December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

S.Boxx v. L.Detweiler
by cman＠IO.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'd like to mention for the record that I don't give a pair of dingo's kidneys whether S.Boxx and L.Detweiler are the same person. Whether they are, or not, it makes no difference. I'm sure in the twisty little passages (all different) that are LD's brain, he could easily have some justification for posting as S.Boxx. Or not. What's important to me is that I have associated with both a remarkably similar reputation, such that both entities have a substantially larger than ordinary burden to overcome to convince me of anything; if either said it was raining, I would pack an umbrella *and* sunscreen. This is how a sane person deals with the current sorry state of authentication on the net, possibly accompanied by actual work participating in research and coding to remedy this sorry state. -- ---------------- /\ Douglas Barnes cman(a)illuminati.io.com / \ Chief Wizard (512) 448-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v) / () \ Illuminati Online metaverse.io.com 7777 /______\

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True Name keys
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu" "L. Detweiler" complains: ><sigh> nobody is interested in preventing pseudospoofing here. the >people who have most maneuvered themselves into a position to aid >future cyberspace are instead constraining it. that's the point, isn't >it? gosh, how could I have been so blind... Not true at all. I proposed a more secure method, signing of keys by trusted certifiers, and JMDiehl said he'd look into implementing it. Warlord said that he didn't like the idea of having a separate network of keyservers for True Names, but that keys could be certified as True Name keys. Nobody said that they opposed the idea of True Name keys. Such certifications, especially if from multiple parties, would be much more secure than a network of keyservers. Remember that these exchange keys, and if you could hack one, you could put a phony key into the loop. JMDiehl: your service would be more widely trusted, and potentially profitable, if you bought a copy of ViaCrypt PGP for legality and charged a small fee for your services. If there is money and your reputation at stake, people will assume you are going to be more careful in checking keys, and they will trust your service more. You don't want any kind of automation; you want to verify each one before signing it. Warlord: Is there any way to clean out old keys from the keyservers? How about keeping track of when a key was uploaded, and killing them after a year or so. If a person wants to keep a key active, he can mail it to the keyserver again before the year runs out. The keyservers are full of old, dead, and revoked keys, and the number will continue to grow as more people use PGP. Present keys could be killed a year from now, or whenever. Detweiler: why don't you do it? You could advance your crusade and make some money in the process. Start a service to certify keys. If a key were certified by several services, you could be pretty sure of its authenticity. Everyone: is it possible to translate RIPEM keys into PGP keys? Can the signature be kept intact? Is it possible to use Mac signer keys for encryption as well as signing? Doesn't it seem just a bit political that the Mac system has RSA for signatures and a symmetric cryptosystem, but no public-key encryption? Maybe something could be done about this, but I don't have a Mac to try it. --- MikeIngle(a)delphi.com

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Re: Should we oppose the Data Superhighway/NII?
by habs＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The FCC can already regulate what is on any broadcast medium that is FCC regulated, (Tobacco Ads, for example). The ONLY way, IMHO, to have a national data highway (not regulated and thus censored by the FCC) is to have it operated by the post office. Since I don't want the government opperating any data network I feel the result will be freedom of "broadcast" IS DEAD. E.g., I can send Tim live porno from my home, but as soon as I make it available on a point to multi-point basis, the FCC steps in.... -- Harry S. Hawk - Extropian habs(a)extropy.org In Service to Extropians since 1991

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INTEREST? True Nyms
by jamie＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Extropians, Aside from the flamebait puke of the COLORADO CRAZIE, the cypherpunks list doesn't seem to be an optimum forum for dicussion of false names, true nyms, multiple personality entropy, blah blah. Yet, I find it a fascinating topic. Anyone here interested? [pointer --> extropians-request(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu] My apologies to subscribers of both the Extropian and Cypherpunk lists who received this message twice. -- ................................ Jamie Dinkelacker Palo Alto CA Jamie(a)netcom.com 415.941.4782 ................................

