December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: backing?
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

pmetzger(a)lehman.com said: >Average inflation between the elimination of gold drawing rights and >the banning of gold ownership by private citizens and 1970 were higher >than in the immediate period before that. [...] >Seems to be a pattern to me, buddy boy. [...] >we should follow the historical models. Gold cannot be printed, is >cheap to store, and is widely recognized as having value. Just in case I was unclear: my point was that it makes sense to have digital currency that is backed by gold, not just the other forms which are not thereby backed. I expect that lots of folks will support their own idiosyncratic forms of digital currency in the future, somewhat similarly to the way that banks used to issue their own paper currency, and that therefore there will not be just a single kind of digital currency. Doug

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Re: POISONOUS CYPHERPUNK TRAITORS
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

writes S. Boxx: > THE CYPHERPUNKS HAVE BEEN POISONED WITH LIES AND HIGH TREACHERY. THOSE > WHO DO NOT CONFESS WILL BE EXPOSED. THE FRAUDS AND THE POSEURS WILL BE > RUTHLESSLY PUNISHED. IF NECESSARY, ON TALK.POLITICS.CRYPTO OR IN THE > MAINSTREAM MEDIA. > > YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED. Yikes, I'll be sure to run and hide. Get a grip, you stupid fuck. -- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Nate Sammons email: nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | Finger nate(a)monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key | #include <std.disclaimer> | Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden +--------+ Always remember "Brazil"

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ITAR to West Indies
by pat＠tstc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HELP! I'm looking to find out about the ITAR regulations on export of crypto to the West Indies. A company that I do consulting for sends out demos that contain some database crypto stuff and they are concerned now that they have a request from outside the United States. Any pointers to where I can find information on this would be extremely helpful. Thanks. -- Pat Hykkonen ** N5NPL ** pat(a)tstc.edu ** CNSA -- (817) 867-4831 Disclaimer: This product may cause irritability in some users. In cases of allergic reaction, delete and consult a physician immediately.

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"Is-a-person" Credentials, Fiat-Shamir paper
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have here the Fiat-Shamir paper, "How to Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems," from the 1986 CRYPTO Conference Proceedings. This is of course the defining paper of the Fiat-Shamir algorithm, which I understand was patented (no idea of patent number, or countries). And I hear from Chaum that Rupert Murdoch's publishing outfit (including Sky Channel, a satellite system) bought the rights to Fiat-Shamir. (Speaking of Chaum and patents, Chaum has also filed for patents and reportedly has already gotten some. We spend a lot of time talking about the RSA/PKP patents and when they'll run out (1998-2002), but patents on digital money may be just as constraining.) Anyway, if there's sufficient interest (contact me via e-mail), I can scan and OCR as much of the paper as is feasible (the equations and Greek symbols are always problematic). I suspect serious students of this stuff have access to the CRYPTO Proceedings at large university libraries, and the Fiat-Shamir paper is definitely a nice little intro, so I'm not sure it's worth the couple of hours it may take to get a good clean copy suitable for uploading to the list. The schemes for "is-a-person" credentialling should be of interest to us for several reasons: 1. The non-PGP "models" that rely on centralized credentialling agencies, be they private companies like Apple or RSA Data Security, or be they government agencies like DMV or National Health Offices. Carl Ellison noted this in connection with the PEM model. (One of the most impoortant innovations of PGP, in my opinion, was the "distributed trust" model used. Let's demand this of other packages we may use.) 2. Key escrow schemes could ultimately involve a tie-in to "is-a-person" databases. Someone wrote yesterday about an FCC-like ruling that would demand that all messages sent over the Net(s) be digitally signed with a signature associatable (sp?) with a True Name. (I can't see how this would be enforced, and can think of many ways around it. But it's important we think about what may be coming, the better to head it off early.) 3. As I have speculated before, I see the talk of a National Health Care Card--possibly a SmartCard of some sort--as naturally associated with a National ID Card. The immigration "problem" is causing many to call for such a card. "Your papers, please! Schnell!" (I hope I did not trivialize my point by bringing Nazis in.) Cypherpunks need to worry about more than just the government snooping on their messages--that's just one facet of the picture. The "dossier society" aspects are just as important. Ditto for other areas. So, let me know if there's real interest in this paper. And I have several of these Proceedings, with access to all the rest of the CRYPTO and EUROCRYPT Proceedings over at the UC Santa Cruz Science Library. I can't scan them all in, for obvious and compelling reasons (even with the "assistance" of the Information Liberation Front :-} ), but this is a resource that is available. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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(fwd) ViaCrypt CW Announcement
by ferguson＠icm1.icp.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the "For What It's Worth" department - Forwarded message: > From: warlock(a)ACM.ORG > Newsgroups: sci.crypt,talk.politics.crypto,comp.org.eff.talk > Subject: ViaCrypt CW Announcement > Date: 19 Oct 1993 13:46:36 GMT > Organization: ACM Network Services > Lines: 29 > Distribution: inet > Message-ID: <2a0r3s$ahh(a)hopper.acm.org> > Reply-To: warlock(a)ACM.ORG > NNTP-Posting-Host: acm.org > Xref: news.sprintlink.net sci.crypt:20523 talk.politics.crypto:874 comp.org.eff.talk:21553 > > } > In spite of the uproar over Phil and Grady, its apparently busi > ness as usual at ViaCrypt as evidenced by their software product > announcement under "New Products" on page 39 of the Oct. ll, > 1993 issue of Computerworld: > > > ViaCrypt has announced ViaCrypt PGP, a high-security public key > > message encryption program designed to protect electronic-mail > > and data files. Transmitted messages or exchanged files are > > secured against unauthorized readers, and the program provides > > digital signature, data compression and key management. Cost: > >> $199.95 for a DOS single-user license, $599 for a five-user > > license and $1,649.95 for a 20-user license. ViaCrypt, Phoenix > > (602) 944-0773..... > > A company rep contacted by phone indicated that their offering > was licensed by RSA/PKP and that an export licence -- if needed > -- was "easy" to obtain provided the licensee was "at least a > "51%" American company". > > > Bill Wilson > > ################################################################## > > "Even a blind pig finds an acorn once in a while" Southern > Appalachian saying. > > ################################################################### > _____________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson Mindbank Consulting Group fergp(a)sytex.com Fairfax, Virginia USA ferguson(a)icp.net

