December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: mondex
by Wesley Felter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 7/18/97 3:26 AM, Ryan Lackey said: >Does anyone know how open the Mondex architecture is? Is it in any way >possible to set up a competing system with your own card manufacture >and issuing bodies for currencies which can be used in deployed Mondex >POS terminals without too much hassle? Would this be analagous to the >problem of replacing InterNIC with other NICs -- you need to make the >user servers know to look at the rival systems and understand their >keys? As I understand it, Mondex is a completely closed system. Everything that you don't absolutely need to know is undocumented. Since you can settle offline, the potential for fraud is frightening; unless I'm getting the benefit of these, um, weaknesses in the system, I don't want there to be any. The lack of privacy seems to be somewhat of a smokescreen; since you can settle offline, they don't have a really accurate way of tracking transactions except at the interface between e$ and other forms of money or goods (like their POS terminals and ATMs). Can you hack Mondex? They say you can't... Wesley Felter - wesley(a)binarycompass.com - Binary Compass Enterprises In BizRate we trust - <http://www.bizrate.com/> Disclaimer: My employer knows I'm crazy.

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'Thanks for This Important Commitment'
by Dave K-P 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

'Thanks for This Important Commitment' by Dan Brekke and Rebecca Vesely 6:06pm 17.Jul.97.PDT Some words that came out of President Clinton's mouth the other day signaled that the Web's biggest search and directory services were on board for a major effort to get sites to rate themselves. "We ... need to encourage every Internet site, whether or not it has material harmful for young people, to label its own content," Clinton said Wednesday at a White House event to announce his new Net self-regulation initiative. "... To help to speed the labeling process along, several Internet search engines - the Yellow Pages of cyberspace, if you will - will begin to ask that all Web sites label content when applying for a spot in their directories." And then the self-described techno-idiot went on to thank Yahoo, Excite, and Lycos "for this important commitment." What the president and most of those who reported the big news missed is that the companies made no such commitment. Calls to Yahoo's PR department minutes after the president spoke for details on what the company would do to get site owners to rate themselves were met with puzzlement. Eventually, callers were pointed to a press release issued in the name of Yahoo, Infoseek, Lycos, and Excite that pledged the companies would do ... almost nothing. The release announced "an initiative to work together to promote self-regulation of the Internet." Got that? The statement talked about the importance of the First Amendment and how the directories could make a difference "by making it easy for Web site developers to rate themselves and to identify their sites appropriately." Regardless of how wide of the mark they were, Clinton's words did make news. And Thursday, some of the directory mavens were trying to clarify things. A spokeswoman for Excite said the search engines will continue to monitor evolving plans on how to keep kids from accessing pornography online. "We have committed to a) finding a system or systems for rating sites, and b) after finding that system, allowing our users to voluntarily rate themselves," said Jerry Yang, co-founder of Yahoo.

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Brookings Inst. on crypto: "There are reasonable compromises"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 09:17:52 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Brookings Inst. on crypto: "There are reasonable compromises" Morton's Steakhouse is a true Washington institution. Nestled in the heart of lawyer country, between K and L streets, the clientele are well-heeled lobbyists hungry for red meat. Which is all you'll find at Morton's, where the menu lists a fine selection of slabs, all thick, bloody, expensive. I had lunch at Morton's yesterday with a colleague, a fellow from the NSA, and a gentleman from the armed forces. We talked Net-regulation, censorship, and hacking. Most of all we talked encryption, and crypto-compromises. This is a theme you'll see repeated in this recent policy paper from the liberal Brookings Institution: There are reasonable compromises. A useful place to start is a national cryptography policy... rigorous oversight and accountability for government access to the keys needed to intercept and read coded data, negotiation of an agreement with our close allies on a global encryption standard, and formation of a government/private sector oversight body... the basic elements of a reasonable compromise are now in sight and may yet be achieved... Current initiatives that would allow export of any technological solution, of unlimited strength, subject only to the proviso that an acceptable key recovery system be maintained with a suitably defined and trusted party (including self-escrow), are headed in the right direction... -Declan ------------------ no. 21 Deciphering the Cryptography Debate July 1997 By Kenneth Flamm FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS, the U.S. government and America's information industries-producers and users of computers, communications systems, software, information services-have been locked in a bitter and highly technical battle over cryptography policy: the rules of the game for techniques used to scramble and unscramble data. Such encryption and decryption is vital in maintaining the confidentiality of information (whether business information, financial transactions, personal medical records, or government secrets) passing through the exploding web of computer and communications links joining this nation together. The hard fought and often arcane debate has come to an inconclusive and unsatisfactory draw that does little to deal effectively with any of the conflicting objectives-civil liberties, economic competitiveness, law enforcement, and national security-brought to the bargaining table. This does not have to be. There are reasonable compromises. A useful place to start is a national cryptography policy built around four key elements-strong cryptography put into wide use, a strengthened legal framework and electronic logging system that provides rigorous oversight and accountability for government access to the keys needed to intercept and read coded data, negotiation of an agreement with our close allies on a global encryption standard, and formation of a government/private sector oversight body to review both the overall security of our national information infrastructure and the voluntary testing and certification of encryption and security products. Why Is Cryptography