December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Commercial Mixmaster
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:34 PM 9/17/95, hallam(a)w3.org wrote: >I seem to remember that Julf took over Stephie's code from Wizvax which >used to >post into the alt.sex.bondage group. I suspect he has modified it since but I >don't think that there is much to it. Actually, it was the code of Karl Kleinpaste that Julf took over...I seem to recall Julf saying this in an article. In any case, this is what Karl claimed last year: "There are 3 sites out there which have my software: anon.penet.fi, tygra, and uiuc.edu. I have philosophical disagreement with the "universal reach" policy of anon.penet.fi (whose code is now a long-detached strain from the original software I gave Julf -- indeed, by now it may be a complete rewrite, I simply don't know); ....Very bluntly, having tried to run anon servers twice, and having had both go down due to actual legal difficulties, I don't trust people with them any more." [Karl_Kleinpaste(a)cs.cmu.edu, alt.privacy.anon-server, 1994-08-29] >How does the cypherpunks remailer work? Does PGP encrypt the signature of a >message so that the identity of the sender is unknown? Or is it simply PEM >style >encryption so that the DN of the sender is in the clear :-( Assuming this is a serious question and not a troll, cypherpunks remailers (at least the ones I have used) completely encapsulate a message. No stuff "dangles outside" the remailed part. When PGP encryption is used, nothing is outside the block. If Alice sends something to Bob's Remailer, Bob decrypts the message and may or may not find further encrypted blocks inside. Envelopes within envelopes. I can't imagine it being done any other way. (I'm not counting the remailers possibly signing the sent messages, as a way of protecting against tampering, but this reveals nothing about the senders.) --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: WAS_tem (fwd)
by keelings＠wu1.wl.aecl.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Incoming from Rev. Ben: > > On Thu, 14 Sep 1995, James A. Donald wrote: > > > If you draw a picture using paintbrush of an underage person engaging > > in sexual conduct, you are in violation of this proposed legislation. > > Doesn't that directly contradict the stated purpose of existing child [snip] > > Do the lawyers on the list want to pipe up? On cypherpunks?!? Whatever for? I imagine there's already a rousing discussion going on about this somewhere in AOL. Take it there. -- "Remember, obsolescence (Win95) isn't an accident; it's an art form!" keelings(a)wu1.wl.aecl.ca s. keeling, aecl - whiteshell labs

