A POLICING AGENCY THAT WILL DETERMINE THAT DONALD TRUMP IS AT DONALD TRUMP@, CHRYSLER IS AT CHRYSLERY@ BILL GATES IS AT BILL GATES@, ETC. BUT MORE IMPORTANT, WE NEED TO CLEANUP THE TRASH THAT THE CYBER-PUNKS ARE PLACING ON THE WEB. ED MEYER

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