December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

VMS remailer?
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- For people wanting to get more remailers going there seems to be a serious apathy for helping people get them going. After posting that I had come into possesion of a VAX account from which I might run a remailer and then asking for some help, I got all of ZERO responses (except from people asking me to help them if I did manage to get any information). Since I had already checked out the available code which only seems to work on UNIX accounts, perhaps someone might inform me that one cannot run a remailer from a VMS account. I assume this is the case since no one deigned to answer. Pretty bogus. Scott G. Morham !The First, Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu ! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbyNrD2paOMjHHAhAQGy5gP/X0OgIotYPnF9+MneK9g+JGqVlhwQCZel B/Dy7Unb+c25TIjo7C3IwLzGZkst+3Lnt3SlPKUoqmpYRESiPeONZs+G1Ra6gXeD Hl/7eQFAQp+4T5medwDmp69m7gn3dMKQcVmBmSN8uZ5MN4KiaKuzExWPHNTAxWDD KpZQr2Pfcx4= =sG2o -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: VMS remailer?
by cfrye＠mason1.gmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not a programmer, but you might write to a LISTSERV site and ask for the source code for the LISTSERV managing software. I would assume that you would need to make the following modifications: o Read the intended user's address from the first line of the message o Run the VMS version of a shell script to delete all header information above the intended address (like X-Anon-To:cfrye@mason1.gmu.edu) o Make the LISTSERV software use that X-Anon-To address as the desination, as opposed to a distribution list o Destroy all records of the incoming message, which is interesting on a VMS account as they are usually kept around for a day (I think?) OK folks, what am I missing? Curt

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prime numbers
by johnsonc＠chem.udallas.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm just wondering if anyone knows whether or not (1+4k) can be written as the sum of squares or not, and if so, what the proof of that is? Anyone care to share?? Thank you, Carrie Anne Johnson -- What? Because I kill indiscriminately? -Tom Servo

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help
by Roger Bryner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

info, please

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Internet Relay Chat
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've noticed some discussions of IRC (Internet Relay Chat), both as a possible model for CP interactions, as well as a location for implementations of BlackNet (in #wares, etc.) Note that IRC, unlike MUDS, has been designed to ensure 'true-names'. While you do use nicknames, anyone can find out the machine name and user ID you are logged in from, with a /whois. Anytime you join or leave a channel, your full machine name and user ID is displayed to everyone, along with your nick. This is different from any (possibly pseudonymous) e-mail address you register for incoming mail. In #wares, people typically trade names of unauthorised FSP sites (such as the one in the LaMacchia case), which normally remain active for less than a few weeks. Though entry to IRC channels can be by invitation only, everyone knows everyone else's real (in the sense of machine and ID) identity. Not CP-friendly at all. It would be nice to have a #Cypherpunks channel, though... many of us don't mind revealing our identities to each other, and it could increase the frequency of interactive sessions greatly. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?" H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Internet Relay Chat
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you did hack your own IRC server, would it be possible to eavesdrop on channels like #warez, without anyone knowing, and without fear of being kicked off? It seems to me that this would be the true hacker's approach if it were possible. Hal

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Re: DId you ever think...
by jpp＠markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: uri(a)watson.ibm.com > Date: Tue, 26 Apr 1994 20:00:44 -0500 (EDT) > > jpp(a)markv.com says: > > Also, after reading Crypto '92 and '93 for a while, I am more and > > more impresed and suprised with the work that NSA put into creating > ^^^ > > DES from Lucifer. > > Surely you mean IBM? [Also a similar message which I unfortuenatly deleted so I can't credit the author :(] No, my writing ability is not in error here -- my mental model of the history of DES is what is in error. I will now update my personal model of DES development to include two steps at IBM. Lucifer -> proto-DES at IBM, and proto-DES -> DES at NSA. Learn something new every day... Since about 1977 I wondered what the 'rediscovered crypto techniques' were. Thanks! j'

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the soda cypherpunks ftp site
by Erich von Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

the soda cypherpunks site, with source for pgp, the remailers, and much other useful information, is moving. the new name for the site is ftp.csua.berkeley.edu. this will actually poing to soda until the summer, at which point it will move to its own machine. please start refering to the site as ftp.csua.berkeley.edu to make the transition as smooth as possible. e

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Crypto scripting language
by peace＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> > I was most >> > taken by the idea of a "Crypto Toolkit". I think it would be understand- >> > able to write the code in plain, vanilla C (as opposed to C++). One >> > good reason is the widespread availability of C compilers, especially >> > with UNIX. Additionally, C++ compilers do take up more space (although >> > this would be more of an issue with PCs. >> >> I think Tim had in mind something that was accessible more from a higher- >> level language than C or C++; ideally, something interpreted so you could >> sit down and type in a few commands to get something useful. Perl and >> TCL are two languages which Tim mentioned and which have been discussed >> here in the past. Smalltalk might do, although it is not as "freely" avail- >> able. >Yes, this is mostly what I meant. Lots of stuff here, and I really >should use my outline processor to do a better job of outlining >options, routes, and miscellaneous points. But I'll just make a few >notes here. (The theme of the next Cypherpunks meeting, date not yet >finalized, is "Protocols," so issues like this are presumably >relevant. Depending on the date, I may be in LEA., and would welcome >meeting with other Southland Cpunks to discuss ideas.) I wrote a cryptographic scripting language that has been implemented in a commercial product. I hesitate to post it here due to its length. If there is a place to send it where it can be archived for public down-load, I could do that. I am in the process of writing it up for a symposium, but have other things that I would rather do. If I could modify it to improve it's integration w/ telescript, I would like to do it, but I don't have telescript, does anyone here have it? Peace

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Re: Clipper Key Exchange
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

matsb(a)sos.sll.se (Mats Bergstrom) writes: Subj: Clipper Session Key >How do two Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack/Tessera units agree on a session key >without compromising it to the bad guys tapping the line? If not known >outside of the NSA, what possible solutions are there? In the case of the MYK-78, the simple Clipper chip to be used in phones and similar devices, that's your problem. You have to do a Diffie-Hellman exchange or RSA or something externally. Or hire a courier. This will cause compatibility problems between different manufacturers' Clipper devices, unless they agree on a standard up front. Probably everyone will clone AT&T Clipper devices, since they are going to be the first to market. If the government buys a large batch, that will set the standard. Without at least a de-facto protocol standard, the system would be almost useless. There is also the problem of adding encryption to the V.x standards for fax, LAPM for modems, etc. Each of these devices will need some kind of key exchange. The Capstone and Tessera (same thing, different package) have the ability to do a modexp operation. From this you can internally do DH exchange or RSA. As I remember, the Capstone does up to 1024 bit modexp, comparable to PGP in security. Skipjack is just a symmetric cipher like DES, except it has an 80-bit key and has (according to the review team) all of DES's problems fixed. --- Mike

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