Important? UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF THIS CENTURY, codemaking and codebreaking were primarily the concern of governments protecting diplomatic and military communications. World War II was a turning point for cryptography. The first primitive electronic computers were built by the United States and Britain during that war and used to break German and Japanese codes. Using technology and methods that remained closely guarded military secrets until the late 1970s, the Allies succeeded in building electronic machines to break the supposedly unbreakable codes used to encrypt virtually all Axis radio messages. This allowed the Allies, for example, to read signals sent by German submarines as they reported their locations, send forces to destroy them, and win the vitally important battle for the North Atlantic shipping lanes. After the war, U.S. codebreakers continued to play a central role in the development of the fastest possible computers of the day, so-called supercomputers. In the late 1960s, others in the military funded research into damage-resistant digital communications networks that gave us the first working prototype of today's Internet. As computers and network use also took hold within business in the 1960s and 1970s, cryptography (mainly the domain of government in earlier decades) increasingly began to protect sensitive business information stored in private sector computers. With outside computer links through communications networks growing, the dangers of unauthorized penetration into sensitive computer databases through these external ties also multiplied. The financial sector led these technological changes. As global financial markets, national banking systems, and local automated teller machines all went electronic, cryptographic systems were installed to protect sensitive data coursing through the digital arteries of finance. Today, we are teetering at the precipice of an even wider transformation of the basic infrastructure for commerce. Telecommunications services, retailing, and the electric power grid are already organized around vast computer networks. Multinational companies link global operations over international networks. By 1999, all U.S. government benefits will be paid electronically. Doctors will access data and communicate remotely with patients, businesses will buy services from consultants, contractors will sell to government, researchers will provide policy advice, seminars will be organized-all over computer networks. Vast savings in time and resources and improvements in business productivity seem possible. For this leap forward in our economic infrastructure to be realized, however, the information running through the system will have to be authenticated, verified, protected from unauthorized access, and guarded against witting or unwitting corruption. Equally profound changes are going on within the military establishments whose investments initially spurred the computer revolution. Our post-Desert Storm military forces are as dependent on complex computerized command, control, and communications networks as commercial industry. The Defense Department is today groping toward an information technology-based Revolution in Military Affairs, a future in which sensors, intelligence databases, command and control systems, precision munitions, and smart weapons platforms are seamlessly linked together in real time to deliver measured military force swiftly, surely, and over great distances. In contrast to the situation of forty years ago, enormous private sector investments are today driving the engine of information technology, with the military largely drawing on commercial technology for its particular variant of the information revolution. Commercial and military computer and communications systems-like the core industrial infrastructure underlying modern military power-are hopelessly intermingled within the sinews of the U.S. information economy. A new term, information warfare, explicitly recognizes that an attack designed to disrupt our military capability or will to fight is as likely to target nominally civil infrastructure, like telecommunications networks, the electric power grid, the banking system, or air traffic control, as any purely military system. Widespread use of effective cryptography to secure and protect the rivers of data flowing through computer and communications systems is needed now to enable the further development of the information infrastructure for tomorrow's high-tech economy and to protect military capabilities dependent on that same information infrastructure. What Are the Issues? The heated debate over cryptography policy is fundamentally driven by rapid technological change. The price of computing power has been dropping 20 to 30 percent annually over decades now, an order of magnitude greater than anything measured during the first great Industrial Revolution of two centuries ago. Computing power is used to both make and break codes, and as the cost of computing power plummets, cryptographic systems that once offered adequate protection for data become insecure. By the same token, however, cheaper computers also make it cost effective to encrypt data where once it would have been uneconomic. Paradoxically, then, plummeting computing costs have both enabled the widespread use of encryption to defend information security and increased the ability of moderate to large organizations (in the private sector and governments) to afford the computing resources needed to successfully attack once-capable encryption systems. To balance these shifting forces, the United States must grapple with multiple and often conflicting objectives. First, there are constitutional issues. On the one hand, the United States has a well-established tradition of respect for privacy and civil liberties that is a bedrock of our society. On the other hand, there are few absolute rights-under court order, communications can be legally intercepted, and private homes may be entered and searched. Encryption-like "speaking in tongues"-might even be interpreted as a form of speech and offered the greater protection that freedom of speech enjoys. Historically, the government has not attempted to control the use of encryption within domestic U.S. borders but instead limited its export overseas. Similarly, court orders are required to lawfully intercept domestic telephone conversations, but not for foreign traffic. The legal framework protecting data communications-including encryption of data-has not changed to address the many new channels for expression (and surveillance of expression) opened up by the computer revolution. It is now appropriate to establish an organized and systematic legal framework for our information society. Second, we need to use strong cryptography to enable electronic commerce on the burgeoning information infrastructure that is going up all around us. The potential economic benefits from moving forward rapidly to locate