December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

C-punks in print...
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, For those interested there is an article in the July 94 issue of Circuit Cellar Ink: The Computer Applications Journal on pp. 36. It specificaly mentions the c-punks and their position (ala Gilmore) on various issues of crypto and constitutional rights. Is a good article but shallow on technical details. It is intended more as a pump primer for those poor souls doing real-time control apps. I would say it is worth the time to read. Take care.

1 0

Announcement: PGS v0.99c
by ER CRAMER 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- PGS v0.99c is out there! This new version of PGS supports 8 bytes keyid's. This version will be able to run in a OS/2 DOS box. PGS v0.99c is available on the following site: wuarchive.wustl.edu:/pub/msdos_uploads/pgs/pgs099c.zip I hope that at the end of next week PGS v0.99c will be available at SimTel too... (oak.oakland.com:/SimTel/security/pgs099c.zip) Do not throw away 0.99b yet because we did the bugfix a bit fast because we want to have it ready before the hollidays... - -- ... If you outlaw Privacy, only Outlaws will have Privacy! Eelco Cramer <crame001(a)hio.tem.nhl.nl> ------ - -------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLh1SOYDAdPKe9hHLAQFkXAP/UTodjE7HqCGVZAazLAxdYrWcrVgMsYBa kPjn2litqpxZWusMjqTIS3+vHYHrEhXCzBexl69CEo1XQ46PNe1kbrbpwPxGCwzc uCryNVeZ+sOdpJOTAWmPmEYM151X2w7KEjI7vPMmgShQGjQlOBWR0PvQ3VOEd61U mUP6FCfW5HQ= =aEkc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

RE: "Cypherpunk" vs. "Cryptorebel"
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Wed, 6 Jul 1994, Lefty wrote: > >> >I like the label "cryptorebel" better than "cypherpunk". The word >> >"punk" just does not seem right, while "rebel" does. I do have a >> >certain attachment to "cypherpunk". Comments? >> >> If it weren't for nitpickers, we'd all be knee-deep in nits. > > There is too much "name recognition" in "cypherpunk" for it to be dropped >now...IMHO. A more serious problem with the name "cryptorebel", which did not immediately occur to me, is that crypto-whatever generally means "someone who denies being a 'whatever' but, in fact, is one". In the words of Inigo Montoya, "You keep using that word, but I don't think it means what _you_ think it does". -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

1 0

Curve Encrypt 1.1 Release
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Curve Encrypt 1.1, IDEA encryption for the Macintosh is now available. Curve Encrypt is a freeware drag-and-drop encryption application for the Macintosh. It uses IDEA cipher-feedback mode with a 255 character pass phrase, encrypts both the data and resource forks of files, and will encrypt the contents of a folder or volume in a single operation. Source code is provided, natch. CE is System 7 only. (Note that this program has nothing whatsoever to do with elliptic curve encryption methods, just so nobody gets confused...) NEW FOR 1.1 The following changes have been made for the 1.1 release: o Faster encryption and decryption. o Faster file wipes. o Department of Defense standard file wiping is now an option. o The "Use as default pass phrase" selection is no longer present. Instead, Curve Encrypt 1.1 uses keyfiles, a more reliable way to reuse pass phrases. oJCurve Encrypt now saves the creation and modification dates of files when they're encrypted, and restores them to their original values when a file is decrypted. o An incompatibility with the Super Boomerang utility has been fixed. Ftp Sites: ripem.msu.edu:pub/crypt/other/curve-encrypt-idea-for-mac/ This is an export controlled ftp site: read pub/crypt/GETTING_ACCESS for information. ftp.csn.org:/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/curve_encrypt/ csn.org is also export-controlled: read /mpj/README for the characters to replace ???????. Address for support: Curve Software <kinney(a)bogart.colorado.edu> Copyright and Distribution: Curve Encrypt (c)1994 Curve Software. Permission is granted for distribution within the United States only, including products containing Curve Software copyrighted source. Export of this software is a Federal crime. Don't do it. Curve Encrypt is free. All releases are verified with PGP signatures. Public key: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCPAiz+bEEAAAEEAMUbtdwYC1vY+s5559ERIvC1MT+Yaw3ozheaHcUciJe7cSAk k9TpAQd7iKukKnQe5kK1YtvYm0JP6fmNrcO8AmG5ukvcOlyuri618sjpXncpQ1cL 5xeV80f3JtmheGMnqAzTK8OyfJ7zRh1PhAZcT/vVzf+JGuCuVcJkEfxTVMrJABEB AAG0K0N1cnZlIFNvZnR3YXJlIDxraW5uZXlAYm9nYXJ0LmNvbG9yYWRvLmVkdT6J AJUCBRAuDZ3RwmQR/FNUyskBAd4wA/90tc6Fp0T3kSrmz0Vsbn+M7eND3fNp/XVy CW4xM6xzQK3ooRAjWBbnZbixTyhzlK33X2+EQGGYB5jWA5A+hgGOk3xYhApgBn+K rivF0xKJxNhR4CnsummIyXLn7UPXl0HrPvKszvSCVDhtky2Sy6jNKQcmN7vkFfY+ aAe8ox8944kAlQIFEC4CAaNLsloC2TxExQEBq2gD/2KeXbfrOC3i6FsTNNrODRI1 7i23XTMiquBWmRNheVIQV1dbNKB7DWawUNaykSZiGCEooW+HRKSv3iEGvQiBu1v1 1JB/7Id10a+bIpzCzzfGQ+RvbCCTt9+gACv3JpuXtBmcvIoHKAUpbuQhUd/vR17x 6U9tNhyEa4fdefHgmUsjiQCVAgUQLQSyUSA78To+806NAQECxQP/X5rfktz8h3Je DqX0c9IhobWL36vYGVvzqr8ViYkARMYI7Q4cKupHgDunO+Q+zKiSSsSFBlzlPe4f dg5hJ+eDOUircFRgz5Bu/CN1jAwPdElAHc4W12yiirTvq4HggR7j37aCPz1xsUmg zbKbiM6FI6SKTWK0faOoXoCCbGzA4v0= =IGUN - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- This key is also available from the key servers. Curve Software <kinney(a)bogart.colorado.edu> Cypherpunks write code! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLhsNVMJkEfxTVMrJAQEFfgP+K7NRta8HUqhlegb1d0r9K/DD2mHqy7tv vKF50VVZordlKxLDryv7O5kpXIQK9iGKSZIyu42WL/L25qNJw5DpmSruNPk80ChK n1vOwzJLSXg4qOmPcVU9ejbxzrUy+j7FUOWC3+mBeOBB/oHYBiAISx3o+UHlLDYC 52leB7ozW8U= =B0E/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re:
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Wed, 6 Jul 1994, Mike Markley wrote: >> can't be broken in a reasonable amount of time. I'm interested in what >> most of the people on this list would consider a reasonable amount of >> time though. > >NEVER is what I consider a reasonable amount of time. >I don't want my secure thoughts broken for public display >in my lifetime. Or any of my children's lifetime. Or there >children's lifetime. .......... You had better not have any "secure thoughts" then. "Forever" is enough time to break _any_ cipher. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

