December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Automatic Magic Money Client
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- We now have three operating Magic Money servers. Several people are attempting to give value to the digicash. Many applications of digicash will be entirely net-based and automated. We need an automatic Magic Money client. The existing client is designed to interact with a user. The automatic client will be designed to interact with a program. It will be controlled entirely by command-line arguments, and should be easy to control from a PERL script or C program. I should have some time for coding soon. Here's a rough functional spec for the automatic client. Don't write any code based on this, becuase it isn't written yet. But please tell me what you think of it and what should be changed or improved. ac -[options] [inputfile] [outputfile] - -b : display bank's keyid : prints 64-bit keyid of the bank in bank.asc - -d (with no inputfile) : list the available coin denominations by reading the elist.dat file - -i (with outputfile) : initializes client, accepting key length and key name from stdin. Generates initialization message. - -l (with no inputfile) : lists all coins in the client's coin file (allcoins.dat) output will be one coin per line - -l (with inputfile) : print the total value of a coins.dat type file if it is readable and signed correctly output is one line (number) - -p (with input/output files) : process a coins.dat type file, preparing it for exchange with a server. Reads from stdin a list of coin denominations to create. Writes to stdout a 128-bit unique identifier generated by xoring the coin id's of all the new coins created - -r (with outputfile) : reinitialize. Generate a new initialization packet. Does not regenerate key or prompt for anything. - -s (with input file) : process a response from the server and store the coins in allcoins.dat. Outputs to stdout the same 128-bit unique identifier as the -p generated, followed on the next line by the total value of the received coins, followed by any message from the server. - -w (with outputfile) : withdraws coins for payment. Accepts a list of coin values to withdraw from stdin, and saves the coins.dat file to outputfile. - -x (with no output file) : if old coins exist, returns the total value - -x (with output file) : accepts a list of new coin denominations to create. Exchanges old coins for those values. Generates value and identifier just like -p To use the client, the payer would run -l to get a list of coins. Then run - -w to withdraw the coins to a file, and mail them to the shop. The shop runs -l to determine the value. Then the shop decides what coins to generate, runs -p to process the coins, and records the unique identifier. The shop mails the output message off to the server. When the server's response comes back, the shop runs -s and receives the 128-bit value again. - From the identifier, the shop determines which transaction was just completed by the server, and delivers the goods to that customer. Any ideas for changes/improvements? The biggest mistake I made in designing Magic Money was to leave out a field for the keyid of the bank which generated the coins. The only way to process coins from multiple banks is to try each bank's key in turn, keeping the files for each bank in a different directory, or to have the user specify which bank the coins came from. I should write a Magic Money 2.0 which handles multiple currencies automatically. I'll do that if Magic Money coins take on enough value to make it worthwhile. Pr0duct Cypher -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdWtgMGoFIWXVYodAQHmOgP5AVyfF37rpUa0v+YheW5Mrp9SVVP+dxdl HRArT3tumzPXGm7aZSXswmVppHV+/ed/TeY+3Bc0+8AY1OAyuch5a8rBfUfAfG5O A5HRXaa23nTsSFsi+dPawKY+w0d5pyEYinXIiU4cYrsGqzUvIjTn2sUzHPyR+XYa sKpS3NxrN8s= =ktLe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

[ANON]: "Why We Fight!"
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[[Reply-To: john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org]] -=> Quoting Hes(a)unity.ncsu.edu to John Nieder <=- He> John, He> I agree with much of what you say - but I wasn't aware that rec.guns He> was a political discussion group. I think that makes a difference. Well, no on at least a couple of counts: First, my original anger was piqued by the practice of killing _all_ traffic coming from remailers, even when the posts were NOT anonymous. I (and several other users who have written to me about this issue) would frequently send perfectly legitimate technical posts through remailers, with Reply-To: fields and sigs attached, because the remailers afforded more header flexibility or posting reliability. These messages were all snuffed, simply because they came through a remailer. That's pure BS. Secondly, a lot of folks do not feel easy about posting to ANY gun-related list or group because of employer, social or other prejudice to which they may be subjected. If a joe.victim(a)anti-gun.widget.com wants to use a simple remailer for putting a little shade on his participation, I don't feel it's anyone else's business; "caution is not cowardice and carelessness is not courage." More importantly, it's nobody else's _problem_ as long as the content of the post is not objectionable. Write this down: ====================================================================== _You have no more right to pass judgment on another's "need" for anonymity than Sarah Brady has a right to pass judgment on your "need" for a handgun. Both are private matters of individual self-defense._ ====================================================================== That's the important "value" issue here, irrespective of the technical ones. I am ashamed to see how many anti-anon RTKBA advocates can't see the obvious parallels. He> (By your statements you seem to feel that makes me, as well as our He> Moderator, to be anti-gun.) No, but maybe a bit parochial and in need of rethinking your definitions of self-defense and personal freedom. |%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%| | <john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org> * CP2A * PGP Key # E27937 on all servers | |-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=| |"If you love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude | | better than the animating contest of freedom, go home from us in | | peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the | | hands which feed you. May your chains set lightly upon you, and may | |posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams, 1776| |=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-| |BOYCOTT: Pepsico <KFC - Taco Bell - Frito-Lay - Pepsi-Cola> & Gillette| |%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%| ---

