December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Directory of 'punks
by Jim Sewell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As another thought, would there be interest in compiling a list of cypherpunks who agreed to be included, their occupations, and any notable experiences such as "Served for 3 years on the Foreign Affairs Committee" or whatever. With tools like a "press kit" and a directory of members we will become viewed as a cross-section of America, citizens with a point of view shared by many, contributors to the general welfare of society rather than a bunch of fanatical computer geeks that haven't given anything to society. (well, maybe...it's a tough battle.) Jim -- Tantalus Inc. Jim Sewell Amateur Radio: KD4CKQ P.O. Box 2310 Programmer Internet: jims(a)mpgn.com Key West, FL 33045 C-Unix-PC Compu$erve: 71061,1027 (305)293-8100 PGP via email on request. 1K-bit Fingerprint: 8E 14 68 90 37 87 EF B3 C4 CF CD 9A 3E F9 4A 73

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AT&T, Clipper, & Saudi Arabia
by paul＠poboy.b17c.ingr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dear AT&T: If you'll roll over for us on Clipper, we will suitably incentivize you. /s/ The Clinton Administration I suppose most of us would consider a $4B contract a "suitable incentive." While there's probably no direct evidence of a quid pro quo, it strikes me as a bit odd that the President is personally intervening in a purely commercial deal. OTOH this is the second time Clinton has intervened in a deal with the Saudis. On the gripping hand, I don't recall anyone intervening to get business for Boeing (Peace Shield, the Saudi C3I network), McDonnell (F-15s), and so on. Thanks a lot, AT&T. - -Paul - -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | Out the 10Base-T port, through the router, perobich(a)ingr.com | over the leased line, off the bridge, past Intergraph Federal Systems | the firewall... nothing but net. Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLb/JLCA78To+806NAQGPrwP+Jf+B7B/AXogJi/APH71KpgT1wGi8QahK Qn3rSx5baRxfpwlHafecV+3TV6OJt8L7je1VlSm3dIJp7vVDPmsKDvV8QD1/Skd9 u3eMIzpKsspje2hG9olS/6Dm6huPAPUHb+Lpx/jD5P2VuYcsiMhyO4shCZw9hMUU ZiiClgJuBf8= =XuPw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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e-mail for WSJ
by habs＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is the e-mail address that can be used to contact the author of the WSJ article on Philip Z. The author's name is William Bulkeley The e-mail address is 6095475(a)mcimail.com Let's not overload him... /hawk

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Re: AT&T, Clipper, & Saudi Arabia
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dear AT&T: If you'll roll over for us on Clipper, we will suitably incentivize yo u. /s/ The Clinton Administration I suppose most of us would consider a $4B contract a "suitable incentive." While there's probably no direct evidence of a quid pro quo, it strikes me as a bit odd that the President is personally intervening in a purely commercial deal. OTOH this is the second time Clinton has intervened in a deal with the Saudis. On the gripping hand, I don't recall anyone intervening to get business for Boeing (Peace Shield, the Saudi C3I network), McDonnell (F-15s), and so on. Can we please confine paranoia to reasonable areas -- like AT&T's sales of secure phones to the government? The U.S. government has a very long record of pushing American products against foreign competitors, such as Boeing versus Airbus. Of course, there is a quid pro quo here -- but it's Clinton reminding the Saudis about Desert Storm. --Steve Bellovin P.S. It goes without saying that I'm speaking for myself, not AT&T.

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Re: DId you ever think...
by jpp＠markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: uri(a)watson.ibm.com > Date: Thu, 28 Apr 1994 15:10:39 -0500 (EDT) > > jpp(a)markv.com says: > > Wasn't there some concern on IBM's part about liability -- > > Thus the US Governments participation, including the 'secret' changes > > to DES? > > Liabilities? To who and about what? Since it became a standard, the > US Gov't assumed the responsibility... Oh, for instance, say liability to the banks who's electronic fund transfers were stolen or forged. But yeah, my understanding was that IBM wouldn't release the cipher for general consumption unless some Gov't would 'standardize' it and take the liability heat. Even the smaller 56 bit key was IBM's idea? Why!??!? Weren't they in the business of making a _strong_ cipher? j'

