December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: This PROMISes to be odius
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:20 PM 10/18/95 -0400, Brad Dolan wrote: > >PR 10/18 0809 ORACLE INTRODUCES SOFTWARE TOOL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT > >Tool Helps Federal, State, Municipal Agencies Stop the Criminal Element > > Oracle SIUSS represents a major step forward in the collection, storage >and analysis of case intelligence information for complex conspiracies, violent >crimes such as rape and murder, drug trafficking, and other major cases. > I asked a friend of mine at Oracle if they are going to sell this to all comers. It would certainly be useful for tracking the activities of government agents. I'll see what he says. DCF

2 1

ANSI to work on e-payment -- first meeting coming up
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

First Meeting of Electronic Commerce Work Group November 29, Washington, DC ANSI Accredited Standards Committee X9 - Financial Services - in response to the explosion of payment transaction proposals for the internet, has approved a new work item to develop a single secure electronic payment syntax. The first meeting of the Electronic Commerce Work Group will be Wednesday, November 29 from 9:00am till 5:00pm at the American Bankers Association, 1120 Connecticut Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20036. Agenda Review of Scope of Work Consideration of Federal Reserve Request to expand scope to Bank-Bank messages Presentation from Industry groups with existing payment protocols Assignment of work items New items Next meetings (Jan/Feb. - San Francisco, May - Boston??) A draft scope: The payment syntax described in this standard is designed to order a financial institution to make payment to a merchant from an account of a purchaser based on the near term delivery of low monetary value goods or services. It will be possible to include this payment order in any electronic protocol that is based on communications between the purchaser and the merchant, and between the merchant and a financial institution. This standard does not describe, nor recommend, any particular communications protocol. When used within a complete payment infrastructure, the secure payment order described shall offer privacy and integrity of the purchaser's payment information, and shall prevent the purchaser from successfully repudiating the sending, or the merchant from successfully repudiating the receiving, of a valid payment order. Thus the financial institution can be sure that its customer requested the payment and that the merchant can be accurately identified on the account statement. About ASC X9 ASC X9 is the accredited standards developer which brings together banks, securities trading companies, equipment and software manufactures, associations and others in the financial services industry to develop voluntary nationally accepted standards based on industry consensus. Founded in 1976, ASC X9 was accredited by the American National Standards institute in 1984. The American Bankers Association serves as X9 Secretariat. For more information on X9, contact the secretariat at 202/663-5300, for more information on the Electronic Commerce Work Group, contact its chair, Tom Jones at 602/554-3569.

2 1

Re: CJR returned to sender
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:13 AM 10/25/95, Raph Levien wrote: > I got the CJR back today, envelope unopened (although the corner was >torn so you could see there were t-shirts inside). "Returned to sender", >it said, "Refused___, Unclaimed___". > > The address on the envelope reads: > >ATTN: Samuel L. Capino - 15 day CJR >Defense Trade Analyst >U.S. Dept. of State >Office of Defense Trade Controls >PM/DTC SA-6 Room 200 >1701 N. Fort Meyer Drive >Arlington, CA 22209-3113 > > Did I do something wrong, or did the Dept. of State decide it >didn't want to deal with this CJR? Raph, I mean no offense, but if _any_ request is ever to be deemed "frivolous," surely submitting a CJR for t-shirts is such a request. I won't belabor the point that the t-shirt is _at best_ comparable to a book, which generally needs no CJR (*), and _at worst_ is an illegible, confusing "work of art." (I personally am miffed at the imprecision of the "This shirt has been declared to be a munition"--or whatever, as I don't have one handy to check--and the language of the sales advertisements.) So the little joke was returned unopened. Not surprising. No offense intended to all those who think a CJR for a t-shirt is a worthy cause, but I think it's a pointless diversion. (* Hal Abelson of MIT says there are possible export problems with the MIT Press book on PGP, and MIT dropped plans for a version in a special OCR font. So, I agree that _some_ books cross the line and look like pure software. However, I continue to maintain that a badly-printed barcode is just a joke, nothing more.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

13 19

Re: How can e-cash, even on-line cleared, protect payee identity?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1 0

What is needed for S/MIME remailer ?
by baldwin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The other day I was wondering what it would take to make an anonymous remailer for an S/MIME client. Implementing S/MIME from scratch is a lot of work given the lack of a public domain implementation, but it seems that a remailer could be built on top of a commercial email product that supported S/MIME. The question is: What features should a commercial S/MIME email product have to make it easy to support a remailer? Are there a small set of command line options that would greatly simplify a remailer implementation? --Bob Baldwin

