December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Digicash address?
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone send me contact information for David Chaum's Digicash company? An email address would be great... Thanks in advance, Adam

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Re: Digital Telephony bill, August 1 draft (fwd)
by Arsen Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 4 Aug 1994 21:17:35 -0400 (EDT) From: Sal Denaro <sal(a)panix.com> To: Arsen Ray Arachelian <rarachel(a)prism.poly.edu> Subject: Re: Digital Telephony bill, August 1 draft (fwd) >From panix!MathWorks.Com!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!library.ucla.edu!agate!headwall.Stanford.EDU!cindy.stanford.edu!user Thu Aug 4 21:03:35 1994 Path: panix!MathWorks.Com!europa.eng.gtefsd.com!library.ucla.edu!agate!headwall.Stanford.EDU!cindy.stanford.edu!user From: rogo(a)forsythe.stanford.edu (Mark Rogowsky) Newsgroups: comp.sys.intel,comp.sys.powerpc Subject: Re: IBM Power-PC future In article <issa.775452041@cwis>, issa(a)cwis.unomaha.edu (Issa El-Hazin) wrote: > * OS/2 and NT. > Microsoft's Windows NT will probably become the OS of choice > for the IBM PPS's and the Intel PCI local-bus will be the only > bus offered with IBM's new machines. Now wasn't a main idea with > the new architecture is to compete/get ride of the MS/Intel > dominance so IBM/Apple can start making a good buck again! OS/2 > for the PowerPC (previously known as WorkPlace OS) keeps on getting > delayed and when it's finally released, I don't think it will compete > with Windows NT 3.5. Beside being a very robust OS, NT is also > available for Intel, MIPS, DECs, and other workstations and its' > been out for a while. Your chip-mania is lunacy... Let's try a new lens... Q2,'95, PPC 604 in machines, chip costs around $400 at 100MHz. Q4,'95 P6 in machines, chip costs around $1100 at 133MHz. PPC 604 matches P6 performance (or betters it) with 133MHz and 150MHz versions. 100MHz version is $250. Developers routinely recompiled Win32 apps for PPC. PPC 620 shipping in quantity. Initial price, $999. AMD K5 variants and Cyrix M1 variants begin really annoying Intel by matching all P5 performance points with lower prices. The ensuing price war begins chopping away something from Intel's gargantuan profits. Q1,'96 P6 machines now available in quantity. Few willing to pay the high price. Really fast P5s keep those not looking for change quite happy. Some, looking for price/performance, begin thinking about PPC machines. Q2,'96 PPC620 machines ship. Faster 604s, P5s, P6s, abound. Nothing can touch 620 in the PC marketplace. Machines expensive. PPC604 chip price now at about $150. P6 at about $750. Q4,'96 Word of the PowerPC 800 series just swept Comdex (IBM and Moto did a big show on the new series). Systems should begin appearing in 12-18 months. Intel cloners becoming really annoying. IBM, making money selling PPC systems, also has figured out what Intel already knows: you can make more money selling whole logic boards to PC cloners rather than just chips. Using Cyrix technology, they are cutting deeper into the P5-class x86 business. Intel/HP briefing ignored. Who cares about a chip coming out in two years? Gateway and Dell merge but keep identities separate. HP again considers buying Apple. Q2,'97 Intel fights back with much cheaper P6s and much faster ones. First PPC 800 series silicon is becoming available. Q4,'97 PPC running 800 SPECint. Q2,'98 Intel/HP first silicon using VLIW technology. Compatible with existing x86 binaries. Intel encouraging ISVs to write to the "native mode" of the new chips, though. That was fun.... IBM's PPCs will have preemption, threads, telephony, video, etc. (as soon as they ship). Macs will have threads, telephony, video, etc. (as soon as 7.5 ships). I don't think lack of preemption will kill, or even severely wound, Apple's efforts to keep -- and perhaps increase -- its market share. Also, that PnP stuff and multimedia will still be better on Macs (because they've always been plug and play and because QuickTime is really going to win the race over Video for Windows -- call Bell Atlantic if you disagree). *** should have been posted to alt.prose :> sal(a)panix.com Yes, I use PGP. Salvatore Denaro Live fast, Die young, Hack C++ My heart is broke/but I have some glue Sex, Drugs and Cryptography. Help me inhale/and mend it with you