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CIA Admits Timothy C. May Son of Sam! Pix at eleven!
by Clark Reynard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[ASCII crap straight from Fidonet deleted.] [Obligatory obscenity deleted, as I have not the time to flame this moron.] [Obligatory crypto reference: I hear the CIA has new cybernetic cryptography hardware; they're experimenting with cyborging, and evidently they stole this poor fool's brain; for obvious reasons, the experiment failed and we can conclude the existence of a vast CIA coverup by the total lack of public denials of the conspiracy. Another telling point is that there is absolutely no evidence of a conspiracy, which attests to the great skill with which they covered it up. In addition, Timothy C. May, if his middle name is in fact Cornelius, despite his lack of trying to hide this obvious clue; is obviously at the helm of the conspiracy to present himself as a countercultural figure, when in fact the letters of his name, when added in strict numerical order and with vast compilations of material only known to the devout studier of Sumerian metaphysics; in fact equals the hideous number 93985676! 93985676, as any fool knows, is the Number of the Beast when read as Hittite cuneiform writing! Obviously, as someone of my great knowledge can tell at a glance, Timothy May, the CIA and the so-called "cypherpunks," now revealed to be, in actuality Satanpunks, devoted to the overthrow of Mom, Apple Pie, and Everything Decent. May they burn in everlasting Hell for their blasphemous, devious, internetworked conspiracy of hatred, and may they pay for their perfidy in multilevelled torture chambers filled with mud, stinging acid and vipers! Now you'll pardon me. I must go. I hear a knock at the door, and it could be the dreaded Eric Hughes himself, who is STEALING MY THOUGHTS with MICROWAVES!] ---- Robert W. F. Clark PGP Key Available Upon Request rclark(a)nyx.cs.du.edu clark(a)metal.psu.edu

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S. Boxx == L. Detwiler
by paul＠poboy.b17c.ingr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- It should be evident; at least I'm convinced. The recent discussion on programs to automatically search for similarities in texts of different authors led me to think back on the collected works of Detwiler and Boxx. This is not sufficient evidence to stand up in court (or in the RISKS Digest), but I offer it for your consideration. There are some unique and characteristic signatures in material from both authors: - writing style: frequency of use of $10 words excessive use of modifiers excessive use of parenthetical phrases - lack of periods between initials and names (e.g. "T.C.May") - consistent use of initials instead of names (see above; no other entity on this list that I recall does so.) - ADJECTIVES and ADVERBS are capitalized for emphasis So, L.Detwiler: are you the snake, or just a tentacle? Of course, maybe S. Boxx is just Eric pretending to be Tim, who is pretending to be you. Or, maybe it's those damn Libertarian Nazi abortionists. I don't know. Wishing the coffee house had a bouncer, - -Paul - -- Paul Robichaux, KD4JZG | Caution: cutting edge is sharp. Avoid contact. Intergraph Federal Systems | Be a cryptography user - ask me how. ** Of course I don't speak for Intergraph. ** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLOeQtyA78To+806NAQE54wQAo3GRAhtt8Ls9lr5U1KHfrw2+by7DziEQ XtcQb2edMnMuwkiY37sz2DrLO2dRX0+SCx7AJv/V5gOoV1c8UlUE1fDhwp5g6pKK +mCmXR+TrbgxDzD+QZ5INiFV4n1oSvmFGi5+/hKOnhyDyl6gH/w2RTxpX2rkRn4z idR028mIKZs= =jldp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Destroying data
by nfe＠scf.nmsu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Philippe D. Nave, Jr. writes: >Thermite grenades are pretty simple; ... NOT! Anyone really wanting to try this should hang out on rec.pyrotechnics for awhile, but for the truely foolhardy here are some tips and thoughts: 1) Thermite is extreamly hard to ignite, so requires an igniter. Most home made igniters are extreamly unstable (do you really want the thing off accidently (bump it, static charge, RF energy, etc)? 2) 50:50 mix of AL and iron oxide will probably work, but best to look up a really ballenced % for the best mix. btw: was that by volume or weight?, there is a slight difference :) 3) in general, the finer the powder, the better. ball mill it if you can. 4) iron oxide has this strainge tendency to hold magnetic charges, do you REALLY want that near your HD? 5) for best results, the thermite charge should achive a completly molten state before the slag begins it's decent to the target, otherwise it waste's part of it's payload. The best homebrew way to do this is by making a cylinder of firebrick dust (hard or soft) and high temp epoxy (ceramics are also good), with a quarter sixe hole in the bottom. umm that's like a cylinder with one end cap'd, maybe 4-8" on diameter. cover the hole in the bottom with a thick piece of sheet metal, or copper, or something. Attach some sticks, or rebar, etc to form legs and offset about 1.5 to 3 inches for better penetration. (probably not necessary for electronic equipment) 6) on loading - best done near where you want to use it - alot of moving/ shaking will tend to make the heavier iron oxide settle to the bottom and you won't get as good of a burn. 7) don't tamp it! - it needs that O2 between the flakes of powder. Now that you all know more than you really wanted to about thermite, does anyone know of a good recipe for a magnetic bomb? - you know, something with abit of oomph! ? -n

