December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

FWD: International Encryption Protocols
by Weld Pond 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: "Frank O'Dwyer" <fod(a)fws.ilo.dec.com> cc: firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM (Firewalls Mailing List) From: Justin Mason <jmason(a)iona.ie> Subject: BoS: Re: International Encryption Protocols Frank O'Dwyer sez: >After all, if the CoCom countries _weren't_ willing to sell each other >crypto equipment, how could they spy on one another? :-) > >(Actually the :-) may not be necessary - I believe there was a story > in the news recently about the UK 'authorities' snooping on Irish > official traffic carried on UK-supplied equipment.) Almost right -- it was the UK surveillance service (GCHQ) snooping on Irish official traffic carried on US-supplied crypto equipment. Apparently, the equipment in question had a "back door", courtesy of the NSA; when GCHQ found out that the Irish govt were using this equipment, they had only to ask their NSA pals for the details. I only heard the details myself via a popular-science program on crypto ;), so the so-called back door may not have been a deliberately weakened algorithm, it may have been a set of keys from an key-escrow repository or some such. --j. Weld Pond - weld(a)l0pht.com - http://www.l0pht.com/~weld L 0 p h t H e a v y I n d u s t r i e s Technical archives for the people - Bio/Electro/Crypto/Radio

1 0

Re: NYT on Internet Flaws
by David Berger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just read through the stack of news this was based on (comp.security.unix) The Berkeley folks rightly point out that if I trust an NFS to send me a binary, then an interaction with the server sans authentication/encryption can leave me with a compromised binary. This is valid when I get my binary from out on the net. This seems much less valid when I live behind a firewall and trust my fellow workers who have access to the server, the wires coming out of my cube, and my whole machine for that matter. As a result, the only thing I think this article should say is that we need secure ftp. Isn't this being worked on? As for the article - 9/10 scaring people, 1/10 semi-fact. Be serious? NFS is not the basic structure of the Internet. I'm embarrassed that an article so weak in its explanations and so high on fluff appeared on the front page of a well respected newspaper. Dave -----the article for reread------- > The New York Times, October 11, 1995, pp. A1, D3. > > [Page One] > > Discovery of lnternet Flaws Is Setback for On-Line Trade > > By John Markoff > > > San Francisco, Oct. 10 -- Newly publicized weaknesses in > the basic structure of the Internet indicate that the > worldwide computer network may need a time-consuming > redesign before it can be safely used as a commercial > medium. > > The flaws could allow an eavesdropper or criminal to divert > many types of documents or software programs traveling over > the Internet, examine or copy or alter them, and then pass > them on to the intended recipient -- who would have no easy > way of knowing that the files had been waylaid. Not only > could electronic mail be read in transit or credit card > numbers be copied en route, but special security techniques > meant to protect such transactions could be dismantled > without the user's knowledge. > > That such security flaws exist is not surprising in a > system designed originally as a scientific experiment. But > the recent rush to the Internet by companies seeking to > exploit its commercial possibilities has obscured the fact > that giving the system a new purpose has unearthed > fundamental problems that could well put off true > commercial viability for years. > > "Companies would have you believe this is a trivial > problem," said Eric Brewer, a professor of computer science > at the University of California at Berkeley. "But now there > is a financiat incentive to exploit these flaws and to do > it secretly." > > The problems were described in a posting that researchers > at the university made on Monday to several on-line > discussion groups. While the discussion groups are intended > for computer security experts, they are potentially > accessible to millions of Internet users -- including > break-in artists, who are known to monitor such discussion > groups for tips on new ways to crack computer systems. > > The researchers who described the Internet weaknesses > include two Berkeley computer science graduate students who > noted a security weakness in a popular Netscape > Communications Corporation software program last month. > Then as now, the students' stated motivation in publicizing > the problems was to underscore vulnerabilities facing all > companies and customers wishing to use the Internet for > commerce. > > When the Netscape problems were disclosed last month, the > company said the security flaws would be corrected in the > next version of its software, which users would be able to > download at no charge from Netscape's Internet site. But > the newly publicized flaws in the Internet itself indicate > that even if a user downloaded a copy of the new, improved > Netscape program, a criminal could tamper with the copy > along the way and make it unsafe for use in credit card > transactions. > > The problem is not Netscape's alone; it potentially affects > any organization that operates a computer from which files > or software could be downloaded over the Internet. The > weakness can be traced to the technical underpinnings of > the network, which was set up more than a quarter-century > ago not as a medium for conducting business but as a way > for academic and scientific researchers to exchange > information. > > The disclosure of the flaws casts doubt on the aspirations > of companies like Netscape, which last summer had one of > the most successful stock offerings in Wall Street history > based on the promise of the impending arrival of a > full-fledged on-line marketplace. > > "Companies