December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CDT Policy Post 3.13 - New FBI Crypto Bill To Force Key Recovery
by Jonah Seiger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _____ _____ _______ / ____| __ \__ __| ____ ___ ____ __ | | | | | | | | / __ \____ / (_)______ __ / __ \____ _____/ /_ | | | | | | | | / /_/ / __ \/ / / ___/ / / / / /_/ / __ \/ ___/ __/ | |____| |__| | | | / ____/ /_/ / / / /__/ /_/ / / ____/ /_/ (__ ) /_ \_____|_____/ |_| /_/ \____/_/_/\___/\__, / /_/ \____/____/\__/ The Center for Democracy and Technology /____/ Volume 3, Number 13 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- A briefing on public policy issues affecting civil liberties online ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CDT POLICY POST Volume 3, Number 13 September 8, 1997 CONTENTS: (1) New FBI Draft Crypto Bill Would Force Mandatory Key Recovery (2) Text of FBI Proposal (3) What You Can Do (4) How to Subscribe/Unsubscribe (5) About CDT, contacting us ** This document may be redistributed freely with this banner intact ** Excerpts may be re-posted with permission of <editor(a)cdt.org> ** This document looks best when viewed in COURIER font ** _____________________________________________________________________________ (1) NEW FBI DRAFT ENCRYPTION LEGISLATION WOULD IMPOSE MANDATORY KEY RECOVERY In its most audacious crypto proposal yet, the FBI is circulating on Capitol Hill legislation to impose full domestic controls on the manufacture and use of encryption. The FBI is seeking support for its proposal among two crucial House Committees preparing to consider encryption legislation this week. The text of the key section of the FBI draft is attached below. The FBI draft would take two extraordinary steps. It would prohibit the manufacture, sale, import or distribution within the United States of any encryption product unless it contains a feature that would create a spare key or some other trap door allowing "immediate" decryption of any user's messages or files without the user's knowledge. In addition, it would require all network service providers that offer encryption products or services to their customers to ensure that all messages using such encryption can be immediately decrypted without the knowledge of the customer. This would apply to telephone companies and to online service providers such as America Online and Prodigy. In the FBI draft, the "key recovery capability" could be activated by the purchaser or end user. But requiring that such a capability be installed in all domestic communications networks and encryption products would be the critical step in enabling a national surveillance infrastructure. The proposal requires the Attorney General to set standards for what are and are not acceptable encryption products. The proposal's requirement of "immediate" decryption would seem to seriously limit the options available to encryption manufacturers seeking approval of their products. While export of encryption products from the United States has long been restricted, there have never been controls on the manufacture, distribution, or use of encryption within the United States. Pending before the House Intelligence and National Security Committees is the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE, HR 695), sponsored by Rep. Goodlatte (R-VA), which would lift current export controls on encryption technology. The Goodlatte bill has already been reported favorably by the House Judiciary and International Relations Committees. The House National Security Committee is scheduled to consider HR 695 on Tuesday, September 9. The House Intelligence Committee has scheduled its vote for September 11. Members of both committees are expected to consider the FBI draft as a substitute to the SAFE bill. This FBI proposal represents a major turn-around for the Clinton Administration, which has denied since its first year that it was seeking domestic controls on encryption. The FBI proposal is an attempted end run around the Constitution. By creating an avenue for immediate access to sensitive decryption keys without the knowledge of the user, the proposal denies users the notice that is a central element of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Just this past April, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment normally requires the government to advise the target of a search and seizure that the search is being conducted. Forcing U.S. citizens and companies to adopt so-called key recovery systems poses serious security risks, especially when the systems can be accessed without the knowledge of the users. A recent study by 11 cryptography and computer security experts concluded that such key recovery systems would be costly and ultimately insecure (see http://www.crypto.com/key_study) CDT executive director Jerry Berman said of the latest proposal, "This is not the first step towards the surveillance society. It *is* the surveillance society." ______________________________________________________________________________ (2) TEXT OF MANDATORY KEY RECOVERY SECTION OF FBI DRAFT LEGISLATION (From FBI "Technical Assistance Draft" Dated August 28, 1997) SEC. 105. PUBLIC ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (a) As of January 1, 1999, public network service providers offering encryption products or encryption services shall ensure that such products or services enable the immediate decryption of communications or electronic information encrypted by such products or services on the public network, upon receipt of a court order, warrant, or certification, pursuant to section 106, without the knowledge or cooperation of the person using such encryption products or services. (b) As of January 1, 1999, it shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture for sale or distribution within the U.S., distribute within the U.S., sell within the U.S., or import into the U.S. any product that can be used to encrypt communications or electronic information, unless that product - (1) includes features, such as key recovery, trusted third party compatibility or other means, that (A) permit immediate decryption upon receipt of decryption information by an authorized party without the knowledge or cooperation of the person using such encryption product; and (B) is either enabled at the time of manufacture, distribution, sale, or import, or may be enabled by the purchaser or end user; or (2) can be used only on systems