December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: coding and nnet's
by daw＠delhi.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199511111800.NAA23831(a)jekyll.piermont.com>, Perry E. Metzger <perry(a)piermont.com> wrote: > > > Perhaps neural nets could be used in an unknown plain text, brute force > > attack to automatically select possible decryptions for human examination. > > I don't know of any papers on the subject. > > I remember seeing a good paper by our own David Wagner on how to do > this without anything more than some ordinary statistics -- no > complicated junk required. David, if you are reading this, could you > comment? > Check out http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/recog.ps for a paper by Steve Bellovin & me on doing plaintext recognition with ordinary statistics. It has nothing to do with neural networks, though.... - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMKZvoCoZzwIn1bdtAQHItQGA1jD4SjC1Vg1fwCO3VLJ7v+gUlUvncwhj v2SwPURAjry2QAeWBNeL5hMJARQuQHNx =Cepa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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ecash in pcweek
by an407769＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Opinion: Digital Cash Takes Step Toward Reality >From PC Week for November 13, 1995 by Bill Machrone Some people are always looking for new ways to make money. Other people are always looking for new ways to spend money. They're running headlong into one another on the Internet. Most of the digital cash and electronic commerce schemes out there are still in their infancy, but many of them are predicated on making a transaction fee off the people who want to buy things in this new, electronic medium. Making money from people spending money is hardly a shocking proposition. But all the approaches that call themselves any kind of "cash" are stretching the definition. To the best of my knowledge, cash is the thing you can spend without having it costing you a cent, so to speak. The only way you'll see digital cash without transaction costs is if a powerful but paternalistic ruling body gets into the business. That doesn't mean if Microsoft builds it into the operating system, but rather if the government gets involved and makes some form of electronic money transfer legal tender, and therefore immune to fiscal encumbrances. This isn't remotely close to happening, so don't get your hopes up. Meanwhile, things are getting pretty interesting in the real world of digital-cash transactions. Digicash (www.digicash.com) has partnered with the Mark Twain Bank to offer online shoppers a debit card-like "E- cash" account that they can fill with real money and then use either in normal purchases or microtransactions from vendors who accept E-cash. You pay a combination of setup fees, monthly fees, and money-movement fees, but the overall goal is to make the transactions painless, transparent, and anonymous. The anonymity factor is a key component of real cash and a design requirement of Digicash. It's extremely unlikely that anyone could spoof the system and spend your money; yet you can re- create your E-cash on your own machine if you have a disk crash. Portland Software (www.portsoft.com) has also attacked the issue, putting itself in the position of vendors who want to sell things electronically. Its approach, called ZipLock, is suited to selling software products on the spot but is also suitable for published content, artistic images, and fonts. It approves your credit and goes through an unlocking/decrypting routine on the spot. The ZipLock transaction is much more like a normal credit-card transaction and in fact uses the communications infrastructure built by a major credit-card clearinghouse. In effect, it transforms your PC into a point-of-sale terminal, where all you have to do is enter your credit-card number. If you're ordering software or other electronically deliverable goods, they're transmitted and decrypted on the spot. Other merchandise is delivered via the usual direct-marketing vehicles. Fees are paid by the merchant, which means that the transaction cost is built into the price. Although E-cash and ZipLock are hardly the only two electronic-payment schemes out there, their differences are instructive. Each appears to have a significant, valid role in building consumer confidence in online commerce. Bill Machrone is vice president of technology for Ziff-Davis Publishing Co. He can be reached at wmachrone (MCI Mail) or 72241,15 (CompuServe). --****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi

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Preparing the Remnant for the far side of the crisis