should take a step back and think about this a > little more," said Ian Goldberg, one of the Berkeley > students. "If it takes a bit longer but comes out more > secure, we will all be better off in the long run." > > The way many Internet systems are set up -- especially the > Internet's increasingly popular World Wide Web service in > which software images and even video and audio clips can be > easily downloaded -- information is stored on a computer > called a file server and then transferred to a user's > computer when it is needed. > > The newly publicized weakness occurs in a widely used > Internet protocol -- or technical standard -- known as the > Network File System, or NFS. Because NFS does not have any > means for allowing the recipient of a program or document > to verify that it has not been altered during transmission > from the file server to the user, any interception or > tampering would go undetected. > > "The Internet protocols have been insecure since day one," > said Jeffrey I. Schiller, the manager of computer networks > at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and director > of an industry task force that is trying to design a new > secure version of the Internet. > > But the group's timetable is uncertain, and even when it > does have recommendations ready, Mr. Schiller is not > optimistic that the industry will be willing to devote the > time and money to put them into effect. > > He said that many technologies already exist for improving > commercial security on the Internet, but many of them > require too much technical sophistication on the part of > computer users. He criticized makers of hardware and > software for not moving more quickly to make easy-to-use > security features a built-in part of the technology used on > the Internet. > > "The people who should be the leaders in offering security > have been too busy counting their money to build these > features in to their products," Mr. Schiller said. > > Some commercial Internet merchants have tended to play down > the potential for harm from an illegal interception of > credit card information over the Internet. They point out > that consumers routinely make their credit card numbers > available in transactions done by mail or telephone and > that the law puts limits on a consumer's liability in cases > of credit card fraud. > > But Mr. Brewer, the Berkeley professor, said that the > crucial difference in the proposed Internet commerce > systems was that for the first time it would be relatively > simple for a criminal to collect hundreds or thousands of > credit card numbers. Then a thief could use each credit > card only one time, making detection much more difficult. > > Sensitive to heightened concerns about security, Wells > Fargo, the large California bank, which earlier this year > began permitting customers with personal computers to view > their account information with the Netscape software, > suspended the service in September after the Berkeley > students reported the flaw in Netscape. > > After Netscape followed with an improved version of its > software, Wells Fargo officials found it secure enough that > they planned to resume the service later this week. The > bank will, however, require customers to use the corrected > version of the Netscape program. > > Even then. Wells Fargo customers will be able only to view > account balances and other information, but not transfer > money or conduct other transactions of the type that might > leave them vulnerable to the Internet NFS weakness. > > "We still hope to be able to offer transactional > capabilities next year, but this has slowed us down a > little bit," said Lorna Doubet, a Wells Fargo spokeswoman. > "Many of our customers feel that security is absolutely > essential and we have to be cautious in this regard." > > Executives at Netscape said yesterday that they were aware > of the security issues surrounding NFS and would make > changes in the next release of their software expected > before the end of the year to permit a recipient of a > downloaded program to check it for signs of tampering. > > And hoping to take advantage of the fault-finding talents > of the Berkeley researchers and other like-minded software > experts, the company announced a contest today called > Netscape Bugs Bounty, in which Netscape will award prizes > to users who find bugs or security loopholes in its > software. > > Some Internet experts said they expected that many security > weaknesses like the one the Berkeley group had demonstrated > would be found, because the Internet was simply not > designed to insure secure commerce. > > "Imagine a walled town or a house," said Noel Chiappa, a > member of the Internet Engineering Task Force, a > standards-setting group. "It doesn't matter if 99 windows > are tight as can be -- if the 100th is wide open, the bad > guys will bypass your security. " > > [End] > > > > > > > > > > >

5 7

Aquaria wars ?
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I need some historical information for a discussion about which security features are to be used in usenet. Perhaps someone can help: Some (many) years ago there was a very large and long flamewar at the usenet. As far as I know it was called "The Aquaria Wars" because it began with a debate about the question whether the newsgroup should be named "alt.aquaria" or "alt.aquarium". I am looking for historical informations about this flamewar. Can anyone remember it or is there anything available about? Thanks a lot Hadmut

2 1

Re: NYT on Internet Flaws
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I understand though, that we can't control what the reporters >say and how they interpret what we say. It is very important to word >your posts carefully such that when you post a bug a reporter won't >think that they should write an article on it until it is verified. NO! Something like Perry's "Do not redistribute without permission" should be the only modification needed. /r$

