December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Crime and punishment in cyberspace - 3 of 3
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Jim Miller Better people make a better world. A committee should be formed to develop specifications describing a good person. The committee could then launch a program to guide society to a future where everyone met or exceeded the recommended specifications. ............................... Better yet, why not build your own! With the growing field of robotics & nanotechnology, you could just grow your own version of the perfect citizen (all in your own image of virtue&morality). There would be no objections, then, to "frequent quality assurance testing to guarantee rapid convergence to the desired goals. [Automatons] who did not meet the specifications would be [rewired into] the program." And there would be no protests or rants regarding privacy, since there would be no need, since everyone would be alike and predictable in their "values" & "ambitions". Blanc

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Censoring the Internet
by an50＠desert.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: GG> In another vien, it was noted that a David Southerland of the National : GG> Advisory Council on the Information Highway stated that the council was : GG> advising the Canadian Government on the regulation and control of the : GG> 'net, and were pushing for a means of tracing messages sent through the : GG> Internet [Does anyone know who these people are?, where they come from?]. : David Sutherland headed the organizing committee for the National : Capital FreeNet and currently holds the positions of Chairman of the : Board of Directors and acting President. Mr. Sutherland is Director of : Computing and Communications Services at Carleton University in : Ottawa. His major interests in this context are public literacy in the : use of telecommunications technology and services, the social impacts : of these services and the development of a "new democratic process" : via computer mediated communications. >Now isn't this gentleman also the person who recommended (and possibly >decided upon) the banning of the alt.sex* newsgroups at Carleton University? "Electronic democracy" and "accountability", when applied to the Internet, are being used as nice-sounding buzzwords that coverup their practical consquences: the oppression of intellecual and political minorities, and the conversion of the Internet from a decentralized system, relatively free of coercion, into a centralized, politically controlled "Information Superhighway", a convenient metaphor for centralized government takeover of the next generation media, on which our ability to freely express ourselves depends. The agenda of people like David Sutherland, L.Detweiler's friend at the NSA who rants about a "Waco in cyberspace", Al Gore, and their ilk runs along the lines of the following: * identification and tracking of all posters and other Internet users for the purpose of "accountability", ie, the ability to threaten and apply coercive retaliation for expressing views that embarass them . The targets for censorship are for now not explicitly political (except for such universally loathed groups as Nazis), but rather selective enforcement of vague notions such as "obsecenity", "harrassment", etc. These serve to set precedents to allow further centralization and control in the future. These bullies call people who wish to speak free of such threats, such as anonymous posters, "cowards" because we do not wish to submit to their threats. * attack against "pseudospoofing" (the alleged use of multiple pseudonyms to make it appear more people favor a point of view). Many "electronic democracy" fans worship the results of opinion polls rather than thinking for themselves; they get truly pissed by the possibility that their lemming mentality could be manipulated. As freinds of the status quo, they ignore the fact that modern centralized media can manipulate our view of "popular" opinion far more radically than "pseudospoofing" possibly could. As L.Detweiler (aka tmp(a)netcom.com) has quite unintentionally demonstrated, it is very difficult to maintain even a few vocal pseudonyms in practice without folks catching on. * imposing radical, unprecedented controls on cyberspace to promote outmoted varieties of commerce (enforcement of some kinds of copyrights and patents recognized by some jurisdictions, attempts to resolve commercial non-repudiation problems in ways that require elimination of privacy on the Internet, etc.) instead of working on new forms of free enterprise that complement, rather than destroy, the