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"Attachments"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why do people keep sending "attachments"? This was just a text article, and not an application (program), so why was it included as an "attachment"? At 8:27 PM 9/17/95, Michael Shields wrote: >Attachment converted: Macintosh HD:cypherpunks as a newsgroup (????/----) >(00005C4E) The message was, as Microsoft Word 6.0 saw it: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The general opinion seems to be that the netnews format is very convenient, though we should keep the list; but that entering Usenet or Altnet would lower the S/N. Why not, then, start a new hierarchy? Why not gate cypherpunks not to alt.cypherpunks or comp.security.cypherpunks, but to crypto.cypherpunks? We could feed it freely between us and set up NNTP servers which are open for just crypto.*. c.c would be the only crypto.* group for now, but it would also be easy to add more -- say, for the "respectable" splinter group, or for protocol WGs. We'd get the convenience of netnews without the high profile. I'm willing to run the gateway on news.tembel.org and feed other sites, if people think crypto.cypherpunks is a good idea. Opinions? - -- Shields. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMFyEm+yjYMb1RsVfAQF1YQQAneg8c6yUKJUUybqepl52yqyS53OGrpLq YfdrMYaIxMWdWKNpMAAus/g8WjWMwYrrB4p+8/WLMm4HsUEHO2ouNzbraiyMRwaB NEhf0v/91h9jGniZIX5uQyqSdM/VC5YupWV0cITqKte9iLZR77C5hVqXBiLhRcwG YL8GwDP5tYw= =roIF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Friday's NIST Key Escrow FIPS Workshop
by Thomas Grant Edwards 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I went to the NIST "Developing Key Escrow Encryption Standards Workshop" held in Gaithersburg, MD on Sept. 15, 1995. It turns out I know the guy who was running the conference so I knew I couldn't miss it...and I knew I had to wear my Cypherpunks t-shirt to show the flag (and it stood out, as there were few without suits there). I got to meet Dorothy Denning for the first time. I was mentioning how government key-escrow doesn't sound too bad to some in the libertarian/cypherpunk world, say for instance to ensure FOIA requests are not encrypted away. She said that would never be a problem, just getting the government to give you FOIA documents in the first place is the problem. In a nutshell, this was a conference to begin work on a FIPS for software key encryption escrow. Industry people there felt that a FIPS would be a great way to standardize key escrow for data recovery. However, except for one guy at IBM who said they tap employees phones alot, most industry people felt that it was not needed for tapping their real-time communications. There was a lot of talk from government people about the need for Law Enforcement to get access to encrypted real-time communication between government employees. This, to say the least, squicked many attendees, and there seemed to be much tension between the sides on that issue. I asked a couple of industry people and privacy advocates the question "Am I just paranoid, or is this FIPS a trial balloon for mandated civillian key escrow?" I got many "yes" answers. I also heard the occasional "this sounds like son-of-clipper" comments in the breakout groups. One noteworthy point is that RSA sent in a position paper to try to get the Digital Signature Standard replaced by RSA signatures for inclusion in key escrow FIPS due to its "virtual non-availability in commercial products," and noted that the US Govt. has free use of RSA sigs. Another noteworthy point is that NIST made clear that the key escrow FIPS should _not_ involve SECRET algorithms. The Workshop consisted of a discussion of goals and objectives by Ray Kammer (Deputy Director, NIST) and some initial thoughts on standards development by Miles Smid (NIST). Here is the gist of the overhead slides: The Goals of the workshop were based on the August 17 announcement by the Administration to allow for exportability of 64-bit software key escrow encryption, plans to allow Federal agencies to use Escrowed Encryption Standards compliant hardware devices for data communications, and the development of a FIPS for key escrow, implementable in software. This escrow FIPS would be used by Federal agencies in conjunction with FIPS-approved encryption techniques. This workshop was held to help begin the FIPS development. The workshop goals included 1) Providing input to the govt. on drafting a software key escrow encryption standard; 2) Helping govt. to identify additional policy and technical issues that need to be addressed and 3) providing the govt. with thoughts on drafting and follow-up The FIPS process involves developing the draft FIPS, a 90 day comment period, then addressing comments, and then it goes to the Secretary of Commerce for signature, and becomes effective six months after the signature. The purpose of the New Escrow FIPS is to foster a wider use of escrow technology...this means: no requirement for SECRET algorithms, software and hardware implementations, and exportability. It also will provide a government validation of escrow systems meeting the standard...theoretically allowing for security, integrity, and availability. Threats examined included compromise (unauthorized disclosure of keys and data recovery), and denial of service (modification or loss of keys, use of bogus recovery fields, and improper system operation). The FIPS will provide common formats and procedures which will facilitate data recovery and lower cost. Applicability of the FIPS will include the US Govt. and contractors. Applications include both stored and transmitted data. Encryption algorithms must be FIPS approved. And finally desirable features include: auditing, configuration control, backup capability, and efficiency. The questions asked to the breakout groups included: 1) Is a standard interface for the release of keys desirable? 2) What documentation is required? 3) How will operational procedures be developed? 4) How will conformance be validated? 5) Will security be evaluated? If so, under what criteria and by whom? 6) How will configuration control be maintained? 7) Are new FIPS-approved algorithms necessary? 8) Should escrowing be built into the Public Key Infracstructure? 9) Is a standard escrow system identification field needed? 10) Is split knowledge required? 11) Do systems which permit data to be encrypted for both storage and transmission need to provide for both kinds of escrow? 12) Does the government require special features (2-hour access, continuous real-time decryption, etc.)?