our businesses on the information superhighway seem large. Without ironclad security, however, no business is going to drive its sensitive data up the on-ramp. Strong cryptography is a small but vital piece in the systems that will provide information security. Third, U.S. companies are world leaders in computers and communications, where success in global markets is an essential ingredient in maintaining competitive advantage. But the market for information technology is one in which capable foreign competitors stand ready to pick up the baton of technological leadership should American firms stumble. The economic preeminence of U.S. information technology companies-and the resulting benefits to the U.S. economy-are arguably at risk should U.S. producers be blocked from selling important technology that is available from foreign competitors. Law enforcement objectives, in contrast, argue for controls on use of strong cryptography (while recognizing that cryptography also protects against electronic crimes). Since the dawn of the age of telephony, lawful wiretapping has been viewed as an essential tool for police, the legal extension of the right to enter and search under warrant. In the information age, with the proliferation of digital technology, cryptography has the potential to deny police the lawful access that they now enjoy to voice and data communications. National security has been another powerful argument for limits on encryption. Though not often discussed openly, interception of foreign communications traffic is in all likelihood one of the most valuable and reliable sources of intelligence for defense and foreign policy purposes. Routine use of strong and difficult-to-break cryptography in, say, the global public telephone network would be a nightmare scenario for both law enforcement and the intelligence community. But we should also recognize that while global availability of strong encryption may limit our offensive gathering of foreign intelligence and perhaps in the future, offensive "information warfare," the global economic success of U.S. information technology producers also has a positive value for offensive intelligence gathering. Even the strongest encryption technology may be rendered vulnerable by the way it is administered and used. A global marketplace dominated by the products of the United States and its allies-which will be well understood by a substantial community of American technologists-will be much more transparent to allied intelligence gathering than a world market dominated by the unfamiliar and poorly understood products of others. And strong encryption, even if pervasive and unbreakable, will nonetheless have a positive national security value in protecting U.S. information from the snooping of adversaries, political and economic. It will also have significant value as a defensive rampart against the information warfare offensives of adversaries. Arguably the United States, now reliant on the most advanced and pervasive information infrastructure in the world, is also the nation with the most to lose to disruption by a successful offensive attack. Finally, we must acknowledge that as more and more aspects of our personal and economic lives are connected to, and accessible over, the information superhighway-things like medical records, corporate accounts, personal travel plans, even daily calendars and diaries-the "wiretapping" metaphor for permitting government access to electronic information begins to break down. It is no strain to forecast a not-too-distant digital future in which almost everything-all sorts of personal information, records, even art and music-is stored or communicated electronically, connected to or accessible through some computer network. As the Worldwide Web reaches out to encompass all aspects of our lives, a surreptitious government access hatch begins to resemble a special door built into the basement of our homes through which government can enter without our knowledge or consent. Our Constitution's protections against "unreasonable searches and seizures" should be our guide as we chart these deep and unknown waters. Government access to private information should be governed by clear rules that "we, the people" make after open debate. Even in simpler times, there have been occasional but deeply disturbing instances in which individuals in government have abused powers granted for legitimate law enforcement and national security purposes. As pervasive electronic tendrils from the information superhighway reach into the nooks and crannies of our lives, the potential damage from poor judgment (or worse yet, corruption) by some individual in government will be enormous. It is vital that a system with clear guidelines and strict accountability be put into place to oversee our national encryption policy as we strike a balance among the multiple, legitimate objectives. Where Are We Now? In the late 1970s, industry, in collaboration with the U.S. government, developed a Data Encryption Standard (DES) based on coding keys (sequences of binary digits, or bits) that were 56 bits long. Though widely used today, steady advances in computer performance now make this system vulnerable (commercial supercomputers almost double in power every year, sufficient to "break" a key that is one bit longer in some given time). Much stronger encryption systems are used within the military and other parts of the U.S. government. Until 1996, the State Department did not readily permit the export of encryption systems using keys longer than 40 bits, which can be easily broken today. The Clinton administration, recognizing the need to promote commercial use of stronger encryption, unveiled such a system in April 1993 (actually developed under previous administrations but not publicly promoted). The system used special computer circuitry dubbed the "Clipper" chip, with decoding keys issued in two parts and held by two separate government agencies-within the Treasury Department and the Commerce Department. This Clipper chip initiative championed the concept of "key escrow," with government holding copies of the keys used to encrypt data, and argued for its voluntary adoption by the private sector as a solution to increasingly evident data security problems. Since only stronger encryption systems using the Clipper chip, or similar technology, were likely to be approved for export, critics argued that the system was not really voluntary. No U.S. multinational corporation would want to build and maintain two separate computer and communications networks-one for domestic use and one for international use. There were other practical objections. It was unclear how foreign governments would react to companies operating in their nations giving the U.S. government the keys to read encrypted communications, or even if this would be required. There was suspicion that the Clipper chip, with its proprietary government-developed technology, was not as secure as advertised and