freedom and privacy available on the Internet (multinational small business, privacy preserving digital cash, etc.). For "Info Superhighway" fans, "the needs of commerce" can provide nice-sounding excuses to kill free enterprise. * similarly, extending outmoded forms of government operation, such as Canada's ban on media coverage of certain court trials, attempts to enforce collection of taxes on international information exchange, and attempts to monitor "conspiracies" (broadly enough defined to cover any group talking about things that threaten them, and might be illegal somewhere). The way they propose to avoid these "threats" is, again, to radically alter the entire Internet (not just Usenet) by instituting panoptic monitoring and content control. Many politicians and fans of the status quo would rather impose 1984 than adapt their operations to the coming era of private, and even cheaper, worldwide communications. * calling for "community standards" for a network that criss-crosses communities that include, by no means at the extremes, both Baghdad and Bangkok. Often, the assumption is that their view of North American standards can be applied to the Internet, and everybody else just better go along, including those of us in North America with different standards. They'd rather impose their community standards on others than using filters to define their own unique local communities. Freedom is, practically, given as much (or more) by the tools we can build to protect it, as it is by our ability to convince others who violently disagree with us not to attack us. On the Internet we have tools like anon remailers and PGP that give us a great deal of freedom from coercion even in the midst of censors. Thus, these tools piss of fans of centralized information control, the defenders of the status quo, like nothing else on the Internet. You'll see these folks attacking anonymous remailers, cryptography, psuedonymous accounts, and other tools of coercion-free expression and information interchange on the net, ironically often in the name of promoting "commerce". You'll hear them rant and rave about "criminals" and "terrorists", as if they even had a good clue about the laws of the thousands of jurisdictions criss-crossed by the Internet, and as if their own attempts to enable coercion bear no resemblance to the practice of terrorism. The scary thing is, they really think they have a good idea about what all those laws should be, and they're perfectly willing to shove it down our throats, regardless of the vast diversity of culture, intellectual, political, and legal opinion on the planet. Alas, you'll also hear rhetoriticans otherwise promoting privacy and freedom piously dismiss tools as "mere technology", or react against some of their unexpected, unfamiliar, in some ways radical enchancement of privacy and freedom. They do this because as with most development, it follows a real-world nonlinear path, not a nice logically consistent political argument. These are the otherwise devoted libertarians who will quick to say, "I'm no crypto-anarchist", after their opponents have called them that in the midst of their typical reactionary ranting. But all the convicing rhetoric in the world doesn't finally decide these issues; in the end its what specifically we do with our cyberspace technology that will decide how free we are in cyberspace. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- This message was mailed through the remailer anon(a)desert.hacktic.nl Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to kafka(a)desert.hacktic.nl For help, send a message to help(a)desert.hacktic.nl. Send a message ping(a)desert.hacktic.nl to allocate an anonymous account. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQBNAi2+t1EAAAECALUS6KI7WLBB47y5dDIN+vHAW2XLxu+ELJCNkHLKYxhAr6vY Ku1e9oMry+bHizW8wCt0JPWMlnzZOkhZplIGsqkABRG0O0Rlc2VydCBBbm9ueW1v dXMgUmVtYWlsaW5nIFNlcnZpY2UgPGFub25AZGVzZXJ0LmhhY2t0aWMubmw+iQBV AgUQLb63vZRymF15lPcFAQF88AH/TdqfNlZ2uNH/CpQiy6BneDa0+FJTmBFgy5W+ wcpbsljOFFheH3zz5zA2rkpxIBoy/nd4vQ9kaa6fc1TkVMeBfokAlQIFEC2+t6C+ ZjYIMi0DBQEBT4YD/0NK9fCG8JjE0fS/0SlFshWAGSZxUYREKoQiwo8/ZPEbORHa +a6E8mXOjy7XHVH00S8/1aOO+ji89FFY2aVNqVVDfZI53er9pZAeNSQ1mvD7isor B3IOQ+WeKgXL/IvOEaZro0ZA/FWtry0Ty7RZbPwX4j1TkBTxlRI08e2dG7YI =MfIT -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: 6/6 New Yorker anti-crypto, anti-net article
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Regarding the author of the anti-net/anti-crypto article, someone says: > I do not have Seabrook's e-mail address, but he is on CompuServe > and it can be obtained from Compuserve's directory. -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