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No Subject
by an118＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw an interesting post in sci.crypt last week about a particular cypher. I think it ws called "The Penknife Cypher" or something along those lines. I guess I have been so PGP oriented that i've sort of stuck my head in the sand and ignored other possibilities regarding encryption. ARE there any other good cypher's out there, suitable for e-mail usage? And more importantly, are they readily available, likely through ftp from some European source. I guess it doesn't matter how popular they are, but how secure they are. I'd be interested in a strong one for usage between a couple of friends and myself. The keys could be spread via PGP and then I suppose we could start using the cypher. Any ideas? Or is my best bet to pickup Schneir's Applied Cryptography and use an algorithim from that? -------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)vox.hacktic.nl Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)vox.hacktic.nl Direct replies to the sender of this message are -not- anonymised <YuK>

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TOMMY THE TOURIST IS COMPROMISED DON'T USE IT
by Tommy the Tourist 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tommy the Tourist is compromised, it is possible to trace who sent the message from the anonymous remiler called "Tommy the Tourist" Anonymity cannot be assured, please direct anonymous traffic through other anonymous remailers. ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 8 lines: :: Response-Key: the-clipper-key ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```%Q^&2?(E<U9BPG1]W7L'=6KH_SN(JMX.Q@RG7^7D(SA%FB(8Q2K4A!M M*VFU=N2XN6?V.C4S.N7*XRQ"*_P0<S5^+Z$37-UG%HN:!,.D5QTC_#9^S][: '.U5H*[Z8-P`` ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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SSN Quandary (was: CreditCard info)
by Garth Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- | From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell(a)netcom.com> | | I'm sure that you are correct. I talked just this past Friday to | David Banistar at EPIC/CPSR on this. But the law seems to | be mostly ignored, as is the fact that SSN's are not unique. | | The key is, what do we do about it? I routinely refuse to give my SSN to agencies that have no government affiliation. I've been hassled for this stance, and frequently refused service/credit. My phone company demanded an exorbitant deposit because I wouldn't give them my SSN when signing for service. I am greatly disturbed by the amount of personal information currently available on an individual, and accessible with keys as simple as SSN, full name, and mother's maiden name. I, however, have no clue what to do other than continue to refuse to supply data whenever possible. garthB> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Garth S. Brown, Semaphore Corporation 122 South Jackson Street, Suite 350 garthb(a)semaphore.com Seattle, Washington 98104 InterNIC WHOIS: GB(31) -Public key available via finger of garthb(a)semaphore.com -PGP2.6 Key fingerprint = 65 0E 48 A1 F7 38 DB 03 3F 77 77 9E B5 53 2E 96 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ All problems can be solved with the proper application of high explosives.

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Looking for info on PGP enabling mail apps. . . .
by Garth Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i'm looking for info on enabling automatic PGP signing of mail messages from PINE and ELM. Perhaps i'm babbling about something in a FAQ i missed, in which case i'll filter flames to /dev/null. =) thanks garthB> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Garth S. Brown, Semaphore Corporation 122 South Jackson Street, Suite 350 garthb(a)semaphore.com Seattle, Washington 98104 InterNIC WHOIS: GB(31) -Public key available via finger of garthb(a)semaphore.com -PGP2.6 Key fingerprint = 65 0E 48 A1 F7 38 DB 03 3F 77 77 9E B5 53 2E 96 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ All problems can be solved with the proper application of high explosives.