or networks that include features, such as key recovery, trusted third party compatibility or other means, that permit immediate decryption by an authorized party without the knowledge or cooperation of the person using such encryption product. (c) (1) Within 180 days of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall publish in the Federal Register functional criteria for complying with the decryption requirements set forth in this section. (2) Within 180 days of the enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall promulgate procedures by which data network service providers and encryption product manufacturers, sellers, re-sellers, distributors, and importers may obtain advisory opinions as to whether a decryption method will meet the requirements of this section. (3) Nothing in this Act or any other law shall be construed as requiring the implementation of any particular decryption method in order to satisfy the requirements of paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section. ______________________________________________________________________________ (3) WHAT YOU CAN I DO TO HELP? Are you concerned about protecting privacy and security in the information age? Curious what your Member of Congress thinks about the issue? Adopt Your Legislator! Visit http://www.crypto.com/adopt for details You will recieve customized alerts with news you can use, inlcuding the latest information on internet-related issues, the views of your Representative and Senators, and contact information to help you ensure your voice is heard in the ongoing debate over the future of the Information Age. Visit http://www.cdt.org/crypto or http://www.crypto.com/ for detailed background information on the encryption policy reform debate, including the text of various legislative proposals, analysis, and other information. _____________________________________________________________________________ (4) SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION Be sure you are up to date on the latest public policy issues affecting civil liberties online and how they will affect you! Subscribe to the CDT Policy Post news distribution list. CDT Policy Posts, the regular news publication of the Center For Democracy and Technology, are received by more than 13,000 Internet users, industry leaders, policy makers and activists, and have become the leading source for information about critical free speech and privacy issues affecting the Internet and other interactive communications media. To subscribe to CDT's Policy Post list, send mail to policy-posts-request(a)cdt.org with a subject: subscribe policy-posts If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, send mail to the above address with a subject of: unsubscribe policy-posts _____________________________________________________________________________ (5) ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY/CONTACTING US The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to develop and advocate public policies that advance democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications technologies. Contacting us: General information: info(a)cdt.org World Wide Web: URL:http://www.cdt.org/ FTP URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/ Snail Mail: The Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW * Suite 1100 * Washington, DC 20006 (v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- End Policy Post 3.13 09/08/97 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Security Flaw Is Discovered In Software Used in Shopping
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 20 Sep 1995 10:47:24 -0400 (EDT) From: Nathaniel Borenstein <nsb(a)nsb.fv.com> To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com Subject: Re: Security Flaw Is Discovered In Software Used in Shopping Without belaboring the point too much, I think there are a few conclusions that really ought to be drawn: -- The world has never seen unbreakable encryption software, and almost certainly never will. Nothing that human beings ever build is perfect. -- Any encryption-based scheme is only as strong as its weakest link. Generally, you don't know what the weakest link will turn out to be. -- Basing a global financial infrastructure on the unbreakability of a certain algorithm or program is at best imprudent. Bear in mind that people as well respected as Dr. Adelman -- the "A" in RSA -- are hard at work trying to figure out how, for example, to use massive parallelism to break the basic algorithms of public key cryptography. -- Keeping sensitive financial information completely off the net is always best, whether or not you are using encryption. For information on a safe, non-cryptographic alternative that has been fully operational for nearly a year, with over 30,000 paying customers, a growth rate featuring a six week doubling period, and NO break-ins to date, check out http://www.fv.com. -- Nathaniel -------- Nathaniel S. Borenstein <nsb(a)fv.com> | When privacy is outlawed, Chief Scientist, First Virtual Holdings | only outlaws will have privacy! FAQ & PGP key: nsb+faq(a)nsb.fv.com | SUPPORT THE ZIMMERMANN DEFENSE FUND! ---VIRTUAL YELLOW RIBBON-->> zldf(a)clark.net <http://www.netresponse.com/zldf> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: FCPUNX:Show Me the Warheads!
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:03 PM -0700 9/4/97, Mike Duvos wrote: >>In an interview to be aired on "60 Minutes" this Sunday, Alexandr >>Lebed, former Russian National Security Advisor, will reveal that >>his country has lost track of more than 100 nuclear bombs made to >>look like suitcases, and has no idea what happened to them. At 10:13 PM 9/4/97 -0700, Tim May wrote: > Stay away from soft targets (Tel Aviv, Haifa, the ZOG section of Jerusalem, > New York, Washington, and so on--Harbors (e.g., Haifa, NYC) are pretty > likely targets, due to the extreme ease of delivery). But also be prepared > for major disruptions and panic even if you are nowhere near the blast. Relax: Anyone who can afford nukes, probably won't use them without very good reason. By the way, I have noticed that the Israelis have lately taken a considerably more conciliatory attitude towards non state entitities. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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I see the Wells Fargo Wagon it's a-comin down...
by Damaged Justice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