might even allow surreptitious government interception without appropriate legal safeguards. Even more important, there was concern that a government-mandated technical solution was being imposed on an industry that was far more capable and responsive to continuing technological change than any cobwebbed and inflexible government bureaucracy, and that industry itself through market forces was much better able to work out the best solutions to its information security problems. Furthermore, argued much of U.S. industry, increasingly capable foreign producers were beginning to market and sell encryption systems that were stronger than what U.S. industry would be permitted to sell in export markets. The net effect of administration policy, in this case, would be to tie the hands of U.S. industry and leave an important and growing segment of the information industry to foreign producers, free to sell any and all strong encryption products to customers anywhere. Stung by these criticisms, the Clinton administration withdrew and regrouped. In mid-1994, it offered up a new proposal in which "trusted third parties" within the private sector, rather than the government itself, would act as key escrow agents. This did little to silence industry critics. Finally, in 1996 the administration revealed a new plan and made some important changes in the direction of its policies. There would henceforth be no restrictions on exports of cryptographic systems-based on key length or technology-if those systems contained so-called key recovery features. That is, if U.S. exporters could demonstrate a viable plan in which trusted third parties (possibly including "self-escrow" within user organizations) would hold (and supply to government when presented "appropriate legal authority") information that would permit recovery of code keys and decryption of data, unrestricted export of such encryption systems would be allowed. Over an interim period of two years, exports of non-key recovery 56-bit cryptography systems would be permitted by producers demonstrating a commitment to develop viable key recovery systems. Cryptographic systems would be reclassified as a dual-use commercial product, rather than a munition, and export controls transferred from the State Department to the Commerce Department (though the Department of Justice would now play a new advisory role in the export licensing process). Finally, an explicitly international framework would be sought, with mutual access to national key recovery agents negotiated with foreign governments through carefully defined legal procedures. Though some in the U..S. business community continued to object, initial reaction was much more favorable than with previous cryptography initiatives. The government had worked with U.S. business in developing the new initiative, and a number of major U.S. computer and software companies voiced support for the general principles outlined in the initiative. (A system that enabled recovery of their own encrypted business data, in fact, was actually useful to companies in dealing with the risks of employee turnover.) Others took a wait-and-see approach. The wait was not a long one. Within months, a number of the proposal's initial supporters had publicly or privately defected as the details of its implementation were revealed. One major sticking point was the government's apparent desire to involve itself in frequent and detailed reviews of proprietary company business plans and progress in developing key recovery systems, as a condition for continued approval of interim exports of 56-bit systems. By mid-1997, some additional problems had become visible. A U.S. attempt at internationalizing the key recovery principle met only limited success: a draft policy from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recommended only that the issues be left to national discretion. While the United States, Britain, and France publicly supported the idea (and Japanese officials made it clear privately that they too would cooperate), opinion in Germany was divided, and other countries hesitated. Dueling bills-establishing a legal framework for key recovery, decontrolling cryptography export-were debated on Capitol Hill. On the face of it, another impasse was shaping up. In fact, however, with a little more flexibility and some degree of innovation, the basic elements of a reasonable compromise are now in sight and may yet be achieved. For the first time, the varied interests at stake are close enough to a workable solution to make establishment of a functioning and effective national cryptography policy a real possibility. Seeking Common Ground Four basic elements make up the core of what a national cryptography policy should do. First and foremost, strong cryptography-strong enough to resist the attacks that rapidly improving computer technology will continue to breed-must be available for routine business use. In an integrated global economy, this also means that it must be usable and exportable around the world. Current initiatives that would allow export of any technological solution, of unlimited strength, subject only to the proviso that an acceptable key recovery system be maintained with a suitably defined and trusted party (including self-escrow), are headed in the right direction. This will permit market forces to determine the most cost effective and flexible technologies, build in the ability to respond dynamically to continuing innovations in computer and communications technology, and yet maintain the ability of law enforcement and national security authorities to gain lawful access to encrypted communications when a critical national interest makes such access imperative. But the government should be more forthright in presenting its case. Though it is true that no constraints on domestic use of encryption are being proposed, the only product likely to gain wide acceptance in today's global economy is cryptography that is exportable to one's foreign subsidiaries and business partners. The government should be crystal clear in acknowledging that this debate is in fact about the encryption systems that will be used widely within the domestic U.S. economy. Also, key recovery remains an untried and untested system. It is entirely possible that a better solution to the cryptography problem may be discovered as computing technology advances, and policy should be flexible enough to adapt if this happens. The critical thing is the principle: strong encryption, widely available, with the potential for lawful decryption by accountable authorities. The government still must establish clear principles and a transparent cryptography policy. The new export regulations do not explicitly address a large number of significant issues (for example, backwards compatibility of key escrow with interim 56-bit systems, length of time escrowed keys must be kept for different types of data) that are now being defined in a piecemeal and private fashion as individual