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A little fairy tale. Has a happy ending, and everything... Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 17 Sep 1997 19:13:41 -0500 From: Bill GL Stafford <springco(a)arn.net> Organization: Spring Management Company MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Preparing the Remnant for the far side of the crisis Robert; This is a rather long post. I wanted for you to see it personally. It is important and I wanted to clear it thru you. If I don't see it posted I will know you did not chose to post it. Best personal regards, Bill GL Stafford Began fowarded mail: >From: jmcnally(a)bigdog.fred.net >Date sent: Thu, 11 Sep 1997 10:42:20 -0400 (EDT) >Subject: REMNANT REVIEW of September 5, 1997 > >Gary North's > REMNANT REVIEW >emailbonus: Matt. 6:33-34 >year2000(a)garynorth.com > > Preparing the Remnant for the far side of the crisis > >Vol. 24, No. 9 590 September 5, 1997 > > I am hereby lifting the copyright of this issue of > Remnant Review. This one I want you to send to your > friends, neighbors, boss, Congressman, and anyone > else who might want advance information on the end, > at long last, of the 16th Amendment: vetoed by Year > 2000 noncompliant computers. Photocopy it, print it, > whatever. Then visit my Web site for full documen- > tation (under "Government"): > >THE ULTIMATE TAX REFORM: JANUARY 1, 2000 > > What I am about to report will verify what I have been saying all >year. If this doesn't constitute proof, I don't know what can persuade >you. From this point on, anyone who tells you that the Millennium Bug >is not a big deal, or who says, "We'll just have to wait and see about y2k, >there's no need to hurry," simply doesn't know what he's talking about. >Ignore him. > > On August 21, I stumbled into the most amazing government >document I have ever seen. I had read a brief news story about a >company that had applied for a contract to work as a subcontractor for >the IRS in a restructuring of its computer systems. The IRS admitted to >Congress last January that its $4 billion, 11-year attempt to modernize >its computer systems had failed. Here was a follow-up story. So, I went >to the company's Web site to find more information. This led me on a >merry chase across the Web. > > Finally I landed on the IRS's page -- specifically, its page >relating to >its PRIME project. There were pages of blue links to documents, each >one with a strange name or the name of a state. It was not clear to me at >first what I had discovered. So, I started clicking links. I found >nothing that I could understand, link after link: government bureaucratese. >Then I hit pay dirt: the mother lode, my friends -- what we have been >waiting for since 1913. Deliverance. Free at last, free at last! THE >IRS'S MAINFRAME COMPUTERS -- 63 OF THEM, PLUS MICROCOMPUTERS -- ARE ON >THE BRINK OF TOTAL COLLAPSE. Yee-hah! > > This amazing admission appears in an innocuously titled document, >"Request for Comments (RFC) for Modernization Prime Systems >Integration Services Contractor" (May 15, 1997). The author is Arthur >Gross, Associate Commissioner of the IRS and Chief Information >Officer, i.e., the senior IRS computer honcho. It was Mr. Gross who >went before Congress in January to admit defeat. > > Mr. Gross now says that the IRS is no longer capable of operating its >own computer systems. The IRS has over 7,500 people involved in just >computer maintenance, with a budget a $1 billion a year (Appendix B. >p. 2), yet they can no longer handle the load. And so, says Mr. Gross, >some of them are going to get fired. You can imagine the continuing >morale problem that this announcement will cause! The IS (information >systems) division will be, as they say, DOWNSIZED. From now on, the >IRS must achieve the following: > > . . . shifting the focus of IS management to a > business orientation: servicing customers with > exponentially increasing technology needs, > implementing massive new technology applications > on schedule within budget while managing the > downsizing of the IS organization > (Appendix B. p. 2). > > Do you think that people slaving away in their cubicles, trying to fix >the Millennium Bug, will respond favorably to this notice? "Fix it, and >then you're out!" Mr. Gross knows better. So, with this amazing >document, he calls on private industry to come in and TAKE OVER >THE ENTIRE IRS COMPUTER DIVISION. This is what Mr. Gross >calls "a strategic partnership" (p. 1). The new partners will have to fix >the Millennium Bug. The IRS will give them exactly eight months, start >to finish: October 1, 1998 to the end of June, 1999. > > The IRS's Digital Augean Stables > > Perhaps you have had trouble on occasion getting information from >the IRS about your account. After reading this document, I now know >why. The information is held in what the IRS calls "Master Files" (p. >4). These files are held in the Martinsburg, West Virginia, computer. >This computer receives data sent in by 10 regional centers that use a >total of 60 separate mainframes. These mainframes do not talk to each >other. Or, as Mr. Gross puts it, they are part of "an extraordinarily >complex array of legacy and stand-alone modernized systems with >respect both to connectivity and inoperability between the mainframe >platforms and the plethora of distributed systems" (p. 4). This is >bureaucratese, but I do understand the word, INOPERABILITY. > > The tax data build up in the local mainframes for five business days. >Then they are uploaded