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Black Unicorn writes: > Some months ago I called for advanced stego and stealth PGP as well as > larger keys in the event we all had to go "into the crypto closet" for a > time. > I call for them again. I know of three ways to get software: 1. Write it yourself. 2. Pay someone else to write it. 3. Find software someone else wrote that meets your needs. If (3) isn't working, perhaps you should try (1) or (2). (I've been "calling for" a big house with a hot tub for years now. Still no progress. I'll let you know if it works out.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMFswPX3YhjZY3fMNAQHatwP/ZJKuNEDRPdCldyvshGkG/w/io+37zx3m DyJ4h1+OicxYCtKbolXYVcX8C4d1j7hXY2sesepcDvYYyy+butdQ+/2tw3u0FW1j WpfCGURpypBVb5T7QlL21Qv39cBIu9mJxkasPkQSeSnrC24eGtoItmZzrIRZgJyj Dj2FOIfxiFY= =5DwJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by unicorn(a)polaris.mindport.net (Black Unicorn) on Sun, 17 Sep 6:39 PM >If some other 'punks want to get together and fund such >projects, I will participate. However, putting the >burden of financing this venture (which will have no >immediate economic return, as I will support no venture >which does not result in fully public software) What are the prospects of privacy-enhancing programing funded by contributors for non-commercial, non-governmental, "fully public software?" I would tithe, modestly but durably, to such work if I believed the promise. They call me Ishmael Sixpack. John Gilmore's (and others'?) underwriting toad is impressive. Along with the voluntary (?) effort of Hugh Daniels (and others, I don't know how toad survives). What else might be done cypherpunk-wise if material resources were available? And under what conditions and arrangements? The discussion of Mixmaster commercialization is instructive. And Julf's and the other remailers survivability and longevity in the face of attacks. How could the contributions be made without contaminating the product? No joke. Or, are only individually initiated and self-funded programs trustworthy, when all is said and done? And no planned program as rewarding as the eclectic irregulated. And bartering and bickering and rending and mending the only reputable method of exchange of the tumultuous souk.

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Re: "Hackers"-- brief review and anecdote...
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>I saw "Hackers" yesterday. It's not bad and its political sensibility is >>very cyberpunk. The ad campaign even uses the tag line, "Their only crime >>is curiosity." > >It may not be a crime, but it's not nice to steal a title. Well, what do you think of my latest predicament. My first book, "Agents Unleashed" will be retitled "Agents At Large" because SAMS, a division of Viacom, considers any title ending with the word "unleashed" to be an infringement of their tradedress. They came up with enough legal mumbo-jumbo about trademark to scare my publisher into changing it. -Peter

