December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Computers at wholesale, Pentiums & AMD(k-5,k-6)
by ceo35＠concentric.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: National Security Committee amendments to SAFE
by Amanda Walker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I take it this last sentence is intended to kill Bernstein, Karn and Junger > and any other cases we might try to bring. Correct? Looks like a separation of powers problem at first glance; how many situations are there where the legislative branch and the executive branch can collude to take the judicial branch out of the loop entirely? Amanda Walker Ascend Communications, Inc. amanda_walker(a)ascend.com

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Re[2]: FBI seeks huge wiretapping system
by sharborth＠hai-net.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: FBI seeks huge wiretapping system Author: Jay Campbell <edge(a)got.net> at internet Date: 03-11-95 06:08 >I was being facetious. The point is that the government has no >inherent right to tap our phones -- indeed, it didn't do so for nearly >the first 200 years of our existance, and we did just fine -- better, >in fact. It is a well-known fact that it was common practice for NSA operatives to ^^^ masquerade as Injuns in the 1800's and waylay Pony Express riders in order ^^^^^^ I think you'll find the NSA was not in existence in the 1800's. to intercept communications between targeted parties. This practice lost popularity towards the end of the century with the advent of boxed cereal, and with it the Lone Ranger Decoder Ring, since the operatives were too underfunded to afford anything more than oatmeal. [ducks] -- Jay Campbell edge(a)got.net - Operations Manager -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node Jay(a)Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 "On the Information Superhighway, I'm the guy behind you in this morning's traffic jam leaning on his horn."

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Re: Telephone bugging devices
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:49 PM 9/16/97 -0400, ERIC HUGHES wrote: > >I was wondering if you can give me infomation on how and where i can get >a non visible telephone bugging device. Cost as well. > >Or a room bugging device non visible as long as it can only be detected >by detecters > > Radio Shack. It's called a FM Wireless Microphone. You can probably get one for less than 20 bucks. You can then take the shell off of this, probably a little black rectangle or a childs toy microphone, and you will have a nie little circuit board. Battery life is a problem, but you can work out a solution to that depending on where you put it. Hide it either on the underside of surfaces below eye level or on the top surfaces of objects a foot or so above head level. They sell some more dedicated hardware out of the back of magazines like popular science and popular mechanics. Look for advertisements that claim that thier product can BROADCAST UP TO A HALF MILE and show a picture of something next to a quarter.

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RE: Many Topics are Appropriate for Discussion Here
by John Curtis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nothing ventured, nothing gained. I don't mind reading serious questions no matter how naive, provided that the questioner is willing to listen to the responses no matter how acerbic. You would have to have a pretty thick skin to post here frequently. ---------- From: Futplex[SMTP:futplex@pseudonym.com] Sent: Friday, November 03, 1995 2:30 PM To: Cypherpunks Mailing List Subject: Re: Many Topics are Appropriate for Discussion Here I have some not-so-hypothetical questions: Suppose I have serious and plausibly realistic aspirations to become an authority in some subtopic of cryptography, network security, etc. (sometime well into the next millenium). Am I more likely to learn and hone my skills by actively participating (sticking my neck out) or merely lurking indefinitely ? Regardless of the answer to the previous question, should the list suffer me my missteps and naivete ? I do not consider these questions rhetorical, and the answers are very important to me on a personal level. And now I believe I'll shut up for a while. -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com>

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Re: National Security Committee amendments to SAFE
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:15 PM 9/17/97 -0400, Carl Ellison wrote: ... >I take it this last sentence is intended to kill Bernstein, Karn and Junger >and any other cases we might try to bring. Correct? > >Is anyone starting a campaign to get congressfolks to kill both McCain-Kerrey >and the amended SAFE? ... I sent an e-mail to my representative, Mr. J. C. Watts Jr. Regrettably, he is on the national security board, so I don't hold out much hope of converting him. I presented him, however inelegantly my words, with the currently popular housekey escrow with the IRS. I also presented another of security cameras in everyones homes for looking in occasionally. Finally I asked that he watch 1984 and warned him about not watching it in the company of minors. Maybe he'll watch 1984, BECAUSE it has nudity, though.