EU official proposes global Internet charter Copyright © 1997 Nando.net Copyright © 1997 Reuter Information Service BRUSSELS, Belgium (September 8, 1997 11:21 a.m. EDT) - The top telecommunications official of the European Union called Monday for an international charter to regulate the Internet and other electronic networks. EU Commissioner Martin Bangemann, in a speech prepared for a telecommunications conference in Geneva, said the charter should deal with questions such as technical standards, illegal content, licenses, encryption and data privacy. "The current situation may lead to the adoption of isolated global rules with different countries signing up to different rules agreed under the auspices of different international organizations," the German commissioner said. "An international charter would provide a suitable answer." The text of the speech was distributed in Brussels. Bangemann said industry should lead the effort to draw up a charter, which would be based mostly on self-regulation and mutual recognition of national licenses. "Its role would not be to impose detailed rules, except in particular circumstances (child pornography, terrorist networks)," he said. The charter would recognize existing pacts negotiated within the World Trade Organization and World Intellectual Property Organization and draw on principles agreed by other bodies such as the Group of Seven top industrial countries, he said.

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Re: USA Today on Fear of Credit Cards over Net
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- <snip> > How much do PC users trust: > > Automatic teller machines 77% > Banking by phone 62% > Banking by computer 57% > Using a credit card or calling > card at a public phone 57% > Writing a credit-card number on > a catalog order form 43% > Sending a credit-card number to > a commercial on-line service 34% > Giving a credit-card number > over the phone 31% > Sending a credit-card number > over the Internet 5% > > (margin of error = +/- 4.7%) <snip> Pity they didn't ask about, "Tossing a credit card slip/carbon in the garbage." Dumpster-diving is still an effective, lo-tech attack. JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh iQCVAwUBMGAxQW1lp8bpvW01AQEfmwP9GfEzhoBWuTNHvxZ7dMvMV7K/cypT0XmO kLqAAtPHyhS3PxmwNiT0G4tquU9QHw2cQ5Rj6IAqR7Fbuvtt1TW2Kora9RsXLp5L 75Zw63/wrsnI20qe+Pnf6FEG0IcjLg4vrezhAGYAC3zSdTpSW4cuqdzId6qeTlvM 4gg2Z9UGOrA= =ReYK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Regards, Jim Ray "Not everything that is faced can be changed, but nothing can be changed until it is faced." -- James Baldwin ----------------------------------------------------------------------- PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Key id. # E9BD6D35 James Milton Ray <liberty(a)gate.net> ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Help Phil! email zldf(a)clark.net or see http://www.netresponse.com/zldf _______________________________________________________________________