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Anonymous Transport Agents (Was: Latency vs. Reordering)
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes) writes: > Simulating any of the salient features of a link encryptor over the > Internet is an interesting exercise, particularly in regard to price > negotiation with your service provider. I'm about to branch into the limits of my knowledge on this particular topic: I run a DOS site under a heavily modified version of Waffle (1.65 base), so the Unix-ish transport mechanisms are a tad out of my realm of knowledge. With that in mind... Suppose an encryption-savvy mail transport agent, say ESMTP, was developed. Further suppose that part of handshaking protocol for this transport protocol included an ENCRYPTED reverse lookup on IP identities to check that the message is actually coming from where it claims it's coming from. Suppose again that the results of this lookup were only checked for correctness (boolean), and then discarded WITHOUT LOGGING, or at least with minimal logging. If the reverse lookup was TRUE (IE: the sending machine was who it said it was), the message was accepted. If it failed, the message would be accepted, and then sent to the bit bucket. In this model, one could provide anonymous transportation of anonymous mail FOR EVERY MACHINE ON INTERNET providing that the original message wasn't forged. All that would be required (beyond running ESMTP) is an encrypted version of the return address (a la Soda remailer) to be placed some predetermined place in the message. This seems too easy: What am I missing? Have I actually come up with a way to do this? --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: Problem in draft FIPS `CRYPTOGRAPHIC SERVICE CALLS'
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It appears to be an attempt to formalize the interface to the Tessera card. The file cryptcal.txt can be found on csrc.ncsl.nist.gov

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RE: CreditCard info
by sidney＠taurus.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[various people speculated about legality of a company requiring your SSN] There's a Social Security Number FAQ posted regularly on alt.privacy, and also available from the usual usenet FAQ sites. It says that government agencies in the U.S. have restrictions regarding asking for and using your SSN, but private sector organizations do not. There's a lot more detail, but I don't need to repeat it here. -- sidney <sidney(a)apple.com>

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Re: Improved remailer reordering
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408072325.AA18643(a)ah.com> Eric Hughes writes: > Imagine a RemailerNet (v0.2) that maintained a fixed level of > traffic between gateways. > > This is exactly what I was talking about when I posted earlier about > link encryptors, and effective collapse of nodes for traffic analysis > purposes. Traffic analysis of mixes and remailers assumes, as an > abstraction, that all the messages going into and coming out of a > particular node are visible. As soon as you remove this condition, > the analytical situation changes completely. There is little difference between RemailNet v0.1 and v0.2 in this regard. Fragmenting messages into packets of fixed length, randomizing routing, and noise injection were all present in v0.1. > The problem with implementation of link encryption is, like everything > else, cost. Link encryption off the Internet requires dedicated > lines. I think that there is some confusion here. Time is defined in terms of steps, each one of which represents the dispatch of one packet. The packets can be received and dispatched in batches. > In general, the messages do not exist > as wholes along the lines connecting the gateways, so a discussion of > their reordering is a good way to waste time. > > You still have to worry about reordering in the network as a whole. > The system you've described has reassembly done at the endpoints, who > might not be the final receiver. I pass over the flaw of lack of > message quantization in the final sending of reassembled messages. > We may assume for discussion that they're all the same length. You need not pass over the 'flaw of lack of message quantization in the final sending'. Someone running a private high security gateway, an "empowered user", participates in the same way as the other RemailerNet gateways, and there is in fact no way to determine even whether he is sending or receiving, or in fact whether he is doing anything at all. He may be just sending and receiving noise packets. Users accessing the net using low security versions of the software do have less security, but that is a consequence of their use of low security software. > Now, you still need to calculate the likelihood that a particular > outgoing message is the same message as a particular incoming message. > These probabilities have to do with message reordering. You still > need to do the calculation. Some of the discussion here is at cross purposes. My focus has been on specifying a system which is itself very difficult to attack using cryptoanalytic techniques. An "empowered" user of RemailerNet v0.2 who sends messages via a system which acts as a gateway need not worry very much about traffic analysis. A user whose access to RemailerNet is via a low security system will be exposed to a higher level of risk. Which factors are the most important element in causing risk depend upon the nature of the traffic through the system and the size and geographic distribution of the network itself. A functioning RemailerNet with widely distributed gateways and at least a moderate level of traffic from at least a moderate number of widely distributed users is not easily subjected to what I might call external traffic analysis. Essentially, you make a model of the system which removes many of the features that defeat traffic analysis and then say, hey, this thing is easily subject to traffic analysis. Well, if you go far enough, sure. -- Jim Dixon

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