to West Virginia. This may take up to 10 actual >days. Then the Martinsburg computer sends it all back to the regional >computers in the Service Centers. Then the information is made >available to the "Customer Service Representatives" (p. 5), i.e., local tax >collectors. The elapsed time may take two weeks. > > But . . . it turns out that the actual source payment documents are >not sent to the Master Files. Neither is "specific payment or tax >information." This information stays in what the IRS calls >STOVEPIPED SYSTEMS, meaning stand-alone data bases "which, for >the most part, are not integrated with either the Master Files or the >corporate on-line system, IDRS" (p. 5). Separate tax assessments for the >same person can appear in six separate systems, and these do not >communicate with each other (p. 5). "Further, each system generates >management reporting information which is not homogeneous, one with >the other . . ." (p. 7). To help us visualize this mess, and much larger >messes, the document includes charts. These charts are so complex that >my printer was unable to print out the 116-page document -- probably >not enough RAM. I had to get two other people involved to get one >readable copy. > > I have included one of these charts on the back page, just for fun. >Go ahead. Take a quick look. No need to get out your magnifying glass >just yet. Then comes the key admission: "These infrastructures are >largely not century date compliant . . ." (p. 11). The phrase "century >date compliant" is the government's phrase for Year 2000-compliant. In >other words, THE IRS'S COMPUTERS ARE GOING TO CRASH. >Now hear this: > > In addition to three computing centers, (Memphis, > Detroit and Martinsburg) the latter of which is a > fully operational tax processing center, the IRS > deploys a total of sixty mainframes in its ten > regional service centers. > > None of the mainframes are compliant, thereby > necessitating immediate actions ranging from > systems software upgrades to replacement (p. 9). > >It gets worse: > > A still greater and far reaching wave of work > in the form of the Century Date Project is > cascading over the diminishing workforce that > is already insufficient to keep pace with the > historical levels of workload. For the Internal > Revenue Service, the Century Date Project is > uniquely challenging, given the aged and non- > century compliant date legacy applications and > infrastructure as well as thousands of undocumented > applications systems developed by business personnel > in the IRS field operations which are resident on > distributed infrastructures but not as yet > inventoried (p. 13). > > Notice especially two key words: "undocumented" and "inventoried." >"Undocumented" means there is no code writer's manual. They either >lost it or they never had it. "Inventoried" means they know where all of >the code is installed. But it says: "not as yet inventoried." How much >code? Lots. > > The IS organization has inventoried and scheduled > for analysis and conversion, as required, the > approximately 62 million lines of computer code > comprising the IRS core business systems. With > respect to the business supported field > applications and infrastructures, however, we do > not know what we do not know. Until central field > systems and infrastructures are completed, the IRS > will be unable to analyze, plan, and schedule the > field system conversion (p. 13). > > I love this phrase: WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT WE DO NOT >KNOW. This is surely not bureaucratese. Now, let's put all of this into >a clearer perspective. The Social Security Administration discovered its >y2k problem in 1989. In 1991, programmers began to work on >correcting the agency's 30 million lines of code. By mid-1996, they had >completed repairs on 6 million lines (CIO Magazine, Sept. 15, 1996.) >Got that? It took five years for them to fix 6 million lines. But the IRS >has 62 million lines THAT THEY KNOW ABOUT, but they don't know >about the rest. It's out there, but there is no inventory of it. > > Consider the fact that they have not completed their inventory. The >1996 "California White Paper," which is the y2k guide issued by the IS >division of the California state government's y2k repair project, says that >inventory constitutes 1% of the overall code repair project. Awareness >is 1%. So, after you get finished with inventory, YOU HAVE 98% OF >YOUR PROJECT AHEAD OF YOU. Meanwhile, the IRS has not yet >completed its inventory. > > The IRS has led the American welfare state into a trap. The Federal >government, like the U.S. economy, will be restructured in the year >2000. Most Americans will be in bankruptcy by 2001, but they will be >free. > > Meanwhile, the news media are all a-dither about the Clinton- >Congress accord on taxes, which will balance the budget in 2002. As >George Gobel used to say, "Suuuuuure it will." Who is going to collect >revenues in 2000? > > Please Help Get Us Out of This Mess! > > The next section of Mr. Gross's report I find truly unique. When was >the last time you read something