4 3

Banque des Cypherpunks
by sdavidm＠iconz.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- C'punks, What would a cypherpunk bank (being a bank the style of which some cypherpunks would not hate too much :-) look like? How could it be made safe to run? One avenue of safety - shepherding the idea through SEC etc scrutiny so as to render the venture completely legal seems to lack something of a c'punk flavour. After all, one idea that some of us are quite taken with is that strong crypto and the changes it brings are not only important (they are), nor good (as Tim has pointed out - it depends where you stand) but *inevitable*. So, how safe would a cp style bank be today? There seem to be a number of possible pressure points: the machine, the operators, the managers/directors, the owners, the assets, getting money out of the system and getting money into the system. The Machine The easiest way to shut down an ebank is probably to unplug the machine the software is running on and take it away. A variation of this is to cut off net/telecomms access, or even electricity. (In the US/UK/NZ etc this would not seem to be too difficult - lie to a judge about a bit of child porn and you can pretty much take what you like.) Restricting ourselves to legitimate securities/banking enforcement, however, it would seem to be enough to move the box to some appropriate offshore site away from the major markets for the bank's services. Obviously, there is no need to actively advertise the physical location of the processor... The Operators Even if the authorities of the target jurisdictions (US, Europe, Asia) can't reach the operators of the machine while they are tending to it, they could, presumably, make it difficult for those people to leave their jurisdictions once they had entered them - by, for instance, issuing arrest warrants, or holding trials in absentia. Again, if the physical location of the machine is sufficiently obfuscated, this attack can be foiled. The Managers/Directors Assuming the bank is some kind of artificial legal entity, it will require some other legal entity to control its actions. That controlling entity could be themselves an artificial legal entity - for instance, a corporate director of an offshore company. The Owners Assuming the bank itself is not a natural person, it will be owned by someone (at least one list member has indicated an interest in investing in some form of ebank). These owners could be the subject of pressure. Using the same technology that made the ecash anonymous, the ownership of the bank could be made similarly unknowable. The Assets A bank isn't going to last long if the SEC can just take its 'deposits'. Fortunately there are still a number of jurisdictions left where the bank's bank account should be safe. Getting Money out of the System Eventually Tim is going to want to turn his Blacknet earnings into USD to reinforce his security perimeter. How do we stop the Feds effectively making it illegal to receive cheques from Banque des Cp? Presumably, BCp instructs its banks to issue bank cheques, or get bank cheques from other banks. Receiving wire transfers from Citbank may be notifiably suspicious, but that just makes you one of millions... Getting Money into the System This strikes me as the most serious problem. If we differentiate between big ticket (wholesale pharmaceutical type) and small ticket (remailer stamp type) transactions, it might just be possible that the former could be managed without bringing down the wrath of the authorities on the customers (having failed to effectivley attack the bank). Essentially the idea is to route payments through enough appropriate jurisdictions that tracing back from the ebank to the customer is impossible (or, rather, unlikely). Sticking a Libyan bank in the chain could help, for instance... But small ticket transactions can't use this route. The easiest thing to do would be to accept credit cards - but it wouldn't take much to convince Visa and Mastercard not to let their services be used, if not turn over details of everyone who tried to buy ecash. Cheques, TTs etc seem too cumbersome to be marketable, and, once again, too easy to trace - at least at first glance. The problem stems, I think, from trying to satisfy two seemingly opposed requirements - the customer must be sure who they are paying, but the authorities must not know the customer is paying the bank. Any ideas? [Another problem occurs to me. Alice's Awsome XXX CD-Rom Shoppe accepts BCp's BlackCash[TM]. Simon from the SEC buys a CD with BlackCash. "Asian Teenage Leather Maidens" duly arrives, and Simon arrests Alice for dealing in unauthorised securities (and unauthorised dealing in securities etc)...] I think I'll stop before I talk myself out of the whole thing :-) Cheers Dm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMHtVEVlo3j8JHzalAQHT9wP/TV0AN7o4/yfkKw3G4SPrZWUO+LUFdDnD a9v6OKUZZ8LrPQ/XORq3dvtOFtJ6GNiOPZkAWQQI9Rm792PcW4mdF+ppKynjgt0A olK/wFnbBVhYwoEOXvqaC+ZwCTbaewpydEi3OEPGRoXbpDaYxQkfAj7K0dPT21sz TjV5qM+rt+M= =dTqF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [Palmtop News Reader - Beta Version 3]