companies' key recovery product development plans are submitted with license requests. Various "exceptions" to the infant policy- permitting the export of stronger encryption without key recovery, for example, in specialized financial applications, or to banks and foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies- are announced weekly. A "black box" process ("just submit it, and we'll tell you if it's OK") that sets limits on cryptography without open discussion and debate and forces Americans to struggle to infer the policy from the sparse and sometimes inaccurate details published in the press is totally unacceptable in an area this important to the nation. A second core element of a new national policy-and one that has yet to be carefully addressed by any broad initiative-is the construction of a clear, up-to-date legal framework for, and safeguards on, government access to encrypted data and communications. Government access is only tolerable in pursuing the legitimate social objectives outlined earlier. The legal framework defining privacy and freedom of speech in electronic data and communications is currently a crazy, patchwork quilt with many holes in it. The administration's new rules specify that key recovery agents must hand over keys to the government within two hours after receiving "appropriate legal authority" but nowhere define precisely what this authority must be. Is a court order required, or merely a signature from a political appointee, and under what circumstances? Our laws should be debated and updated to define the answers better and more comprehensively, given current and foreseeable technological realities. Careful attention must also be paid to the potential for abuse or corruption. Even after appropriate legal authority is granted on paper for some narrow purpose, there is typically substantial room for interpretation as to what is "reasonable" in deciding how wide to cast an electronic net in trapping suspicious communications and how to deal with unexpected discoveries that turn up. Most government officials can be expected to behave in a responsible and lawful way, but an excessively curious or aggressive, or even corrupt, official using a legal interception to "surf" through data or communications beyond its intended scope creates a potential for damage that will grow just as quickly as the information superhighway itself. The same computer technology that makes electronic communication so cheap and pervasive also makes it possible to electronically record and log, with a permanent and verifiable audit trail, any government interception of electronic communications. Just as financial services companies safeguard against abuse by logging and taping telephone contacts with customers, comprehensive logs and a verifiable audit trail should be automatically recorded and stored electronically in each and every instance that a government official intercepts private data or communications. In addition, tougher standards for private abuse of personal data and illegal access to private communications should be included in whatever new legal framework is adopted, and significant penalties should be defined. Third, a national cryptography policy must recognize that the problems-and solutions-outlined above are inherently international in scope. Law enforcement, national security, regulation and oversight of global finance and trade are all areas that span national boundaries today and require cooperation among governments. Just as our private sector works with its foreign partners to define standards that allow it to operate easily and effectively in global markets, the U.S. government must work with foreign governments to define an international encryption policy that makes the U.S. approach compatible with foreign systems. U.S. requirements imposed on U.S.-based businesses must be compatible with the foreign environments in which they operate. U.S. requirements should also be no more onerous than those imposed by foreign governments on their business communities. A level playing field, with common global rules of the game, is needed to avoid giving economic rivals competitive advantages over one another. The administration made an important and correct decision in seeking an international consensus on the key recovery approach to strong encryption and must be sure to continue to work hard in seeking this common global approach. While it has yet to achieve such a consensus within the OECD, many of the key players with the technical capability to ship advanced cryptography products and affect global markets-Britain, France, and (quietly) Japan-are supporting the U.S. approach, and if a few more (like Germany and Israel) can be brought on board, the critical mass around which the core of an international agreement can be assembled will exist. Finally, with cryptography set to play such a key role in tomorrow's information infrastructure, some new institution that provides a framework for business and government to jointly examine both the overall security of our information infrastructure and the integrity of its individual parts is needed. At the micro level, we must recognize that acquiring a cryptographic product is not like buying a computer or auto- simply testing or using it within an organization gives insufficient insight into its quality or utility. The essence of an effective cryptography system is what the most capable and potentially hostile forces outside a business or other organization can do with the system. There are also obvious economic benefits from some sort of government-industry testing and certification process that spares individual customers a costly and duplicative investment in determining the effectiveness of a cryptography product (and makes use of sensitive information that may be available only to the government). At the macro level, the integrity of our power grid, banking system, and phone network are clearly as vital to our national security as the number of transport aircraft the U.S. Air Force buys, and both government and industry have an obvious interest in scrutinizing the entire information infrastructure and taking steps to reduce weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Government and the private sector should form an oversight body tasked with both reviewing the overall integrity and security of the national information infrastructure and creating a voluntary testing and certification process for the information security products developed by the private sector. A national cryptography policy built around these four elements- strong cryptography put into wide use, a strengthened legal framework and electronic logging system that provides rigorous oversight and accountability for government access to the keys needed to intercept and read coded data, negotiation of an agreement with our close allies on a global encryption standard, and formation of a government/private sector oversight body to review both the overall security