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Re: AT&T, Clipper, & Saudi Arabia
by paul＠poboy.b17c.ingr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Can we please confine paranoia to reasonable areas -- like AT&T's sales > of secure phones to the government? The U.S. government has a very long > record of pushing American products against foreign competitors, such as > Boeing versus Airbus. I have great respect for you, Steve, but in this case I must humbly disagree with you. The US government does have a very long record of promoting US products for foreign sales, but it is certainly rare for the President himself to get involved so publically. Do you really think that selling 50,000 secure phones would be _that_ attractive to AT&T? It would certainly be attractive to the particular business unit in charge of selling them, but not nearly as attractive as the promise of help in the future. > Of course, there is a quid pro quo here -- but it's Clinton reminding the > Saudis about Desert Storm. Considering that the Saudis paid for a large fraction of the monetary cost of Desert <foo>, and that they have made or attempted to make substantial FMS and civilian purchases from the US, they very well may feel that they have discharged their debt. I think it's reasonable to visualize a conversation in which the administration promised to "help AT&T in the future" in exchange for AT&T's adoption of Clipper. It certainly may not have been as blatant as my satirical letter, but that doesn't make it less plausible. - -Paul - -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | Out the 10Base-T port, through the router, perobich(a)ingr.com | over the leased line, off the bridge, past Intergraph Federal Systems | the firewall... nothing but net. Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLb/UACA78To+806NAQFltgP+ILjjQTG2EOlnj9+csJHC5q8v2cwXwaUo Y5MMShgVShUB4xe3knS6UPShEW2YemGGzvfWWIO+O1hgiXLWKbxclnRB/UCgne4G J+0TJzwZGu6WxD/IEoOMvFkFisJauqpeL4uP7DgaWtAcV5LeBg4mKoTgxGvZaE7i r4nNBLkJdI4= =IB4g -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Revenge of the Nerds who Missed Woodstock
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous quotes Stevens Miller paraphrasing Stuart Baker of the NSA: Focusing on his spin rather than his content is a good idea, let's spin a little more. > - The debate over the Clipper proposal is "really just a culture clash > among net-heads." Yes, between authoritarians and libertarians who are aware of the issue. > - Those opposing the proposal are late-coming counter-culturists, "who > couldn't go to Woodstock because they had to do their trig homework." Some things won in the 60s have suffered wear, tear, disrespect, distortion and retreat. Other changes that happened then were wrong. If Mr. Baker is saying that we're a later generation carrying on the work, I'm honored. I was a natural in trig and didn't do my homework, but I did extra reading in political topics in high school. George Orwell's essays come to mind. > - Opponents envision themselves as would-be "cybernauts in bandoliers and > pocket-protectors." Jes' patriotic citizens payin' our eternal vigilance dues. Mr. Miller continues: > I quote these remarks (as best I can from memory; my hands were shaking too > much to write clearly at this point) to make it clear that our government's > representative has reached a conclusion about the community opposing its > plan. He has concluded that the members of that community are so beneath > his respect that it is more appropriate to make fun of them than it is to > respond to their views. Or he may have that little confidence in the substance of his own position. Or he may have that little respect for reasoned public debate in general. Or he may be that clueless about his opposition. In any case I wouldn't assume (and Mr. Miller doesn't seem to) that Mr. Baker actually believes his own public statements. -fnerd quote me - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gradually, I become aware of a presence. Between me and sustenance stands a woman in a suit. --Michael Swaine -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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NPR Clipper Transcript
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

