December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: DejaNews all over again--a URL for Usenet Searching
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:28 PM 11/6/95 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >I usually avoid passing on URLs of interesting sites, in the name of >conserving bandwidth (*), but this one really has me jazzed: > >http://dejanews.com/ > >It allows searching of Usenet archives (a few months' worth, from what I >can see). I'm not impressed since I've been using the subscription version of Infoseek for a while now which lets you search the last month of News and includes mailing lists as well (including cypherpunks). The free version is behind the Net Search button on Netscape but only searches the Web. http://www.infoseek.com A search for tcmay(a)got.net produced more than 200 hits. My Tim you *do* get around. Modesty prevents me from mentioning any newsgroup names. DCF

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Re: DejaNews all over again
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 7 Nov 1995 lmccarth(a)cs.umass.edu wrote: > your True Name (verinym) from your name on the net. > Many will want to use > tentacles (*), er, separate pseudonyms for discussions in different parts of > the net. After all, I might not want the c'punks to hear about my past life > as a control freak (pun intended) in alt.config. Just a reminder.... > > (*) Speaking of tentacles, Dejanews reveals that my name is on the long list > of people whose signatures have been appropriated by Detweiler ;) You too, eh?? I wish that Detweiler could (seriously) go back to wherever he came from. Hopefully this time, he can make the attempt ... backwards. I no longer become incensed at his type of spoofing. I understand that a message may look like it appears to come from a site, but it in fact doesn't. Who really knows?? Even a message that is PGP signed isn't guaranteed to be from the person who apparently signed it. Someone might have a web server that asks Netscape Navigator (very politely) to send out someone's secret PGP keyring, or asks Navigator to monitor a person's keystrokes when they enter their password, or heaven forbid their electronic daytimer. Once you have that, it's easy to send a forged PGP SIGNED email. Even worse, most readers of email will tend to believe that an electronic signature is prima facie evidence that a message is from who it appears to be from. It just doesn't work that way. You have to look at the message and use "fuzzy" logic to determine how probable it is that a given message is from the person who it represents itself as coming form. And sometimes, you'll be wrong. Just like the good old, "Dr. Frederick B. Cohen", who posted to this list. Is he really the Dr. Cohen, noted international computer virus expert, the very man who coined the term "computer virus", or isn't he? Is he the man who the US military approached to verify whether missile guidance systems could be compromised by a foreign power utilizing a trojan horse or virus, or not. Do we believe his web page?? Even if we do, do we place a greater degree of trust in his words, than that of say, yours truly, Alice de 'nonymous, or of someone who claims to be Tim May when they BOTH say that there are very serious flaws and deficincies in the Netscape Navigator product? Or do we infer that a "no comment" coming from AT&T and Netscape, acts as confirmation that the *information* in the post is reliably correct. It's impossible to say with certainty. Maybe if someone on this mailing list attended Dr. Cohen's talk today at the Hilton Hotel, in Washington, D.C., and fills us in with what he said, (if we can trust _that_ poster) and we independently verify for ourselves whether what _he_ (Dr. Cohen or Mr. Confirmation) is saying *seems* to be reasonable, then we _might_ be able to say that we _may_ be reasonably certain, that we DO have an international celebrity amongst us and posting to this list, and notifying the world of a serious problem. I mean what would you expect, a Press Release?? Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: using pgp to make an otp
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:31 PM 11/6/95 EST, Derek Atkins <warlord(a)MIT.EDU> wrote: >> PGP output is not random enough to be used for a one time pad. >> The security of a OTP is *entirely* based on the quality of the random >> numbers; they should come from some strong generator. Building good >> one time pads is tough, and usually not worth the effort. > >No, however the output of "pgp +makerandom=XXX filename.dat" _IS_ >random enough for an OTP. The problem then becomes distributing this >data. amp had written: | my point here is that _if_ pgp output is random enough, i wouldn't need | hardware. even i, with my extremely limited programming skills could create | a .cmd file or program that could be used as input for a stream cypher. The output of PGP should be random enough for your application, as long as you don't think you're getting a cryptographically-correct OTP out of the deal. PGP uses its randpool stuff in its random number generation, so there are likely to be at least 24 bytes of real randomness kept around, maybe more depending on the size of your randpool, but the rest of your security comes from algorithm quality and is theoretically crackable like any pseudo-random sequence (albeit requiring exponentially-large crackwork.) It's using IDEA in a feedback mode, so it's better than just repeated MD5s. The output of PGP +makerandom probably is secure enough for most applications, depending on how many bits you're using, what you're doing with it, and how paranoid you need to be. Check out the code to be sure. You may have special applications such as amp's stream cypher for which it's more convenient to XOR the makerandom instead of using PGP, but watch out for attacks like known-plaintext, which can really bite you in secure-voice systems where there's a lot of near-silence. Careless protocol work can spoil really decent random numbers.... #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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PGP Comment feature weakens remailer security PGP Comment feature weakens remailer security