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RE: Censoring the Internet
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Nobody <an50(a)desert.hacktic.nl> Many "electronic democracy" fans worship the results of opinion polls rather than thinking for themselves; they get truly pissed by the possibility that their lemming mentality could be manipulated. .... But all the convicing rhetoric in the world doesn't finally decide these issues; in the end its what specifically we do with our cyberspace technology that will decide how free we are in cyberspace. .................................... I read a statement somewhere to the effect of: When we are faced with a disease, we shouldn't say "what is wrong with the germ"? Rather we should be asking ourselves "what should we be doing to prevent it from affecting us"? Rather than achieving a grasp of methods&means to help themselves, lemmings will instead complain about the need for "good" leadership. This is a good summary from "Nobody" on what I have noticed from my very recent forays into Usenet newsgroups (and other places). Blanc

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(None)
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim choate <ravage(a)bga.com> writes: > For a group to comit conspiracy they have to actually do something other > than > just talk about it. For example, you and I are discussing robbing a bank over > lunch, nothing illegal about that. However(!), the instant you say "lets use > my car" or "I have a gun we can use" then you have committed conspiracy. My (non-professional) understanding is that conspiracy just requires intent to commit a crime. Two people sitting around a table, throwing around hypothetics is no big deal. Two people, sitting around a table, making plans, OTOH, is. > It is my understanding that conspiracy is a felony even if the crime is a > misdemeanor... I think you're right, although I'm not sure I understand that rationale behind it... --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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CYBERSPACE IS BY NAT
by bmorris＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com RR> > skinheads were jailed for conspiracy to bomb an synagogue, however RR> > synagogue had not actually been bombed. They went to prison. RR> For a group to comit conspiracy they have to actually do something ot RR> just talk about it. Ah, thanks for the clarification. The skinheads had amassed guns and bombs and were clearly past the just-speculating stage. RR> It is my understanding that conspiracy is a felony even if the crime RR> is a misdemeanor... Something which is as legalistically demented as ITAR not allowing the PGP EXE to be exported but which does allow the source and detailed file format changes to be exported! * RM 1.4 B0037 *

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Windows PGP and remailer list
by an49＠desert.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1. What is the best implementation of a Windows GUI for PGP out there? 2. Where do I 'finger' to get the latest remailer list? thanks, ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- This message was mailed through the remailer anon(a)desert.hacktic.nl Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to kafka(a)desert.hacktic.nl For help, send a message to help(a)desert.hacktic.nl. Send a message ping(a)desert.hacktic.nl to allocate an anonymous account. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQBNAi2+t1EAAAECALUS6KI7WLBB47y5dDIN+vHAW2XLxu+ELJCNkHLKYxhAr6vY Ku1e9oMry+bHizW8wCt0JPWMlnzZOkhZplIGsqkABRG0O0Rlc2VydCBBbm9ueW1v dXMgUmVtYWlsaW5nIFNlcnZpY2UgPGFub25AZGVzZXJ0LmhhY2t0aWMubmw+iQBV AgUQLb63vZRymF15lPcFAQF88AH/TdqfNlZ2uNH/CpQiy6BneDa0+FJTmBFgy5W+ wcpbsljOFFheH3zz5zA2rkpxIBoy/nd4vQ9kaa6fc1TkVMeBfokAlQIFEC2+t6C+ ZjYIMi0DBQEBT4YD/0NK9fCG8JjE0fS/0SlFshWAGSZxUYREKoQiwo8/ZPEbORHa +a6E8mXOjy7XHVH00S8/1aOO+ji89FFY2aVNqVVDfZI53er9pZAeNSQ1mvD7isor B3IOQ+WeKgXL/IvOEaZro0ZA/FWtry0Ty7RZbPwX4j1TkBTxlRI08e2dG7YI =MfIT -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Crime and punishment in cyberspace - 3 of 3
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