like this in an agency's report on its >own capacity? (The next time will be the first.) > > THE CHALLENGE: THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS (IS) > ORGANIZATION LACKS SUFFICIENT TECHNICAL > MANAGEMENT CAPACITY TO SIMULTANEOUSLY > SUPPORT TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT, EFFECTUATE THE > CENTURY DATE CONVERSION AND MANAGE > MODERNIZATION (p. 13). > > This states the IRS's problem clearly: its computer systems are just >barely making it now, and the Year 2000 Problem will torpedo them. > > Mr. Gross then announces the IRS's solution: quit. The IRS has >now admitted that "tax administration is its core business" and it will >now "shift responsibility for systems development and integration >services to the private sector . . ." (p. 54). But first, it must find >some well-heeled partners. > > "The IRS has acknowledged that its expertise now and in the future >is tax administration." This means that "the IS organization must be >rebuilt to preserve the existing environment and partner with the private >sector to Modernize the IRS" (p. 13). I love it when someone capitalizes >"Modernize." Especially when it really means "officially bury." > > Then the coup de grace: "Any reasonable strategy to move forward, >therefore, would focus on managing the immediate crisis -- 'stay in >business' while building capacity to prepare for future Modernization" >(p. 14). Then comes part 2 of the report: > > The Next Eighteen Months: > Staying in Business and > Preparing for Modernization > > Mr. Gross knows that there is a deadline, and it isn't 2000. It's >months earlier. He has selected June, 1999. Most organizations have >elected December, 1998. This allows a year for testing. Mr. Gross is >more realistic. He knows late 1998 is too early. The IRS can't do it. (I >would say that late 2008 is too early. The IRS has tried to revamp its >computer system before.) > > . . . the IRS must undertake and complete major infrastructure >initiatives no later than June 1999, to minimally ensure century date >compliance for each of its existing mainframes and/or their successor >platforms. At the same time, the IRS must complete the inventory of its >field infrastructures as well as develop and exercise a century date >compliance plan for the conversion replacement and/or elimination of >those infrastructures. (p. 19). > > Then comes an astounding sentence. This sentence is astounding >because it begins with the word, IF. (Note: RFC stands for Request for >Comment.) > IF THE INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS BECOMES >AVAILABLE, UPDATES WILL BE PROVIDED TO POTENTIAL >OFFERERS TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPING RESPONSES TO THE >RFC. > > If...? IF...? He is warning all those private firms that he is inviting >in to clean up the mess that they may not be given the code analysis. But >code analysis constitutes the crucial 15% of any Year 2000 repair job, >according to the California White Paper. Then, and only then, can code >revision begin. > > Meanwhile, the IRS system's code is collapsing even without y2k. >The programmers are not able to test all of the new code. Mr. Gross >calls this "Product Assurance." This division, he says, has "sunk to >staffing levels less than 30 percent of the minimum industry standard . . >.. ." This makes it "one of the highest priorities within the IS >organization, given that, today, major tax systems are not subjected to >comprehensive testing prior to being migrated to production" (p. 15). In >short, Congress passes new tax code legislation, and the IRS >programmers implement these changes WITHOUT TESTING THE >NEW CODE. Now comes y2k. As he says, "the Century Date >Conversion will place an extraordinary additional burden on the Product >Assurance Program." I don't want to bore you, but when I find the most >amazing government document I've ever seen, I just can't stop. Neither >could Mr. Gross: > > Regrettably, the challenge is far more overarching: to modernize >functioning but aged legacy systems which have been nearly irreparably >overlaid by and interfaced with a tangle of stovepiped distributed >applications systems and networked infrastructures (p. 55). > > I'll summarize. The IRS has got bad code on 63 aging mainframe >systems, plus micros. It has lost some of the code manuals. It does not >know how much code it has. It must now move ("migrate") the data >from these y2k noncompliant computers -- data stored in legacy >programs that are not y2k compliant -- to new computers with new >programs. These computers must interact with each other, unlike >today's system. Bear in mind that some of this code -- I have seen >estimates as high as 30% -- is written in Assembler language, which is >not understood by most programmers today: perhaps 50,000 of them, >worldwide (Cory Hamasaki's estimate). Then everything must be tested, >side by side, old system vs. new system, on mainframe computers, before >anyone can trust anything. (This assumes that extra mainframes are >available, but they aren't.) Warning: > > Beyond the magnitude of the applications