of our national information infrastructure and the voluntary testing and certification of encryption and security products-will leave many (maybe even most) participants in the current debate unsatisfied. An absolute right to privacy would not be created in the electronic realm. The government would probably face greater constraints in seeking lawful access to electronic communications, and maintenance of auditable records probably will create some additional costs. Business is being asked to bear some burden in keeping the keys needed to decrypt confidential communications for a time. Intelligence and national security officials will be more dependent than ever before on cooperation with their allied counterparts. Cooperation on common rules of the game for encryption at the international level will have to be carefully negotiated. None of this will be painless. But it must be done if we are to balance an important and complex set of interests as we enter the next century, the age of the information society. Kenneth Flamm is a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy studies program and the author of Mismanaged Trade? Strategic Policy and the Semiconductor Industry (Brookings, 1996). The views expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author and not necessarily those of the trustees, officers, or other staff members of the Brookings Institution. ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/

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http:--cnnfn.com-digitaljam-wires-9707-18-encryption_wg-
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Compaq: Outstanding Products, Great New Prices. [INLINE] Digital Jam graphic Encryption battle heats up House committee set to vote next week on bill that would relax limits July 18, 1997: 1:38 p.m. ET [LINK] [INLINE] U.S. OKs Netscape exports - June 24, 1997 Encryption bill nears vote - June 4, 1997 [IMAGE] U.S. House of Representatives Infoseek search __________ ____ ____ WASHINGTON (Reuter) - The battle in Congress over export limits on computer encoding technology will heat up again next week as the House International Relations Committee is scheduled to vote on a bill to dramatically relax the current restrictions. [INLINE] The legislation, already approved by the House Judiciary Committee, would allow U.S. companies to export powerful encryption programs, software which scrambles information and renders it unreadable without a password or software "key." [INLINE] The International Relations Committee plans to hold a vote on July 22 on the bill, authored by Virginia Republican Bob Goodlatte and called the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act. [INLINE] Once the realm of spies and generals, encryption has become increasingly important as a means of securing global communications and electronic commerce over the Internet. [INLINE] The Clinton administration favors strict controls on encryption exports unless the programs allow the government to crack the codes by gaining access to the software keys. But many lawmakers oppose the limits, which they say hurt U.S. firms while allowing foreign companies to gain market share. [INLINE] The Goodlatte bill has over 190 co-sponsors, including a majority of members of the committee. [INLINE] But committee chairman Benjamin Gilman, a New York Republican, is strongly opposed and may try to amend the bill to retain most export controls, congressional staffers said. [INLINE] The substitute amendment could be modeled on encryption export provisions in a broader bill in the Senate backed by Arizona Republican John McCain and Nebraska Democrat Bob Kerrey, staffers said. That bill was approved by the Senate Commerce Committee last month, but a bill more similar to Goodlatte's is pending in the Senate Judiciary Committee. [INLINE] The McCain-Kerrey bill would allow free export of medium-strength encryption, with keys up to 56 bits long, and establish a board to consider raising the limit in the future. But the president would have the authority to overrule the board's decisions for reasons of national security. [INLINE] The vote in the International Relations Committee could be close, some lobbyists said. [INLINE] "I think the votes are there to defeat a substitute, but it's probably going to be close," said one industry lobbyist who asked not to be named. [INLINE] The Goodlatte bill would also prohibit mandatory key recovery for encryption used within the United States and criminalize the use of encryption to hide evidence of a crime. But those provisions are outside the International Relations committee's jurisdiction. [INLINE] Privacy advocates back the bill, arguing that people need unfettered access to strong encryption to protect the privacy of personal data, medical records and electronic communications. The software industry is also supporting the legislation. [INLINE] But FBI director Louis Freeh and other top law enforcement officials warn that the proliferation of strong encryption overseas will complicate the task of keeping tabs on international criminals and terrorists. Link to top home | digitaljam | contents | search | stock quotes | help Copyright © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

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MN CP meeting?
by Robert Hayden-0797-EMP-HSE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone up for a Minnesota CP get-together anytime this summer? =-=-=-=-=-= Robert Hayden rhayden(a)means.net IP Network Administrator (612) 230-4416 MEANS Telcom

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Re: Keepers of the keys
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Declan, what would you think if the actual keepers of the keys, >so to speak, were the courts, such as the Administrative Office of the >US Courts? That would at least seem to reduce a lot of the possible >privacy concerns. One has the sense that once they get into the hands of >the varius agencies, they'll get back out. It has no real effect. The problem is that corporations have very good reason to expect governments to abuse key escrow. The Nixon administration showed that the President of the US was capable of ordering the burglary of his opponents offices. Since the President appoints the Supreme court this is a pretty direct demonstration that nobody can be trusted. The concerns for foreign corporations are even greater. France openly boasts about its commercial espionage. It also murders its political opponents by planting bombs on civilian ships. Any foreign corporation operating in that company must expect a concerted effort to disclose its trade secrets to its French competitors. People in the security industry are paid to be paranoid, to reduce risk to the lowest possible. If your security model does not trust the CEO of the company concerned absolutely why should minor officials of the US government be trusted? Phill

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think we should all follow jim's example.