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Suppose you want to mail or post something sensitive enough to chain through several remailers with PGP encryption at every stage to protect the privacy of communications. PGP can bite you. The PGP comment feature lets you stick one (or more?) lines of comment into your encrypted messages, after the Version: line but before the encrypted message body. If you use the PGP comment feature to say something more or less unique (mine says that you can get PGP outside the country from ftp.ox.ac.uk), anybody eavesdropping the last remailer in your chain can notice this in the remailer's input and recognize that it's from you, even though you've chained through six different places to get there. It's still encrypted, and protected to the extent that the remailer protects you, but if the remailer is corrupt or your message can be identified by size among the other remailer inputs, you're hosed. So, for safety, either turn off PGP comments before using it with remailers, or wipe out the comments by hand before each layer of encryption (easy to do with GUI-based systems like Private Idaho; I don't know if premail lets you do this or not.) Bill Stewart -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7.1 Comment: PGP available outside U.S.A. at ftp.ox.ac.uk iQBVAwUBMKAgw/thU5e7emAFAQFStwH/QnIiiaeSmUp1YynDBLVo3HAWsVkS0nx8 Fc95Mr0YJ/YIoRDz+xuNgLHbjJZSTUbhOnigMRb7JLNqhmCGvS5RBQ== =ZWhB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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EARLY WARNING: Decemeber SF Bay Area Cyperpunks
by Katy Kislitzin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi-- Eric Messick and I will be holding the Decemeber C'punks meeting at our geodesic dome in the Santa Cruz Mountains. It will be a combination meeting and holiday get-together. It will be happening on the usual c'punks saturday, Dec 9, but will start at 4:00 pm instead of the usual noon. A more spirited announcement will follow closer to the date. --kt

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Lotus Notes RSA Implementation Question
by bglassle＠kaiwan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am currently considering using Lotus Notes for a group-ware solution where security is of great importance. I have studied Notes documentation regarding thier implementation of the RSA encryption library, but it leaves some unanswered questions. If anyone on the list has knowledge of the following items, I would be very gratefull. 1) What is the key size used by the USA licensed version? 2) Considering RC4 is a proprietary scheme, have there been any concerted efforts to validate it's strength or lack of? If so, could you give a pointer to any documents I could review. ...Bob Glassley -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMKBVtW7xvKhVs/sNAQHCowP+LF2stvSPzatDfAkKx2DfU8sH5S7p6KwN PwDEak9it1Uq0eALHWVTc3VZ3WYY+6XIjYNnNyfdKsgehXb+2dVEgjz1qbHyK+uE 3JhlYOeCfBcXUrTbilAoYXghJHvrpJq8z+Pa6u2W5Wgxks+t9MYzjV3YKLM2Nj6Z y6jbBUcyyNc= =TN1O -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Crypto++, Cpunk Icons, list noise
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 6 Nov 1995 s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >> And as the messenger, I (hope) I don't have anything to fear, from the >> NSA or any other foreign group that would seek to pursue its own agenda >> within the borders of sovereign Canada. I really don't think that the >> NSA is "evil incarnate", as some list subscribers do. They have their >> intelligence and know how to use it. Usually, they use it prudently. > >They have a nice friend (the author of Spyworld would say outpost) >right here in Ottawa at the Communications Security Establishment. Yes. I'm well aware of where I can find an Operations Officer, if I need to. Locally, in fact. Don't really have to go to Ottawa, for that. (Wrong guess, btw ...) >They (CSE) seem to have done some recent spying on the opposition >parties and Quebec separatists (so I vaguely recall having read in >several places. Yes. At least in this part of the country, we're relatively ho-hum (big yawn) about scouts and scouting. Part of the territory, I guess. We're Canadian. We're civilized about these things. >If you're ever in town, they're just a bit past Carleton U. on Heron. >(it doesn't say CSE on the signs, but the guy at the gate will tell you so) Thanks. Personally, I'm much more interested in the Museum of Civilization. Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: Java insecurity - long - argumentative - you are warned.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 6 Nov 1995, Dr. Frederick B. Cohen wrote: > WARNING - THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS > A FLAME BY SOME READERS - IT IS LONG AND TEDIOUS - YOU ARE WARNED! > > 4.2 Security in the Java Environment > > > > Security commands a high premium in the growing use of the Internet > > for products and services ranging from electronic distribution of > > software and multimedia content, to "digital cash". The area of > > security with which we're concerned here is how the Java compiler and > > run-time system restrict application programmers from creating > > subversive code. [long list of important questions deleted ...] Essentially, I think that all of this will distill to a single issue, vis-a-vis Java or any other paradigm which wishes to represent itself as *secure*. Where is the security review role placed within the project development life cycle?? Is it at Design Concept? Or during Application Development? Or is it done last, after design