December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

17 Dec '03

At 04:34 PM 10/20/95 -0400, Jim Cannell wrote: > >=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >I have been a long time lurker on this list, as well as having a long time >interest in crypto. Most of my activity in this area has been on FidoNet >rather than the internet. Due to the control phreak nature of much of >FidoNet, I've spent a lot of time and effort in an attempt to just simply >route around the bastards. I created the SecureMail system, which is a >network of FidoNet nodes that agree to route any and all traffic without >monitoring or censorship. Within SecureMail, encrypted traffic is not >only permitted, it is encouraged. At the end of the month, I will be putting my BBS back online with new software which is more Fido friendly than what I had been using.. I would be interested in your SecureMail system as an alternative to the mind-numbing strickness normally associated with FidoNet.. Any chance I can get more info? Thanks- RobL

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Re: crypto export from the UK
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jon Baber <jbaber(a)mi.leeds.ac.uk> writes: > sameer <sameer(a)c2.org> wrote: > > Could people in the UK please tell me what the crypto export > > laws are like there? I know someone who wrote some really great crypto > > code in the UK but isn't willing to distribute it because of crypto > > export laws... I was under the impression that it was legal to export > > crypto from the UK. > > I believe that the laws regarding the export of crypto from the UK are > very similar to the ITAR regs in the US. I thought they were markedly different! I always understood there were NO restrictions on crypto export, import or use to western countries. There used to be COCOM agreements which said that you should get approval to send commercially produced crypto to some blacklisted countries (Iraq, etc). I also read that the COCOM restrictions did not claim to apply to free software. Anyway, I read that the COCOM agreement has expired, so none of this applies anymore, even. There are a number of surveys around, and the above is my understanding from reading those. If you have any thing else I should be reading I'd like to see it. > However our Government seems to take the view that putting crypto > software on the net is not exporting it, the exporting is done > whenever anyone from an export restricted country downloads the > software and is done by them rather than by the person who made the > software available. I also have heard this. > Strong crypto is therefore openly available from a number of places in > this country, particually sable.ox.ac.uk at the university of Oxford. Indeed. > Of course IANAL and the government may change it's mind about the > interpretation of these things but I would expect that your > acquaintance would be perfectly safe distributing his software via > sable (the ftp site (and its predicessor) have been distributing > crypto software for a number of years and I have not heard of any > problems). I think he would be safe emailing it, putting it on the WWW, or posting it to USENET. There are no selective access restrictions on *any* crypto ftp/http sites that I know of in the UK (like various ones in the US which make a sho of enforcing the export restriction by not allowing export to non-US domain names.) Adam

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mixmaster(a)gondolin.org> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> cpunk"; $remailer{"precip"} = "<mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<remail(a)ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- replay remailer(a)replay.com ******+***** 7:15 99.99% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com + --------- 1:36:59 99.84% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl * ******** 10:05 99.80% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ******### 1:52 99.78% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu + ++-*+++#* 6:28 99.71% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com + ++++++++++ 43:31 99.67% ecafe remail(a)ecafe.org - ****### 3:31 99.67% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ** ********* 16:56 99.60% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net * ********** 13:16 99.58% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi -+-- ----+ 5:07:54 99.03% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com --------.- 4:44:16 96.61% c2 remail(a)c2.org + +++++ 57:02 96.35% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net + ****+ * * 26:48 94.29% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net * **** * * 9:26 93.72% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu # ** *** 1:20:32 92.71% rahul homer(a)rahul.net *# ** ****## 2:20 99.71% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de . ----._ 22:58:20 73.77% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org - ---+-- 1:30:08 57.37% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com - ------ 4:48:34 50.13% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: require for new remailer list tag?
by futplex＠pseudonym.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sameer suggests the creation of a new remailer list property, "permanent", to denote a remailer expected by its operator(s) to persist indefinitely. I'm curious about the potential sociological effects of such a move. I imagine that pseudonyms would be attracted to "permanent" remailers for use in their reply chains. But this phenomenon could/should be mitigated by the possibility that sting remailers would tend to advertise themselves as "permanent" (truthfully, even !), in anticipation of the bias in pseudonym remailer chain inclusion. Enemies of anonymity might specially target remailers claiming to be "permanent" for antisocial uses. This is all similar to the effects (observed and supposed) of the existing reliability ratings for remailers. But the sharp contrast of a binary property might make the effects more pronounced. Perhaps it would be useful/meaningful to note the duration (or starting date) of each remailer's term of operation, on the theory that past survival is some indicator of the chances for continued existence. Anyway, I think it would be an interesting experiment to try. -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com>