All this brings us to a related issue - another one hinging on principles: Do cypherpunks accept the need for wiretapping? Wiretapping is necessary to solve many 'crimes'. If we accept that these crimes are important enough to justify wiretapping, than there is little difference between wiretapping analog phones and tapping data. The EFF and other organizations have pursued the laudable goals of extending laws guaranteeing freedom of expression, privacy etc to cyberspace, adapting them, as and where necessary, to the nature and technology of digital networks. It is only to be expected that the FBI, theoretically a socially agreed upon body enforcing laws made by socially agreed upon legislators, to attempt to extend the powers granted to it for wiretapping to cyberspace. _Adapting them, as and where necessary (eg. digital encryption), to the nature and technology of digital networks. If we accept the need for wiretapping, than the only problem is to find a way to make Clipper/DTII as protective of privacy as current analog-tapping laws; as inconvenient as current analog tapping. If we accept the need for wiretapping, we can find such ways. Variants of Micali's fair crypto; an open, publicly available no-trapdoor algorithm; a requirement that, as with primitive exchanges, DTII'd ones would still have to be visited by LEOs to work a tap, etc. We can then respond to the various (non-serious) calls from Freeh, Denning et al for an 'alternative'. Or else, if wiretapping per se does more harm to privacy than it does to crime, call for an end to wiretapping altogether. There is an anecdote about George Bernard Shaw (or Bertrand Russell?): At a social event, he hypothetically asks the lady next to him whether she would sleep with him for a million pounds. For a million pounds, she says, she migh consider it. "Would you sleep with me for sixpence, then?" he asks. Outraged, she replies "What kind of woman do you think I am?" His response: "We have already established what kind of woman you are. We are just haggling about the price." Rishab (ps. no offence intended -- that's an illustratory anecdote, c'est tout) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh They came for the Jews, and I was silent because I was not a Jew; rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in They came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not protest, because I did not Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 belong to a trade union; Voicemail +91 11 3760335 They came for the Catholics, and I said nothing because I was not a Catholic; H 34C Saket And then they came for me. New Delhi There was no one left to say anything... INDIA ----Father Niemoeller

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Re: Remailer Chaining Security
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- :: Request-Remailing-To: rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu :: Request-Remailing-To: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu :: Request-Remailing-To: vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu The preceding remailer message path was generated using Hal's Chain utility. One can find this program at soda.berkeley.edu pub/cypherpunks/remailer, get Chain.zip. It automates alot of the drudge in chaining remailers. It will even encode messages using PGP if you have the remailers public key on your ring and your PGP directory in your path statement. For instance, to get the above remailer path I typed the following: chain vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu vox rperkins nowhere <foo.let> foo.vox Thus my address will be the final destination, the message file (foo.let) is converted to the remail ready file, foo.vox. The remail ready file must then be manually sent to the first remailer in the chain, in this case remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl. It will then go to rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu and then to nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu, finally being sent to vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu. The Chain.ini file (from the chain.zip file) contains the remailer addresses and whether a PGP public key for the remailer is available on your public key ring. Remailers for which you have keys will automatically be encoded and begin thusly: :: Encrypted: PGP N.B., It may be neccesary to edit the chain.ini file (it is merely an ASCII file) to update the list of remailers. I recommend this utility for chaining to most remailers. Remember that remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu does not support the format, :: Request-Remailing-To: Even so it is a handy program to have if you want to avail yourself of the cypherpunks remailer system. Scott G. Morham !The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLfoGvz2paOMjHHAhAQFSoQP+IELwswIrLk6B0W1nXDQJysqjYl7GGQg8 6gO38xSI7CzbqFFneM8YMNQG7U/PKIjs5Kw89lFZNHAYk6NzDGvVUbOepvIjQ9F3 xIO/TsTYASFAz5WcGNHKVR2ceq4juubDkBd9O5r+mEcj9c34Nhsbs9QxWC1T1l64 +YSyP9DBxHE= =hDW4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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test... please ignore.
by Robert Lau 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

this is only a test. if this had been a real emergency, this message would have been crypted. Robert Lau - Systems Programmer, Unix Systems 213-740-2866 -- University Computing Services Internet: rslau(a)usc.edu -- University of Southern California Bitnet: rslau@uscvm -- 1020 W Jefferson, LA, CA USA, 90089-0251 UUCP: ...!uunet!usc!rslau

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