2 1

Re: Question: Key Distr. in realtimeo applications?
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: Ideally, you want to pick up your crypto-phone, initiate a call to : another crypto-phone which you've never called before, and which was : possibly manufactured yesterday, and be able to exchange keys with it : in a secure fashion. But I can't think of any way to do this, without : opening yourself up to a man in the middle attack. The physical key exchange can be done by Diffie-Helman, but as you note it can be man-in-the-middled. I think what the STU sets do is to print the other guy's keyprint that was actually used on an LCD on the phone, and you read it back out to each other in voice mode. Of course, that can be m-i-t-m'd too but it's a damn sight harder... G

1 0

Re: (fwd) Re: BSD random() - any good (source included)
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:05 PM 07/08/94 -0500, Jim choate wrote: >Yes, I could do that if I were so inclined. I am not. Seems to me that just >Bottem line is that at this point there is no clear cut 'standard' that I >biggest problems w/ the list at this point is the range of expertise that >piss somebody off. The real question is whether it is worth the time to >reply to them (in general I hold it isn't) rather than just hitting 'd' >The bottem line is it was crypto related, was in reference to source code, Seeing how he is so fit for the job, and knows not only what we all need to see, but also what the bottem line is, I hereby nominate Jim for CypherGod, and urge him to, as his first action in that role, to pipe all of usenet through cypherpunks, because you Just Never Know when you might miss something that is crypto related, and after all, if you want to be crypto-savvy, you have to pay a little. -j -- "Blah Blah Blah" ___________________________________________________________________ Jamie Lawrence <jamiel(a)sybase.com>

1 0

ITAR violation?
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Someone anonymously posted; >Reprinted with permission from the Chicago Sun-Tribune, 5 July >1994: >From Sun-Tribune Wires >Washington, D.C.- > In a Rose Garden press conference early this morning, >Justice Department spokesmen announced the indictment of a >Washington, DC. computer bulletin board system (BBS) operator, one >Mr. Gil Bates, for violation of ITAR munitions export laws in >connection with the operation of the infamous 'We got yer nudes >here' BBS. I would like to point out that the two major Chicago Papers are the Chicago Sun Times, and the Chicago Tribune. There is no Sun- Tribune. I liked the references to "A Georgetown Professor" and the obvious reference to Steganography, but otherwise this story reeks. Why the Hell post it anonymously? Larry are you out there? A lifelong Chicago resident Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced communication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you.... AT&T" --James Speth -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLh2UVtCcBnAsu2t1AQGI8QP/d60uwuAHiGxwPTImsTZDNlfJmemX53Nn mT3JQIiK6GsEpl/xKQsG2Y9sitcyRMbq0e++R9PGocp/muBCPqEKFPUqfroSesKU 1SmoEPboaV64soltmCAPykp8PNWAIHCJGbRjigmHJdDZsv2C1NH4vWUV0At9OAVQ e3LZVkwzxYQ= =REcP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Request: tamper-proofing executables
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:19 PM 07/08/94 -0400, Michael Handler wrote: > OTOH, if anyone else has come up with a scheme that is hard to >break / unbreakable, *please* come formward and correct me. I have a few >applications that I'd like to apply this to. :) The only method I have heard (and this is merely hard to break) is to put the hash value in a dongle. Then everyone will hate your program. Another method that could provide interesting results is to throw code in that will cause the program to function *differently* if hacked. I'm thinking of (I think- correcttions wecome) AutoCad, which was dongled and hacked, but the hack caused some math funciton or another to return erroneous results. This is just obfusification, but could give a hacker some major headaches. -j -- "Blah Blah Blah" ___________________________________________________________________ Jamie Lawrence <jamiel(a)sybase.com>

1 0

Re: Question: Key Distr. in realtimeo applications?
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

adam(a)bwh.harvard.edu writes: >Sending your otp by RSA reduces the security of your OTP to that of RSA Who said anything about sending a one time pad under RSA? I was talking about a session key. Sorry not to use the buzz word "session key", but neither did I use the buzz word "otp", I just said "random"... -kb -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 31:15 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

1 0