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Anarchy Gone Awry (fwd) Cu Digest, #5.91
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Computer underground Digest Sun Dec 5 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 91 ISSN 1004-042X ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Thu, 02 Dec 93 04:36:10 -0700 From: "L. Detweiler" <ld231782(a)LONGS.LANCE.COLOSTATE.EDU> Subject: File 1--Anarchy Gone Awry Mr. Leichter raises some extremely pivotal issues in CUD #5.90 related to the `anarchy' of the Internet. B.Sterling is the author of one of the most brilliantly colorful characterizations and metaphors of the Internet as `anarchic', comparing its evolution and development to that of the English language: > The Internet's `anarchy' may seem strange or even unnatural, but > it makes a certain deep and basic sense. It's rather like the > `anarchy' of the English language. Nobody rents English, and > nobody owns English. As an English-speaking person, it's up > to you to learn how to speak English properly and make whatever > use you please of it (though the government provides certain > subsidies to help you learn to read and write a bit). > Otherwise, everybody just sort of pitches in, and somehow the > thing evolves on its own, and somehow turns out workable. And > interesting. Fascinating, even. Though a lot of people earn > their living from using and exploiting and teaching English, > `English' as an institution is public property, a public good. > Much the same goes for the Internet. Would English be improved > if the `The English Language, Inc.' had a board of directors > and a chief executive officer, or a President and a Congress? > There'd probably be a lot fewer new words in English, and a lot > fewer new ideas. Unfortunately, though, having attended a lecture by Mr. Sterling and having read `The Hacker Crackdown', I think he has a tendency to overdramatize and glorify quasi-criminal behavior and rebellious, subversive, revolutionary aspects of social structures, including those of the Internet. In my view, to the contrary the Internet is largely held together with the glue of social cohesion and human civility, and ingredients that are destructive to that order are likewise toxic to Cyberspace, and that, conversely, virtually all of the excruciating poison in the bloodstream today can be traced to violations and perversions of that trust. (Unfortunately, the English language is itself subject to unpleasant, corrupt, or toxic uses such as for profanity, disinformation, and lies, which are prevented or at least minimized through rejections by honest people.) I agree with Mr. Leichter in the belief (to paraphrase Twain) that `reports of the anarchy on the Internet are greatly exaggerated'. Leichter: >The Internet has been >described as an anarchy, but in fact only relatively small parts of >the Internet are actually anarchic. I would like to go further than this and suggest that the Internet has been over-promoted as `anarchic' by certain subversive, quasi-criminal segments that have found a tenacious hold there, namely extremist libertarians and `Cryptoanarchists'. The Cryptoanarchist cause is closely associated with the Cypherpunk founders E.Hughes and T.C.May (characterized particularly by the latter's infamous signature), who in my view appear to promote not merely `privacy for the masses' and `the cryptographic revolution', but at least condone or tolerate the use of collections of imaginary identities to manipulate and deceive others, and even to evade legitimate government actions such as criminal prosecutions. My most strident requests for their position, personal knowledge, and potential involvement in this practice have gone unanswered, evaded, and repressed over many weeks, but I have many statements from followers that might be regarded as `cult fanatics' about the Liberating Effects of `pseudoanonymity', which they exalt as True Anonymity. In my opinion, in this regard of the ease of creating fake identities, the `anarchic' vulnerability of the Internet reaches its peak in undesirable and socially poisonous consequences, which people are bloodily battling daily on many diverse mailing lists and Usenet groups. In my experience, the Internet inhabitants I have found who most fanatically worship the Internet `anarchy' seem to be closely associated with criminally subversive aims of pornography distribution, tax evasion, black marketeering, and overthrow of governments, goals which are all masked in much of the eloquent Cryptoanarchist dogma and rhetoric. While some of us have glimpsed various hideous corners of Cyberspatial Hell, those who subscribe to the Liberating Religion of Anarchy are in their Paradise on the Internet As We Know It. I call their Utopia a Ticking Time Bomb and a Recipe for an Apocalypse. I have come to these (admittedly melodramatic) conclusions after ~10 months and ~3500 messages of generally unpleasant and at times excruciatingly troubling and painful reading and participation on the Cypherpunks list and many personal communications with the Cypherpunk leaders including E.Hughes, T.C.May, and J.Gilmore. In fact, in my opinion the `Psychopunk Manifesto' parody in CUD #5.89, which longtime cypherpunk list subscriber P.Ferguson describes in 5.90 as having `made its rounds in the cyberspatial world', actually in many ways comes closer to delineating the actual cypherpunk agenda than the one authored by founder E.Hughes on soda.berkeley.edu: /pub/cypherpunks/rants/A_Cypherpunk's_Manifesto. The satire is actually a reformulated version of the original Manifesto, and the former's amazing meme-virus penetration of the into the cyberspatial psyche that P.Ferguson alludes to is indicative of its resonance over the latter. I gave the Cypherpunks the most extraordinary benefit of the doubt for months, far beyond that of a reasonable cyberspatial inhabitant. But now I must warn everyone who can hear me that if they assign the `cypherpunks' as an organization the same credibility as a group like EFF or CPSR they are dangerously, perhaps disastrously, misguided. They appear to me to the contrary to be the cultivators of a flourishing conspiracy and essentially the first Cyberspatial guerilla and terrorist group! The Psychopunk satirization of the Cryptoanarchists is representative of this Internet Anarchy Gone Awry. More information on the CryptoAnarchist & Cypherpunk agenda can be found in RISKS 15.25, 15.27, and 15.28x (FTP crvax.sri.com, directory RISKS:). I also have an essay `Joy of Pseudospoofing', regarding the dangerous consequences and poisonous effects of the manipulations of fake cyberspatial identities such as on the Internet by Cryptoanarchists, available to anyone who requests it from me by email at <ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu>. * * * I think that many people have mistaken the word `anarchic,' implying no overseeing authority or order (which the Internet is less) with the word `decentralized' (which the Internet is more). Again, the Internet has many regulatory and self-governing systems and orders. For example, connecting sites are required to implement a certain minimum set of software standards and prevent or even root out corruptions in