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Re: textbooks
by ethridge＠Onramp.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I have also heard good things about a book by Warwick Ford. "Computer Communications Security", Warwick Ford, PTR Prentice Hall, 0-13-799453-2 allen

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Re: Netscape rewards are an insult
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> The idea that Netscape (like Microsoft) thinks they can get free >> testing services from all over the net by real experts just by offerring >> a tee shirt is down right offensive. > > >THE NETSCAPE BUGS BOUNTY > >(major snip) > > And if the security bug you find is severe as defined by Netscape, and > hasn't been previously found, and can be reproduced by us, we'll write > you a check for $1000. Ha! I reported a serious problem to Netscape ten days ago, on Thursday the twelfth. They haven't even returned an answer to my email yet nor even acknowledged its receipt. Yep, I guess that their check is in the mail .... Has anyone else seen or heard anything?? T-shirt's, mugs, checks, or email being returned or answered?? Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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COMMUNITY CONNEXION TO OFFER REWARD FOR REVEALING HOLES IN ECASH
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For Immediate Release Contact: Sameer Parekh sameer(a)c2.org 510-601-9777 (pager: 510-321-1014) COMMUNITY CONNEXION TO OFFER REWARD FOR REVEALING HOLES IN ECASH October 23, 1995 - Community ConneXion, an internet privacy provider in Berkeley, California, announced the extension of its existing "Hack" contests to the electronic cash system announced today by Digicash bv and Mark Twain Bank. "The ecash deployment an important step towards making internet commerce more than just a curiosity," said Sameer Parekh, President of Community ConneXion. The contest is meant, as with the other "Hack" promotions being run by Community ConneXion, to encourage the examination of the security of the ecash system so as to reveal holes before they are exploited by a criminal element. Community ConneXion hopes that the inquiry being done into the security of these products results in a secure infrastructure for the new paradigms provided by internet commerce. "All internet commerce systems thus far released have been based in old, out-of-date, insecure technology, such as credit cards. DigiCash is the first revolutionary system which can change the way we do business," said Parekh. "If the move to internet commerce does not radically improve the way people do business, then we have not taken full advantage of the potential inherent in the technology." Details regarding the Hack DigiCash promotion are available on Community ConneXion's webserver at http://www.c2.org/hackecash/. Contest submissions should be sent to hackecash(a)c2.org. Community ConneXion is the premier internet privacy ISP. They offer anonymous accounts, remailers, and psuedonym servers, in addition to the standard ISP fare of webspace and dialup IP access. Information is available from http://www.c2.org/ or from sending email to info(a)c2.org. Ecash, DigiCash, Cyberbucks, and Mark Twain Bank are trademarks of their respective owners. This promotion is not affiliated with DigiCash bv nor Mark Twain Bank.

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pkcs7 examples
by Eric Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings peoples, I have just about finished writing routines to parse and write pkcs7 objects. I have written all the backend digital envelope routines and so now I have to decide on the the library API and test things. I currently only have a single pkcs7-signedData example, one that is being used to 'transport' x509 certificates and CRL's. Do any of you out there have pkcs-7 'objects' you can send me? I especially want examples of pkcs7 signedAndEnveloped. For those that don't know, pkcs7 is used in S/MIME and is a superset of PEM. The degenerative case of signedData is being used by protocols such as SSLv3 to transport X509 CRL's. thanks in advance. eric (whos SSL library is becoming a kitchen sink of crypto related stuff) -- Eric Young | Signature removed since it was generating AARNet: eay(a)mincom.oz.au | more followups than the message contents :-)