1 0

No Subject
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

alk.politics.guns.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com Subject: [ANON] War: How Secure? Reply-To: john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org Bcc: v043948(a)stortek.stortek.com Bcc: mike(a)hopper.itc.virginia.edu Bcc: ricky_g_williamson(a)aud.alcatel.com Bcc: donb(a)netcom.com Bcc: johng(a)rosevax.rosemount.com Bcc: magnum(a)cs.umd.edu Bcc: sybok(a)athena.mit.edu Bcc: brunner%lakota(a)icarus.ssd.loral.com Bcc: kolju(a)cc.lut.fi Bcc: dan(a)hopi.dtcc.edu Bcc: justice(a)mcs.com Bcc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Bcc: alt.privacy.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com Bcc: charles.martin(a)f217.n125.z1.fidonet.org Bcc: walter(a)netcom.com Bcc: martin.greifer(a)f216.n914.z8.rbbs-net.org [[Reply-To: john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org]] [Please note that I wrote a 70+ line response to your message last night, but was hit by an hour long power outage which destroyed the post before completion. Perhaps this is Pacific Gas & Electric's divine method of remonstrating such excessive casting of pearls before swine, but this is probably a question for theologists. It also prevented me seeing or taping _Kids in the Hall_, which was the greater tragedy. What follows is an abbreviated recreation from memory:] -=> Quoting Syoung(a)pecanpi.atl.ga.us to John Nieder <=- Sy> Imposing? Hardly. The Moderator gets to do that, based on the input Sy> of everyone who cares to write - you, me, and even Sarah Brady, should Sy> she care to participate. Note that the moderator censored my posts and that pro-anon netmail I received that was posted to the group did not appear. Sy> Well, considering that I make a very nice living in the field of data Sy> communications and security, I think I'll stand by my statements. :-) Sy> The folks interested in getting information about this don't even have Sy> to break Sy> the coding; in many cases, just being able to do traffic analysis may Sy> be enough. Keeping an eye on a handful of key systems could do it. I'm amazed that you are being paid good money for supposedly knowing about these things and do not know that the current generation remailers incorporate several different schemes for making traffic analysis virtually impossible at the remailer. The only thing that can be determined with any certainty is that an account sends or receives encrypted messages from a remailer. This isn't much to go on, especially considering that the messages are frequently dummies, may abort or split, do not correspond in size before and after entering the remailer and are remailed in random order at random times. Additional precautions against traffic analysis may be implemented at the originating and receiving accounts, by generation of artificial volume or by chaining. Sy> I don't contend that it would necessarily be easy, but it can be done. It's my opinion that no one short of the NSA can do it, but they are estopped by charter from most of such activities (not that this matters), could not do it economically or routinely and presumably have more important fish to fry in any case. It has been established by barium tests that the top level encryption and remailer tech is immune from law enforcement from the FBI down, barring physical security breach, tempest attack or user error. All of which is beside the point, namely that most users need only trivial anonymity adequate to protect their participation from being known to nosey employers, administrators and soforth. As I pointed out, remailers in a non-anonymous mode are useful for many people. Sy> I agree. In spite of your email address, it is obvious that you have Sy> no real experience or understanding of this arena. You'd be surprised. Really. In any case I would personally use other methods than remailers, particularly advanced steganography techniques, for the transmission of truly serious communications, if I had any. Sy> Concentrating on Sy> the supposed invulnerability of the encryption scheme, and ignoring Sy> the other methods of attack, like traffic analysis, is the mark of a Sy> rank amateur. Indeed! Note that no one I know does, certainly not the Cypherpunk principals, and I never said they did. |%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%| | <john.nieder(a)tigerteam.org> * CP2A * PGP Key # E27937 on all servers | |-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=| |"If you love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude | | better than the animating contest of freedom, go home from us in | | peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the | | hands which feed you. May your chains set lightly upon you, and may | |posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams, 1776| |=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-| |BOYCOTT: Pepsico <KFC - Taco Bell - Frito-Lay - Pepsi-Cola> & Gillette| |%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%| ---