6 5

I want to learn!
by Leo_Martensen_at_~~HEID-DHS＠ccmail.odedodea.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: VINCENT810(a)aol.com >Message-Id: <951017234254_126621887(a)mail06.mail.aol.com> >To: Cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: I want to learn! >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk >Can someone please show me the ropes on becomeing a cypherpunk!!!! Thanxs. Me Too, I'm catching on but some help would help ! Leo_Martensen_at_~~HEID-DHS(a)ccmail.odedodea.edu

1 0

unsubscribing
by Sheedy, E.C.C. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Apologies for the e-mail but could someone please tell me how one unsubcribes from this list as the recent changes have messed it up. _______________________________________________________ Kamer : B40 KPN Research Telefoon : +31-50-5822816 PO Box 15000 Fax : +31-50-3183110 9700 CD Groningen Email : e.c.c.sheedy(a)research.kpn.com The Netherlands ________________________________________________________________

1 0

Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by Herb Sutter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:58 10.18.1995 -0700, Modemac wrote: > 1) A person writes a message and encrypts it with PGP. Using a set public key? Which would mean the remailers all share the same pub/pri key pair (or pieces thereof)? You'll have to come up with a good way of maintaining this secret, since if you're not careful it could be compromised by something as simple as an attacker's trying to attach a new remailer to the remailer group or physically attack any existing remailer. > 2) That person then posts his message to the "anonymous messages" > newsgroup. > 3) A remailer scanning the newsgroup picks up the message, > decrypts it, strips the headers and makes it anonymous, and > sends it to its destination. Not only is the anonymity of the entire traffic load compromised if the single shared private key is compromised, but even if the secret is kept the newsgroup articles' headers being posted in the clear still opens this scheme to traffic analysis (even if you put it a short random remailer delay, as you say later on; computers are very good at sifting through large volumes of data to find this kind of pattern, especially if the remailer delay's upper bound is known (you proposed two hours)). >The actual remailer code, involving scanning the newsgroup for >PGP-encrypted messages and stripping headers, could be written with >PERL scripts. This would keep it portable, and it would be easy for >a person to tell if it has been tampered with. This code would be >distributed widely. ...and if someone installs their own remailer and adds it to the group, and therefore it must get the complete shared private key at some point (of necessity, else it couldn't decrypt the messages), and then the attacker can just look at the key and decrypt all traffic...? Herb ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Herb Sutter 2228 Urwin, Suite 102 voice (416) 618-0184 Connected Object Solutions Oakville ON Canada L6L 2T2 fax (905) 847-6019

