December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Problems with anonymous escrow 2--response
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by jamesd(a)netcom.com (James A. Donald) on Sun, 4 Sep 11:24 AM >I am complaining about dangerous carelessness in your >use and definition of words. Your use of the word >reputation is as fraught with frightful consequences >as Marx's use of the word "value". > >Reputation based systems work for freedom, and coercion > based systems work for centralized government, for >obvious reasons that all of us agree upon. > >*Define* reputations to be something other than >reputations, and you are kicking the crucial foundation >out from under freedom. >support a reputation, but by abandoning the correct >usage of the word "reputation" you have obscured that >fact from yourself. >Use the word *credentials*, not the word *reputations*. >If we were to start using the word *reputations* in the > way that you have been using it, we will make errors >with vastly more serious consequences that the errors >that you have made. James, Your answers to Hal and Tim have been enlightening. And your attempt to move away from nominalism to improve precision of language and to ward off inadverdent undermining of fundamentals, is admirable, that is, if I understand your objections to Hal's proposals correctly. Perhaps to avoid counter-objections that matters of definition all to often lead back into nominalistic debates, you will be able to suggest practical examples of what you mean by "dangerous", "frightful", "serious consequences", "kicking the crucial foundation out from under freedom", and the like. Sometimes these melodramatic terms obscure rather than point toward concrete situations that will convey your intentions more effectively. Your strong feelings on these matters are clear, but I for one do not know what you would do in place of what Hal, and others, are proposing, to build and sustain reputations in the electronic realm. Not, to be sure, to undermine what is valid in brickspace, but how such firm foundations might be extended, even emulated occasionally, in the cyber realm. I don't yet see these efforts as threatening as you claim. When you get a chance, your specific examples would help. Thanks. John

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Where to ftp ITAR docs
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matthew.Ghio(a)andrew.cmu.edu: > Is there anywhere I can ftp a copy of the ITAR law? ftp.eff.org /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/* (includes lots of other relevant stuff, cantwell bill etc.)

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DSS Diffie-Helman program
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jay Prime Positive <jpp(a)jpplap.markv.com>: > There exist signature standards other than RSA. Perhaps the USA's > DSS can be exported. If not, there may well be other systems out > there. Feel free to implement DSS, or others. Vouch 1.0 does DSS and encryption with Diffie-Helman key exchange. The DOS executables are at: garbo.uwasa.fi /pub/pc/crypt/vouch10.zip No ITAR problems, it's been developed by Awais Hussain in Pakistan. Freeware, no source code. Awais is not on the Net (Pakistan doesn't appear to have a gateway), and may not be aware of the need for GPL style stuff. I'm trying to get in touch with him, but the only contact info in the docs is a post box number in Islamabad, and snail mail takes time... The program itself seems ok, with decent key management etc, though we obviously don't want to rely on it without available source.

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Re: Unicorn case
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Call me a free speech absolutist, but I believe that. > > --Tim May It would be just perfect if everyone were a free speech absolutist; till then... -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA The National Fairness to Game Animals Association says: Support your right to arm bears! --------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: to The Atlantic
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>The NSA has not admitted that it can break DES, but there is plenty >of evidence that 0.01% of its budget would be enough to build a >machine to break it. That sounds to me like a big "Yes" for supposition, then. -- Lefty [gYon-Pa] (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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Partition Encrypters for OS/2
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've noticed a couple of TSRs and device drivers for DOS that will encrypt an entire partition. Does anyone know of one that will work for OS/2 2.1? Thanks.

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Mailer questions
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a few questions about the Cypherpunk remailers that hopefully someone can answer for me: What is the maximum length of a "Request-Remailing-To:" header? Can several of them be inserted for lengthy lists? Regarding the "mail-to-Usenet" posting gateways, where you typically replace the dots in newsgroup names with hyphens, what about groups that have hyphens in their names? Can the posting software tell the hyphens apart? I understand that several of the headers can be changed by using a "##" token instead of "::". Which ones can be changed and which ones can't? Has anyone had any experience chaining from a Cypherpunk-style remailer to anon.penet.fi? Can a "::" separator be used successfully, or which format will work? -----