1 0

Disguise_PGP_Ascii
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- It occurred to me that if we are going to be posting pgp'ed files to a newsgroups it might be best to remove the PGP headers and make the ciphertext look more text-like. So here is some code to do that, sort of. Basically I kept it simple so it's easy to read. To make this: - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.3a pgAAANL6C1+DERhOIhjtLQnEA0GZOnXmXa7xSqPTdX1Retrkn+CnnqkBrdGXQ/sO 9Gl+k4MjG/8991Erhl+cay+SBSKS+YoGNp79mwEnvwHICq/WsMs6lTo6GudHku/e 9gnXVHkYg5/lYbAWFLRnIMDhGpeeUqCEoG5vlhl++JMwzgc/lqGCwZAeUd+q5UXG bqm/sGAo80xtG2hs1LqLPP0lCoqSZ5cJkuNRJBgpm+r8P4PHijCLr9iAE4InFy+F otm+Ut8SDYbt8OjR9WPig8V7aYdp8x0= =i8Hu - -----END PGP MESSAGE----- turn into this: - --- --BEG IN PGP M ESSAG E ---- -.. Ver s ion : 2.3a .. .. pgAAA N L 6C1+ DER hO IhjtL Qn E A0G ZO n X mXa7 x SqP TdX1 Retrk n+Cnn qk Br dG XQ/sO ..9Gl +k4 MjG/8 9 91Er hl+ca y+SB SKS+ Yo GNp 79 m wEnv w HICq /W sMs 6lT o 6GudH ku /e..9 gn XVHk Yg 5/lY bAW FLRn IMDh Gp e eUq CEo G5 v lhl++ J M w zgc / lqGCw ZAe Ud+q5 UXG ..bq m/s GAo 80xt G2 hs1Lq L PP0lC oqS Z5c JkuN RJBg pm+r8 P4P H ijC Lr9iA E4 InFy + F..ot m+U t8 SD Ybt8O jR 9WPig 8V 7 aYd p8x 0=..= i8 H u..--- --E ND P GP ME S SAG E---- -.. type "st e < infile > outfile" And to convert it back type "st d < infile > outfile" ST.C: #include <stdio.h> #include <time.h> #ifdef MSDOS || __OS2__ #include <stdlib.h> // for exit() #endif void main(int argc, char **argv) { int i = 0, j = 0, k; char c; if (argc > 2) fprintf(stderr, "\nUsage: %s [e|d] < infile > outfile\n", argv[0]), exit(1); srand(time(0)); while (!feof(stdin)) { if (toupper(*argv[1]) == 'E') { k = rand() % 5; for (i = 0; i < k + 1; i++, j++) { if (!(j % 50)) putchar('\n'); c = getchar(); if (c == '\n') printf(".."); else putchar(c); } putchar(' '); } else if (toupper(*argv[1]) == 'D') { switch (c = getchar()) { case ' ': case '\n': break; case '.': if (i == 1) putchar('\n'); i = !i; break; default: putchar(c); break; } } else fprintf(stderr, "\nUsage: %s [e|d] < infile > outfile\n", \ argv[0]), exit(1); } } -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCcAgUBLdh1frhnz857T+PFAQH9RQQ2KC5uYfO8tLlq1X8PcmuJy0Akog84lyfK sYEiiwMHJsNm6/isVWvihZHBct/DuBkqtNsWXzwxl1rxlVvjTjOMyyDioidbfqnb IOWLXkY+/vzdvgxr/Z0tV31mwCVoCcHIMUeBZ9+PBCHt16YCEb7emPE0/QzLFWnB VNUSkSW+hYtP8Ezg1UoS =TESU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