completion, after all of the programming is complete and the production people are involved in operational turnover. Or is it done at all? This concept is not new, and should not present any problems to anyone in the industry. Even John Q. Public will understand it, if we use a simple construction analogy. If you want to build a secure house, your security doesn't start AFTER the house is built. It has to start at a very early stage. It starts before the blueprints are made, when you specify that you want a concrete windowless box located on a quiet street at the end of a cul-de-sac. That is simple and obvious. You certainly don't have *security* if after building a glass house on Main Street, if after the design is finished, the footings have been poured, and the key is about to be turned over to the occupant; if then, as an afterthought you put a single strong deadbolt on the front door to "secure" it. Anyone who can't or won't quite grasp this idea is either willfully attempting to steer gullible individuals astray, or is congenitally stupid. It's time to call a spade a spade. > What exactly does this mean? > > > While all this checking appears excruciatingly detailed, by the time > > the byte code verifier has done its work, the Java interpreter can > > proceed knowing that the code will run securely. Knowing these > > properties makes the Java interpreter much faster, because it doesn't > > have to check anything. Yikes!! I'll leave this for someone else to address. This sounds to me like a variation on virus scanning. I think that there are far more reputable virus experts than I who can comment and expand on *flaws* with that approach. > No runtime checking whatsoever. Get past the supposed verifier, and you > have free run of the machine. A single verifier bug or inadequacy, and > the world is unsafe for electronic commerce. As someone who *vividly* remembers October, 1987 and the near economic meltdown which was BARELY averted by the Fed, a near meltdown which occurred because of the interactions of systems far less intelligent or complex than those we routinely utilize today, systems which directly interface not only to each other, but have undocumented, non-predictable interactions with "soft and wet" systems, I might have some serious concerns. Then again, it is _only_ the economy, isn't it? > ASBESTOS SUITS MAY NOW BE REMOVED - FLAME OFF. > > P.S. > > When: Tuesday, November 7, 8AM > Where: The Hilton, Washington D.C. (the CSI conference) > The talk: 50 Ways to Attack Your World Wide Web Systems > > If you want a chance to heckle - be there. Drat ... I don't think that I'll be able to attend. I've already got a local presentation that I've pencilled in for tomorrow morning at some god awfully early hour. Then again, D.C. isn't quite my circuit. I was hoping though for some clarification. Are you THE Dr. Frederick B. Cohen?? The one who originally coined the phrase "computer virus" and who maintains the computer virus FAQ? Are you THAT Dr. Frederick B. Cohen, and are you speaking publically in Washington, tommorow as one of the keynote speakers? If you are, I'd be interested as to whether you'll talk about the recent gaping security hole in the existing installed Navigator code base which I detailed to this list's subscribers. The one posted this last Friday the Thirteenth, that questioned Netscape's wisdom in creating an experimental MIME object which does not follow the usual HTTP request/response paradigm, but instead allows a server to open and maintain a bi-directional communications channel from server to client. Effectively a non-password protected telnet into the heart of any system, a open exploitable connection which penetrates proxy servers and firewalls, and acts as an enhanced bi-directional delivery/recovery mechanism? I'd be very interested in the comments around that, especially since both Netscape and AT&T (who distributes the softwre under its own brand name) have made an explicit "no comment". I'd especially be interested in any post-session transcript. I also think that Elaine Garzarelli might be interested. Especially since she'll be addressing the nation and the public via the public television airwaves this Friday evening. Or at least ... uhmmm ... I _think_ that's when her electronic daytimer has her pencilled in ... Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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expiration dates on cryptography
by John Curtis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The discussion between Mr. May and Mr. Shields concerning time-release cryptograhy raised an interesting question in my mind. Given that trust is often of an ephemeral nature, it would be quite useful to set time limits on secrets. Would it be possible to cryptographically protect a secret such that it could not be decrypted after a certain time? I suspect that the laws of thermodynamics might prohibit this in classical cryptography because as a message expired the amount of entropy would decrease. Quantum cryptography might work, but that will be science fiction for some time to come. Has anyone either shown how to do this or proven it impossible?

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Re: Newt on Crypto
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From John Young's posting CYB_lip of a column from the Washington Post > "At some point in the not-very-distant future," said > Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) in an August interview in > Wired with computer guru Esther Dyson, "somebody is going > to have encryption you can't break.... Governments are not > going to be able to stop it." Newt's an optimist (from the government perspective.) At some point in the not-very-distant future, _everybody_ is going to have encryption the government can't break! #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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