system migration, the >complexity and enormity of the date conversion that would be required >necessitates careful planning and risk mitigation strategies (e.g., >parallel processing). While the risks inherent in Phase III may be nearly >incalculable given the age of the systems, the absence of critical >documentation, dependency on Assembler Language Code (ALC) and >the inevitable turnover of IRS workforce supporting these systems, it is >essential to plan and execute the conversion of the Master Files and its >related suite of applications (p. 30). > > I'll say it's essential! The key question is: Is it possible? No. > > Can you believe this sentence? "The risks inherent in Phase III may >be nearly incalculable . . ." What does he mean, "may be"? They ARE. > > Meanwhile, Congress keeps changing the Internal Revenue Code. >This creates a programming nightmare: coding the new laws. So, how >big is this project? Here is how Mr. Gross describes it: "Modernization >is the single largest systems integration undertaking in world eclipsing >in breadth and depth any previous efforts of either the public or private >sector. Given the fluid nature of the Nation's Tax Laws, Modernization >is likely to be the most dynamic, creating even greater complexity and, >in turn, compounding the risks" (p. 54). Many, many risks. > > Two questions arise: (1) Who is going to fix it? (2) At what price? >The answer? He has no answer. All he knows is that this project is so >huge that NORMAL COMPETITIVE BIDDING WILL NOT WORK. >For this project, the IRS is not saying what its "partners" will be paid. >It's open for negotiation. > > You may be thinking: "Boondoggle." I'm thinking: "Legal liability >in 2000 larger than any company's board of directors would rationally >want to risk, unless they think Congress will pass a no-liability law in >2000." Here is Mr. Gross's description of the special arrangement. Pay >close attention to the words "competitive process." He bold faces them; I >do, too. > > Our challenge, therefore, is to FORGE A BUSINESS PLAN AND > PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP in accordance with federal > governmental procurement laws and regulations ABSENT THE > TRADITIONAL LEVEL OF DETAILED REQUIREMENTS > TYPICALLY ESTABLISHED AS THE BASIS OF THE > COMPETITIVE PROCESS (p. 60). > > He calls on businesses to create a "DETAILED SYSTEMS >DEVELOPMENT PLAN" (p. 60). He goes on: "In general, the IRS >seeks to create a business plan which: Shares risk with the private >sector; Incents [incents???!!!] the private sector to either share or >assume the 'front end' capital investment . . ." (p. 60). Read it again. >Yes, it really says that. THE IRS WANTS THE PRIVATE SECTOR >TO PUT UP MOST OR ALL OF THE MONEY TO FIX ITS ENTIRE >SYSTEM. > > This is why the minimum requirement for a company to make a bid >is $200 million in working capital. It has to have experience in >computers. It must be able to repair 5 million lines of code (p. 70). > > How complex is this job? The complexity is mind-boggling: a seven- >volume "Modernization Blueprint." To buy it on paper costs $465, or >you can get a copy on a free CD-ROM. Needless to say, I got the CD-ROM. > > So, you think, at least the IRS is getting on top of this problem. >Suuuuure, it is. The contract award date is [let's hear a drum roll, >please]: October 1, 1998 (p. 73). How realistic is this? You may >remember Mr. Gross's deadline: June 1999. So, he expects these firms >to be able to fix 62 million lines of noncompliant code, if they can find >the missing code in the field offices, even though the IRS has lost the >documentation for some of this code, in an eight-month window of >productivity. Social Security isn't compliant after seven years of work >on less than half the IRS's number of lines of code. > > The IRS is facing a complete breakdown. Its staff can't fix the code. >The IRS wants private firms to pay for the upgrade and manage the >computer systems from now on. It does not know how much code it has. >It does not have manuals for all of the old code. It does not even know >how to pay the firms that get the contracts: either by "contractually >greed upon fees" or "pursuant to measurable outcomes of the >implemented systems" (p. 61). It has called for very large and >experienced firms to submit comments by October 1, 1997. > > In short, the IRS does not know what it is doing, let alone what it >has to do. It only knows that it has to find a few suckers in private >industry >to bear the costs of implementing a new, improved IRS computer system >and then assume responsibility for getting it Year 2000-compliant >between October 1, 1998 and the end of June 1999. ("There's one born >every minute.") Here are 12 companies that have expressed interest: >nderson Consulting, Computer Sciences Corporation, EDS >Government Services (EDS is not itself y2k compliant), GTE >Government Systems, Hughes Information Technology Systems, IBM, >Litton PRC, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Northrup Grumman >Corporation, Ratheon E-Systems, Tracor Information Systems >Company, and