(none)
by cdodhner＠indirect.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <2r9h97$oro(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu>, Alex Strasheim wrote: > > I have been reading nothing but complaints ever since the planned release > of 2.6 was announced. With good reason. It's a bullshit product. > It is true that messages generated with 2.6 won't be decodable with some > earlier versions, including 2.3a. And most likely 2.4 as well, although that's a horse of a different color. > It is also true that 2.6 can't be exported with RSAREF code. Not quite. It's not *legal* to export it. But to say that it "can't be exported" is simply untrue. It "can" be exported, and easily at that. However, I doubt there will be much demand for it, in or out of the us. It is slower than 2.3a, has unreasonable limits on keysize, and is not backwards compatable with the versions much of the world uses. > This means that it will not be possible, at > first, to use 2.6 to correspond with users who are not in the US or > Canada. Or with users in the usa or canada who choose to use 2.3a. (and possibly 2.4 as well? Any confirm or deny on this one?) > But this will be a temporary condition. There are precedents for > exporting code into which foreign users can plug their own crypto > engines. This is probably what will happen with PGP: programmers > outside of the US will develop code which duplicates the functionality of > the RSAREF engine, and a non-US version of PGP, functionally equivilant > to the American version, will be made available to users who don't have > access to the US version. A total waste of time. Any 'foreign users' who wish it will be able to get a copy of 2.6 in short order. But that's still not going to change the fact that it's not a worthwhile program. > The word to describe what has happened is "compromise". The PGP > developers, along with MIT, were able to reach a compromise with RSADSI > and PKP. Yes, they had to give some things up. But in exchange, they > were able to secure the right to legally distribute, for free, an open > source version of PGP in the USA. The word to describe what has happened is "disaster". It is a deliberate attempt to fragment the international crypto community. > This is an enormous victory. It is the end, in practical terms, of the > struggle to put strong, verifiable, and affordable crypto software into > the hands of the general public. It's over, and we have won. It will be "over" when I can use whatever encryption I choose to protect my communication, without the requirement of government of corperate 'approval' to avoid "legal trouble" > The thing that bothers me the most about the complaints which have been > posted is that they are implicity, if not explicity, condemnations of the > compromise which PRZ and MIT negotiated. I _explicitly_ condemn the _decisions_ of whoever wrote the damn program to: 1)disallow keys bigger than 1024bits 2)remove backwards-compatable operation > I think that PRZ deserves the > benefit of the doubt. He's the one who has put himself on the line for > the rest of us, and he's the one who is most responsible for raising > public awareness of crypto issues. I'm not suggesting that we follow him > blindly; but at the same time, if he thinks this is a good deal, that > ought to carry a lot of weight. I have not yet heard prz's position regarding the limitations on pgp version 2.6, however if he supports it I simply disagree with him. Happy Hunting, -Chris ______________________________________________________________________________ Christian Douglas Odhner | "The NSA can have my secret key when they pry cdodhner @ indirect.com | it from my cold, dead, hands... But they shall pgp 2.3 public key by finger | NEVER have the password it's encrypted with!" cypherpunks WOw dCD Traskcom Team Stupid Key fingerprint = 58 62 A2 84 FD 4F 56 38 82 69 6F 08 E4 F1 79 11 - - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ A government mandante for key-escrow encryption in all communication devices would be the information-age equivalent of the government requiring private citizens to quarter troups in their home. --David Murray PGP NSA ViaCrypt Phrack EFF #hack LOD/H 950 FBI MindVox ESN KC NUA murder QSD Hacker DEFCON SprintNet MCI AT&T HoHoCon DNIC TRW CBI 5ESS KGB CIA RSA Communist terrorist assassin encrypt 2600 NORAD missile explosive hack phreak pirate drug bomb cocain payment smuggle A.P. bullets semi-auto stinger revolution H.E.A.T. warheads porno kiddiesex export import customs deviant bribe corrupt White House senator congressman president Clinton Gore bootleg assasinate target ransom secret bluprints prototype microfilm agents mole mafia hashish everclear vodka TnaOtmSc Sony marijuana pot acid DMT Nixon yeltsin bosnia zimmerman crack knight-lightning craig neidorf lex luthor kennedy pentagon C2 cheyenne cbx telnet tymenet marcus hess benson & hedges kuwait saddam leader death-threat overlords police hitler furer karl marx mark tabas agrajag king blotto blue archer eba the dragyn unknown soldier catch-22 phoenix project biotech genetic virus clone ELINT intercept diplomat explosives el salvador m-16 columbia cartel -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLdiuIuKc9MdneB1xAQFwfQP/THNlr7lcPK1ZtF1dFqdM8yw+RJE2q+C6 tScuiBduZAGBhKlOpx8yUnFr76FV8v76bhCzR4NJNMY4ybm/xpU+UBVg/gp5CB/S 8WAGE3w6FIHYBxHxxHDNtyvwzC8ySCBU47CWDhGXgXbx4kBnr7EBKv6s+x3d9GtX 0hu4XzlNqR4= =yZ4m -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