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(fwd) Australians dump DES (from RISKS)
by ferguson＠icm1.icp.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone provide ant detailed information on 'Seneca'? Forwarded message: > From: darrell(a)cse.ucsc.edu (Darrell Long) > Newsgroups: sci.crypt > Subject: Australians dump DES (from RISKS) > Date: 19 Oct 1993 03:11:34 GMT > Organization: University of California, Santa Cruz (CE/CIS Boards) > Lines: 32 > Distribution: world > Message-ID: <29vlt6$82c(a)darkstar.UCSC.EDU> > NNTP-Posting-Host: sequoia.cse.ucsc.edu > > Date: Mon, 18 Oct 1993 17:14:08 +1000 > From: zaph(a)torps.apana.org.au (Kevin Burfitt) > Subject: Australian government to replace DES > > Here is something I found in an Australian computer magazine, which > sounded like something for the Risks Forum... > > Quoted from "PCWEEK October 20, 1993" > > The Australian Government has secretly developed its own data > encryption firmware and algorithm, killing its dependence on the > US DES (Data Encryption Standard) Algorithm. > > Called Seneca, the firmware element was developed as a joint project > of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) in Adelaide > and the Defense Signals Directorate (DSD) in Canberra. > > [...] > > "It is a symmetric encryption technology like DES, but can operate > at very high speeds" said the source. Seneca's original specifications > included a throughput of 2Mbps, but testing had achieved rates of > 20Mbps. > > Isn't part of the security with DES its slowness, which implies that this > new encryption method will be inherently risky because of its speed ? > > Kevin Burfitt > > zaph(a)torps.apana.org.au (Kevin Burfitt) Compuserve: 100240,2002 > Torps Productions: torps.apana.org.au BBS +61-3-818-0986 FidoNet: > 3:635/574 > _____________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson Mindbank Consulting Group fergp(a)sytex.com Fairfax, Virginia USA ferguson(a)icp.net