TRW. The list is posted at: > >http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/bureaus/irs/prime/interest.htm > Conclusion > > It's all over but the shouting. The IRS is going bye-bye. >Accompanying it will be the political career of Mr. Gingrich and the >historical reputation of Mr. Clinton. Bill Clinton will be remembered as >the President on whose watch the Federal government shut down and >stayed shut down. First Mate Newt will try to avoid going down with >the ship of state, but he won't make it. And as for Al Gore . . . . Well, >maybe he can get a job herding cattle on the Texas ranch of his ex- >roommate at Harvard, Tommy Lee Jones. Think of it: not "Gore in >2000," but GORED IN 2000. Mr. Information Highway will hit a dead end. > > On June 30, 1999, the IRS will know that its computers are still >noncompliant. On the next day, July 1, fiscal year 2000 rolls over on >the Federal government's computers and on every state government's >computer that has not rolled over (and shut down) on a bi-annual basis >on July 1, 1998. Almost every state: about half a dozen will roll over on >October 1, 1999. > > In 1999, chaos will hit the financial markets, all over the world -- >assuming that this does not happen earlier, which I do not assume. The >public will know the truth in 1999: THE DEFAULT ON U.S. >GOVERNMENT DEBT IS AT HAND. The tax man won't be able to >collect in 2000. The tax man will be blind. Consider how many banks >and money market funds are filled with T-bills and T-bonds. Consider >how the government will operate with the IRS completely shut down. >Congress hasn't thought much about this. Neither has Bill Clinton. > END -- ÐÏà¡±á Content-Type: text/x-vcard; charset=us-ascii; name="vcard.vcf" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Description: Card for Bill GL Stafford Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="vcard.vcf" --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Getting the ITAR
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The front of the ITAR has this convenient phone number you can call to get a copy: 1 703 875 6644. I don't think anyone on this list can claim ignorance. :) BTW, as for Pegasus, please note that I didn't say the author was going to get in trouble, merely that his software is export controlled -- there's a difference. /r$

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Re: Password File Utility Wanted [Win95, ha ha]
by llurch＠networking.stanford.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: comp.os.ms-windows.win95.misc, alt.security,comp.security.misc) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <48888p$970(a)news.infi.net>, lestat(a)richmond.infi.net (Terry Harrison) wrote: >I would like to obtain a program to address the following..... > >I use the 'remember password' option on my network logins, and then >when they expire, I don't remember what they were. This is bad as I >need them to change the old password (particularly a problem with >Netware). What I would like is a utility that would prompt me for my >current windows ID for security, then decode the .pwl files so that I >could read my old passwords. Ideally, it would allow an edit of the >existing passwords as well. Anybody seen onea these?? Such a thing could exist, because Win95 allows you to save passwords that use different encryption methods. Microsoft would say "no, doesn't exist," however, because this is a major security flaw. I haven't seen such a tool, though. Anybody? What you should do is get a real encryption package like PGP (poke around on http://web.mit.edu/ or http://www.netresponse.com/zldf/, it's free), use something that is long and complicated but that you will never ever forget as your PGP passphrase, and encrypt a text file containing all of your passwords with PGP. You can put other stuff like all your credit card numbers in a PGP-encrypted file with reasonable safety too. You (only) will be able to decrypt and read this file whenever you want. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMKgam43DXUbM57SdAQE9eQP/YY/Sv9izIoSg9gnOZUM+WQSZfkv/YDi4 oCzFerVMDFZT+7kD+w206qGjrtWUDQ3Rwie5XqlaLG3Ezhh9tpldMMPdy50K8dwI WL43SQeplXDxAESUC3Td7j2MRK5ONacfojSaSoauHW6Ffr+M2sU5opJlB+y88eTv 45VCTDn8J1I= =Qbqx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- rich graves, llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu moderator of the win95netbugs list http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~llurch/win95netbugs/faq.html

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Re: coding and nnet's