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Re: Photuris Primality verification needed
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"William Allen Simpson" writes: > Folks, I was somewhat disappointed in the response to our previous > requests for verification of the strength of the prime moduli. > > Recently, someone asked for a smaller prime of only 512-bits for speed. > This is more than enough for the strength of keys needed for DES, 3DES, > MD5 and SHA. Perhaps this would be easier to have more complete and > robust verification as well. I think that this is a very large mistake. Allow me to explain why. La Macchia (sp?) and Odlyzko (sp?) have a very nice result which shows that once you've done enough precalculation on a particular modulus, you can break any subsequent Diffie-Hellman operation performed on that modulus with (for our purposes) no effort. 512 bits is, from what I can tell, not far out of the realm of possibility for what someone could try to crack with current machines given enough effort. [Sorry about the spelling. I'm tired, and don't have time to look up your names. I know that Brian at least reads this list and I'm sorry about likely misspelling your name.] Perry

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LACC: DEA Agents Accuse CIA of Tapping Phones
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This would probably be a pretty interesting complaint to read, if there are any DC-area cypherpunks who feel like making a trip down to the courthouse .. >Resent-Date: Wed, 17 Sep 1997 19:55:42 +1000 (EST) >Date: 17 Sep 1997 09:49:50 -0000 >From: proff(a)suburbia.net >X-Loop: lacc(a)suburbia.net >Resent-Sender: lacc-request(a)suburbia.net >To: lacc(a)suburbia.net >Resent-From: lacc(a)suburbia.net >X-OS: FreeBSD3.0-current >X-Mailing-List: <lacc(a)suburbia.net> ftp://ftp.suburbia.net/pub/mailinglists/lacc/archive/latest/1018 >X-Subscription: To unsubscribe from this fine mailing list mail lacc-request(a)suburbia.net with Subject: unsubscribe >Subject: LACC: DEA Agents Accuse CIA of Tapping Phones > >Real-To: proff(a)suburbia.net > > > >SAN FRANCISCO (AP) - The CIA and other spy >agencies have systematically tapped the phones of >overseas Drug Enforcement Administration offices, >according to a class action lawsuit agents filed >Thursday in Washington. > >The lawsuit, which also names the National Security >Agency and the State Department, seeks a court >order barring those agencies from any further >wiretapping. > >"These agencies have a pattern and practice of >eavesdropping on DEA agents' and employees' >conversations while they are serving the government >overseas," said attorney Brian Leighton of Clovis, Calif. > >But legal experts say it could be a difficult lawsuit to >win, especially since an employer - in this case the >government - generally has a right to listen to employee >conversation on office phones. > >It also doesn't help that national security was involved >and that courts have held that U.S. citizens don't have >constitutional rights overseas. > >``It's an uphill battle. It's going to be a tough suit,'' said >constitutional law expert Paul Rothstein of Georgetown >University. > >The lawsuit was filed on behalf of all DEA agents, >but the agency itself was not part of the action. > >The only DEA agent named as a plaintiff in the suit >is Richard A. Horn, currently with the agency's New >Orleans bureau. Five other incidents involving other >unidentified agents are alleged. > >Two years ago Horn filed a lawsuit accusing U.S. >officials of undermining his anti-drug efforts in Burma. > >That suit is still pending. > >Leighton said subsequent contacts with other DEA >personnel revealed a pattern of similar abuses around >the world. > >CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield said he could not >comment directly on the class action lawsuit, but >defended his agency. > >"It is not the CIA's mission, nor is it part of the >operations of the agency, to surveil in any manner >U.S. officials, or other U.S. citizens at home or >abroad,'' Mansfield said. > >The only exception would be in counterintelligence >cases, he added, and then only in consultation with >senior Justice Department officials. > >DEA spokesman James McGivney said he could not >comment on pending litigation, but noted that as a >U.S. citizen, Horn had the right file his own lawsuit. > >John Russell, spokesman for the Justice Department, >which defends the other agencies in lawsuits, >said only, ``we will respond in court.'' > >In Horn's previous case, Leighton said, the Justice >Department angered DEA agents by claiming they >have no Fourth Amendment constitutional right >against wiretapping when working outside the >country. > >Leighton, a former federal prosecutor, said the >lawsuit doesn't address the reasons for the alleged >electronic eavesdropping. > >"My assumption is because they want to know >what DEA is doing, they want to rip off DEA >informants, they want to know DEA contacts >within foreign governments,'' Leighton said. >``And with the Cold War over, these agencies >are looking for a new mission.'' > >An April 1996 letter to agents by Horn and >Leighton, details the allegation of wiretapping >against the agent in Burma. > >Horn's residence ``was the target of a U.S. >Government Agency-sponsored electronic audio >intercept,'' it said. > >"Horn had occasion to see a cable containing >his words in quotation marks, that he had spoken >to another DEA agent, set forth exactly as stated...'' > >The suit also reports alleged wiretaps against >DEA agents in the Dominican Republic from >1987 to 1990, in May 1993 and September 1994 >at the Bangkok, Thailand office; at the Guatemala >City office in 1984, 1985 and from 1987 to 1989; >and in an unidentified location in April 1987. > >The suit, assigned to U.S. District Judge Harold H. >Greene, names as defendants Secretary of State >Warren Christopher, CIA Director John Deutch >and NSA Director Adm. J.M. McConnell. > > -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | Export jobs, not crypto. http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | http://www.parrhesia.com