1 0

Re: Microsoft: WFW & Win95 TCP/IP is insecure, and alleged serious computer crime
by llurch＠Networking.Stanford.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Posted, emailed, and archived. I probably should have talked to a lawyer first. Oh well. Followup-To poster (that means email) or spawn new threads. The FAQ is at http://www-dccs.stanford.edu/NetConsult/Win95Net/faq.html. It's getting dated; please download the new.txt link, in UNIX mbox format. The quixote list archive server has been turned off for security reasons. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <461u88$luk(a)dingo.cc.uq.oz.au> in a few newsgroups, DavidS(a)gpo.pa.uq.edu.au (David Steadson) writes: >In article <45rims$9fc(a)Networking.Stanford.EDU>, llurch(a)Networking.Stanford.EDU >says... >> >>Note that Microsoft's "in order to have this problem, there must be a >>UNIX >>computer on your network" really means "if you're connected to the >>Internet, and you're not behind a firewall that disallows all SMB traf >>fic, >>you have this problem." Some other bits are misleading as well. > >Ummm, this is new?? I knew about this security hole in MS TCP/IP months ago, >via newsgroups. Lots of things are new, and very interesting, especially for Usenet readers, because the story involves forged cancels, apparently stolen passwords, and serious computer crime. I'm so glad you asked. Unsurprising Fact: Microsoft has finally acknowledged and documented the problem, and, without fanfare, released a patch for Windows for Workgroups that claims to fix it. Fact: several people at Microsoft have been lying about the problem. In early September, paulbal(a)microsoft.com assured a gathering of Stanford computing support staff that the problem had been fixed in build 490, so I looked no further into it. For a while. Fact: On September 27, I reposted a July article from the SAMBA email list archive about the bug you know all about. I asked for confirmation on whether it had been fixed in the release version of Win95, and whether a fix was available for WFW. Supposition: Early morning September 28, my kerberos password was apparently hacked, and my .forward file was disabled on several UNIX machines, preventing me from receiving some personal and work-related email. I did not notice this problem until October 6 because I seldom log on to the machines in question. Fact: On September 28, I received several replies to my post, several saying that Microsoft had assured them that it had been fixed at some specified (often specified different) build. I also received two replies that the problem had *not* been fixed, and volunteering to reproduce the problem for me. Fact: I posted the confirmation of the bug to win95netbugs(a)lists.stanford.edu. Fact: The Windows for Workgroups security bug fix patch on Microsoft's FTP server is dated late night September 28. Fact: On October 2, Paul_Krill(a)InfoWorld.Com phoned and emailed me inquiring about the problem. He had also been assured by Microsoft sources that the problem had been fixed. I forwarded several articles his way indicating that it had not been fixed. I again searched the Microsoft Knowledge Base for any mention of "SAMBA" or "SMBCLIENT" and found none. Fact: On October 4, received an email message from henrysa(a)microsoft.com inquiring about the problem and offering to investigate for me the current status of the problem. In reply, I sent him the three email messages that are included at the bottom of this post. I have not received any sort of reply from Henry. Fact/Supposition: October 2 (?), somebody made a directory on a Stanford FTP server world-readable and world-writeable, uploaded several megabytes of "warez," and advertised the site on hacker BBSes. Since many people had access to this directory, there were no suspicions about who was responsible. My kerberos password, which I now believe was stolen, would have been sufficient to cause this problem. Fact: Late night/early morning October 14-15, in a routine browse of the Microsoft Knowledge Base, I came across articles on the SMB security bugs, which we all know about now. I posted them, with commentary rather less lurid than what you have seen from me since, when I was perturbed. Fact: The article was canceled. On this day 10/18/95, under penalty of perjury, I swear that it was not canceled by me. My PGP signature should be legally binding. Fact: I also Cc'd the article to \win95netbugs and myself via email. The email made it. NewsWatcher works such that separate Message-IDs are created for news and email, and someone reading the news post has no way of knowing whether the article was also emailed. Supposition: the canceler did not know that NewsWatcher worked this way. Fact: In the morning, I noticed the article was missing, but that earlier and later articles by me were there. I figured something must have gone wrong, so I reposted it. Fact: From 12:10 to 5PM, I was with Kevin Morris at Sacred Heart school in Atherton, building a local PhoneNET network. Obviously, I had no Internet access. While I was there, my second post of the article was canceled. Fact: Around 7PM, I noticed the second cancel, and a followup thereto from a netcom account confirming that the article had been posted and propagated, got really pissed off, and posted it a third time. I also posted to news.admin.net-abuse.misc and our local news administration group. I also Cc'd several PC and networking magazines via email, and cross-posted to a .test group so that I would have verification of the propagation of the article in hand. Fact: Today, as was the case 15 hours after it was posted, article <llurch-1510951157410001(a)tip-mp3-ncs-3.stanford.edu>, to which there was that netcom followup, is missing, presumed canceled, from the core Stanford news servers nntp and csd-newshost. It is present on the secondary news host morrow.stanford.edu, and on external sites. No one has been able to provide any explanation for this. Supposition: the canceler either screwed up or canceled the cancel or, more likely, forged a repost after seeing the netcom followup. For some reason, however, the article did not make it back onto nntp or csd-newshost. Fact: Later that night and in the morning, I received copies of the forged cancels of my messages as seen from nasa.gov, rand.org, and mcom.com. I posted them to news.admin.net-abuse.misc. Supposition: an individual or group has gone great lengths, engaging in quite a bit of highly illegal and unethical behavior, in order to cover up security and networking bugs in Microsoft products. Opinion: they have failed. In a big, big way. - -rich graves distributed computing and communication systems stanford university llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMITf34ND7LjhcPQ9AQGlsQP+KFNuOehBPLExKjJc0e/7bv8iAF29bYgi o4ioLYuwx4AKtR2hER85PWWPNBuDO+G8uqDBcDNzKZ+VxrNDWvhP9oSfTy9ry9OM p5hkcQfB/MqqeDZ5nFOXmTkI2y+EI3az1lHWBr9kQuSalpAVkXTx0/qeW9WWYVFZ cuZ8+Tf3W7o= =G/Dk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Unanswered letters to henrysa(a)microsoft.com:

1 0

Re: Netscape PR
by Charles Gimon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > > If you wish to get an official statement from Netscape, you should > contact our PR department. Their number is 415-528-2802. > They don't have e-mail?

1 0