2 1

Who did win???
by ER CRAMER 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I read a message that the 'american' had won the 'RSA war'. I think the loose. Because we can still send private messages to the states with PGP 2.3a but they can't sent private messages out of the states... So, really? Who did win??? ... If you outlaw Privacy, only the Outlaws will have Privacy! Eelco Cramer <crame001(a)hio.tem.nhl.nl> ------ --------------------------------------------------

1 0

PGP 2.6
by dave.hodgins＠canrem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

********** Original From: DAVE HODGINS * CARBON * To: ALL * COPY * Date/Number: 05/17/94 - Not Yet Posted ********** On: CRS - 5207 - U-AltSecurPGP ----------------------------------------------------------------------- In response to a request, to have canrem.com added to MIT's list of Canadian sites, I've just received a response indicating that pgp 2.5 has been removed from the MIT servers. The message states that PGP 2.6 will be released, probably next week, after a new release of rsaref is out. The new version will be "upgraded", to be incompatible with earlier versions, in order to protect the patent rights of rsadsi. Regards, Dave Hodgins. cc: ALL in 6525 on CRS ALL in 1139 on CRS --- * RM 1.3 00820 * Internet:Dave.Hodgins@Canrem.com Rime->118 Fido(1:229/15)

1 0

Sun to leave US over Clipper?
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In "Superchip bugs US companies," an article on Clipper by Adrian Berry reproduced from The Daily Telegraph, the author says that big companies are threatening to move their headquarters overseas at a cost to the government of billions of dollars in lost tax. "Without this initiative, the government will eventually become helpless to defend the nation" says Louis Freeh, director of the FBI. ... Foreign buyers want nothing to do with any hardware that might contain Clipper. ... Many computer companies are talking of leaving America. Trusted Information Systems, a Maryland-based encryption firm, has started a subsidiary in Britain [to avoid US ITAR restrictions] ... "I can't estimate the sales we're losing through Clipper, but they could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars," said [Scott] McNealy, [CEO Sun Microsystems]. McNealy added "The new rules may force us to leave. If we don't leave, we just don't grow." Not clear what "new rules" McNealy's talking about. ITAR's been around a long time, maybe it's just beginning to affect them? DT II? Clipper's not yet a "rule"... ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA The National Short-Sleeved Shirt Association says: Support your right to bare arms! -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

visual cryptography (talk by Shamir yesterday at MIT).
by sommerfeld＠orchard.medford.ma.us 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a brief summary of Shamir's talk at MIT yesterday, which was well attended. The problem he solved was to create a cryptosystem which is as secure as possible, but can be decoded (with some care) using only the human visual system. Shamir described two applications of this system: - sending encrypted faxes where you don't have control over the receiving fax machine. - demostrating cryptography to a lay audience.. The cryptosystem in its simplest form encrypts a (bitmap) image as a similar image but with half the resolution. for each pixel in the plaintext, you expand it to four pixels in the cyphertext and key. The key (a "one time pad") is printed on a transparent material (overhead projector transparancies). each 2x2 grid in the key has a random selection of two pixels darkened: There are six different ways to do this: | | |##| |# | | #| | #| |# | |##| | | | #| |# | | #| |# | You then produce the plaintext as follows: - for each "black" spot on the plaintext image, color in the two pixels not colored in on the ciphertext. - for each "white" spot on the plaintext image, color in the same two pixels as the key. Line the key up with the cyphertext (registration is somewhat tricky particularly as the pixel size gets really small), and you get an image which ranges in density from 50% gray to 100% gray. as a practical matter, it works better if you use alternating vertical and horizontal bars in a chessboard pattern because the image starts to appear when you get the registration within just under 2 pixels. Shamir also described extensions of this system to: - k of k secret sharing schemes - k of n secret sharing schemes these work best when `k' is small, though `n' can get large without messing up the scheme (he claimed that 3 of 1000 was practical). - grey scale images - steganography Both key and ciphertext contain an image of your choice; when overlaid, their images disappear and the plaintext appears. This is done by encoding both cipher and key images using a "white=50%, black=75%" method; the resulting plaintext is encoded using a "white=75%, black=100%" method. - Bill

1 0

Patent expiration date?
by Ezekial Palmer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1 0