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wiretaping ability and future plans
by JMKELSEY＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Date: Thu, 02 Nov 1995 01:55:06 -0800 >From: Jay Campbell <edge(a)got.net> >Subject: FBI seeks huge wiretapping system >FBI seeks huge wiretapping system >BY JOHN MARKOFF >New York Times >``These are staggering numbers,'' said Mark Rasch, director of >information security law and policy for Science Applications >International Corp. in McLean, Va. ``Either they do a lot more >wiretaps than they now admit, or they plan on doing a significant >larger number of wiretaps in the future because of the fear of >domestic terrorism.'' I can see at least two possible alternative explanations: 1. The FBI envisions a time when voice-recognition systems will be cheap enough to do "keyword searches" on digital voice in something close to real time, with high accuracy. This might be useful when fishing for crime, dissent, etc. It would certainly require some rather broader powers, but they may expect this, especially if they expect more acts of domestic and foreign terrorism. 2. After implementing some kind of widespread escrowed crypto, the FBI envisions recording lots of encrypted phone conversations, perhaps targeted on suspiscious people, perhaps random. Since the whole conversation is encrypted, this might not violate any laws, since they still have to get the warrant to recover the conversation. This would get them past the obvious practical problem with most wiretap-based investigations--if you start your wiretap three days after the target becomes a suspect, you've probably missed all the juicy stuff. Only a bit of carelessness or stupidity on the part of your target will get the desired information. > Jay Campbell edge(a)got.net - Operations Manager > -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node > Jay(a)Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 Note: Please respond via e-mail as well as or instead of posting, as I get CP-LITE instead of the whole list. --John Kelsey, jmkelsey(a)delphi.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMJm0AUHx57Ag8goBAQGHTAP/XCsTUjb26sLB+UORMQCNjtBz2dhCjcF2 QkKfRjuUcBOG3z/nCeLDgfb1hWiiSYJwRhJOTG0dCcqS9k9gO//hpC4CsDz3y0Yw mt5sG4X6POB+ljBfFOHqM7joekLmnmbodZQYdmiFTHbZ/Zn4w4obrTRjcPKhlQH9 Fctxd8JCYyg= =ITxA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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video as a source of public randomness
by JMKELSEY＠delphi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Date: Thu, 02 Nov 1995 00:39:29 -0800 >From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) >Subject: Re: Video as a source of randomness >Digitized video input, especially from something like a noisy channel (t.v. >channel, for example), is quite likely to produce a lot more entropy bits >per second than nearly any of us ever need. (One's PGP key could be seeded >in a fraction of a millisecond, for example.) This seems like a potential source of a stream of public random bits. If these can be authenticated and matched, this kind of thing can be useful in a lot of protocols. For example, if there is some packet structure in the digital video transmission which has at least 160 bits of entropy, then we can take the SHA1(packet[i]) to be public random bit block i. (If we're worried about entropy, we can collect arbitrarily large numbers of packets to hash per 160-bit public random block.) For large-scale, above ground protocols, these packets would need some kind of signature or other authentication. However, for protocols that could handle having the public random string checked offline later, this idea provides a reasonably good public random string that can be used without any knowledge or consent of the broadcaster/cable system/satellite system/whatever. If the transmission is sent under encryption, so much the better. This does still leave the possibility that an attacker could control the broadcaster's transmissions for a few seconds, but this seems unlikely in practice. An alternative might be the encrypted transmissions from any communications satellite. How many telephone calls are your opponents able to reroute? >--Tim May, who has both audio and video digitizers built into his Power >Macintosh 7100av, but notes that none of the crypto programs he uses has >any provision for using them, and so he doesn't use them for crypto >purposes. Note: Please respond via e-mail as well as or instead of posting, as I get CP-LITE instead of the whole list. --John Kelsey, jmkelsey(a)delphi.com PGP 2.6 fingerprint = 4FE2 F421 100F BB0A 03D1 FE06 A435 7E36 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMJmz3kHx57Ag8goBAQGYiwQAkx3dxUUcGjsEKqRAlc0CTq6EaTzBrLRz ifrKgZPxfyD9F+sBTJGGPpHWc3mtfwJwV8HeIa/MY1Z1hpssN1ZY6ELlEn+4FFIA 3A+BNjB1PKrHebVZ0WHBJ3DI3h4/olF37bYNP261Uqd8CNig+fQ3VMtE0L0frBdr I+izpEMOwiw= =y7To -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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