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Re: Mailer questions
by ghio＠cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nobody(a)shell.portal.com wrote: > I have a few questions about the Cypherpunk remailers that > hopefully someone can answer for me: > > What is the maximum length of a "Request-Remailing-To:" header? Generally, as much as you can fit on the line. If you're running out of space in your particular mail editor, try using "Anon-To:" instead. > Can several of them be inserted for lengthy lists? If you mean chaining remailers, then yes. If you mean the ability to send to multiple recipients, then no. Most remailers don't allow multiple recipients. This is due to our friend Detweiler who likes to experiment with exponential growth phenomena. > Regarding the "mail-to-Usenet" posting gateways, where you > typically replace the dots in newsgroup names with hyphens, > what about groups that have hyphens in their names? Can the > posting software tell the hyphens apart? Obviously you have not read my info file on the remailers. Finger remailer-list(a)chaos.bsu.edu or send mail to mg5n+remailers(a)andrew.cmu.edu It lists many mail-to-usenet gateways which will accept dots. > I understand that several of the headers can be changed by using > a "##" token instead of "::". Which ones can be changed and > which ones can't? When headers follow a ## token, they are simply added into the output file without any processing. Headers following the :: token are processed as commands in normal headers. This seems to have caused some confusion with respect to the Subject: header. Most remailers pass the subject header unaltered. If there is a subject header following the :: token, it will be treated as if it were a normal header, and passed thru to the outgoing message. A subject can also be added (like any other header) following the ## token. However, if you have a subject line in the headers, and another following the ## token, the original subject gets passed thru, and the second one then gets appended, resulting in both Subject lines being present in the output file. My remailer (ghio(a)kaiwan.com) will strip out a blank subject line, so that you can insert one with the ## if you wish. I think Hal Finney's remailer is set up the same way. Chael Hall's remailers (bsu.edu) always remove the subject line, so you must insert it with the ## header if you want one. > Has anyone had any experience chaining from a Cypherpunk-style > remailer to anon.penet.fi? Can a "::" separator be used > successfully, or which format will work? I think it can be done...

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Re: Mailer questions
by usura＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ghio(a)cmu.edu (Matthew Ghio) writes: >> What is the maximum length of a "Request-Remailing-To:" header? > >Generally, as much as you can fit on the line. If you're running out >of space in your particular mail editor, try using "Anon-To:" instead. The remailers at VoX are running under dos so the maximum length is 128 symbols. VoX accepts X-Anon-To: and the lenghty Request-Remailing-To: it does _not_ support Anon-To: [note to some hip edu site !!] >> I understand that several of the headers can be changed by using >> a "##" token instead of "::". Which ones can be changed and >> which ones can't? VoX doesn't support ##. >> Has anyone had any experience chaining from a Cypherpunk-style >> remailer to anon.penet.fi? Can a "::" separator be used >> successfully, or which format will work? > >I think it can be done... I know it can be done... -- Exit! Stage Left. Alex de Joode <usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl>

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CLIP: flaw found?
by ddt＠lsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Nothing can be made to be foolproof: fools are far too ingenious." -dave >Newsgroups: xpress.news.usa >From: xpress (Associated Press) >Date: 2 Jun 94 03:57:00 GMT >X-Category: NA*N**** >Subject: Times: Flaw Found In Wiretap > >NEW YORK (AP) > >A computer scientist has discovered a basic flaw in coding technology that the >Clinton administration has been promoting as a standard for electronic >communications, The New York Times reported Thursday. > >Matthew Blaze, a researcher at AT&T Bell Laboratories, told the Times his >research had shown that someone with sufficient computer skills can beat the >government's technology by encoding messages so that no one, not even the >government, can crack them. > >The administration has been urging private industry to adopt the so-called >"Clipper chip" as a standard encoding system. The government says telephone and >computer messages sent with the chip cannot be read by an outsider but can be >decoded by government law-enforcement agencies. > >Officials fear that without such a system, wiretaps would be useless against >criminals and terrorists because their communications could be hidden in >unbreakable codes. But communications executives and privacy-rights experts >fear the potential for snooping and worry that foreign customers wouldn't buy >the equipment if Washington could snoop on it. > >Blaze said the flaw he discovered in the Clipper design would not permit a >third party to break a coded computer conversation. But it would enable two >people to have a secret conversation that law enforcement officials could not >unscramble. > >Blaze said a draft report of his findings has been circulating among computer >experts and federal agencies. > >The National Security Agency, which played a leading role in developing the >technology, does not dispute the flaw's existence, but believes the Clipper >remains useful anyway, the Times said. > >Michael A. Smith, the agency's director of planning, told the Times in a >written response to questions that the flaw found by Blaze was difficult enough >to exploit that most people wishing to circumvent the system would find other >ways to do it. > >Martin Hellman, a Stanford University expert on data encryption who has read >Blaze's paper, said: "The government is fighting an uphill battle. ... People >who want to work around Clipper will be able to do it."

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