4 3

Re: Verification of Registration
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:02 AM 10/24/95 -0500, you wrote: >Everybody who receives mail from cypherpunks(a)toad.com received this >message becuase the message was addressed to >cypherpunks(a)toad.com. Apparently someone may have >joined this 'group' or service and used the cypherpunks address as >the e-mail address. Mayhap the cypherpunks(a)toad.com / cypherpunks >userid/password. > >This would be my guess, of course. > >Does anybody know what this service does? > Makes sense given the numbers that also received the message. C|Net has a web site and a weekly program on cable about the Net. I saw it {the show) once. Nothing to recommend - silly stuff like URL's for the weather. Regards - Lynne ******************************************************************** Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. Poughkeepsie, New York lharrison(a)mhv.net "Say not, 'I have found the truth', but rather, 'I have found a truth.'" - Kahlil Gibran from "The Prophet" ********************************************************************

1 0

Get rid of this stuff, please...
by an370736＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Welcome to c|net From: anon-remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl (Name Withheld by Request) Date: Tue, 24 Oct 1995 20:10:07 +0100 > From cypherpunks(a)toad.com Tue Oct 24 09:03:00 1995 > Received: from cnet.com (central.cnet.com [204.188.123.10]) by > orpheum.cnet.com (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id JAA10708 for > <verify(a)orpheum.cnet.com>; Tue, 24 Oct 1995 09:03:00 -0700 > Received: from longs.lance.colostate.edu by cnet.com via ESMTP > (8.6.12/940518.SGI.central) > for <verify(a)cnet.com> id OAA10916; Tue, 24 Oct 1995 14:53:01 GMT > Received: from [204.131.233.49] (p49.Denver1.dialup.csn.net > [204.131.233.49]) by longs.lance.colostate.edu (8.6.12/8.6.5a (LANCE > Revision: 1.3)) with SMTP id KAA07689 for <verify(a)cnet.com>; Tue, 24 Oct > 1995 10:02:06 -0600 To Someone in charge. Please UNSUBSCRIBE to this stuff for us, please.

1 0

Re: [NOISE] Re: Hack DigiCash: Payee Anonymity
by User A. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dave sez: : >Now all we need is to do is get some specs on how DigiCash's software works : >so that we can code this. I expect that this method will become quite : >popular. To withdraw DigiCash, one must come up with $250 to start, sign a : >bunch of forms, etc. I suspect that most people would rather change money : >in lesser amounts, probably under $50. This opens up a huge market for : >Blacknet money exchangers. I would gladly pay Tim's Internet Cash Exchange : >a commission to exchange $50 worth of greenbacks for Digicash instead of : >dealing with Mark Twain and shelling out $250 to start.. : Irrelevant point: To open an account as a consumer, not a merchant, and : solely for DigiCash use, only $11 (!) is required. Although I'll agree : with the bunch of forms part. Damn, I wish I understood legalese... Hmm their webpage states clearly: --begin quote-- How Does This All Work? There are two essential components to this test of the Ecash system. Both are necessary to make this work. 1.You must open a WorldCurrency Access(tm) account with Mark Twain Bank (USA). This is a traditional banking account where you can choose between 25 different currencies for your deposits. 2.You will obtain and install the Ecash software by DigiCash. This is subject to a separat license agreement. In conjunction with your banking account from Mark Twain Bank, you can now move money to your own hard drive from the Ecash Mint, for spending when you choose. --end quote-- Now, to open an WorldCurrency Access(tm) account you have to deposit $2500, if the account balance falls below $250 you need to pay a $10 fee. I surely hope that someone could shed some light on this. -AJ-

1 0

Conference Report?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did anyone go to the "Worldwide Electronic Commerce Law, Policy, Security and Controls Conference" ? It was in Bethesda October 18 - 20. Just curious. Sponsored by a lot of Big Cheese (ABA, HLS, NIST, UNCITL, SPA, ETC, ETC, ETC). Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

1 0

Re: textbooks
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > The quick proof of why the initial and final permutations add nothing to > > the security of DES is presented in an informal and quite obvious sidebar. > > Actually, I found the proof not completely convincing. It's really a > proof that it doesn't strengthen the DES against a *known plaintext* > attack, but there are other weaker attacks it may make marginally more > difficult (or easier..); for instance, partially-known plaintext or > some forms of verifiable plaintext. > I'm afraid I'm not quite following you here, could you expound a bit? Ah:) Isn't it great to be talking about encryptions again?:) Patrick _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

1 0