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mailing software
by walter kehowski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks, Could someone send to me a list of software that expedites the processing of large amounts of e-mail? I'm on a next computer now and the browser, sorting, and mailboxes are very convenient. I won't always be using the next, though, and I'd like to start learning what the options are. Thanks, Walter A. Kehowski <wak(a)next0.math.pitt.edu>

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"Root Canal" questions
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <00541.2835966052.614(a)washofc.cpsr.org> dsobel(a)washofc.cpsr.org writes: > "Root Canal" questions > BTW, anyone have ideas about that name!? Having just been through this procedure (UK National Health, $70), I can tell you - It's all about *Deep Drilling*. Presumably for data, in this case. And it hurts. G -- Personal mail to gtoal(a)gtoal.com (I read it in the evenings) Business mail to gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Be careful with the spelling!) Faxes to An Teallach Limited: +44 31 662 4678 Voice: +44 31 668 1550 x212

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DC-Nets
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim McCoy has asked me about the DC-Nets references I have cited. Here they are. The seminal Chaum articles are not cited--the main one has been posted to this List more than once. Clearly the Eurocrypt '89 book is the one to get. If your library does not carry it, Springer-Verlag (1-800-SPRINGE) can ship it (and please don't write to me asking for the ISBN!). Also, "Computer Literacy Bookstore" in Sunnyvale (408 area code) usually has a bunch of these Proceedings in various years and can also ship. Disruption is the main problem addressed in these papers. Given the malicious disruption we've seen on our List lately, it is of course a very real problem. Even more so if and when DC-Nets get deployed and some agents/entities seek to automate the disruption process (a likely prospect, given the way they work). A reminder to you all, even though I am not myself working on DC-Nets (trying to program them in Mathematica is pointless, I think), that there are several groups currently interested in DC-Nets: * Jim McCoy and the Austing group (I think they run the DC-Net mailing list...I'm on too many mailing lists, so I skipped this one) * Henry Strickland (Strick) is interested, has plans, and is putting together his crypto toolkit in TCL. * Yanek Martinson, of whom little has been hear lately, was once hot on doing this, and even got a basic DC-Net running. Anyway, here are some important references: - J. N. E. Bos and H den Boer, "Detecting Disrupters in the DC Protocol," Eurocrypt '89, pp. 320327. - M. Waidner and B. Pfitzmann. "The Dining Cryptographers in the Disco," Eurocrypt '89, p. 690. - A. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner, "Networks without User Observability," Computers and Security 6 (No 2, April 1987), pp. 158-166. - B. Pfitzmann and A. Pfitzmann, "How to Break the Direct RSA-Implementation of Mixes," Eurocrypt '89, pp. 373-381. (In case you're curious, the Pfitzmanns are husband and wife.) - J. N. E. Bos, "Disruption and Synchronization in Untraceable Sending," in "Practical Privacy," the 1992 Ph.D. thesis of Bos. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (Netherlands). (This little book is not published, in purchasable form. The relevant chapter was included in the Xeroxed handout at the first Cypherpunks meeting. You might be able to get the book by contacting Eindhoven directly.) --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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