National Public Radio Broadcast 28APR94 Morning Edition @ approx :20 past the first/third hour Bob Edwards (?): ... in the age of digital communication: the debate over encryption technology ... first, headlines from Carl Castle .... [Headline News] BE: The new era of digital communication has brought with it some very thorny problems concerning personal privacy. Three months ago, the Clinton administration announced a new encryption technology, called the "Clipper Chip" --- a device that encodes voice communications so that eavesdroppers can't understand what's being said. Privacy advocates are angry because the government will keep the keys to the Clipper Chip code, enabling the National Security Agency and the FBI to listen in. Critics say the Clipper policy will threaten privacy in the soon-to-be-deployed information technology on which the messages will include very personal documents and highly sensitive business communications. Next week, committees in both the Senate and the House will hold hearings on the controversy. NPR's John McChesney (sp) reports. JMcC: Today's digital encryption technology is so good that it's made law enforcement officials fearful that they're about to lose the wire tapping capabilities they already have. That's the reason the Clinton administration has proposed new technology that will keep law enforcement in the loop, so to speak. Clipper is part of what the administration hopes will become a new encryption standard. Jeff Greibledinger heads the Justice Department's Narcotics Division. JG: Clipper can be put into telephone or fax or similar hardware and provides extraordinarily strong encryption, using an algorithm that's been in use by the government now for a number of years. JMcC: Two people conversing will be able to activate Clipper encryption on their telephones, so that to an eavesdropper their conversation will be meaningless gibberish. In fact, Clipper's code is so complex, the government says it needs to keep the key, so that it can unlock the code and listen in if it thinks the laws are being broken. Thus the controversy, and there's a virtual canyon of difference between the government and privacy advocates, with both sides painting dark, disturbing visions of our digital future. Federal officials warn that the information super highway could become a lawless road, travelled by terrorist conspirators and kiddie porn merchants peddling their sordid wares over global networks, while lawmen are left standing by in uncomprehending helplessness. Civil libertarians, on the other hand, foresee a nearly omniscient government able to dip at will into the digital pipelines and pull up data containing the most intimate details of our personal and professional lives. JPB: The problem with cyberspace is that essentially every time you do anything there, you leave some kind of data trail. JMcC: John Perry Barlow writes about digital technology for Wired Magazine. JPB: In the physical world, you've got walls and doors that you can lock. But, you know, in the virtual world everything you do is visible except that which you explicitly make invisible. And the only way in which you can make things invisible is by using cryptography. And the only way in which you can make them invisible to the government is by using the strong cryptography that they don't want you to have. JMcC: The government may not *want* you to have strong encryption, but so far it hasn't said that you *can't* have it. Strong, private encryption software, to which the government will *not* have a key, will still be available on the domestic market. Administration spokesmen insist that Clipper, and other government data encryption standards yet to come, will be strictly voluntary. But that's a straddle that appears to have satisfied no one. Critics say that nobody with criminal intentions would be stupid enough to use the codes that the government has keys to. And others say that the administration is being disingenuous --- that it's using the levers of government to ensure that Clipper becomes *the* standard. One such skeptic is Jerry Berman of the Electronic Frontiers Foundation. JB: The government, while it says it's a voluntary system, they are determined to drive the market, to use government buying power to make this a defacto standard. If every government agency, the IRS, Treasury, and the Health Care System use Clipper Chip, there will be a tremendous market incentive to move towards Clipper as a potential standard. Second of all, they are making it very difficult for other encryption schemes to compete on the market by continuing to hold that any powerful encryption scheme available in the United States cannot be exported. It's a munition. It's a weapon. JMcC: The export restriction has infuriated the American software industry, which says it stands to lose more than $6 billion each year it's in effect. But it's the potential loss of privacy, rather than the loss of profit, that will undoubtedly remain at the center of the Clipper debate. Government backers of Clipper say there are sufficient legal restraints now in place to prevent illegal invasions of our privacy. Again, the Justice Department's Jeff Greibledinger: JG: A wiretap without lawful authorization is a Federal felony offense, punishable by up to five years in prison. That's true right now, even for unencrypted communications. It will be no less true in the future, when encryption is available. JMcC: Greibledinger says the Clipper system would make it even harder for government officials to gather information illegally. They key to each Clipper chip's code will be split into two parts, which will be held in escrow by two separate government agencies. A wiretap order would have to include separate, documented applications to these two agencies for the keys. But skeptics say that the excesses of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover should be kept in mind during this debate. They also point out that modern digital technology is changing the terms of the debate about privacy. In the first place, there will be a lot more information about our private lives on the networks of the future than there is on the phone lines of today. And secondly, as critics like Jerry Berman point out, powerful computers connected to digital networks greatly increase the efficiency of spying, making it possible instantly to pull together a detailed personal portrait of any citizen. JB: What kind mail you're sending and to whom What kind of telephone calls you're making and to whom What kind of banking transactions and where you are, and What kind of vacation you're taking and What kind of movies you're watching --- all at the same time. JMcC: And all of the information surging through the digital pipelines of the future can be far more easily searched than could the mail and telephone calls of the past. Stanford Professor Martin Hellman, a noted pioneer in cryptographic technology, who opposes Clipper, says old-time wire taps required an expensive human being to monitor each and every call. MH: But once you have information in computer readable form, you can scan approximately 10 billion words for $1. You heard me right --- 10 billion words for $1! So the fact that we're going to computer readable information makes this much more dangerous. JMcC: Vermont's Senator Patrick Leahy heads a Senate Technology Sub-Committee that will hold hearings on the Clipper chip next week. He worries that concern about Clipper could slow down the deployment of the broadband communications networks the administration has been promoting. PL: We've had already some 48,000 people sign on to an electronic petition through Internet to say they're against it. The administration has set off alarms that probably they didn't need to set off, in some instances. Because I don't think that they laid the groundwork for this at all. And in some other areas, they've set off alarms that so far do not have adequate answers. JMcC: Nearly everyone agrees that the stakes in this debate are high --- finding the proper balance point between privacy and public safety in the digital age. Some observers believe that the Clinton administration may be softening its stand on Clipper now. Administration spokesmen are emphasizing that they've solicited alternative ideas from the computer and software industries. In San Francisco, I'm John McChesney reporting. BE: The time is 29 minutes past the hour. *************************** Transcribed by Lois Frissell

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Re: spooks on cypherpunks
by Phil G. Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey! He forgot about Fox Moulder! Hanno Reactionist

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Re: NSA snobs.
by cfrye＠mason1.gmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim- Sounds like a great plan. I'm in a crunch until 13 May but would be willing to help after that. Count me in! Curt

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