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Re: Mondex vs. Digicash (was: Godzilla vs. Mothra)
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text To: rah(a)shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga), www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com, ecm(a)ai.mit.edu, bsdc(a)ai.mit.edu Cc: hallam(a)w3.org Subject: Re: (cpx) Mondex vs. Digicash (was: Godzilla vs. Mothra) Date: Mon, 23 Oct 95 12:06:43 -0400 From: hallam(a)w3.org X-Mts: smtp Sender: bounce-bsdc(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: hallam(a)w3.org Some comments on the comments: > The availability of Digicash in the US, for real, with spender anonymity, will be announced very soon; reporter activity on this subject is consistent with an embargoed press release for Monday or Tuesday. From posts to the list it's clear that a fully working system, ready for customers, will be announced. The avbilability in the US I don't consider as meaning much one way or the other. Mondex is avaliable in Swindon in the UK, a very large and very serious real world trial. More importantly Mondex has Wells Fargo Bank behind it and NatWest and HKSB, these are major league players with very tight coupling, cross ownership of subsidiaries etc. > When doing market research on this subject, it became clear that low-value payments are largely going to be used for impulse purchases. If the Digicash system allows people to set up their accounts without getting out of their chairs (which I suspect will be the case, if they do it right), it will initially get more adopters. DigiCash will be limited to the Internet, Mondex is genuine cash, it allows offline purse to purse transactions. > One or both systems could be found to have serious security problems; who knows what the outcome of their discovery & exploitation would be? I know at least one group of people who believe they have a good line on a serious security problem in Mondex. If they have the specs they are under an NDA. If you know people who know a problem tell them to get in touch with Tim Jones, they are very keen to get the best security possible. I'm not sure that the conventional "publish everything" dogma of cypher types is valid. I don't think they are relying on security through obscurity, they simply want it in addition. Mondex is designed with two security schemes to be exchanged at overlapping four year intervals. > Even if the Mondex hardware were given away for free, think how much fun it is for the average user to add a new piece of hardware to their machines... ever install a sound card and CD-ROM drive on a PC? I remember reading something like 20% of all "multimedia" kits were returned, largely due to user install problems. If there is a competing method that costs the same and _doesn't_ require the hardware, people will tend go with this. They need it to be plug 'n play. I expect this to happen. > In my conversations with state and federal regulators, it is clear that it _is_ possible to issue spender-anonymous e-cash. If you ask them, "Hey, can I create fully anonymous digital cash?", they go apeshit, but if you explain that the money uses existing (auditable) channels going in, and existing (auditable) channels going out, and that only spenders are anonymous, they relax considerably. They may change their minds later, but we're about to get an existence proof. All I know is that at the mention of DigiCash bankers start muttering Regulation E. > It's not clear that _either_ system is going to win completely in the next 10+ years. Although there's been considerable shakeout in the last ten years, there is still a huge variety of non-electronic payment methods -- how can you be so sure that Mondex will win over Digicash, and that they won't co-exist like, say, money orders, currency and cashier's checks (three instruments with both similar and dissimilar attirbutes)? Quite probable, except that Mondex is a very credible scheme with very large and very established names behind it. I haven't heard of Mark Twain bank. I don't say that this predetermines the outcome, just that there are reasons why one might have an advantage. Phill H-B --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: FidoNet Remailer
by jgrubs＠left.webcasters.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- RobL <robl(a)on-ramp.ior.com> writes: > At 04:34 PM 10/20/95 -0400, Jim Cannell wrote: > > > >=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= > > > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > > >I have been a long time lurker on this list, as well as having a long time > >interest in crypto. Most of my activity in this area has been on FidoNet > >rather than the internet. Due to the control phreak nature of much of > >FidoNet, I've spent a lot of time and effort in an attempt to just simply > >route around the bastards. I created the SecureMail system, which is a > >network of FidoNet nodes that agree to route any and all traffic without > >monitoring or censorship. Within SecureMail, encrypted traffic is not > >only permitted, it is encouraged. > > > At the end of the month, I will be putting my BBS back online with new > software which is more Fido friendly than what I had been using.. I would be The Fido remailer appears to be drawing some interest. Fidonet is often criticized (by me among many, many others) for being dull, provincial, and dominated by power phreaks. However, the Fidonet connectivity protocols have much to be admired from the 'punks perspective. Internet has great speed and bandwidth, but network routing is "hardwired." Fidonet is frequently slow and narrowband, but routing is much more flexible. The so-called "nodelist" contains the node number (the equivalent of IP number), various technical parameters, and the dial-up telephone number and availibility schedule at which e-mail/data calls can be accepted. Since the access number of every site in the network is known, you can send e-mail directly to the destination site if you wish not to use standard, fixed routing. This, plus call forwarding and laptops at pre-arranged temporary locations, means Freeh's wiretap problem is now the need to monitor every call at every ESS. Hence, his curious request for huge wiretap capacity. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: LIBERTY!! Use it or lose it!! iQCVAwUBMIvDZt74r4kaz3mVAQG74wP/XhD/g9jE/sNcP5dQWskd95yJSPgJgXac Z42Aj1QfR1fchG4v1A2iuUsaKDma3MU/whn4gqMxJPVjeat6D7wvzU0DzSj7eeSk mAjVZNnZcmGcXiTy4ueTBcdttgi0JV2g0djijOvKCGx48fMIUy8zWK9vPFe7kpkb hDzcqlpD5Xw= =ObiT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- WebCasters(tm) James C. Grubs jgrubs(a)webcasters.com 6817 Maplewood Avenue Tel.: 419-882-2697 Sylvania, Oh 43560 Fax: 419-885-2814 Internet consulting, HTML programming, Information brokering

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