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Re: Encryption algorithms used in PrivaSoft (fwd)
by David Van Wie 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Clavadetscher of PrivaSoft writes: > At this time our crypto engine is patented and proprietary. Ian Goldberg writes: > Waitasec... I was under the impression that if you patented it, you had to > reveal it. That's why RC4 isn't patented (it used to be a trade secret). Many technologies have both patented parts and trade secret parts. Often, companies will maintain information that is in patent applications as trade secret until they are granted. I guess I should say _if_ they are granted! After a patent is granted, it is usually a good idea to also maintain some trade secrets in your products -- since trade secrets never "expire," unlike patents. If the patent isn't granted, you still have the option of treating the contents as an intellectual property under trade secret protection. dvw

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netscape bug
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

clearly the netscape engineers did not practice "safe crypto programming", but I question the seriousness of the crack. none of the articles mention that the cracker must have login access to the computer that the random numbers are generated on. is this true? does the code require knowledge of the PID etc. that can only be obtained by a login to the system that the netscape session is running on? if this is true (i.e. login access required) this bug is by far not as serious as some of the hyperbole is suggesting. I agree it is still very insecure but the most dangerous crypto bugs are those where you can determine keys from data alone.. physical penetration into a machine is another level of security.. furthermore, I would like to commend Netscape for their fast response to the problem and apparent commitment to establishing safeguards that avoid it in the future. cypherpunks have an easy time ridiculing someone who slit their throat on writing some crypto functions, but geez, cut them some slack: crypto stuff has so many pitfalls and bugaboos that even the world-class experts make mistakes. where else can not properly "burning" stack registers (function parameters) and environment variables be considered "lethal"??? PGP errors have been reported on numerous occasions, some in the randomizer code. do people call for Zimmermann's head on a stick and call him "incompetent"? often when cryptographers say something is "broken" it can still mean that it is not necessarily unsafe in practice. there are many shades of "broken", some requiring a Cray and other's requiring a PC. I am really surprised how much people here consider "broken is broken". this is only the extreme theoretical perspective. granted I am not advocating that people *not*fix* bad crypto functions, I'm only saying that maybe its not in everyone's best interest to run around and say "the sky is falling" and lambaste companies for minor difficulties.. Netscape is a world class product, and it's *free*. on this cypherpunks list, I have seen no end to the venemous criticisms that people level at *free* products, which IMHO is quite tasteless at times. Netscape has done far more for the cypherpunk cause than many, many companies just by including RC4 in their product. they have taken some heat for their decisions & code, but they are on the front lines of battle. now instead of our vague claims about how the world can benefit from good crypto, how it is immensely valuable and important to cyberspatial financial transactions, to promote the cypherpunk cause, we now have something *popular*, *physical*, and *tangible* to point to: netscape!! this is *not* vaporware. this is not some cpunk saying, "all one needs is [x] algorithm running on [y] network and you have a world class infrastructure". the amount of work to get something like Netscape into the world is quite daunting and herculean. we owe a great debt to netscape and their accomplishments for furthering our own agenda!!! please do not trivialize what they have accomplished!! Netscape is here, it works, and it is cyberspatial crypto that Joe Sixpack can understand and *use*!! it is not a toy remailer, it is not some PGP front end, it is not some mailer script, *this* is the format in which Joe Sixpack will be using crypto in the future, the format which will bring "crypto to the unwashed masses"!! Netscape may very well be the chief vehicle that puts on *concrete pressure* on our government to relax crypto export laws. I see this happening *right now* with them going to a 64 bit key from a 40 bit one, and the world starting to realize the importance of crypto and the idiocy of the export laws. I am really amazed at how few seem to be supporting Netscape here and considering them the *premiere ally* in our current battle. it reminds me of how much people here rant at Microsoft when virtually no other company on the planet could pull off what they make look easy (ah, that's another story I've filled up other posts with). please do *not* take an adversarial relationship with the companies who are helping advance the cutting edge of cyberspace!! do *not* ridicule them. rather, help them to understand their problems. I think you will find that most companies are *not* hostile to improving their software, and will readily admit it when it needs fixing (intel has been humbled by their pentium glitch, and I doubt any company again will ever be so obstinate and belligerent..) . I am willing to bet that the netscape bug would have been fixed quickly if it had been quietly brought to their attention, without the blaring media lights (I enjoy the media circus as much as the next guy, but on the other hand, doing some things quietly may actually advance the cypherpunk cause further than by making a noisy hullaballoo in cyberspace). once again I commend Netscape for their fine software and willingness to perfect it. netscape is at the cutting edge of advancing key cyberspace technologies and it is not surprising that they make some minor mistakes with the code in these early phases. cyberspace is very young!! give designers a bit of time to get it right. be patient!! do not accuse them of incompetence!! netscape is tens of thousands of lines of world-class code. only in programming can a few moments of total, rapt attention lead to bugs that get blared on the front page of new york times and affect your stock price!! good lord, give the guys a break. cpunks: when Netscape has some serious competitors, they will get their act together. but at the moment they are the only game in town, and it will pay off to be nice to them, and try to support them, instead of kicking them in the teeth and wringing them every time they make a mistake. few in the world are as knowledgeable or paranoid as we are about security, and its going to be a gradual process to get to even a fraction of the expertise here penetrating the mainstream software industry. be patient!! -- P.M. notes that anywhere there is a data-driven buffer overflow (which he suspects are all over netscape) he can get code to execute anything he wants. this reminds me of the Morris internet worm that ran exactly the same way. it used a bug in the finger demon that caused a string buffer overwrite (via strcpy, instead of strncpy) to execute customized code. my question: I have not seen the specifics of how this works. does this require specialized knowledge of the native machine language on the host machine? or is it just used to cause something like a core dump to get a command line or something like that? --Vlad Nuri