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planning for life during the crypto night (was Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.)
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)polaris.mindport.net> writes: > > 3. Unescrowed crypto banned, with advanced stego, panic passwords, > stealth PGP, incorporated remailers all across international borders > making offenders impossible to identify or catch. > > [...] I believe the goal is to propogate crypto far enough to at > least have a salient "underground" participants. > > Some months ago I called for advanced stego and stealth PGP as well > as larger keys in the event we all had to go "into the crypto > closet" for a time. > > I call for them again. Guess you're saying that a future underground cypherpunk group is going to need tools to continue if the US plummets into cryptographic darkness. And you'd like to see these tools available now, as it will be difficult to distribute, and set up if the big ban is already on us. A pre-emptive safety precaution in the event that it happens. So what threat model do you envisage tools being needed to withstand? A couple of the things you list are realisable with little effort, one is a PGP with large keys, I am using a doctored to go to 16k keys (I did this to amuse myself with getting timings for how long encrypt / decrypt & keygen take for varying key sizes). The patch is small, and easy to figure out, just a couple of #ifdefs, various people posted their patches to do this to alt.security.pgp some time ago. I think there was at least one patched version of PGP distributed (unofficially of course - PGPs largest allowed key size being 2048 bits), though I don't have any URLs for such a beast. Part of the problem is people seem to frown on distributing PGPs with larger keys, or alternate versions of PGP, due to version control issues, and such. Technically easy to do tho. Adding stealth features to PGP, or even as standalone, aren't hard either. I've been trying to add Hal's improved stealth algorithm to Henry Hastur's stealth program. It's basically finished, except for the problem that I am unsure about the security of the construct: x' = f(MD5(x)) * N + x where 0 < x < N and 0 < x' < M where M is a power of 2, and M > 2^64 * N and f is just a scaling function If that is secure I'd be happy to release an updated version of stealth, but without assurance, it is necessary to include random numbers, and the best way I see to achieve that is to build it in to PGP, and use PGP's ran no utils directly. If you're talking about a different version of PGP, perhaps this wouldn't be a big deal anyway. So that's big key PGP, and stealth PGP. I'm presuming most people figure 128 bit IDEA is suitably unassailable, but RSA keys are a moving target, and less predictable due to improvements in factoring algorithms. Already people are talking about an academic RSA129 like attempt on a 512 bit PGP key. What are views about creating Yet Another version of PGP. I've read a few discussions of this kind of thing in the past on alt.security.pgp, and most people were against it. But I think some useful things could come out of it. The other problem is working with pgp2.x when there is a version 3.0 being worked on, not sure what stage 3.0 is at, any coding.. perhaps if a stealth capable pgp2.x was worked on, and a few features demonstrated, the 3.0 folks would be willing to take a look at it to evaluate the features for possible version 3.0 inclusion. Just don't want to go do a of work, and then get a polite cease and desist from those with interests in managing the version control of PGP. Good stego tools are the other main problem. My understanding is that all of the stego programs to date do it by just ripping out the LSB of an audio or graphic image, and replacing that with the bits from a message with a stealthed message. Sending masses of pictures around is kind of suspicious tho, I mean several a day, each freshly scanned from what? I guess if video conferencing gets here, it would be fun to add the stego into that noisy stream, same for internet phone. Text stego, with bits hidden in the entropy of english text seems a harder objective, but a useful one. I'm presuming that plausible deniability, and facilities for anonimity are essentials. How does one go about doing that? Using newsgroups to carry on a two level communication might be a good way of maintaining plausible deniability. Either a stego interface to remailers in other countries, so that the stego gateway to remailers scans it's newspool, decrypts messages addressed to it, and forwards that off to the anon remailers. The outcome could be a further text or graphics stegoed message for posting to a suitably high noise news group. The recipient is also scanning his news spool for stego messages addressed to him. Sounds feasible. Perhaps a proof of concept would be easy to knock up, if a place holder is inserted for the 'good text stego' program should go. There was a 'texto' posted a while ago which did something suitable. Adam

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Re: "Hackers"-- brief review and anecdote...
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

in" -- this doesn't mean madonna stole it, does it? > >I'm reminded of the time a few years a go that there were two films in >release simultaneously named "Black Rain", and, most oddly, both took >place in Japan. > >Perry This is not as odd as you might think once you realize that the rain that fell after the atomic bombing was black. -Peter

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Re: FAX Encryption Software
by NSCEE＠aurora.nscee.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI: This was posted to a slew of Usenet newsgroups. Unless I've missed something, which "CRYPTO-STRONG" package has ever been "licensed" by the "U.S. Department of Commerce"? Does anybody have more info on this product or the good folks behind it? ===================================================================== Originally posted by: clav(a)deltanet.com >ANYONE FOR A CRYPTO-STRONG, YET EASY TO USE FAX/EMAIL SECURITY >SOFTWARE PACKAGE FOR BUSINESS OR OTHER USE??? > >Aliroo Ltd. has developed a Windows, eye-to-eye fax/email >encryption package called PrivaSoft. > >Unlike any previously devised system, this method protects, with >only 4 mouse clicks, fax and email transmissions in electronic >and even paper form - FROM THE TIME YOU CREATE A MESSAGE UNTIL IT >IS READ - NOT JUST WHEN YOUR FAX IS BEING TRANSMITTED. > >You can encrypt a message, and then fax or email it (via plain >old standard fax machine or fax modem), print it to paper or save >to a disk file. > >It is fully licensed, without restriction for export, by the U.S. >Department of Commerce. NO PGP WORRIES. > >Email me for a free copy which will be sent to you via email or >snail mail post. It is fully functional (not crippleware) and >enables you to try our system out before purchase with 8 free >page scrambles. It retails for $130 per installed computer. >Looking for end users and distributors. > >Thanks, >David

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