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: tcmay(a)got.net 13-NOV-1995 02:25:05.47: At 11:40 PM 11/11/95, Michael Pierson wrote: >I wouldn't be surprised to learn of somebody like FinCEN using >neural-net systems to do pattern analysis on funds transfers and >the like, or the NRO or NSA investing research money into >investigating the usefulness of NNs for image processing or for >scanning raw ELIN SIGINT or COMINT data. In fact, I'd be quite >surprised if they weren't. [...] I recall reading of some contracts let out, and other RFCs, for AI programs for FinCEN use. Not surprising. (If I ran FinCEN, this is what I'd surely have a bunch of folks working on. Scary thought.) ------------------------ I find it interesting that FinCEN has a net link (at http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/bureaus/fincen/fincen.html) I have heard about an IRS cash-tracking center in Detroit, where all those $100+ cash deposits/withdrawals get sent. They probably use similar setups for analysis, although with more of an individual focus. I have recently been contemplating how a private digital cash system (either national-currency based or private-currency based) would show up on such an analysis process. My suspicion is that it would do so via fewer known non-cash transfers. Cash transactions might actually increase, due to conversions between digital cash and normal cash. On the other hand, many of those using a private digital cash scheme may (like myself) tend to use mostly cash anyway. I am interested in hearing the thoughts of others on this subject. Particularly useful would be methods to stealth or spoof such a system; i.e., to either hide a private digital cash system from it, or to give it so many false positives that they couldn't distinguish what is real and what is not. I suggest that the latter would be easier (and would have other valuable applications). -Allen P.S. Does anyone know what is up with the extropians list? Down again, I suspect.

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Re: NSA, ITAR, NCSA and plug-in hooks.
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>jim bell writes: >>>I think it's 121.1, Category XIII paragraph (b) item (5): >>>"Ancillary equipment specifically designed or modified for paragraphs (b) >>>(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of this category;" >> >>Question: What makes computers in general NOT describable by such a >>paragraph?!? > >The referenced paragraphsdescribe cryptographic hardware, software and >technical data. Computers in general are not "specifically designed" >as cryptographic equipment. Great! Then you must merely ensure that there is at least one (non-encryption) program around that can use the same hooks.

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U.S. Exit Tax - SI
by gjeffers＠socketis.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

U.S. EXIT TAXES from Strategic Investment's Intelligence bulletins - November 15, 1995 Strategic Investment 824 E. Baltimore St. Baltimre, MD 21202-4799 Published monthly for U.S. residents at US$109 per year. Republicans add barbed wire to Clinton's "Berlin Wall." SI accurately forecasted the coming of the "exit" tax proposed by the Clinton Admin- istration earlier this year. Now Senate Republicans have passed an exit tax that is even more punitive than that proposed by Clinton. Section 12441(b) of the Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act of 1995 (H.R. 2491) adds a new layer of confiscatory taxes, succession taxes, to be imposed upon U.S. citizens and residents. Unlike gift or estate taxes, which are imposed upon the giver or his estate, succession taxes are imposed upon the recipient of bequests. Under the Senate proposal, succession taxes would be levied upon property acquired by gift or inheritance from a former U.S. citizen or former long-term resident of the U.S. who leaves U.S. tax jurisdiction after February, 1995. This tax would make it finan- cially more punitive for an American to renounce his citizenship unless his entire family came along. It would also make unattractive for foreign- ers with close U.S. relatives to take up residence in the United States. The would be subject ot confiscatory exit taxes upon leaving. (Questions arise - is there any legislation that Congress can't pass or attempt to pass? Aren't Republicans supposted to be an alternative to Democrates?) - GLJ

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Re: unsubcribe
by vitamin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubcribe

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FKI_osk
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-14-95. Washrag: "FBI Targets Expected Growth In Computer Crime." The FBI is beefing up its fight against computer crime. A Washington office, which handles international cases, was established in 1993. The San Francisco office will keep a close eye on activities in Silicon Valley, while the New York squad will handle financial-related computer crimes. "Postal Service Planning to Sell Prepaid Telephone Cards." Because the phone cards are "stored value cards," they could offer the Postal Service a logical first step toward the use of a "smart card" that might be used in connection with an information kiosk the agency is developing for the federal government to provide the public with a computer link to the federal bureaucracy. Long-range plans for the kiosk call for use of smart cards that would enable people to receive government payments, such as welfare benefits or checks for food stamps. FKI_osk (7 kb)

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