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jesus had 3 nipples. (this has been proven to be true)

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Netscape Servers too ? (forwarded message from Marc VanHeyningen)
by Laurent Demailly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- start of forwarded message (RFC 934 encapsulation) ------- From: marcvh(a)spry.com (Marc VanHeyningen) To: Wayne Wilson <wwilson(a)umich.edu> Cc: Kazuma Andoh <andoh(a)nikkeibp.co.jp>, www-security(a)ns2.rutgers.edu Subject: Re: What's the netscape problem Date: Wed, 20 Sep 1995 07:51:47 -0700 [...] > http://home.netscape.com/newsref/std/random_seed_security.html The interesting part of this article is the discussion of random seed weaknesses on the *server* side. If true, this means anybody could use the random-seed hole to reverse engineer the process by which the server's private key information was generated and break that keypair with much, much much less effort than would normally be needed to factor a 512-bit RSA key. (Note that I'm not entirely sure Netscape's server uses 512 bit RSA keys, since the documentation, technical data sheets, and generation process don't give any clue about what key size is being used. Guess they don't want customers worrying their pretty little heads about it.) This would mean merely getting a fixed server would be insufficient; every Netscape server user would need to generate a new keypair, get a new Verisign certificate, and revoke the old one. (Oops, wait, there's no way to revoke the old one. I guess you just have to hope nobody does this before all those certificates expire.) - - Marc ------- end ------- dl -- Laurent Demailly * http://hplyot.obspm.fr/~dl/ * Linux|PGP|Gnu|Tcl|... Freedom Prime#1: cent cinq mille cent cinq milliards cent cinq mille cent soixante sept smuggle nuclear North Korea SDI cracking Mossad DES

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Re: Java Source for Encryption...
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:34 PM 9/8/97 -0400, Peter Wayner wrote, to coderpunks: >Is anyone giving away Java source code for public-key encryption? What evil lurks in the heart of the Internet? AltaVista Knows.... Besides www.systemics.com, which has free Java crypto there's also www.baltimore.ie which has commercial Java crypto as well as some free downloadware. However, Baltimore's web pages also talk about how they're the winner of the EuroTrust TTP/CA development contract. Sigh.

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