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JUDGMENT PROOFING
by Sandy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Robert J. Woodhead quoted Nate who wrote, in part: Imagine if all your money . . . was tied up in anonymous accounts and that all your property was owned by digital pseudonyms (from whom you rented the property). To which Robert responded: . . . Do not be so quick to assume that these wonderful and interesting techniques we discuss will solve long-standing problems. . . . No assumption necessary, Robert. Non-digital variations of these techniques have been used successfully for generations. The rich and politically savvy have always seen to it that exposure to litigation and the burden of taxes fell only on the middle class. Computers, the nets and crypto technology just make it easier for the rest of us to get in on the same deal. Once critical mass is reached, governments can't survive. The end, not with a bang, but a whimper. As for all the other nasty things governments can do to you: Remember, they have to see you as a threat or a juicy victim before they can focus in on you. If you use traditional and electronic privacy techniques, there is very little likelihood that you will come to their attention. Low Profile = Minimal Hassle S a n d y >>>>>> Please send e-mail to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com <<<<<< ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Canon copier engine
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The worrisome item was the statement that the copiers would add > some sort of unspecified marking to each copy made, allowing copies > to be traced back to their source. Steganographic signatures. Similarly, signatures are being put into explosives (although they are somewhat traceable already) by using various mixtures of trace elements. Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com

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Re: your mail Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> D. Owen Rowley () writes: > > I want privacy too, and I want as much free-wheeling as possible in the > > matrix. Personally I think that accountability is going to be required > > as the price for reasonably secure encryption, reasonably open access, > > and reasonably secure privacy of data. > Why should it be? Reasonably secure encryption, reasonably > open access, and reasonably secure privacy of data can all be > implemented without accountability. Yes, of course they can be implemented. > (I refer you to Public Key > cryptography, DC/Mix nets, and secret sharing) Perhaps in practice, > the majority of people will refuse to participate in such a network but > that does not stop crackers/pirates from using one. Crackers routinely > dick each other over because of lack of accountability, but the trade off > (getting free software/phone access) is better than (getting busted) Fine, spend your time in a network of this character. But I'm trying to inject some real world values into this issue. Heres a clue, when your just playing games, this scenario is fine, when its bigtime finance, industrial secrets and intellectual property with high value, and the process of managing these things, you will find that reliabile security will be the number one requirement. In my opinion, Accountability will win over anonymity if it comes down to a choice. > Do you think I am accountable? If I didn't put my real name in my > sig you'd never be able figure out who I really am. Not even gnu, who > graciously allows me use of their machines, has my real address or phone. > The annex port that I log in on is set up incorectly allowing me to > telnet anywhere without needing to use my student account (and thus not > linking rjc@ to my college where my really private info resides) I'm sure you are quite clever, there are lots of clever people around. > rjc@ is simply my pseudonym. I could be Bill Clinton and you > wouldn't know, so why worry about it? What keeps me in line in the > reputation linked to rjc@ which I have spent a long time building up. > Acting like an asshole and choosing a new account name would waste a lot > energy that I put into posting these years. This is all fine and good in regard to the narrow focus you take on where this technology is going, and what business needs from it. > > IMNSHO, it is unreasonable to expect an anarcho-libertarian outcome to > > these issues. If you can prove me wrong I will be thrilled. > You made the assertion, the proof is up to you. Sigh.. IMNSHO is an acronym for *In my NOT so humble opinion*. LUX ./. owen

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Re: backing?
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: pmetzger(a)lehman.com >In every time and place that [gold backing] was eliminated, the currency >eventually collapsed Non-gold backed currency is reputation based. The debasement of a reputation based currency looks a lot like the game theory strategy of "tit for tat, but if you can get away with tricking them, go for it"; the tit for tat is needed to keep the reputation and works both ways: (1) if a currency issuer debases value relative to another currency issuer, people will switch money to the better currency (switching to a better reputation issuer, if possible), (2) counterfeiters are tracked down and stopped to uphold the reputation. The "if you can get away with tricking them, go for it" can be easily be performed when major currency issuers work together to debase all at the same time. Luckily, this kind of collusion doesn't hold together well (like OPEC). So we already have reputation based currency as represented by hard to reproduce paper. Similarly, a reputation based digital deposit could be built that is based on ordinary currency. (I view anonymous transaction as being completely orthogonal to this.) Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com

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