their local sites and software. We have centralized databases that require the registration of domains for fees. A complex network of agreements and policies governs interconnectivity and communication, and a complicated interplay of elements affects basic content such as `commercial vs. academic.' Lack of some of these regulations and protocols would be disastrous. Leichter: >Most of the Internet, in fact, is >better described as self-governing. There are a variety of social >norms concerning network use and interactions. One doesn't post >messages to unrelated groups. One doesn't evade moderation >restrictions. One maintains a certain (rather limited, it must be >admitted) degree of restraint in how one describes other network >participants. There are few effective mechanisms for enforcing these >norms, and they are certainly broken on an all-too-regular basis; but >the network continues to function because social pressure *can* be >applied to those who become too annoying; and in the most outrageous >cases, it's possible to remove the offenders' access to the net. I advocate that we build new formal mechanisms to enforce this order! We have for too long pretended that a central element of the Internet is not integral to it, namely that of the `degree of restraint over network participants' exerted through `social pressure'. Let us codify and formalize these `norms concerning network use and interactions' and develop systems that enforce them! I believe such systems can be developed that do not stray from the sacred Internet tradition of decentralization of control and freedom from censorship. Why should we continue to subject ourselves to the torture of `few effective mechanisms for enforcing these norms broken on an all-too-regular basis'? One of my most enduring Cyberspatial hallucinations is that of a Ratings server. A Ratings server would be a massive distributed network for the propagation of information similar to Usenet, and could conceivably be built upon it. But the Ratings server is not Information, as Usenet is, it is Information about Information. Anyone can post an arbitrary message to the Ratings server that refers to Information somewhere else in Cyberspace. It is in a sense a Rating of that Information. The Information could be *anything* -- a mailing list, a person, a particular Usenet posting, an FTP site. But postings on the Ratings server can be perused by anyone, and anyone can contribute Ratings to the server or indicate their own opinion on the existing Ratings. Different mechanisms exist such that some Ratings are `local' and some are updated globally. The fantastic possibilities of this system are evident upon some reflection and consideration. We could establish arbitrary new groups that have *formal* requirements that are matched by Ratings servers. For example, we could require that new sites that enter the Internet be `trusted' by an existing site. We could require that membership in certain groups requires a certain amount of collateral peer approval, with automatic suspension or expulsion as the consequences for violating it! We could have *meaningful* polls on arbitrary issues. We could have news servers that automatically sort and archive articles according to their passing certain Ratings thresholds. We could restrict the influence of troublemakers! These are all examples of strengthening and formalizing the informal social orders that are, in my opinion, today just barely holding the Internet together. With a Ratings system, I think the civility of the Internet would increase to a fantastic degree. In short, we could have our *own* cyberspatial government! Note that there is no centralized authority or unfair influence in this system, unless people corrupt their servers. When everyone who has joined a group *individually* decides to screen their postings of messages that fail to meet a certain `quality' or posters who have a certain `reputation', that is not Orwellian Censorship but the beautiful Internet freedom and right of Bozo Filtering. When everyone who joins a group *agrees* to a charter that may bar troublemakers based on Ratings, no one can claim they are being unfairly oppressed. Other extremely interesting implementation issues in the use of the Ratings servers can be addressed in detail. For example, the use of cryptographic protocols to ensure the integrity of voting or privacy of certain entries will certainly prove invaluable and even critical to their development. The optimal protocols for the localization or distribution of votes will surely be subject to extremely fascinating and fruitful research. In my view the concept of a Ratings server is wide open territory and holds some immensely promising potential in finally, valiantly slaying the dreaded, ugly, vicious Signal to Noise Monsters harassing, terrorizing, and torturing us everywhere on the Internet, to be replaced with Shining Castles. I urge anyone interested in developing `civilized systems for cyberspace' to subscribe to a new group I have helped start with J.Helgingius (owner of the popular and revolutionary anon.penet.fi anonymous server) called the Cypherwonks, dedicated to openness, honesty, and cooperation on the Internet, and building sophisticated new systems to promote social harmony in Future Cyberspace. We are particularly fascinated with the possibilities of `Electronic Democracy'. (Send a message to `MajorDomo(a)lists.eunet.fi' with the body the commands `info' or `subscribe cypherwonks'.) I fervently hope that the glorifications and manipulations of Internet Anarchy by mouth-frothing libertarian extremists, Cryptoanarchists, and sympathizers can be adequately controlled and minimized in the future, and some harmonious systems and effective countermeasures along the lines of the Rating server can be established by visionaries and tinkerers, but in any case, for the sake of humanity's integrity, sanity, and well-being, I pray that Future Cyberspace is far less Anarchic than the Current Internet. ------------------------------

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Re: Remailer ideas (Was: Re: Latency vs. Reordering)
by anonymous＠hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Dixon writes: >Commercial remailers would probably be very concerned with legal >issues, both criminal (pornography, etc) and non-criminal (copyright >violations). Those commercial remailers probably will be located around the world, so pornography could be send by using an "offshore" [=non-american] remailer as last link in the chain. The jurisdiction where this remailer could be located, preferably shouldn't care about pornografy. [Holland, Scandinavia ?] >-- >Jim Dixon

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Remailer message bundling
by tk＠ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If each remailer encrypts outgoing traffic with its (immediate) recipient forwarder's public key, then several outgoing messages headed in the same direction can be bundled together, obfuscating further the message identities. No need to have 1 message in ==> 1 message out, with or without delay, reordering, or whatever. But maybe everyone already thought of this.

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